





THE  
RELIGION  
OF  
NATURE













Raymond D. Havens

4 February 1935

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W863

1724

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RAYMOND DEXTER HAVENS



"David Webb" on last sheet

262

see Leslie Stephen Hist Eng Thought 18<sup>cent</sup>

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iii. 38-42, ix. 9-11

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Nicholls Illustrations i. 199

By William Wollaston

1031 [Wollaston (William)] The Religion of Nature Delineated. 4to, sound  
contemporary calf 7/6 London, S. Palmer, 1725

\* Only a few copies of the first edition of this book were privately printed in 1722.  
Benjamin Franklin was employed as a compositor by Samuel Parker and undoubtedly  
assisted in the printing of this book. In fact some of the arguments in the book not  
appearing to Franklin as being well proved, he wrote a reply to some passages in a small  
treatise "Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity; Pleasure and Pain."



written on the back

[Russellston, William]




THE  
RELIGION  
OF  
NATURE  
DELINEATED.

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Ἐνιοὶ φεύγοντες τὴν Δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπέπλουν εἰς Ἀθεότητα τραχείαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑψηπιδήσαντες Ἐν Μέρῳ καμένην τὴν Εὐσέβειαν. Plut.

Χαίρειν ἔν ἐάσας τὰς Τιμὰς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν Ἀληθείαν σκοπῶν, περᾶσθαι τῷ ὄντι ὡς ἀν δύνωμαι βέλτερον ὢν καὶ ζῆν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἀποδῆσκω, ἀποδῆσκην. Plato.

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L O N D O N :


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THE  
RELIGION  
OF  
THE FUTURE  
DEFINED.

THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE, AS  
DEFINED BY THE LATE  
MR. J. C. H. ...



LONDON:  
Printed by ...  
...  
...  
...



216  
W 863  
1724



# Advertisement.



Few copies of this book, tho not originally intended to be published, were printed off in the year 1722. but, it being transcribed for the press ha<sup>st</sup>ly, and corrected under great disadvantages, many errata and mistakes got into it, which could not all be presently observed. With a great part of them

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## Advertisment.

therefore still remaining four or five of the copies were afterwards given away; and some more, taken from the printing-house, passed through hands unknown to the author, and he supposes were sold privately. There has, beside, been some talk of a piratical design upon it: and if that should take effect, both it and he might suffer extremely. For these reasons he has thought fit to reprint it himself, more correctly, with some small alterations (in things not essential to the main design) and some additions. Tho he cannot but be apprehensive, that still there may be many things, which have escaped his eye, or his attention.



The





## *The Religion of Nature delineated.*

To *A. F. Esq;*



WAS much surprised, *SIR*, when (some time ago) you so importunately desired *my thoughts* upon these questions,

I. *Is there really any such thing as natural religion, properly and truly so called?*

II. *If there is, what is it?*

III. *How may a man qualify himself, so as to be able to judge, for himself, of the other religions profest in the world; to settle his own opinions in disputable matters; and then to enjoy tranquillity of mind, neither disturbing others, nor being disturbed at what passes among them?*

With what view you did this; whether in expectation of some little degree of satisfaction; or merely to try my abilities; or (which I rather think) out of kindness



ness to amuse me at a time, when I wanted something to divert melancholy reflexions, I shall not venture to guess. I shall only say, that could I have foreseen in due time, that such a task was to be imposed upon me, I might have been better prepared for it. I might have marked what was suitable to my purpose in those books, which I have read, but shall scarce ever return to read any more: many more I might have read too, which, not wanting them for my own conviction, I have neglected, and now have neither leisure nor patience to peruse: I might have noted what the various occurrences and cases, that happen in life, suggested: and, in general, I might have placed more of my time on such parts of learning, as would have been directly serviceable to me on the present occasion.

However, as I have not spent my days without *thinking* and reflecting seriously within my self upon the articles and duties of *natural religion*, and they are *my thoughts* which you require, I have attempted, by recollecting old meditations, and consulting a few scatterd papers, in which I had formerly for my own use set down some of them (briefly, and almost solecistically), to give an answer to the *two first* of your questions, *together*: tho I must own, not without trouble in adjusting and compacting loose sentiments, filling up vacuities, and bringing the *chaos* into the shape of something like a system.

Notwithstanding what I have said, in a treatise of *natural religion*, a subject so beaten and exhausted in all its parts, by all degrees of writers, in which so many notions will inevitably occur that are no one's property, and so many things require to be proved, which can scarce be proved by any other but the old arguments (or not so well), you must not expect to find *much* that is new. Yet *something* perhaps you may. That, which is advanced in the following papers, concerning the nature of *moral good and evil*, and is the prevailing thought that runs through them all, I never met with any where. And even as to those matters, in which I have been prevented by others, and which perhaps may be common, you have them, not as I took them from any body, but as they used to appear to me in my walks and solitudes. So that they are indeed *my thoughts*, such as have been *long mine*, which I send you; without any regard to what others have, or have not said: as I persuade my self you will easily perceive. It is not hard to discern, whether a work of this kind be all of a piece; and to distinguish the genuine hand of an author from the false wares and patch-work of a plagiary. Tho after all, it would be madness in a man to go out of his right way, only because it has been frequented by others, or perhaps is the high road.

Sensible how unfinished this performance is, I call it only a *Delineation*, or rude draught. Where I am defective, or trip, I hope you will excuse a friend, who has  
now



## 7

S E C T. I. *Of Moral Good and Evil.*

3

stinguish;



stinguish, cannot choose: and that, which has not the opportunity, or liberty of choosing for itself, and acting accordingly, from an internal principle, acts, if it acts at all, under a necessity incumbent *ab extra*. But that, which acts thus, is in reality only an *instrument* in the hand of something which imposes the necessity; and cannot properly be said to *act*, but to be *acted*. The act must be the act of an agent: therefore not of his instrument.

A being under the above mentioned inabilities is, as to the morality of its acts, in the state of inert and passive matter, and can be but a *machine*: to which no language or philosophy ever ascribed *ἦσεν* or *mores*.

II. *Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the conformity of those words or signs, by which things are express'd, to the things themselves, Defin.*

III. *A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition.* It is certain there is a meaning in many acts and gestures. Every body understands weeping, laughing, shrugs, frowns, &c. these are a sort of universal language. Applications are many times made, and a kind of dialogue maintain'd only by casts of the eye and motions of the adjacent muscles<sup>b</sup>. And we read of feet, that *speak*; of a philosopher, who *answer'd* an argument by only getting up and walking<sup>c</sup>; and of one, who pretended to *express* the same sentence as many ways by gesticulation, as even *Cicero* himself could by all his *copia* of words and eloquence<sup>e</sup>. But these instances do not come up to my meaning. There are many acts of other kinds, such as constitute the character of a man's conduct in life, which have in nature, and would be taken by any indifferent judge to have a signification, and to imply some proposition, as plainly to be understood as if it was declared in words: and therefore if what such acts declare to be, is not, they must *contradict truth*, as much as any false proposition or assertion can.

If a body of soldiers, seeing another body approach, should fire upon them, would not this action declare that they were enemies; and if they were *not* enemies, would not this military language declare what was *false*? No, perhaps it may be said; this can only be called a mistake, like that which happen'd to the *Athenians* in the

<sup>a</sup> *Lacryma pmdera vocis habent.* Ov. <sup>b</sup> *Oculi, supercilia, frons, vultus denique totus, qui sermo quidam tacitus mentis est &c.* Cic. *Nutu signisque loquuntur.* Ov. *Est actio quasi sermo corporis.* Cic. & sim. pass. <sup>c</sup> מוֹלֵל בְּרַגְלֵיוֹ. Prov. <sup>d</sup> Τὸν κατὰ τὴν κινήσεως λόγον σιωπῶν, ὡς ἐμπόρῳ. Sext. Emp. So *Monedemus* reproved luxury by eating only olives. *Diog. L.* And others are mentioned by *Plutarch*, who did ἀνδρὶ φρονῆς ἀδελφείῳ φράζεω. <sup>e</sup> *Macrob.*



attack of *Epipolæ*<sup>a</sup>, or to the *Carthaginians* in their last incampment against *Agathocles* in *Africa*<sup>b</sup>. Suppose then, instead of this firing, some officer to have said they were enemies, when indeed they were friends: would not that sentence affirming them to be enemies be false, notwithstanding he who spoke it was mistaken? The truth or falsehood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer's knowledge or ignorance: because there is a certain sense affixt to the words, which must either agree or disagree to that, concerning which the affirmation is made. The case is the very same still, if into the place of words be substituted actions. The salute here was in nature the salute of an enemy, but should have been the salute of a friend: therefore it implied a falsity. Any spectator would have understood this action as I do; for a declaration, that the other were enemies. Now what is to be understood, has a meaning: and what has a meaning, may be either true or false: which is as much as can be said of any verbal sentence.

When *Popilius Lenas* solicited to have *Cicero* proscribed, and that he might find him out and be his executioner<sup>c</sup>, would not his carriage have sufficiently signified to any one, who was ignorant of the case, that *Tully* either was some very bad man, and deserved capital punishment; or had some way grievously injured this man; or at least had not saved his life, nor had as much reason to expect his service and good offices upon occasion, as he ever had to expect *Tully's*? And all these things being false, were not his behaviour and actions expressive of that which was false, or contradictions to truth? It is certain he acted as if those things had been true, which were not true, and as if those had not been true which were true (in this consisted the fault of his ingratitude): and if he in words had said they were true or not true, he had done no more than talk as if they were so: why then should not to act as if they were true or not true, when they were otherwise, contradict truth as much as to say they were so, when they were not so<sup>d</sup>?

A pertinacious objector may perhaps still say, it is the business of soldiers to defend themselves and their country from enemies, and to annoy them as opportunity permits; and self-preservation requires all men not only barely to defend themselves against aggressors, but many times also to prosecute such, and only such, as are wicked and dangerous: therefore it is natural to conclude, that they are enemies against whom we see soldiers defending themselves, and those men wicked and dangerous, whom we see prosecuted with zeal and ardor. Not that those acts of defending and prosecuting speak or signify so much: but conjectures are raised upon the com-

<sup>a</sup> Where we find φίλος τε φίλοις, καὶ πολίτας πολίταις ἐς χεῖρας ἀπὸ φίλοις ἐλθόντας. *Thucyd.*

οἰκίαις ὡς πολέμους ἠμύνοντο. *Diod. S.*

<sup>c</sup> *Val. Max.*

<sup>d</sup> Ἀνθρώποις ἐκ ἑχθρῶν ποτὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἔχουσιν. *Eurip.* Quasi intersit, audiam, an videam. *Cic.*



*mon sense*, which mankind has of such proceedings. *Ans.* If it be *natural* to conclude any thing from them, do they not *naturally* convey the notice of something to be concluded? And what is conveying the *notice* of any thing but *notifying* or signifying that thing? And then again, if this signification is *natural* and founded in the *common* principles and sense of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning which results only from the use of some *particular* place or country, as that of language doth?

If *A* should enter into a compact with *B*, by which he *promises* and engages never to do some certain thing, and after this he does that thing: in this case it must be granted, that his act *interferes* with his promise, and is *contrary* to it. Now it cannot interfere with his promise, but it must also interfere with the truth of that *proposition*, which says there was such a promise made, or that there is such a compact subsisting. If this proposition be true, *A* made such a certain agreement with *B*, it would be denied by this, *A* never made any agreement with *B*. Why? Because the truth of this latter is *inconsistent* with the agreement asserted in the former. The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a denial, is this *inconsistence*. If then the behaviour of *A* be *inconsistent* with the agreement mentioned in the former proposition, that proposition is as much denied by *A's* behaviour, as it can be by the latter, or any other proposition. Or thus, If one proposition imports or contains that which is *contrary* to what is contained in another, it is said to *contradict* this other, and denies the existence of what is contained in it. Just so if one act imports that which is *contrary* to the import of another, it *contradicts* this other, and *denies its existence*. In a word, if *A* by his actions denies the engagements, to which he hath subjected himself, his actions deny them; just as we say, *Ptolemy* by his writings denies the motion of the earth, or his writings deny it<sup>a</sup>.

When the question was asked, *Whose sheep are these?* the answer was, *Ægon's*: for he committed them to my care<sup>b</sup> (he uses and disposes of them as his). By this act *Dametas* understood them to be *his*; and if they had not been his, but *Alphon-das's* or *Melibæus's*, *Ægon*, by an act very intelligible to *Dametas*, had expressed what was not true. What is said here is the stronger, because he, who has the *use* and *disposal* of any thing, has *all* that he can have of it; and *v. v.* he who has the *all* (or property) of any thing, must have all the *use* and *disposal* of it. So that a man cannot more fully proclaim any thing to be *his*, than by *using* it, &c. But of this something more hereafter.

<sup>a</sup> Ἡμεῖς τὸν ἀνέμενον βιβλία Πλάτωνος ἀνείδαμεν φερὲν Πλάτωνα, κλ. *Plut.*

<sup>b</sup> *Virg. & Theocr.*



## Of Moral Good and Evil.

II

In the *Jewish* history we read, that when *Abimelek* saw *Isaac* sporting <sup>a</sup> with *Rebekah*, and taking conjugal liberties<sup>b</sup>, he presently knew her to be *Isaac's* wife; and if she had not been his wife, the case had been as in the preceding instance. If it be objected, that she might have been his mistress or a harlot; I answer, that so she might have been, tho' *Isaac* had told him by words that she was his wife. And it is sufficient for my purpose, and to make acts capable of contradicting truth, if they may be allow'd to express things as plainly and determinately as words can. Certainly *Abimelek* gave greater credit to that information which passed through his eye, than to that which he received by the ear<sup>c</sup>; and to what *Isaac* did, than to what he said. For *Isaac* had told him, that she was not his wife, but his sister<sup>d</sup>.

A certain author<sup>e</sup> writes to this purpose, "If a soldier, who had taken the oath to *Cæsar*, should run over to the enemy, and serve him against *Cæsar*, and after that be taken; would he not be punished as a deserter, and a perjured villain? And if he should plead for himself, that he never denied *Cæsar*; would it not be answer'd, *That with his tongue he did not deny him, but with his actions (or by facts) he did?*" And in another place, "Let us, says he, suppose some tyrant command a Christian to burn incense to *Jupiter*, without adding any thing of a verbal abnegation of *Christ*: if the Christian should do this, would it not be manifest to all, that by that very act he denied him;" (and I may add, consequently denied those propositions which affirm him to be the *Christ*, a teacher of true religion, and the like<sup>f</sup>)?

When a man lives, as if he had the estate which he has not, or was in other regards (all fairly cast up) what he is not, what judgment is to be pass'd upon him? Doth not his whole conduct breath untruth? May we not say (if the propriety of language permits), that he lives a lye?

In common speech we say some actions are insignificant, which would not be sense, if there were not some that are significant, that have a tendency and meaning. And this is as much as can be said of articulate sounds, that they are either significant or insignificant<sup>g</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> משמש משהו. *Rashi*. <sup>b</sup> Only ענין נשוק וחיבוק according to *Alshek*. <sup>c</sup> Ὡτα γὰρ τοῦ χάνει ἀνδράποισιν ἔοντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλμῶν. *Herod.* <sup>d</sup> T' and his guest *Alexander*, in *Arrian*, might be subjoind to this. <sup>e</sup> Εἰ τις αὐτὸς εἶδε φιλοφρονεμένους ἀλλήλους ἀν τῷ λέγοντι ἔκ εἵναι φίλους αὐτὸς. <sup>f</sup> De Dupl. mart. <sup>g</sup> Something like this is that in one of *Greg. Naz.*'s orations. When some Christians, who had been insnared by *Julian*, asked, πῶς Χριστὸν ἠρνήμεθα; they were answer'd, ὅτι κατὰ τὴν πύρην ἐθυμῶν ἀπατεῖ. <sup>h</sup> Τὰ ψευδῆ πρᾶγματα ἐλάττω. *Chrys.* Καὶ σολισμὸς ἀνδρὸς, καὶ γέλως, καὶ βῆμα ποδὸς ἀναγέλλει περὶ αὐτῶν, as *Basil* speaks: and therefore greater things must do it more. <sup>i</sup> As that Βλέπει ἀρ. *Diog. L.* in v. *Zen.*



It may not be improper by the way to observe, that the *significancy* here attributed to mens acts, proceeds not always from nature, but sometimes from custom and agreement among people<sup>a</sup>, as that of words and sounds mostly doth. Acts of the latter kind may in different times and places have different, or even contrary significations. The generality of *Christians*, when they pray, take off their hats: the *Jews*, when they pray<sup>b</sup> or say any of their *Berakoth*, put them on. The same thing which among Christians denotes reverence, imports irreverence among the *Jews*. The reason is, because covering the head with a hat (if it has no influence upon one's health) is in itself an *indifferent* thing, and people by usage or consent may *make* it interpretable either way. Such acts seem to be adopted into their language, and may be reckoned part of it. But acts of the former kind, such as I chiefly here intend, have an *unalterable* signification, and can by no agreement or force ever be made to express the contrary to it. *Aegon's* treating the flock, and disposing of it as if it was his, can by no torture be brought to signify, *that it was not his*. From whence it appears, that *facts* express more strongly, even than *words* themselves<sup>c</sup>; or to contradict any proposition by facts is a fuller and more effectual contradiction, than can possibly be made by words only<sup>d</sup>. *Words* are but *arbitrary signs*<sup>e</sup> of our ideas, or indications of our thoughts (that word, which in one language denotes *poverty*<sup>f</sup>, in another denotes *riches*<sup>g</sup>): but *facts* may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the *thoughts themselves produced into act*; as the very conceptions of the mind brought

<sup>a</sup> Αἰγύπτιοι — τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ἔμπαινον τοῖσι ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐξήσαντο ἡθὰ τε καὶ νόμους, κτλ. Herod.

<sup>b</sup> — המתפלל לא יעמוד בתפלה — בראש מגולה. Maim. & al. pass. <sup>c</sup> Θεὸν ὁμολογῶν εἰδέναι, τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ἀρνεῖται. Epist. ad Tit. And τὸ ἔργοις ἀρνεῖσθαι Θεὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἰπεῖν ἐν στόματι. Chrys.

<sup>d</sup> Λόγῳ ἔργῳ σκιῇ. Plut. Res loquitur ipsa: qua semper valet plurimum. Cic. Quil verba audiam, cum facta videam? Id. Αὐτὰ βῶα τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῇ φωνῇ σιωπᾶς. Bas. <sup>e</sup> This we know. For they are different to different nations; we coin them as we please, &c. Φύσει τῶν ἐνομάτων ἕδον ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν γένηται σύμβολον. Arist. And tho Plato seems to be of another mind, yet when Cratylus says, Ὅνόματ' ὁρδότητα εἶναι ἐκάστω τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν, it is much to be questioned whether any thing more be meant than this, that some names of things are more natural or proper than others. For he says, that this rectitude of names is the same καὶ Ἑλλήσι καὶ βαρβάροις; that it is [ὡς] such as is sufficient δηλοῦν εἶον ἐκάστων ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων; such as may render them κατά

&c. That lepidum et festivum argumentum, which P. Nigidius, &c. makes use of to shew, cur videri possint verba esse naturalia magis quam arbitraria, deserves only to be laughd at.

<sup>f</sup> ריש Hebr. <sup>g</sup> ריש Arab. So Ab. Ezra observes that אברה in Heb. is to will, in Arab. to nill (tho' in Arab. the word is written ابري): and in another place, that the same word even in the same language, sometimes signifies רברו הפכו, a thing and its contrary. And every one knows, that the greater part of our words have different senses and uses. رابغ in Arabic, according to Giggeius and Golius, has 70 or 80, and some (two at least) contrary the one to the other.



forth, and grown to maturity; and therefore as the most natural and express representations of them. And, beside this, they bear certain *respects* to things, which are not arbitrary, but as determinate and immutable as any *ratio's* are in mathematics. For the facts and the things they respect are *just what they are*, as much as any two given quantities are; and therefore the respects interceding between those must be as *fixt*, as the *ratio* is which one of these bears to the other: that is, they must remain the same, and always speak the same language, till things cease to be what they are.

I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, *That whoever acts as if things were so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so*; as plainly as he could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts contradict *those propositions*, which assert them to be as they are<sup>a</sup>.

IV. No act (whether word<sup>b</sup> or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and evil are imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be ■ it is, can be right. For,

1. If that proposition, which is false, be wrong<sup>c</sup>, that act which implies such a proposition, or is founded in it, cannot be right: because it is the very proposition itself in practice.

2. Those propositions, which are true, and express things as they are, express the relation between the subject and the attribute as it is: that is, this is either affirmed or denied of that according to the nature of *that relation*. And further, this relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determin'd and fixt by the natures of the things themselves. Therefore nothing can interfere with any proposition that is true, but it must likewise interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the natures of the things themselves too), and consequently be *unnatural*, or *wrong in nature*. So very much are those gentlemen mistaken, who by following nature mean only complying with their bodily inclinations, tho in opposition to truth, or at least without any regard to it. Truth is but a conformity to nature: and to follow nature cannot be to combat truth<sup>d</sup>.

■ This is ποιεῖν ψεῦδος. Apocal. Plato uses the same way of speaking. Ψεῦδος, says he, μηδεὶς μνησθῆναι — μήτε λόγῳ μήτε ἔργῳ πράξειε. The contrary to this is in Aristotle ἀληθεύειν ὁμοίως ἐν λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν; and ἐν εἰρῇ ἀληθεύειν. And in S. B. לכת באמת, and ררך אמת. <sup>b</sup> Actum generale verbum est, siue verbis siue re quid agatur. Justin. Dig. <sup>c</sup> As it must be, because ὁρῶν ἢ ἀληθεῖ ἀεί. Soph. <sup>d</sup> Τῷ λογικῷ ζώῳ ἡ αὐτὴ πρᾶξις κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ κατὰ λόγον (that is, according to truth, which it is the office of reason to discover). Anton. Nunquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia dicit. Juv.



3. If there is a Supreme being, upon whom the existence of the world depends; and nothing can be in it but what He either causes, or permits to be; then to own things *to be as they are* is to own what He causes, or at least permits, *to be thus caused or permitted*: and this is to take things as He gives them, to go into His constitution of the world, and to submit to His will, reveal'd in the books of nature<sup>a</sup>. To do this therefore must be agreeable to *His will*. And if so, the contrary must be disagreeable to it; and, since (as we shall find in due time) there is a perfect rectitude in His will, certainly *wrong*.

I desire that I may not be misunderstood in respect to the actings of wicked men. I do not say, it is agreeable to the will of God, that what is *ill* done by them should be *so* done; *i. e.* that they should use their liberty ill: but I say, when they *have* done this and committed some evil, it is agreeable to his will, that we should allow it to *have been* committed: or, it would be disagreeable to his will, that we should *deny* it to have been committed.

As the owning of things, in all our conduct, *to be as they are*, is direct obedience<sup>b</sup>: so the contrary, not to own things *to be* or *to have been* that are or have been, or not *to be what they are*, is direct rebellion against Him, who is the Author of nature. For it is as much as to say, "God indeed causes such a thing to be, or at least permits it, and it is; or the relation, that lies between this and that, is of such a nature, that one may be affirmed of the other, &c. this is true: but yet to me it shall not be so: I will not indure it, or act as if it were so: the laws of nature are ill framed, nor will I mind them, or what follows from them: even existence shall be non-existence, when my pleasures require." Such an impious declaration as this attends every *voluntary* infraction of truth.

4. Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in *any instance* or *manner whatsoever*, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For such are these: *every thing is what it is; that which is done, cannot be undone*; and the like. And then if those truths be consider'd as having always subsisted in the Divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himself, to do this is to act not only in opposition to His *government* or *sovereignty*, but to His

<sup>a</sup> Ἐδωκεν [ὁ Θεός] ἀντὶ δέλεος τῷ κόσμῳ. Chrys.

is, is true in respect of every thing. Τῷ Θεῷ νόμος κατακολουθεῖν ἐστὶ — τὸ αὐτὸς εἶναι τίθεσθαι, ὃ γέγονασι. There is a passage somewhere in S. Iqqr. much like this: where it is said (as I remember) that he, who worships an Angel מַצֵּד מִהוּא שְׁלִיחַ ה' (as being what he is, the messenger of God) is not guilty of idolatry.



*nature* <sup>a</sup> also: which, if He be perfect, and there be nothing in Him but what is most right, must also upon this account be most *wrong*.

Pardon these inadequate ways of speaking of God. You will apprehend my meaning: which perhaps may be better represented thus. If there are such things as *axioms*, which are and always have been immutably true, and consequently have been always *known to God to be so* <sup>b</sup>, the truth of them cannot be denied any way, either directly or indirectly, but the truth of the *Divine knowledge* must be denied too.

5. Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greatest *possible* absurdity. It is to put bitter for sweet, darkness for light, crooked for straight, &c. It is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and flatly to deny the existence of any thing. For nothing can be true, nothing does exist, *if things are not what they are*.

To talk to a *post*, or otherwise treat it as if it was a *man*, would surely be reckoned an absurdity, if not *distraction* <sup>c</sup>. Why? because this is to treat it *as being what it is not*. And why should not the converse be reckoned a *bad*; that is, to treat a *man* as a *post* <sup>d</sup>; as if he had no sense, and felt not injuries, which he doth feel; as if to him pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not happiness. This is what the cruel and unjust often do.

*Lastly*, to deny things to be as they are is a transgression of the great *law of our nature*, the law of Reason. For truth cannot be opposed, but reason must be violated. But of this more in the proper place.

Much might be added here concerning the *amiable nature* <sup>e</sup>, and great *force* <sup>f</sup> of truth. If I may judge by what I feel within my self, the least truth cannot be

<sup>a</sup> הקב"ה נקרא אמת וכו'. In *Resh. bhokm. & al.* And S. *Chrysostom* defines *truth* in the same words, which philosophers apply to the Deity. Ἀλήθεια τὸ ὄντως ὄν. <sup>b</sup> Ἀλήθεια ἢ ὁπαδὸς Θεῷ. Ph. Jud.

<sup>c</sup> Πόμνας — ὡς ἀνδρας — ἔχων is in *Soph.* the character of *Ajax*, when his head was turned, in a fit of raving. And among the monstrous and mad extravagances of C. *Caligula* one is, that he treated his horse *Incitatus* as a man. *Suet.*

<sup>d</sup> *Horace* argues after the same manner. Si quis lectica nitidam gestare amet agnam; Huic vestem, ut natae, paret, &c. Interdicto huic omne adimat jus Prator, &c. Quid, si quis natam pro muta devovet agnam, Integer est animi? ne dixeris. If it be against truth and nature to use a *lamb* as a *daughter*, it will be as much against truth to use a *daughter* as a *lamb*.

<sup>e</sup> Καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φάνηλον καὶ ψευτόν τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν. *Arist.* Est quiddam, quod sua vi nos allicit ad sese, non emolumento captans aliquo, sed trahens sua dignitate: quod genus virtus, scientia, veritas est. *Cic.* Γλυκύ ἡ ἀλήθεια

<sup>f</sup> O magna vis veritatis, &c. *Cic.* A good man יושב האמת מופני שהוא אמת. *Maim.*



contradicted without much reluctance: even to see other men disregard it does something more than displease; it is *shocking*.

V. *What has been said of acts inconsistent with truth, may also be said of many omissions, or neglects to act: that is, by these also true propositions may be denied to be true; and then those omissions, by which this is done, must be wrong for the same reasons with those assigned under the former proposition.*

Nothing can be asserted or denied by any act with regard to those things, to which it bears no relation: and here no truth can be affected. And when acts do bear such relations to other things, as to be declaratory of something concerning them, this commonly is visible; and it is not difficult to determine, whether truth suffers by them, or not. Some things cannot possibly be done, but truth must be *directly* and positively denied; and the thing will be clear. But the cases arising from omissions are not always so well determined, and plain: it is not always easy to know *when* or *how far* truth is violated by omitting. Here therefore more latitude must be allowed, and much must be left to every one's own judgment and ingenuity.

This may be said in general, that when any truth would be denied by acting, the omitting to act can deny no truth. For no truth can be contrary to truth<sup>a</sup>. And there may be omissions in other cases, that are silent as to truth. But yet there are *some neglects* or refusals to act, which are manifestly inconsistent with it (or, with some true propositions).

We before<sup>c</sup> supposed *A* to have engaged *not to do* some certain thing, &c. if now, on the other side, he should by some solemn promise, oath, or other act undertake *to do* some certain thing before such a time, and he *voluntarily*<sup>d</sup> omits to do it, he would behave himself as if there had been no such promise or engagement; which is equal to denying there was any: and truth is as much contradicted in this as in the former instance.

Again, there are some ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, *nature* and *truth* are denied. If a man does not desire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his *own* nature and the nature and definition of *happiness* to be what they are<sup>b</sup>. And then further, willingly to neglect the *means*, leading to any such end, is the same as not to propose that end, and must fall under the same censure. As retreating from any end commonly attends the not advancing towards it, and that may be considered as

<sup>a</sup> Plura vera discrepantia esse non possunt. Cic.  
πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τέλος ὃ αὐτῇ. Arist.

<sup>b</sup> Ἀπαντα ὅς ὡς ἐπείν, ἐτέρε χάριν ἀφ' ἑμῶν

<sup>c</sup> p. 10.

<sup>d</sup> Oblivione voluntaria. Cc.



an act, many omissions of this kind may be turned over to the *other side*<sup>a</sup>, and brought under the foregoing proposition.

It must be confessed there is a *difficulty* as to the means, by which we are to consult our own preservation and happiness; to know what those are, and what they are with respect to us. For our abilities and opportunities are not equal: some labor under disadvantages invincible: and our ignorance of the true natures of things, of their operations and effects in such an irregular distemperd world, and of those many incidents, that may happen either to further or break our measures, deprive us of certainty in these matters. But still we may judge as well as we can, and do what we can<sup>b</sup>; and the neglect *to do this* will be an omission within the reach of the proposition.

There are omissions of other kinds, which will deserve to be annumerated to these by being either *total*, or *notorious*, or upon the score of some other *circumstance*. It is certain I should not deny the *Phœnisæ* of *Euripides* to be an excellent *drama* by not reading it: nor do I deny *Chibil-menâr* to be a rare piece of antiquity by not going to see it. But should I, having leisure, health, and proper opportunities, read nothing, nor make any inquiries in order to improve my *mind*, and attain such knowledge as may be *useful* to me, I should then deny my mind to be what it is, and that knowledge to be what it is. And if it doth not appear precisely, into what kind of studies this respect to truth will carry a man preferably to all others, how far it will oblige him to continue his pursuit after knowledge, and where the discontinuance begins to be no offence against truth, he must consult his own opportunities and genius, and judge for himself *as well as he can*<sup>c</sup>. This is one of those cases which I said before were not so well determind.

If I give nothing to this or that poor body, to whom I am under no particular obligation, I do not by this deny them to be *poor*, any more than I should deny a man to have a squalid beard by not shaving him, to be nasty by not washing him, or to be lame by not taking him on my back.

*Many things* are here to be taken into consideration (according to the next proposition): perhaps I might intrench upon truth by *doing* this; and then I cannot by *not doing* it<sup>d</sup>. But if I, being in circumstances to afford now and then something in charity to the poor, should yet *never* give them any thing at all, I should then

<sup>a</sup> In the Civil Law he is said to *act*, who does omit. *Qui non facit quod facere debet, videtur facere adversus ea quæ non facit.* Dig.

<sup>b</sup> *Est quodam prodire tenus.* Hor.

<sup>c</sup> *Disces, quamdiu voles: tamdiu autem velle debebis, quoad te, quantum proficias, non paritebit,* says Cicero to his Son.

<sup>d</sup> *Nulla virtus virtuti contraria est.* Sen.



certainly deny the condition of the poor to be what it is, and my own to be what it is: and thus truth would be injured. So, again,

If I should not say my prayers at such a certain *hour*, or in such a certain *place* and *manner*, this would not imply a denial of the existence of God, His providence, or my dependence upon Him: nay, there may be reasons perhaps against *that particular* time, place, manner. But if I should *never* pray to Him, or worship Him at all, such a *total* omission would be equivalent to this assertion, *There is no God, who governs the world, to be adored*: which, if there is such a being, must be contrary to truth. Also *generally* and *notoriously* to neglect this duty (permit me to call it so), tho' not quite always, will *favor*, if not directly proclaim the same untruth. For certainly to worship God after this manner is only to worship him *accidentally*, which is to declare it a great accident that he is worshipd at all, and this approaches as near as it is possible to a *total* neglect. Beside, such a sparing and *infrequent* worshiper of the Deity betrays such an habitual disregard of Him, as will render every religious act insignificant and null.

Should I, in the last place, find a man grievously hurt by some accident, fall down, alone, and without *present* help like to perish; or see his house on fire, no body being near to help, or call out: in this extremity if I do not give him my assistance immediately, I do not do it *at all*: and by this refusing to do it according to my ability, I deny his case to be what it is; humane nature to be what it is; and even those desires and expectations, which I am conscious to my self I should have under the like misfortune, to be what they are.

VI. *In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considered not only what it is in it self or in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect, which is capable of being denied by facts or practice: and the Whole description of the thing ought to be taken in.*

If a man steals a horse, and rides away upon him, he may be said indeed by riding him to use him as a *horse*, but not as *the horse of another man*, who gave him no licence to do this. He does not therefore consider him as being what he is, unless he takes in the respect he bears to his true owner. But it is not necessary perhaps to consider what he is in respect to his color, shape, or age: because the thief's riding away with him may neither affirm nor deny him to be of any particular color, &c. I say therefore, that those, and *all* those properties, respects, and circumstances, which may be contradicted by practice, are to be taken into consideration. For otherwise the thing to be considered is but imperfectly surveyd; and the



the whole compass of it being not taken in, it is taken not as being what it is, but as what it is *in part* only, and in other respects perhaps as being *what it is not*.

If a *rich* man, being upon a journey, should be robbed and stript, it would be a second robbery and injustice committed upon him to take from him part of his then character, and to consider him only as a rich man. His character completed is a *rich man robbed and abused*, and indeed at that time a *poor* man<sup>a</sup> and distressed, tho able to repay afterwards the assistance lent him.

Moreover a man in giving assistance of any kind to another should consider what *his own* circumstances are, as well as what the *other's* are<sup>b</sup>. If they do not permit him to give it, he does not by his forbearance deny the other to want it: but if he should give it, and by that deny his own or his family's circumstances to be what they are, he would actually contradict truth. And since (as I have observed already) all truths are consistent, nor can any thing be true any further than it is compatible with other things that are true; when both parties are placed in a *right* light, and the case *fairly* stated for a judgment, the latter may indeed be truly said to want assistance, but not the assistance of the former: any more than a man, who wants a guide, may be said to want a blind or a lame guide. By putting things thus may be *truly* known what the latter is with respect to the former.

The case becomes more difficult, when a man (A) is under some *promise* or *compact* to assist another (B), and at the same time bound to consult his own happiness, provide for his family, &c. and he cannot do these, if he does that, *effectually*. For what must A do? Here are not indeed opposite *truths*, but there are truths on opposite *sides*. I answer: tho there cannot be two incompatible duties, or tho two inconsistent acts cannot be both A's duty at the same time (for then his duty would be an impossibility); yet an obligation, which I will call *mixt*, may arise out of those *differing* considerations. A should assist B; but *so*, as not to neglect himself and family, &c. and *so* to take care of himself and family, as not to forget the other engagement, *as well and honestly as he can*. Here the *importance* of the truths on the one and the other side should be diligently compared: and there must in such cases be always some *exception* or *limitation* understood. It is not in man's power to promise *absolutely*. He can only promise as one, who may be *disabled* by the weight and incumbency of truths not then existing.

<sup>a</sup> עני באותה שעה: according to that determination in a case something like this, which occurs in Talm. Mafs. Phe. <sup>b</sup> *Utrique simul consulendum est. Dabo egenti; sed ut ipse non egeam, &c.* Sen. *Ita te aliorum miserecat, ne tui alios misereat.* Plaut.



I could here insert many instances of *partial* thinking, which occur in authors: but I shall choose only to set down one in the margin<sup>a</sup>.

In short, when things are truly estimated, *persons* concerned, *times*, *places*<sup>b</sup>, *ends* intended<sup>c</sup>, and *effects* that naturally follow, must be added to them.

VII. *When any act would be wrong, the forbearing that act must be right: likewise when the omission of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it (i. e. not omitting it) must be right. Because contrariorum contraria est ratio.*

VIII. *Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong. For that cannot be good, which is wrong; nor that evil, which is right.*

IX. *Every Act therefore of such a being, as is before described, and all those omissions, which interfere with truth (i. e. deny any proposition to be true, which is true; or suppose any thing not to be what it is, in any regard<sup>d</sup>) are morally evil, in some degree or other: the forbearing such acts, and the acting in opposition to such omissions are morally good: and when any thing may be either done, or not done, equally without the violation of truth, that thing is indifferent.*

I would have it to be noted well, that when I speak of acts inconsistent with truth, I mean any truth; any true proposition whatsoever, whether containing matter of speculation, or plain fact. I would have every thing taken to be *what in fact and truth it is*<sup>e</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> *Sextus Emp.* seems to be fond of that filthy saying of *Zeno*, in relation to what is storied of *Jocasta* and *Oedipus*: μή ἄτοπον εἶναι τὸ μορίον τῆς μητρός τρίψαι, κλ. any more, than to rub with the hand any other part of her, when in pain. Here only τρίψις is considered; as if all was nothing more, but barely τρίψις: but this is an incomplete idea of the act. For τρίψις ἢ μορίῳ is more than τρίψις by it self: and τρίψις ἢ μορίῳ τῆς μητρός is still more: and certainly τρίβειν τὴν χεῖρα τῇ χειρὶ is a different thing from τρίβειν τὸ μορίον τῷ μορίῳ, &c. He might as well have said, that to rub a red hot piece of iron with one's bare hand is the same as to rub one that is cold, or any other innocent piece of matter: for all is but τρίψις. Thus men, affecting to appear free-thinkers, shew themselves to be but half-thinkers, or less: they do not take in the whole of that which is to be considered.

<sup>b</sup> *Sunt res quædam ex tempore, & ex consilio, non ex sua natura considerandæ. — Quid tempora petant, aut quid personis dignum sit, considerandum est, &c. Cic.*

<sup>c</sup> *Οὐ λέγεις φιλόπονον τὸν διὰ παιδισκάριον ἀγρυπνήντα. Arr. Amico agro aliquis assidet: probamus. at hoc si hereditatis causâ facit, vultur est, cadaver expectat. Sen.*

<sup>d</sup> *Ὅν ᾧ εἰς ἀγνήσιώς ἐστὶ τρόπος. Chrys.*

<sup>e</sup> *Τὸ κρείττον ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἀλήθεια, καὶ ὁ ἕχματος ὅρος τῆς πονηρίας τὸ ψεῦδος. Bas.*



It may be of use also to remember, that I have added those words *in some degree or other*. For neither all evil, nor all good actions are equal<sup>a</sup>. Those truths which they respect, tho they are equally true, may comprise matters of very different importance<sup>b</sup>; or more truths may be violated one way than another<sup>c</sup>: and then the crimes committed by the violation of them may be equally (one as well as the other) said to be crimes, but not *equal crimes*<sup>d</sup>. If A steals a *book* from B which was pleasing and useful to him, it is true A is guilty of a crime in not treating the book as being what it is, the book of B, who is the proprietor of it, and one whose happiness partly depends upon it: but still if A should deprive B of a *good estate*, of which he was the true owner, he would be guilty of a much greater crime. For if we suppose the book to be worth to him one pound, and the estate 10000*l*. that truth, which is violated by depriving B of his book, is in effect violated 10000 times by robbing him of his estate. It is the same as to repeat the theft of one pound 10000 times over: and therefore if 10000 thefts (or crimes) are more, and all together greater than one, one equal to 10000 must be greater too: greater than that, which is but the 10000th part of it, sure. Then, tho the convenience and innocent pleasure, that B found in the use of the *book*, was a degree of happiness: yet the happiness accruing to him from the *estate*, by which he was supplied not only with necessaries, but also with many other comforts and harmless enjoyments, vastly exceeded it. And therefore the truth violated in the former case was, *B had a property in that, which gave him such a degree of happiness*: that violated in the latter, *B had a property in that, which gave him a happiness vastly superior to the other*. The violation therefore in the latter case is upon this account a vastly greater violation than in the former. Lastly, the truths violated in the former case might end in B those in the latter may perhaps be repeated in them of his family,

<sup>a</sup> Notwithstanding that paradox of the Stoics, "Ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα, καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα, *Ap. Cic. Plut. Diog. L. & al.* which might easily be confuted from their own words in Cicero. For if sinning be like passing a line, or limit; that is, going over or beyond that line: then, *to sin* being equal to *going beyond that line*, to go more (or further) beyond that line must be to sin more. Who sees not the falsity of that, *nec bono viro meliorem, — nec forti fortiozem, nec sapiente sapientiozem posse fieri?* And so on. *Nullum inter scelus & erratum discrimen facere* (as S. Hier. expresses their opinion: if that epistle to *Celantia* be his) is to alter or destroy the natures of things. <sup>b</sup> Sure: that Wiseman was but a bad accountant, who reckond, τὴν μεγίστην οὐσίαν ἀπαβαλὼν, δραχμὴν μίαν ἐκβεβληκέναι. *Ap. Plut.*

<sup>c</sup> This is confest in Cic. *Illud interest, quod in servo necando, si adsit injuria, semel peccatur: in patris vita violanda multa peccantur, &c.* *Multitudine peccatorum praestat, &c.*

<sup>d</sup> This may serve for an answer to Chrysippus, and them who say, ἐἰ ἀληθὲς ἀληθὲς μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐδὲ ψεύδους ψεύδους ἕτως ἐδὲ ἀπάτη ἀπάτης, ἐδὲ ἀμαρτήματα ἀμαρτήματος, κλ. *Ap. Diog. L.*



who subsist also by the *estate*, and are to be provided for out of it. And these truths are very many in respect of every one of them, and all their descendents. Thus the degrees of evil or guilt are as the *importance* and *number* of truths violated<sup>a</sup>. I shall only add, on the other side, that the value of good actions will rise at least in proportion to the degrees of evil in the omission of them: and that therefore they cannot be *equal*, any more than the opposite evil omissions.

But let us return to that, which is our main subject, the *distinction* between moral good and evil. Some have been so wild as to deny there is any such thing: but from what has been said here, it is manifest, that there is as certainly moral *good* and *evil* as there is *true* and *false*; and that there is as natural and immutable a difference between *those* as between *these*, the difference at the bottom being indeed the same<sup>b</sup>. Others acknowledge, that there is indeed moral good and evil; but they *want* some *criterion*, or mark, by the help of which they might know them afunder. And others there are, who pretend to have *found* that rule, by which our actions ought to be squared, and may be discriminated; or that *ultimate end*, to which they ought all to be referred<sup>c</sup>: but what they have advanced is either false, or not sufficiently guarded, or not comprehensive enough, or not clear and firm<sup>d</sup>, or (so far as it is just) reducible to *my* rule. For

They, who reckon nothing to be good but what they call *honestum*<sup>e</sup>, may denominate actions according as that is, or is not the end of them: but then what is *honestum*<sup>f</sup>? Something is still wanting to measure things by, and to separate the *honesti* from the *inhonesti*.

They who place all in *following nature*<sup>g</sup>, if they mean by that phrase acting according to the natures of things (*that is*, treating things as being what they in na-

<sup>a</sup> *Quæis paria esse ferè placuit peccata, laborant Cum ventum ad verum est: sensus moresque repugnant, Atq; ipsa utilitas.* Hor.

<sup>b</sup> Therefore they, who denied there was either good or evil (*φύσει ἀγαθόν ἢ κακόν*), were much in the right to make thorough work, and to say there was nothing in nature either *true* or *false*. V. Sext. Emp. & Diog. L.

<sup>c</sup> *Quod* [extremum, s. ultimum bonorum] *omnium philosophorum sententiâ tale debet esse, ut ad id omnia referri, oporteat: ipsum autem nusquam.* Cic.

<sup>d</sup> There was among the old philosophers such an uncertainty and variety of opinions concerning the *fines bonorum & malorum*, that if Varro computes rightly, the number might be raised to 288. S. Aug.

<sup>e</sup> *Quod honestum est, id bonum solum habendum est.* Cato ap. Cic.

<sup>f</sup> To say, *Quod laudabile est, omne honestum est*, or any thing like that, is to say nothing. For how shall one know what is truly laudable?

<sup>g</sup> *Τέλει εἶπε [Ζήνων] τὸ ὁμολογούμεως (αἰ. ἀκολούθως) τῇ φύσει ζῆν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν. Ἀγχι γὰρ πρὸς ταύτην ἡμῶς ἡ φύσις.* Diog. L.



ture are, or according to truth) say what is right. But this does not seem to be their meaning. And if it is only that a man must follow his own nature, since his nature is not purely rational, but there is a part of him, which he has in common with brutes, they appoint him a guide which I fear will mislead him, this being commonly more likely to prevail, than the rational part. At best this talk is loose.

They who make *right reason*<sup>b</sup> to be the law, by which our acts are to be judged, and according to their conformity to this or deflexion from it call them *lawful* or *unlawful*, good or bad, say something more particular and precise. And indeed it is true, that whatever will bear to be tried by right reason, is right; and that which is condemned by it, wrong. And moreover, if by right reason is meant that, which is found by the right use of our rational faculties, this is the same with truth: and what is said by them, will be comprehended in what I have said. But the manner in which they have delivered themselves, is not yet explicit enough<sup>c</sup>. It leaves room for so many *disputes* and *opposite right-reasons*, that nothing can be settled, while every one pretends that *his* reason is right. And beside, what I have said, extends further: for we are not only to respect those truths, which we discover by reasoning, but even such *matters of fact*, as are fairly discovered to us by our senses. We ought to regard things as being what they are, which way soever we come to the knowledge of them.

They, who contenting themselves with superficial and transient views deduce the difference between good and evil from the *common sense* of mankind<sup>d</sup>, and certain *principles*<sup>e</sup> that are born with us<sup>f</sup>, put the matter upon a very *infirm* foot. For it is much to be suspected there are no such *innate* maxims as they pretend, but that the impressions of education are mistaken for them: and beside that, the sentiments of mankind are not so *uniform* and *constant*, as that we may safely trust such an important distinction upon them<sup>g</sup>.

▪ *Vivere ex hominis naturâ.* Cic. It is true he adds, *undique perfectâ & nihil requirente*: but those words have either no meaning, or such as will not much mend the matter. For what is *natura undique perfectâ & nihil requirens*? Beside, moral religion doth not consist in following nature already perfect, but by the practice of religion we aim at the perfecting of our natures. <sup>b</sup> Celebrated every where.

▪ Τὸ μὲν ἐν ὑμῶν διορίσασθαι τὰς ἀγαθὰς πράξεις, τὰς κατὰ τὸν ὁρδὸν γινόμενας λόγον, καὶ τὰς πονηρὰς τελευτήτων, ἀληθεῖς μὲν ἔκ ἐστι δὲ ἱκανὸν τὰς πράξεις σημῶναι. Andr. Rh.

<sup>d</sup> *Nec solum jus & injuria à natura dijudicatur, sed omnino omnia honesta & turpia. Nam communis intelligentia nobis notas res efficit, easq; in animis nostris inchoavit, ut honesta in virtute ponantur, in vitiis turpia.* Cic. Κρίσις φησιν [ὁ Χρύσιππος] εἶναι ἀποδιδόναι καὶ πρόληψιν. Diog. L. <sup>e</sup> They are usually called *principia naturæ, lex* (or *leges*) *naturæ*, προλήψεις, κοινὰ, or φυσικὰ ἔννοιαι, νόμος φυσικός, &c.

<sup>f</sup> The set of these practical principles (or habit flowing from them) is what, I think, goes by the name of *Synteresis*. <sup>g</sup> *Unaquaq; gens hoc legem natura putat, quod didicit.* Hieron.

They,



They, who own nothing to be good but *pleasure*, or what they call *jucundum*, nothing evil but *pain*<sup>a</sup>, and distinguish things by their tendencies to *this* or *that*<sup>b</sup>, do not agree in what this pleasure is to be placed<sup>c</sup>, or by what methods and actions the most of it may be obtained. These are left to be questions still. As men have different tastes, different degrees of sense and philosophy, the same thing cannot be pleasant to *all*: and if particular actions are to be proved by this test, the morality of them will be very uncertain; the same act may be of *one* nature to one man and of *another* to another. Beside, unless there be some strong *limitation* added as a fence for virtue, men will be apt to sink into gross voluptuousness, as in fact the generality of *Epicurus's* herd have done<sup>d</sup> (notwithstanding all his talk of temperance, virtue, tranquillity of mind, &c.); and the bridle will be usurped by those appetites, which it is a principal part of all religion, *natural* as well as any other, to curb and restrain. So these men say what is intelligible indeed: but what they say is false. For not all pleasures, but only such pleasure as is *true*, or happiness (of which afterwards), may be reckoned among the *fines* or *ultima bonorum*.

He<sup>e</sup>, who, having considered the two extremes in mens practice, in condemning both which the world generally agrees, places virtue in the *middle*, and seems to raise an idea of it from its situation at an equal distance from the opposite *extremes*<sup>f</sup>, could

<sup>a</sup> Under which word these delicate men comprehend *labor*. When *Epicurus*, in *Lucian*, is asked, Κακὸν ἢ γῆ ἢ πόνον; he answers, Ναι. And *Mindyrides* (Σμινδυρίδης, ap. *Herod.* δὲ ἐπὶ πλείστον δὴ χλιδῆς εἰς ἀνὴρ ἀπὸ κέλεο) proceeded so far in his aversion to labor, that *ejus latus alieno labore condoluit*—: *qui cum vidisset fodientem, & aliud rastrum allevantem, lassum se fieri* (δῆγμα λαβεῖν, in *Athen.*) *questus, vetuit illum opus in conspectu suo facere.* Sen. <sup>b</sup> *Ad hac [voluptatem, & dolorem] et qua sequamur, et qua fugiamus, refert omnia [Aristippus].* Cic. <sup>c</sup> *Velim definias, quid sit voluptas: de quo omnis hac questio est.* Cic. The disputes about pleasure between the *Cyrenaics*, *Epicurus*, *Hieronymus*, &c. are well known: whether the end was pleasure of body, or mind: whether it was *voluptas in motu*, or *in statu* (*stabilitate*); *qua suavitate aliqua naturam ipsam movet*, or *qua percipitur, omni dolore detracto*; ἢ ἐν κινήσει, ὅς ἡ κατασηματικὴ, &c. Cic. *Diog. L.* & al. <sup>d</sup> *Negat Epicurus jucundè vivi posse, nisi cum virtute vivatur.* Cic. But for all that their pleasures have not continued to be always like those in the little gardens of *Gargettus*. Nor indeed do they seem to be very virtuous even there. For *Epicurus* not only had his *Leontium* (or, as he amorously called her, Λεοντέριον), a famous harlot; but she πᾶσι τε τοῖς Ἐπικουρείοις συνῆν ἐν τοῖς κήποις. *Athen.* And in his book περὶ τέλης he is said to have written thus, 'Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τι νοῆσω τὰ γὰρ δὸν, ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν (χειλῶν, *Athen.*) ἡδονὰς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς δι' ἀφροδισίων, κλ. See this and more in *Diog. L.* <sup>e</sup> *S. ferom* uses the plural number, as if this was the prevailing notion in his time. *Philosophorum sententia est, μεσότητος ἀρετὰς, ὑπερβολὰς κακίας εἶναι.* <sup>f</sup> Ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἀμαρτανάνται, καὶ ἡ ἑλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται. — Ἐστὶν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕως προαιρετικῆς, ἐν μεσότητι ἔσα, κτλ. Μεσότης δὲ, δύο κακιῶν τῆς μὲν κατ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἑλλειψιν. *Arist.* Perhaps *Pythagoras* (and after him *Plato*, and others), when he said (ap. *Diog. L.*) τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀρμονίαν εἶναι, might have some such thought as this.



only design to be understood of such virtues, as have extremes. It must be granted indeed, that whatever declines in any degree toward *either* extreme, must be so far wrong or evil; and therefore that, which equally (or nearly) divides the distance, and declines *neither* way, *must be right*: also, that this notion supplies us with a good *direction* for common use in many cases. But then there are several obligations, that can by no means be derived from it: scarce more than such, as respect the virtues couched under the word *moderation*. And even as to these, it is many times difficult to discern, which is the *middle point*<sup>3</sup>. This the author himself was sensible of.

And when his master *Plato* makes virtue to consist in such a *likeness to God*, as we are capable of (and God to be the great *exemplar*), he says what I shall not dispute. But since he tells us not how or by what means we may attain this likeness, we are little the wiser in point of practice: unless by it we understand the practice of truth, God being *truth*, and doing nothing contrary to it<sup>d</sup>.

Whether any of those other *foundations*, upon which morality has been built, will hold better than these mentiond, I much question. But if the *formal ratio* of moral good and evil be made to consist in a conformity of mens acts to the *truth of the case* or the contrary, as I have here explaind it, the *distinction* seems to be settled in a manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by a *true proposition* and *matter of fact* is perfectly understood by every body; so will it be easie for any one, so far as he knows any such propositions and facts, to compare not only *words*, but also *actions* with them. A very little skill and attention will serve to interpret even these, and discover whether they *speak truth*, or not<sup>e</sup>.

X. If there be moral good and evil, distinguished as before, there is religion; and such as may most properly be styled *natural*. By religion I mean nothing else but an obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind. I say, to do) what ought not to be omitted, and to *forbear* what ought not to be done. So

■ When he says, it must be taken εως ως αν ο ορθος λογος προσάξη, it is not by that ascertaind. See before.

<sup>b</sup> Ου γαρ ράδιον διορίσαι τὸ πᾶς, καὶ τίσι, καὶ. Therefore R. Albo might have spared that censure, where he blames him for expressing himself too generally, when he says, כִּמְדֵּי שְׂרָאֵי, וְכִמְדֵּי הַרְאֵי וּבִמְקוֹם הַרְאֵי without telling him what that *manner, time, place* is.

<sup>c</sup> That man, says he, cannot be neglected, who endeavours δικαίως γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ἐπιτηδεύειν ἀρετὴν, εἰς ὅσον δύναται ἀνθρώπων ὁμοιωθῆναι θεῷ. And in another place, our φύλη ἐνθένδε is ὁμοιωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. St. Austin seems to agree with him, in that sentence of his, Religionis summa est imitari quem colis.

■ Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθεὶς, τί ποίεισιν ἄνθρωποι θεῷ ὅμοιοι, ἔφη, ἐὰν ἀληθεύωσι. Stob. <sup>e</sup> There is certainly not that difficulty or perplexity in morality, which Cicero seems to suppose, when he says *Conversatio exercitatioq; capienda, ut boni ratiocinatores officiorum esse possimus*.



that there must be religion, if there are things, of which some ought not to be done, some not to be omitted. But that there are such, appears from what has been said concerning moral good and evil: because that, which to omit would be evil, and which therefore being done would be good or well done, ought certainly by the terms *to be done*; and so that, which being done would be evil, and implies such absurdities and rebellion against the Supreme being, as are mentiond under proposition the IVth. ought most undoubtedly *not to be done*. And then since there is *religion*, which follows from the distinction between moral good and evil; since this distinction is founded in the respect, which mens acts bear to truth; and since no proposition can be true, which expresses things otherwise than as they are in nature: since things are so, there must be religion, which is founded in nature, and may upon that account be most properly and truly called the *religion of nature* or *natural religion*; the great *law* of which religion, the law of nature, or rather (as we shall afterwards find reason to call it) of the Author of nature is,

XI. *That every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act to contradict truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is<sup>a</sup>.*

*Objections* I am sensible may be made to almost any thing<sup>b</sup>; but I believe none to what has been here advanced but such as must be answerable. For to consider a thing as being *something else* than what it is, or (which is the same) not to consider it as being what it is, is an absurdity indefensible. However, for a *specimen*, I will set down a few. Let us suppose some gentleman, who has not sufficiently considered these matters, amidst his freedoms, and in the gaiety of humor, to talk after some such manner as this. “ If every thing must be treated as being what it is, what rare  
“ work will follow? For, 1. to treat my *enemy* as such is to kill him, or *revenge*  
“ my self soundly upon him. 2. To use a *creditor*, who is a spend-thrift, or one  
“ that knows not the use of money, or has no occasion for it, as *such* is not to  
“ pay him. Nay further, 3. if I *want money*, dont I act according to truth, if I take  
“ it from some body else to supply my own wants? And more, do not I act con-  
“ trary to truth, if I do *not*? 4. If one, who plainly appears to have a *design* of  
“ killing another, or doing him some great mischief, if he can find him, should ask me  
“ where he is, and I know where he is; may not I, to save life, say I do not know,  
“ tho that be false? 5. At this rate I may not, in a *frolick*, break a glass, or burn  
“ a book: because forsooth to use these things as being what they are, is to drink

<sup>a</sup> What it is in nature. כפי מה שהוא, to use Maim.'s words. And thus that in Arrianus is true, Νόμος βιωτικός ἐστὶν οὗτος, τὸ ἀκόλουθον τῇ φύσει πράττειν. *Omni in re quid sit veri, videre et tueri decet.* Cic. This is indeed the way of truth. <sup>b</sup> Because there is scarce any thing, which one or other will not say. *Quid enim potest dici de illo, qui nigram dixit esse nivem, &c.* *Lact.*

“ out of the one, not to break it; and to read the other, not burn it. *Lastly*, how  
 “ shall a man *know* what is true: and if he can find out truth, may he not want the  
 “ power of acting agreeably to it?”

To the *first* objection it is easy to reply from what has been already said. For if the objector's enemy, whom we will call E, was *nothing more* than his enemy, there might be some force in the objection; but since he may be considered as something else beside that, he must be used according to what he is in other respects, as well as in that from which he is denominated the objector's (or O's) enemy. For E in the first place is a *man*; and as such may claim the benefit of common humanity, whatever that is: and if O denies it to him, he wounds truth in a very sensible part. And then if O and E are *fellow-citizens*, living under the same government, and subject to laws, which are so many common covenants, limiting the behaviour of one man to another, and by which E is exempt from all private violence in his body, estate, &c. O cannot treat E as being what he is, unless he treats him also as one, who by common consent is under such a protection. If he does otherwise, he denies the existence of those laws and public compacts, to which he is himself, *one way or other*, a party; contrary to truth. And beside, O should act with respect to *himself* as being what he is; a man himself, in such or such circumstances, and one who has given up all right to *private revenge* (for that is the thing meant here). If truth therefore be observed, the result will be this. O must treat E as *something compounded* of a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy, all three: *that is*, he must only prosecute him in such a way, as is agreeable to the statutes and methods, which the society have obliged themselves to observe. And even as to *legal prosecutions*, there may be many things still to be considered. For E may shew himself an enemy to O in things, that fall under the cognizance of law, which yet may be of moment and importance to him, or not. If they are such things, as really affect the *safety* or *happiness* of O or his family, then he will find himself obliged, in duty and submission to truth, to take refuge in the laws; and to punish E, or obtain satisfaction, and at least security for the future, by the means there prescribed. Because if he does not, he denies the *nature* and *sense* of happiness to be what they are; the obligations, which perhaps we shall find hereafter he is under to his *family*, to be what they are; a *dangerous* and *wicked* enemy to be dangerous and wicked; the *end* of laws, and society itself, to be the safety and good of its members, by preventing injuries, punishing offenders, &c. which they will appear to be, when that matter comes before us. But

▪ Conveniet cum in dando munificum esse, tum in exigendo non acerbum: — à litibus verò quantum liceat, & nescio paulo plus etiam quàm liceat, abhorrentem. — Habenda est autem ratio rei familiaris, quam quidem dilabi sinere flagitiosum est. Cic.



if the enmity of E rises not beyond *trifling* or *more tolerable* instances, then O might act against truth, if he should be at more charge or hazard in prosecuting E than he can afford, or the thing lost or in danger is worth; should treat one that is an enemy in little things, or a *little* enemy, as a *great* one; or should deny to make some allowances, and *forgive* such peccadillo's, as the common frailty of human nature makes it necessary for us mutually to forgive, if we will live together. *Lastly*, in cases, of which the laws of the place take *no notice*, truth and nature would be sufficiently observed, if O should keep a vigilant eye upon the steps of his adversary, and take the most *prudent* measures, that are compatible with the character of a private person, either to assuage the malice of E, or prevent the effects of it; or perhaps, if he should only *not* use him as a friend<sup>a</sup>. For this if he should do, notwithstanding the rants of some men, he would cancel the natural differences of things, and confound truth with untruth.

The debtor in the *second* objection, if he acts as he says there, does, in the first place, make himself the *judge* of his creditor, which is what he is not. For he lays him under a heavy sentence, an incapacity in effect of having any estate, or any more estate. In the *next* place, he arrogates to himself more than can be true: that he perfectly *knows*, not only what his creditor and his circumstances *are*, but also what they ever *will* be hereafter. He that is now weak, or extravagant, or very rich, may for ought he knows become otherwise. *And*, which is to be considered above all, he directly denies the money, which is the creditor's, to be the creditor's. For it is *supposed* to be owing or due to him (otherwise he is no creditor): and if it be due to him, he has a right to it: and if he has a right to it, *of right* it is his (or, it is *his*). But the debtor by detaining it uses it, as if it was his own, and therefore *not* the other's; contrary to truth. To pay a man what is *due* to him doth not deny, that he who pays may think him extravagant, &c. or any other truth; that act has no such signification. It only signifies, that he who pays *thinks* it due to the other, or that it is his: and *this* it naturally doth signify. For he might pay the creditor without having any other thought relating to him, but would not *without this*.

*Ans.* to *objection* the 3d. Acting according to truth, as that phrase is used in the objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, so to act that *no truth* may be *denied* by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does not signify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth. But taking it *denies* that to be his, which (by the supposition) *is his*.

<sup>a</sup> Τὸν φίλον ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν ἔασαι. Hes.

The former is only as it were silence, which denies nothing; the latter a direct and loud assertion of a falsity; the former what can contradict no truth, because the latter does. If a man wants money through his own extravagance and vice, there can be no *pretence* for making another man to pay for his wickedness or folly. We will suppose therefore the man, who wants money, to want it for *necessaries*, and to have incurred this want through some *misfortune*, which he could not prevent. In this case, which is put as strong as can be for the objector, there are ways of expressing this want, or acting according to it, without trespassing upon truth. The man may by honest *labor* and industry seek to supply his wants; or he may apply as a *suppliant*<sup>a</sup>, not as an enemy or robber, to such as can afford to relieve him; or if his want is very pressing, to the first persons he meets, whom truth will oblige to assist him according to their abilities: or he may do *any thing but* violate truth<sup>b</sup>; which is a privilege of a vast scope, and leaves him many resources. And such a behaviour as *this* is not only agreeable to his case, and expressive of it in a way that is natural; but he would deny it to be what it is, if he did not act thus. If there is no way in the world, by which he may help himself without the violation of truth (which can scarce be supposed. If there is no other way) he must e'en take it as his fate<sup>c</sup>. Truth will be truth, and must retain its character and force, let his case be what it will. Many things might be added. The man, from whom this money is to be taken, will appear Sect. vi. to have a right to *defend* himself and his, and not suffer it to be taken from him; perhaps he may stand as much in need of it, as the other, &c.

*Ans.* to *obj.* the 4th. It is certain, in the *first* place, that nothing may willingly be done, which in any manner promotes *murder*: whoever is accessory to that, offends against *many* truths of *great* weight. 2. You are not obliged to answer the *curioso's* question. Silence here would contradict no truth. 3. No one can tell, in strict speaking, where another is, if he is not within his view. Therefore you may *truly* deny, that you know where the man is. *Lastly*, if by not discovering him you should indanger your life (and this is the hardest circumstance, that *can* be taken into the objection), the case then would be the same, as if the inquirer should say, "If you do not murder such a one, I will murder you." And then be sure you must not commit murder; but must defend your self against this, as against other dangers, against Banditi, &c. *as well as you can*. Tho merely to deny truth by *words* (I mean, when they are not productive of facts to follow; as in

<sup>a</sup> Τὸ πένεσθαι ἐκ ὁμολογῆναι τινὶ ἀίχρην, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ ἀίχρην. Thucyd.

γ' ἐδὲν οὐκ ἐστίν. Hes.

<sup>c</sup> *Suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius, quàm de alterius commodis detrahendum.* Cic. According to Plato, a man should choose to die *πρὸς τὸ ἀδελφεῖν*.

<sup>b</sup> For *ἔργον*



judicial transactions, bearing witness, or passing sentence) is not equal to a denial by facts; tho an *abuse* of language is allowable in this case, if ever in any; tho all sins against truth are not equal, and certainly a little trespassing upon it in the present case, for the good of all parties<sup>a</sup>, as little a one as any; and tho one might look on a man in such a fit of rage as mad, and therefore talk to him not as a *man* but a *mad man*: yet truth is *sacred*<sup>b</sup>, and there are other ways of coming off with innocence, by giving timely notice to the man in danger, calling in assistance, or taking the advantage of some seasonable incident<sup>c</sup>.

The 5th *objection* seems to respect *inanimate* things, which if we must treat according to what they are, it is insinuated we shall become obnoxious to many *trifling* obligations; such as are there mentiond. To this I *answer* thus. If the *glass* be nothing else but an useful drinking-glass, and these words fully express what it is, to treat it accordingly is indeed to drink out of it, when there is occasion and it is truly useful, and to *break* it designedly is to do what is wrong<sup>d</sup>. For that is to handle it, as if it neither was useful to the objector himself, nor could be so to any one else; contrary to the description of it. But if there be any *reason* for breaking the glass, then something is wanting to declare fully what it is. As, if the glass be *poisoned*: for then it becomes a *poisoned drinking-glass*, and to break or destroy it is to use it according to this *true* description of it. Or if by breaking it any thing is to be obtaind, which more than countervails the loss of it, it becomes a *glass with that circumstance*: and then for the objector to break it, if it be his own, is to use it according to what it is. And if it should become by some circumstance *useless* only, tho there should be no reason for breaking it, yet if there be none against it, the thing will be indifferent and matter of liberty. This answer, *mutatis mutandis*, may be adapted to other things of this kind; *books*, or any thing else. As the usefulness or excellence of some books renders them worthy of immortality, and of all our care to secure them to posterity; so some may be used more like what they are, by tearing or burning them, than by preserving or reading them: the num-

<sup>a</sup> Οὕτω καὶ ἰατροὶ νοσούντων ἐξαπατᾷ, — καὶ δεινὸν ἔδει. Max. Tyr.

<sup>b</sup> To that question, Si quis ad te confugiat, qui mendacio tuo possit à morte liberari, non es mentiturus? S. Austin answers in the negative, and concludes, Restat ut nunquam boni mentiantur. — Quanto fortius, quanto excellentius dices, nec prodam, nec mentiar.

<sup>c</sup> In such pressing cases, under imminent danger, the world is wont to make great allowances. Οὐκ ἀιχρὸν ἡγῆσαι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγειν; — Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ σωθῆναι γέ τοι ψεύδῳ φέρεται. Soph. Even they, who say השח שיחה בשלה עובר במעשה, and מ"ע לרבר אמת אפילו במילי, and רעלמא and רעלמא, say also אכל לשום שולם מותר, המשקר כאלו עובר ע"ר, and רעלמא. S. Hhared. (C. al. pass). And Ab. Ezra says of Abraham, רחה אבימלך ברברים כפי צורך השעה. In short, some have permitted, in desperate cases, mendacio tanquam veneno uti. Sext. Pythag.

<sup>d</sup> אסור — לשבר. S. Hhared. כליו בחמתו וכו'. S. Hhared.

<sup>e</sup> Who doth not detest that thought of Caligula de Homeri carminibus abolendis, &c. Suet.

ber of which, *large* enough already, I wish you may not think to be increased by this, which I here send you.

It cannot upon this occasion be impertinent to observe, that tho to act against truth in any case is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying with the importance of things, in some cases the importance one way or t'other may be so little ~~as to~~ render the crime *evanescent* or *almost* nothing <sup>a</sup>. And to this must be added, that *inanimate* beings cannot be considered as capable of wrong treatment, if the respect they bear to living beings is separated from them. The drinking-glass before mentioned could not be considered as such, or be what it *now* is, if there was no drinking animal to own and use it. Nothing can be of any importance to that thing it self, which is void of all life and perception. So that when we compute what such things are, we must take them as being what they are *in reference* to things that have life.

The last and most material *objection*, or *question* rather, shall be *answerd* by and by: In the mean time I shall only say, that if in any particular case truth is inaccessible, and after due inquiry it doth not appear *what*, or *how* things are, then this will be true, *that the case* or thing under consideration is *doubtful*: and to act agreeably unto this truth is to be not opinionative, nor obstinate, but modest, cautious, docile, and to endeavour to be *on the safer side*. Such behaviour shews the case to be as it is. And as to the want of *power* to act agreeably to truth, that cannot be known till trials are made: and if any one doth try, and do his endeavour, *he* may take to himself the satisfaction, which he will find in Sect. 4.

## SECT. II. Of Happiness.

**T**HAT, which demands to be next considered, is *Happiness*; as being in it self most considerable; as abetting the cause of truth; and as being indeed so nearly allied to it, that they cannot well be parted. We cannot pay the respects due to one, unless we regard the other. Happiness must not be denied to be what it is: and it is by the practice of truth that we aim at happiness, which is true.

In the few following propositions I shall not only give you my *idea* of it, but also subjoin some *observations*, which tho perhaps not necessary here, we may sometime hereafter think no loss of time or labor to have made *en passant*: such as

<sup>a</sup> The *Stoicks* must certainly therefore be much too scrupulous, when they affirm (if they were in earnest), that εὐδαιμονία τὸ δάκρυλον ὡς ἔτυχεν σαλεύειν τῷ σοφῷ ὁ λόγος ἐπιτρέπει. *Clem. Alex.* Especially since this is, at least ordinarily, a thing perfectly indifferent by pr. ix.



men of science would call, some of them *Porismata*, or corollaries, and some *Scholæ*. I shall take them as they fall in my way promiscuously.

I. *Pleasure is a consciousness of something agreeable, pain of the contrary: & v. v. the consciousness of any thing agreeable is pleasure, of the contrary pain.* For as nothing, that is agreeable to us, can be painful at the same time, and as such; nor any thing disagreeable pleasant, by the terms; so neither can any thing agreeable be for that reason (because it is agreeable) not pleasant, nor any thing disagreeable not painful, in some measure or other.

Obs. 1. *Pleasures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions and sense of their subjects, or the persons affected with them.* For consciousness and perception cannot be separated: because as I do not perceive what I am not conscious to my self I do perceive, so neither can I be conscious of what I do not perceive, or of more or less than what I do perceive. And therefore, since the degrees of pleasure or pain must be answerable to the consciousness, which the party affected has of them, they must likewise be as the degrees of perception are.

Obs. 2. *Whatever increases the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more susceptible of pleasure or pain.* This is an immediate consequence; and to add more is needless: unless, that among the means, by which perceptions and the inward sense of things may in many cases be heightend and increased, are the principal *reflexion*, and the practice of thinking, as I cannot be conscious of what I do not perceive: so I do not perceive that, which I do not advert upon. That which makes me feel, makes me advert. Every instance therefore of consciousness and perception is attended with an act of advertence: and as the more the perceptions are, the more are the advertences or reflexions; so v. v. the more frequent or intense the acts of advertence and reflexion are, the more consciousness there is, and the stronger is the *perception*. Further, all perceptions are produced in time: time passes by moments: there can be but one moment present at once: and therefore all present perception considered without any relation to what is past, or future, may be looked upon as momentaneous only. In this kind of perception the percipient perceives, as if he had not perceived any thing before, nor had any thing perceptible to follow. But in reflexion there is a repetition of what is past, and an anticipation of that which is apprehended as yet to come: there is a connexion of past and future, which by this are brought into the sum, and superadded to the present or momentaneous perceptions. Again, by reflecting we practise our capacity of apprehending: and this practising will increase, and as it were extend that capacity, to a certain degree. Lastly, reflexion doth

doth not only accumulate moments past and future to those that are present, but even in their passage it seems to *multiply* them. For time, as well as space, is capable of indeterminate division: and the finer or nicer the advertence or reflexion is, into the more parts is the time divided; which, whilst the mind considers those parts as so many several moments, is *in effect* rendered by this so much the longer. And to this experience agrees.

Obs. 3. *The causes of pleasure and pain are relative things: and in order to estimate truly their effect upon any particular subject they ought to be drawn into the degrees of perception in that subject.* When the cause is of the same kind, and acts with an equal force, if the perception of one person be equal to that of another, what they perceive must needs be *equal*. And so it will be likewise, when the forces in the producing causes and the degrees of perception in the sentients are *reciprocal*. For (which doth not seem to be considered by the world, and therefore ought the more particularly to be noted) if the cause of pleasure or pain should act but half as much upon A, as it does upon B; yet if the perceptivity of A be double to that of B, the sum of their pleasures or pains will be *equal*. In other cases they will be *unequal*. As, if the *causa dolorifica* should act with the same *impetus* on C with which it acts upon D; yet if C had only two degrees of perception, and D had three, the pain sustained by D would be half as much more as that of C: because he would perceive or feel the acts and impressions of the cause more by so much. If it should act with twice the force upon D which it acts with upon C, then the pain of C would be to that of D as 2 to 6: *i. e.* as one degree of force multiplied by two degrees of perception to two degrees of force multiplied by three of perception. And so on.

Obs. 4. *Mens respective happinesses or pleasures ought to be valued as they are to the persons themselves, whose they are; or according to the thoughts and sense, which they have of them:* not according to the estimate put upon them by other people, who have no authority to judge of them, nor *can* know what they are; may compute by different rules; have less sense; be in different circumstances; or such as guilt has rendered partial to themselves. If that prince, who having plenty, and flocks many, yet ravished the poor man's single ewe-lamb out of his bosom, reckon the poor man's loss to be not greater, than the loss of one of his lambs would have been to him, he must be very defective in moral arithmetic, and little understood the doctrine of proportion. Every man's happiness is *his* happiness, what

▪ *Tu si hic sis, aliter sentias.* Ter.



it is to *him*; and the loss of it is answerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things to his wants and circumstances<sup>a</sup>.

Obs. 5. *How judicious and wary ought princes, lawgivers, judges, juries, and even masters to be!* They ought not to consider so much what a stout, resolute, obstinate, hardend criminal may bear, as what the weaker sort, or at least (if that can be known) the persons immediately concerned can bear: *that is*, what any punishment would be to them. For it is certain, all criminals are not of the former kind; and therefore should not be used as if they were. Some are drawn into crimes, which may render them obnoxious to public justice, they scarce know how themselves: some fall into them through necessity, strength of temptation, despair, elasticity of spirits and a sudden eruption of passion, ignorance of laws, want of good education, or some natural infirmity or propension: and some, who are really innocent, are oppressed by the iniquity or mistakes of judges, witnesses, juries, or perhaps by the power and zeal of a faction, with which their sense or their honesty has not permitted them to join. What a difference must there be between the sufferings of a poor wretch sensible of his crime, or misfortune, who would give a world for his deliverance, if he had it, and those of a sturdy *veteran* in roguery; between the apprehensions, tears, faintings of the one, and the brandy and oaths of the other; in short, between a tender nature and a brickbat!

Obs. 6. *In general, all persons ought to be very careful and tender, where any other is concerned.* Otherwise they may do they know not what. For no man can tell, by himself, or any other way, how another may be affected.

Obs. 7. *There cannot be an equal distribution of rewards and punishments by any stated human laws<sup>b</sup>.* Because (among other reasons) the same thing is rarely either the same gratification, or the same punishment to different persons.

Obs. 8. *The sufferings of brutes are not like the sufferings of men.* They perceive by moments, without reflexion upon past or future, upon causes, circumstances, &c.

Time and life without thinking are next neighbours to *nothing*, to no-time and no-life<sup>d</sup>. And therefore to kill a brute is to deprive him of a life, or a remain-

<sup>a</sup> Felicitas cui præcipua fuerit homini, non est humani iudicii: cum prosperitatem ipsam alius alio modo, & suapte ingenio quisq; terminet. Pliny.

<sup>b</sup> It is not possible (in *Albo's* words) לתת לאיש ברכיו שוה בשוה ולשער העונשים במרה ובמשקל זכו.

<sup>c</sup> Inter hominem & belluam hoc maximè interest, quod hac — ad id solum quod adest, quodq; præsens est, se accommodat, paululum admodum sentiens præteritum aut futurum, &c. Cic. Nos & venturo torquemur & præterito. Timoris enim tormentum memoria reducit, providentia anticipat. Nemo tantum præsentibus miser est. Sen.

<sup>d</sup> Præsens tempus brevissimum est, adeo quidem, ut quibusdam nullum videatur, &c. Sen. "Ὅταν δ' αὐτὸν μὴ δὲν μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν, ἢ λάβωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, εἰ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι ὁ χρόνος. Arist.

der of time, that is equal to little more than nothing: tho this may perhaps be more applicable to some animals than to others. That, which is chiefly to be taken care of in this matter, is, that the brute may not be killed unnecessarily; when it is killed, that it may have as few moments of pain as may be<sub>a</sub>; and that no young be left to languish. So much by the way here.

II. *Pain considerd in itself is a real evil, pleasure a real good.* I take this as a *postulatum*, that will without difficulty be granted. Therefore,

III. *By the general idea of good and evil the one [pleasure] is in itself desirable, the other [pain] to be avoided.* What is here said, respects mere pleasure and pain, abstracted from all circumstances, consequences, &c. But because there are some of these generally adhering to them, and such as enter so deep into their nature, that unless these be *taken in*, the full and true character of the other cannot be had, nor can it therefore be known what *happiness* is, I must proceed to some other propositions relating to this subject.

IV. *Pleasure compared with pain may either be equal, or more, or less: also pleasures may be compared with other pleasures<sub>b</sub>, and pains with pains.* Because all the moments of the pleasure must bear some respect or be in some *ratio* to all the moments of pain: as also all the degrees of one to all the degrees of the other: and so must those of one pleasure, or one pain, be to those of another. And if the degrees of intenseness be multiplied by the moments of duration, there must still be some *ratio* of the one product to the other.

That this proposition is true, appears from the general conduct of mankind; tho in some particulars they may err, and wrong themselves, some more, some less. For what doth all this hurry of business, what do all the labors and travels of men tend to, but to gain such advantages, as they think exceed all their trouble? What are all their abstinences and self denials for, if they do not think some pleasures less than the pain, that would succeed them? Do not the various methods of life shew, that men prefer one sort of pleasure to another, and submit to one sort of pain rather than to have another? And within our selves we cannot but find an in-

• עושה צער לבהמה חנם — בא לריו וכו'. Ab. Ez. אין השם חפץ שתמות בהמה חנם וכו'. S. Hhas. <sup>b</sup> The rants of those men, who assert, *μη διαφέρειν ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς, μηδὲ ὀδίνων τι εἶναι*: nay, *φύσει οὐδὲν ἡδὺν, ἢ ὀδίνος*, ap. Diog. L. can surely affect no body, who has sense, or is alive. Nor that of the Stoics in *Plur.* *ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ὁ χρόνος ἐκ αὐτοῦ προσηγομένους*, κτλ. As if an age was not more than a moment, and (therefore) an age's happiness more than a moment's.



difference as to many things, not caring, whether we have the pain with the pleasure obtained by it, or miss the pleasure, being excused from the pain.

V. *When pleasures and pains are equal, they mutually destroy each other: when the one exceeds, the excess gives the true quantity of pleasure or pain.* For nine degrees of pleasure, less by nine degrees of pain, are equal to nothing: but nine degrees of one, less by three degrees of the other, give six of the former *net and true*.

VI. *As therefore there may be true pleasure and pain: so there may be some pleasures, which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckoned as pains<sup>a</sup>; and v. v. some pains, that may be annumerated to pleasures.* For the true quantity of pleasure differs not from that quantity of true pleasure; or it is so much of that kind of pleasure, which is *true* (clear of all discounts and future payments): nor can the true quantity of pain not be the same with that quantity of true or mere pain. Then, the man who enjoys three degrees of such pleasure as will bring upon him nine degrees of pain, when three degrees of pain are set off to balance and sink the three of pleasure, can have remaining to him only six degrees of pain: and into these therefore is his pleasure finally resolved. And so the three degrees of pain, which any one endures to obtain nine of pleasure, end in six of the latter. By the same manner of computing some pleasures will be found to be the loss of pleasure, compared with greater: and some pains the alleviation of pain; because by undergoing them greater are evaded<sup>b</sup>. Thus the natures of pleasures and pains are varied, and sometimes transmuted: which ought never to be forgot.

Nor this moreover. As in the sense of most men, I believe, a little pain will weigh against a great deal of pleasure<sup>c</sup>: so perhaps there may be some pains, which exceed all pleasures; that is, such pains as no man would choose to suffer for any pleasure whatever, or at least any that we know of in this world. So that it is possible the difference, or excess of pain, may rise so high as to become immense: and then the pleasure to be set against that pain will be but a point, or cipher; a quantity of no value

VII. *Happiness differs not from the true quantity of pleasure, unhappiness of pain.* Or, any being may be said to be so far happy, as his pleasures are true, &c. That cannot

<sup>a</sup> *Noceat (sit noxa) empty dolore voluptas.* Hor. And—*multo corrupta dolore voluptas.* Id. when that Pompey mentioned by Val. Max. by burning his finger escaped the torture. *malis paria non sunt, etiam pari numero: nec latitia ulla minimo mœrore pensanda.* Plin.

<sup>b</sup> As

<sup>c</sup> Bona

be the happiness of any being, which is bad for him: nor can happiness be disagreeable. It must be something therefore, that is both *agreeable* and *good* for the possessor. Now present pleasure is for the present indeed agreeable; but if it be not true, and he who enjoys it must pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be for his good, or good for him. This therefore cannot be his *happiness*. Nor, again, can that pleasure be reckond happiness, for which one pays the full price in pain: because these are quantities, which mutually destroy each other. But yet since happiness is something, which, by the general idea of it, must be desirable, and therefore agreeable, it must be some kind of pleasure<sup>a</sup>: and this, from what has been said, can only be such pleasure as is true. That only can be both agreeable and good for him. And thus every one's happiness will be as his true quantity of pleasure.

One, that loves to make *objections*, may demand here, whether there may not be happiness without pleasure: whether a man may not be said to be happy in respect to those evils, which he escapes, and yet knows nothing of: and whether there may not be such a thing as *negative* happiness. I *answer*, an exemption from misfortunes and pains is a high privilege, tho we should not be sensible what those misfortunes or dangers are, from which we are deliverd, and in the larger use of the word may be styled a happiness. Also, the absence of pain or unhappiness may perhaps be called negative happiness, since the meaning of that phrase is known. But in proper speaking happiness always includes something positive. For *mere* indolence resulting from insensibility, or joind with it, if it be happiness, is a happiness infinitely diminishd: *that is*, it is no more a happiness, than it is an unhappiness; upon the confine of both, but neither. At best it is but the happiness of flocks and stones<sup>b</sup>: and to these I think happiness can hardly be in strictness allowd. 'Tis the privilege of a flock to be what it is, rather than to be a miserable being: this we are sensible of, and therefore, joining this privilege with own our sense of it, we call it happiness; but this is what it is in our manner of apprehending it, not what it is in the flock itself. A sense indeed of being free from pains and troubles is attended with happiness: but then the happiness flows from the *sense* of the case, and is a *positive* happiness. Whilst a man reflects upon his negative happiness, as it is called, and enjoys it, he makes it positive: and perhaps a sense of immunity from the afflictions and miseries every where so obvious to our observation is one of the *greatest* pleasures in this world.

<sup>a</sup> Οὐόμεθα δὲν ἡδονὴν παρεμνήσθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Arist.  
Aristip. ap. Diog. L.

<sup>b</sup> Οἱ οἶονι κατ'εὐδοντος κατάστασις,



VIII. *That being may be said to be ultimately happy, in some degree or other, the sum total of whose pleasures exceeds the sum of all his pains: or ultimate happiness is the sum of happiness, or true pleasure, at the foot of the account. And so on the other side, that being may be said to be ultimately unhappy, the sum of all whose pains exceeds that of all his pleasures.*

IX. *To make itself happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its capacity, owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent being may be supposed to aim at, in general<sup>a</sup>. For happiness is some quantity of true pleasure: and that pleasure, which I call true, may be considered by itself, and so will be justly desirable (according to prop. II, and III). On the contrary, unhappiness is certainly to be avoided: because being a quantity of mere pain, it may be considered by itself, as a real, mere evil, &c. and because if I am obliged to pursue happiness, I am at the same time obliged to recede, as far as I can, from its contrary. All this is self-evident. And hence it follows, that,*

X. *We cannot act with respect to either our selves, or other men, as being what we and they are, unless both are considered as beings susceptible of happiness and unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other. Other animals may be considered after the same manner in proportion to their several degrees of apprehension.*

But that the nature of happiness, and the road to it, which is so very apt to be mistaken, may be better understood; and true pleasures more certainly distinguished from false; the following propositions must still be added.

XI. *As the true and ultimate happiness of no being can be produced by any thing, that interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things: so neither can the practice of truth make any being ultimately unhappy. For that, which contradicts nature and truth, opposes the will of the Author of nature (whose existence, &c. I shall prove afterwards); and to suppose, that an inferior being may in opposition to His will break through the constitution of things, and by so doing make himself happy, is to suppose that being more potent than the Author of nature, and consequently more potent than the author of the nature and power of that very being himself, which is absurd. And as to the other part of the proposition, it is also absurd to think, that, by the constitution of nature and will of its author, any being should be finally mi-*

<sup>a</sup> This is truly *Bonum summum, quod tendimus omnes*. Lucr. Ἄπαντα γὰρ ὡς ἐπιτεῖν, ἑτέρεα χάριν αἰετέμεθα, πλὴν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας· τέλος γὰρ αὐτῇ. *Arist.*

ferable only for *conforming* himself to truth, and owning things and the relations lying between them to be what they are. It is much the same as to say, God has made it natural to contradict nature; or unnatural, and therefore punishable, to act according to nature and reality. If such a blunder (excuse the boldness of the word) could be, it must come either through a defect of *power* in Him to cause a better and more equitable scheme, or from some *delight*, which he finds in the misery of his dependents. The former cannot be ascribed to the First cause, who is the fountain of power: nor the latter to Him, who gives so many proofs of his goodness and beneficence. Many beings may be said to be happy; and there are none of us all, who have not many enjoyments<sup>a</sup>: whereas did he delight in the infelicity of those beings, which depend upon Him, it must be natural to Him to make them unhappy, and then not one of them would be otherwise in any respect. The world in that case instead of being such a beautiful, admirable system, in which there is only a *mixture* of evils, could have been only a scene of *mere* misery, horror, and torment.

That either the enemies of truth (*wicked men*) should be ultimately happy, or the religious observers of it (*good men*) ultimately unhappy, is such injustice, and an evil so great, that sure no *Manichean* will allow such a *superiority* of his evil principle over the good, as is requisite to produce and maintain it.

XII. *The genuine happiness of every being must be something, that is not incompatible with or destructive of its nature<sup>b</sup>, or the superior or better part of it, if it be mixt.* For instance, nothing can be the true happiness of a *rational* being, that is inconsistent with *reason*. For all pleasure, and therefore be sure all clear pleasure and true happiness must be something agreeable: and nothing can be agreeable to a reasoning nature, or (which is the same) to the reason of that nature, which is repugnant and disagreeable to reason. If any thing becomes agreeable to a rational being, which is not agreeable to reason, it is plain his reason is lost, his nature depressed, and that he now lifts himself among *irrationals*, at least as to that particular. If a being finds pleasure in any thing *unreasonable*, he has an *unreasonable* pleasure: but a rational nature can like nothing of that kind without a contradiction to itself. For to do this would be to act, as if it was the contrary to what it is. Lastly, if we find hereafter, that whatever interferes with reason, interferes with truth, and to contradict either of them is the same thing; then what has been said under the former proposition, does also confirm this: as what has been said in proof of this, does also confirm the former.

<sup>a</sup> Non dat Deus beneficia. Unde ergo quæ possides? quæ — Sen.  
καμία ἢ κακοδαίμονια ἐστὶ. Arr.

<sup>b</sup> Παντὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν αὐτοῦ



XIII. *Those pleasures are true, and to be reckoned into our happiness, against which there lies no reason.* For when there is no reason against any pleasure, there is always one for it<sup>a</sup>, included in the term. So when there is no reason for undergoing pain (or venturing it), there is one against it.

*Obs.* There is therefore no necessity for men to torture their inventions in finding out arguments to justify themselves in the pursuits after worldly advantages and enjoyments, provided that neither these enjoyments, nor the means by which they are attained, contain the violation of any truth, by being unjust, immoderate, or the like<sup>b</sup>. For in this case there is no reason why we should not desire them, and a direct one, why we should; viz. because they are enjoyments.

XIV. To conclude this section, *The way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the one into the other*<sup>c</sup>. For no being can be styled happy, that is not ultimately so: because if all his pains exceed all his pleasures, he is so far from being happy, that he is a being unhappy, or miserable, in proportion to that excess. Now by *prop.* XI. nothing can produce the ultimate happiness of any being, which interferes with truth: and therefore that, which doth produce it, must be something that is consistent and coincident with it.

Two things then (but such as are met together, and embrace each other), which are to be religiously regarded in all our conduct, are *truth* (of which in the preceding sect.) and *happiness* (that is, such pleasures, as accompany, or follow the practice of truth, or are not inconsistent with it: of which I have been treating in this). And as that religion, which arises from the distinction between moral good and evil, was called *natural*, because grounded upon truth and the natures of things: so perhaps may that too, which proposes happiness for its end, in as much as it proceeds upon that difference, which there is between true pleasure and pain, which are physical (or *natural*) good and evil. And since both these unite so amicably, and are at last the same, here is *one* religion which may be called natural upon *two* accounts.

<sup>a</sup> Τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ κατὰ λόγον ὁρθὸν μεταλαμβάνομεν. Simpl. Recte facit, animo quando obsequitur suo: quod omnes homines facere oportet, dum id modo fiat bono. Plaut.

<sup>b</sup> Habebit philosophus amplas opes; sed nulli detractas, &c. Sen. Here he seems to confess the folly of the Stoics, who denied themselves many pleasures, that were honest and almost necessary; living in tubs, feeding upon raw herbs and water, going about in a sordid garment, with a rough beard, staff and satchel, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Quid rectum sit, apparet; quid expediat, obscurum est: ita tamen, ut — dubitare non possimus, quin maximè conducant, quæ sunt rectissima. Cic.

## SECT. III. Of Reason, and the ways of discovering truth.

MY manner of thinking, and an *objection* formerly made, oblige me in the next place to say something concerning the means of knowing, what is true: whether there are any, that are *sure*, and which one may *safely* rely upon. For if there be not, all that I have written is an amusement to no purpose. Besides, as this will lead me to speak of *Reason*, &c. some truths may here (as some did in the former section) fall in our way, which may be profitable upon many occasions; and what has been already asserted, will also be further confirmed.

I. *An intelligent being, such as is mentiond before<sup>b</sup>, must have some immediate objects of his understanding; or at least a capacity of having such.* For if there be no object of his intellect, he is intelligent of nothing, or not intelligent. And if there are no immediate objects, there can be none at all: because every object must be such (an object) either in itself immediately; or by the intervention of another, which is immediate; or of several, one of which must at least be immediate.

II. *An intelligent being among the immediate objects of his mind may have some, that are abstract and general.* I shall not at present inquire, how he comes by them (it matters not *how*), since this must be true, if there is any such thing as a rational being. For that reason is something different from the knowledge of particulars may appear from hence; because it is not confined to particular things or cases. What is reason in one instance, is so in another. What is reasonable with respect to *Quinctius*, is so in respect of *Nervius*<sup>c</sup>. Reason is performed in *species*. A rational being therefore must have some of these *species* (I mean specific and abstract *ideas*) to work with; or some superior method, such as perhaps some higher order of reasoners may have, but we have not.

The knowledge of a particular *idea* is only the particular knowledge of that *idea* or thing: there it ends. But *reason* is something universal, a kind of general instrument, applicable to particular things and cases as they occur. We reason about particulars, or from them; but not *by* them.

<sup>a</sup> The last objection, p. 27.

<sup>b</sup> Sect. I. prop. I.

<sup>c</sup> *Quis hoc statuit, quod equum sit in Quinctium, id iniquum esse in Nervium? Cic.*

<sup>c</sup> *Quis hoc statuit, quod equum*



In fact we find within our selves many *logical, metaphysical, mathematical ideas*, no one of which is limited to any particular, or individual thing : but they comprehend whole *classes* and kinds. And it is by the help of these that we reason, and demonstrate. So that we know from within our selves, that intelligent beings not only may have such abstract *ideas*, as are mentiond in the proposition, but that some *actually have* them : which is enough for my purpose.

III. *Those ideas or objects, that are immediate, will be adequately and truly known to that mind, whose ideas they are.* For *ideas* can be no further the *ideas* of any mind, than that mind has (or may have) a perception of them : and therefore that mind must perceive the whole of them ; which is to know them *adequately*.

*Again*, these *ideas* being immediate, nothing (by the term) can intervene to increase, diminish, or any way alter them. And to say the mind does not know them truly, implies a contradiction : because it is the same thing as to say, that they are misrepresented ; *that is*, that there are other intervening and misrepresenting *ideas*.

And *lastly*, there cannot be an immediate perception of that, which is not ; nor therefore of any immediate object otherwise, than as it is. We have indeed many times wrong notions, and misperceptions of things : but then these things are not the immediate objects. They are things, which are notified to us by the help of organs and *media*, which may be vitiated, or perhaps are defective at best and incapable of transmitting things as they are in themselves, and therefore occasion imperfect and false images. But then, even in this case, those images and *ideas*, that are immediate to the percipient, are perceived as they are : and that is the very reason, why the originals, which they should exhibit truly, but do not, are not perceived as *they* are. In short, I only say the mind must know its own *immediate ideas*.

IV. *What has been said of those ideas, which are immediate, may be said also of those relations or respects, which any of those ideas bear immediately each to other : they must be known immediately and truly.* For if the relation be immediate, the ideas cannot subsist without it ; it is of their nature : and therefore they cannot be known adequately, but this must be known too. They are in this respect like the *ideas* of Whole and Part. The one cannot be without the other : nor either of them not discover that relation, by which the one must be always bigger and the other less.

To say no more, we may satisfy our selves of the truth of this, as well as of the foregoing propositions, from the experiences of our own minds : where we find many

ny relations, that are immediately seen, and of which it is *not in our power* to doubt<sup>a</sup>. We are conscious of a knowledge, that consists in the *intuition* of these relations. Such is the evidence of those truths, which are usually called *axioms*, and perhaps of some short demonstrations.

V. *Those relations or respects, which are not immediate, or apparent at the first view, may many times be discovered by intermediate relations; and with equal certainty.* If the ratio of B to D does not instantly shew itself; yet if the ratio of B to C<sup>b</sup> does, and that of C to D<sup>c</sup>, from hence the ratio of B to D<sup>d</sup> is known also. And if the mean quantities were ever so many, the same thing would follow; provided the reason of every quantity to that, which follows next in the *series*, be known. For the truth of this I vouch the *mathematicians*<sup>e</sup>: ■ I might all, that know any science, for the truth of the proposition in general. For thus *theorems* and derivative truths are obtained.

VI. *If a proposition be true, it is always so in all the instances and uses, to which it is applicable.* For otherwise it must be both true and false. Therefore

VII. *By the help of truths already known more may be discovered.* For

I. *Those inferences, which arise presently from the application of general truths to the particular things and cases contained under them, must be just.* Ex. gr. *The whole is bigger than a part: therefore A* (some particular thing) *is more than half A.* For it is plain that A is contained in the *idea* of Whole, as half A is in that of Part. So that if the antecedent proposition be true, the consequent, which is included in it, follows immediately, and must also be true. The former cannot be true, unless the other be so too. What agrees to the *genus, species, definition, whole*, must agree to the *species, individuals, thing defined, the part*. The existence of an *effect* infers directly that of a *cause*; of one *correlate* that of the other; and so on. And what is said here holds true (by the preceding proposition) not only in respect of axioms and first truths, but also and equally of theorems and other general truths, when they are once known. These may be capable of the like applications: and the truth of such consequences, as are made by virtue of them, will always be ■ evident as that of those theorems themselves.

<sup>a</sup> That question in *Plato*, Τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἰ τις ἔροιτο νῦν ἕως οὗ τὰ παρόντι, πότερον κατεύδομεν, καὶ πάντα ἃ διασέμεθα ἀναιδέως, κτλ. may have a place among the *velitations* of philosophers: but a man can scarce propose it seriously to himself. If he doth, the answer will attend it. <sup>b</sup> = a. <sup>c</sup> = e. <sup>d</sup> = ae. ■ V. *Tacq. El. Geom.* l. 5. p. 3. n. XII. But the thing appears from the bare inspection of these quantities: *b, ab, aeb, aeib, aeioib, &c.*



2. All those *conclusions*, which are derived through mean propositions, that are true, and by just inferences, will be as true as those, from which they are derived. My meaning is this: every just consequence is *founded in some known truth*, by virtue of which one thing follows from another, after the manner of steps in an *algebraic* operation: and if inferences are so founded, and just, the things inferred must be true, if they are made from true premisses.

Let this be the form of an argument.  $M=P: S=M: \text{ergo } S=P$ . Here if  $S=M$  be false, nothing is concluded at all: because the middle proposition is in truth not  $S=M$ , but perhaps  $S=Ma$ , which is foreign to the purpose. If  $S=M$  be true, but  $M=P$  false, then the conclusion will indeed be a right conclusion from those premisses: but they cannot shew, that  $S=P$ , because the first proposition if it was express'd according to truth would be  $Mc=P$ , which is another thing, and has no place in the argument. But if these two propositions are both true,  $M=P$ , and  $S=M$ , then it will not only be rightly concluded, but also true, that  $S=P$ . For the second or middle proposition does so connect the other two, by taking in due manner a term from each of them (or to speak with the *logicians*, by separately comparing the predicate or *major* term of the conclusion with the *medium* in the first proposition, and the subject or *minor* term with it in the second), that if the first and second are true, the third must be so likewise: all being indeed no more than this,  $P=M=S$ . For here the inference is just by what goes before, being founded in some such truth as this, and resulting immediately from the application of it, *Quæ eidem æqualia sunt, & inter se sunt æqualia*; or *Quæ conveniunt in eodem tertio, etiam inter se conveniunt*; or the like<sup>a</sup>. Now if an inference thus made is justifiable, another made after the same manner, when the truth discovered by it is made one of the premisses, must be so too; and so must another after that; and so on. And if the last, and all the intermediate inferences be as right, as the first is supposed to be, it is no matter to what length the process is carried. All the parts of it being locked together by truth, the last result is derived through such a succession of mean propositions, as render its title to our assent not worse by being long.

Since all the forms of true *syllogisms* may be proved to conclude rightly, all the advances made in the *syllogistic* method toward the discovery or confirmation of truth, are so many instances and proofs of what is here asserted. So also are the performances of the *mathematicians*. From some self-evident truths, and a few easie

<sup>a</sup> If men in their illations, or in comparing their *ideas*, do many times not actually make use of such maxims; yet the thing is really the same. For what these maxims express, the mind sees without taking notice of the words.

theorems, which they set out with at first, to what immense lengths, and through what a train of propositions have they propagated knowledge! How numerous are their theorems and discoveries now, so far once out of human ken!

I do not enter so far into the province of the *logicians* as to take notice of the difference there is between the *analytic* and *synthetic* methods of coming at truth, or proving it; whether it is better to begin the disquisition from the subject, or from the attribute. If by the use of proper *media* any thing can be shewd to be, or not to be, I care not from what term the demonstration or argument takes its rise. Either way propositions may beget their like, and new truth be brought into the world.

VIII. *That power, which any intelligent being has of surveying his own ideas, and comparing them; of forming to himself out of those, that are immediate and abstract, such general and fundamental truths, as he can be sure of<sup>a</sup>; and of making such inferences and conclusions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth, after it comes to be known; in order to find out more truth, prove or disprove some assertion, resolve some question, determine what is fit to be done upon occasion, &c. the case or thing under consideration being first fairly stated and prepared, is what I mean by the faculty of Reason, or what entitles him to the epithet rational, Or in short, Reason is a faculty of making such inferences and conclusions, as are mentiond under the preceding proposition, from any thing known, or given.*

The Supreme being has no doubt a direct and perfect intuition of things, with their natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious to His eye: or at least we may safely say, that He is not obliged to make use of our operose methods by *ideas* and inferences; but knows things in a manner infinitely above all our conceptions. And as to superior finite natures, what other means of attaining to the knowledge of things they may have, is a thing not to be told by me; or how far they may excell us in this way of finding truth. I have an eye here chiefly to our own circumstances. Reason must be understood, when it is ascribed to God, to be the *Divine* reason; when to other beings above us, to be *their* reason; and in all of them to transcend *ours*, as much as their natures respectively do our nature<sup>b</sup>.

It

<sup>a</sup> Under the word *Reason* I comprehend the *intuition* of the truth of axioms. For certainly to discern the respect, which one term bears to another, and from thence to conclude the proposition necessarily true, is an act of *reason*, tho performed quick, or perhaps all at once.

<sup>b</sup> If many believed, according to Socrates *ap. Luc.* that ὅση ἔχει τὸ μέγεθος ἡ φύσις τὴν ὑπεροχὴν πρὸς τὸ Σωκράτους



It may not be amiss to note *further*, that tho a man, who truly uses his rational powers, has abstract and universal ideas obtained by reflexion; out of these frames to himself general truths, or apprehends the strength of such, and admits them, when they occur to him; by these, as by so many standards, measures and judges of things; and takes care to have the materials, which he makes use of in reasoning, to be rivetted and compacted together by them: yet by a *habit* of reasoning he may come to serve himself of them and apply them so quick, that he himself shall scarce observe it. Nay, most men seem to reason by virtue of a habit acquired by conversation, practice in business, and examples of others, without knowing what it is, that gives the solidity even to their own just reasonings: just as men usually learn rules in arithmetic, govern their accounts by them all their days, and grow very ready and topping in the use of them, without ever knowing or troubling their heads about the *demonstration* of any one of them. But still tho this be so, and men reason without adverting upon general ideas and abstract truths, or even being aware that there are any such, as it were by rule or a kind of rote; yet such there are, and upon *them* rests the weight of reason as its foundation.

This, *by the way*, helps us to detect the cause, why the generality of people are so little under the *dominion* of reason; why they sacrifice it to their interests and passions so easily; are so obnoxious to prejudices, the influence of their company, and din of a party; so apt to change, tho the case remains the very same; so unable to judge of things, that are ever so little out of the way; and so conceited and positive in matters, that are doubtful, or perhaps to discerning persons manifestly false. Their reasoning proceeds in that track, which they happen to be got into, and out of which they know not one step, but all is to them *Terra incognita*; being ignorant of the scientific part, and those universal, unalterable principles, upon which true reasoning depends, and to find which and the true use of them are required *cool* hours and an *honest* application, beside many *preparatives*.

In the *next place* it must be noted, that one may reason truly from that, which is only probable, or even false<sup>a</sup>. Because just inferences may be made from propositions of these kinds: *that is*, such inferences may be made as are founded in certain truths, tho those propositions themselves are not certainly true. But then what follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or false, according to

κράτες ἢ χαίρειν τὸ εἶδεν, τηλικῶτον καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς, καὶ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ διάνοιαν ἀνάλογον διαφέρειν τῆς περὶ ἡμῶς διαδέσεως, what may we think of the God of the world? Therefore Tully seems to express himself too boldly where he writes, *Est — homini cum Deo rationis societas. Inter quos autem ratio, inter eosdem etiam recta ratio communis est.*

<sup>a</sup> Upon this account it is, that I add the word *given* at the end of my description of reason.

the quality of that proposition, or those propositions, from which the inference is made.

*Again*; it should be observed, that what I have said of reasoning, chiefly belongs to it as it is an *internal* operation. When we are to represent our reasonings to others, we must transfer our thoughts to them by such ways as we can. The case is to be stated in a manner suitable to their capacities; a fair narration of matters of fact; and their circumstances, to be made; many times persons and things to be described by proper *diatyposes*, and the like: all which are additional labor, and take up much room in discourses and books, and are performed by different authors, upon different subjects, and in different kinds of writing, with an infinite variety of methods and forms, according to mens different views and capacities; and many times not without a necessity of some condescensions, ascititious advantages, and even applications to the passions. But notwithstanding this, in strict reasoning nothing is required, but to lay steps in a due order, firmly connected, and express properly, without flourish<sup>a</sup>; and to arrive at truth by the *shortest* and *clearest* gradation we are able.

*Once more*; perhaps disputacious men may say I ascribe the investigation of truth to one faculty, when it is in reality the joint business of several. For when we go about this work, we are forced to make use of subordinate powers, and even external helps; to draw *diagrams*, and put cases in our own imagination; to correct the images there, compound them, divide them, abstract from them; to turn over our memory, and see what has been entered and remains in that register; even to consult books, and use pen and ink. In short, we assemble all such axioms, theorems, experiments and observations, as are already known, and appear capable of serving us, or present themselves upon the opening and *analysis* of the question, or case before us. And when the mind has thus made its *tour*, fetched in materials from every quarter, and set them in its own view; then it contemplates, compares, and methodizes them; gives the first place to this, the second to that, and so on; and when trials do not succeed rightly, rejects some, adopts others, shifts their order, &c. till at last the *series* is so disposed, that the thing required comes up resolved, proved, or disproved by a *just* conclusion from proper premisses. Now in this process there seem to be many faculties concerned; in these acts of circumspection, recollection, invention, reflexion, comparing, methodizing, judging. But what if all this be so? I do not *exclude* the use of such subservient powers, or other helps, as are necessary to the exerting this faculty of Reason; nor deny the mind matter to work upon.

<sup>a</sup> *Simplex & nuda veritas est luculentior; quia satis ornata per se est: adeoque ornamentis extrinsecus additis fucata corrumpitur: mendacium verò specie placet alienâ, &c. Lactant.*



I may allow all the intellectual faculties their proper offices, and yet make reason to be what I have described it to be.

IX. *There is such a thing as right reason: or, Truth may be discovered by reasoning*<sup>a</sup>. The word *reason* has several acceptations. Sometimes it is used for that power mentioned in the last proposition; as when we say, *Man is a being indued with reason*. And then the sense of this proposition must be this; that there is such a use to be made of this power, as is right, and will manifest truth. Sometimes it seems to be taken for those general truths, of which the mind possesses itself from the intimate knowledge of its own ideas, and by which it is governed in its illations and conclusions; as when we say, *Such a thing is agreeable to reason*: for that is as much as to say, it is agreeable to the said general truths, and that authentic way of making deductions, which is founded in them. And then the sense of this proposition is, that there are such general truths, and such a right way of inferring. Again; sometimes it seems to stand only for some particular truth, as it is apprehended by the mind with the causes of it, or the manner of its derivation from other truth: that is, it differs not from truth except in this one respect, that it is considered not barely in itself, but as the effect and result of a process of reasoning; or it is truth with the arguments for our assent, and its evidences about it; as when it is said, *that such or such an assertion is reason*. And then the sense of the proposition is, that there are truths so to be apprehended by the mind. So all comes to this at last; truth (or there are truths, which) may be discovered, or found to be such, by reasoning.

If it were not so, our rational faculties, the noblest we have, would be vain.

Beside, that it is so, appears from the foregoing propositions and what we know within our selves. 'Tis certain we have immediate and abstract ideas: the relations of these are adequately known to the mind, whose ideas they are: the propositions expressing these relations are evidently known to be true: and these truths must have the common privilege and property of all truths, to be true in all the particulars and uses, to which they are applicable. If then any things are notified to us by the help of our senses, or present themselves by any other way or means, to

<sup>a</sup> That way, which some Sceptics take to prove the inexistence of truth, has nothing in it, unless it be a contradiction. If any thing, say they, is demonstrated to be true, how shall it be known, that that demonstration is true? *Ἐι ἐξ ἀποδείξεως, ζητηθήσεται πάλιν, πῶς ὅτι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀληθὲς ἐστὶ; καὶ ἔτι αἰετὸς ἐστὶν ἀπείρον. Sext. Emp.* Nor do I well comprehend S. Chrysostom's meaning, when he says, *Τὸ λογισμῶις ἀποδειχθὲν, καὶ ἀληθὲς ἦ, ἔδωκεν πληροφορίαν τῇ ψυχῇ παρέχει καὶ πίσιν ἱκανήν.* For as no man truly believes any thing, unless he has a reason for believing it; so a reason can be stronger than demonstration.

which these truths may be immediately applied, or from whence deductions may be made after the forementioned manner, new truths may be thus brought forth. And since these new truths, and the numerous descendents, that may spring from their loins, may be used still in the same manner, and be as it were the seed of more truth, who can tell at what undescried fields of knowledge even men may at length arrive? At least no body can doubt, but that much truth, and particularly of that kind, which is most *useful* to us in our conduct here, is discoverable by this method.

They, who oppugn the force and certainty of reason, and treat *right reason* as a *Chimera*, must argue against reason either with reason, or without reason. In the latter way they do nothing: and in the former they betray their own cause, and establish that, which they labor to dethrone. To prove there is no such thing as *right reason* by any good argument, is indeed impossible: because that would be to shew there is such a thing, by the manner of proving, that there is not.

And *further*, if this proposition be not true, there is no right reasoning in *Euclid*; nor can we be sure, that what is there demonstrated, is true. But to say this I am sure is absurd. Nor do I desire, that this proposition, which I here maintain, should be esteemed more certain than those demonstrated by him: and so *certain* it must be; because there can be no certainty in them, if this be not true.

The great *objection* against all this is taken from the many instances of false reasoning and ignorance, with which the practices, discourses, writings of mankind are too justly taxed. But, in *answer* to it, I would have it minded, that I do not say, men may not by virtue of their freedom break off their meditations and inquiries prematurely, before they have taken a sufficient cognizance of things; that they may not be prepossessed with inveterate errors, biassed by interest, or carried violently down with the stream of a sect or faction, or dazzled by some darling notion or bright name<sup>a</sup>; that they may not be unprovided of a competent stock of *præcognita* and preparative knowledge; that (among other things) they may not be ignorant of the very nature of reasoning, and what it is that gives sinews to an inference, and makes it just; that they may not want philosophy, history, or other learning requisite to the understanding and stating of the question truly; that they may not have the confidence to pretend to abilities, which they have not, and boldly to judge of things, as if they were qualified, when they are not; that they may not be impotent in their elocution, and misrepresent their own thoughts, by expressing themselves ill, even when within themselves they reason well; that many understandings may not be naturally gross, good heads often indisposed, and the ablest judges sometimes overseen, through

<sup>a</sup> *Haec alio fidei promiore lapsu, quam ubi falsa rei gravis autor existit.* Pliny.



inadvertence or haste: I say none of these things. The contrary I confess is manifest: and it is in opposition to those errors, which appear in these cases under the name of reason, that we are forced to add the epithet *right*, and to say *right reason* instead of *reason* only; to distinguish it from that, which wrongfully assumes that appellation. Nor, moreover, do I say, that by reasoning the truth is to be discovered in *every* case: that would imply an extent of knowledge, which we cannot pretend to. I only say, that there is such a thing as right reason, and truth discoverable by it.

I might add, that he, whose faculties are intire and sound, and who by a proper exercise of his mind in scientific studies first opens and enlarges its capacity, and renders his intellectuals active and penetrating; takes care to furnish himself with such leading truths, as may be useful to him, and of which he is assured in his own breast; and in treating any subject keeps them still in his eye, so that his discourse may be agreeable to them: I say, such a one is not in much danger of concluding falsely. He must either determin rightly, or soon find, that the subject lies out of his reach. However he will be sensible, that there are many things within his sphere, concerning which he may reason; and that there are truths to be found by this use of his faculties, in which he may securely acquiesce.

Thus that question supposed to be asked p. 27. *How shall a man know, what is true?* is in part answerd. More shall be added by and by: only a proposition or two, which ought not to be omitted, must be first inserted.

X. *To act according to right reason, and to act according to truth are in effect the same thing.* For in which sense soever the word *reason* is taken, it will stand either for truth itself, or for that, which is instrumental in discovering and proving it to be such: and then, with respect to this latter sense, whoever is guided by that faculty, whose office consists in distinguishing and pointing out truth, must be a follower of truth, and act agreeably to it. For to be governed by any faculty or power is to act according to the genuin decisions and dictates of it.

That reason, which is *right* (by the meaning of the words) must conclude *rightly*: but this it cannot do, if the conclusion is not true, or truth.

That is (for so I would be understood), if the principles and premisses from whence it results are true<sup>a</sup>, and certainly known to be so, the conclusion may be taken as certain and absolute truth: but otherwise the truth obtaind at the end of the argument is but hypotheticalal, or only this, that such a thing is so, if such another, or such others are so or so.

<sup>a</sup> That manner of demonstration, in which it has been pretended truth is deduced directly from that which is false, is only a way of shewing, that an assertion is true, because its contradictory is false; founded in that known rule, *Contradictoria nec simul vera, nec simul falsa esse possunt*, &c.

XI. To be governed by reason is the general law imposed by the Author of nature<sup>a</sup> upon them, whose uppermost faculty is reason: ■ the dictates of it in particular cases are the particular laws, to which they are subject. As there are beings, which have not so much as sense, and others that have no faculty above it; so there may be some, who are indued with reason, but have nothing higher than that. It is sufficient at present to suppose there may be such. And then if reason be the uppermost faculty, it has ■ right to controll the rest by being such. As in sensitive animals sense commands gravitation and mechanical motions in those instances, for which their senses are given, and carries them out into spontaneous acts: so in rational animals the gradation requires, that reason should command sense.

It is plain, that reason is of ■ commanding nature<sup>b</sup>: it enjoins this, condemns that, only allows some other things, and will be paramount (in an old word τὸ ὑγεμονικόν<sup>c</sup>) if it is at all. Now ■ being, who has such ■ determining and governing power so placed in his nature, ■ to be essential to him, is ■ being certainly framed to be governed by that power. It seems to be as much designed by nature, or rather the Author of nature, that rational animals should use their reason, and steer by it; ■ it is by the shipwright, that the pilot should direct the vessel by the use of the rudder he has fitted to it. The rudder would not be there, if it was not to be used: nor would reason be implanted in any nature only to be not cultivated and neglected. And it is certain, it cannot be used, but it must command: such is its nature.

It is not in one's power deliberately to resolve not to be governed by reason. For (here the same way of arguing may be used, that was lately) if he could do this, he must either have some reason for making that resolution, or none. If he has none, it is ■ resolution, that stands upon no foundation, and therefore in course falls: and if he has some reason for it, he is governed by reason. This demonstrates that reason must govern.

XII. If a rational being, as such, is under ■ obligation to obey reason, and this obedience, or practice of reason, coincides with the observation of truth, these things plainly follow.

<sup>a</sup> Cujus [summi rectoris & domini] ad naturam apta ratio vera illa & summa lex à philosophis dicitur. Cic. Νόμος ἀψευδής ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος, ἐχ' ὑπὸ τῆς δεινότητος ἢ τῆς δεινότητος δινητὴς φθαρτός, ἐν καρτιδίῳ ἢ ἐν ἡλῆϊ ἀψυχὸς ἀψύχῳ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀθανάτου φύσεως ἀφθαρτός ἐν ἀθανάτῳ διανοίᾳ τυπωθείς. Philo Jud. More to this purpose might be easily collected. <sup>b</sup> Λόγος ἐστὶν ἐκὼν Θεῷ. Ph. Jud. <sup>c</sup> Τὸ ὑγεμονικὸν τὸ κυριεύον τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος. M. Anton. Or as it is in Plutarch, τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνώτατον μέρος. Principatus in Tully, Summus in anima gradus. Tert.



1. That what is said *sect. I. prop. IV.* must be true with respect to such a being for this further cause; because to him nothing can be right, that interferes with reason, and nothing can interfere with truth, but it must interfere with reason. Such a harmony there is between them. For whatever is known to be true, reason either finds it, or allows it to be such. Nothing can be taken for true by a rational being, if he has a reason to the contrary. 2. That there is to a rational being such a thing as *religion* which may also upon this further account properly be called *natural*. For certainly to obey the law, which the Author of his being has given him, is religion: and to obey the law, which He has given or revealed to him by making it to result from the right use of his own natural faculties, must be to him his *natural religion*. 3. A careful observation of truth, the way to happiness, and the practice of reason are in the issue the same thing. For, of the two last, each falls in with the first, and therefore each with other. And so, at last, natural religion is grounded upon this triple and strict alliance or union of *truth*, *happiness*, and *reason*; all in the same interest, and conspiring by the same methods to advance and perfect human nature: and its truest definition is, *The pursuit of happiness by the practice of reason and truth*.

Permit me here again to insert an observation *obiter*.

*Obf.* The ~~neither~~ of right reason and truth, or that which is to be regarded in judging of right and truth is *private*: that is, every one must judge for himself. For since all reasoning is founded originally in the knowledge of one's own private *ideas*, by virtue of which he becomes conscious of some first truths, that are undeniable; by which he governs his steps in his pursuits after more truths, &c. the *criterion*, or that by which he tries his own reasonings, and knows them to be right, must be the *internal* evidence he has already of certain truths, and the agreeableness of his inferences to them. One man can no more discern the objects of his own understanding, and their relations, by the faculties of another, than he can see with another man's eyes, or one ship can be guided by the helm of another. They must be his *own* faculties and conscience, that must determin him. Therefore to demand another man's assent to any thing without conveying into his mind such reasons, as may produce a sense of the truth of it, is to erect a tyranny over his understanding, and to demand a tribute which it is *not possible* for him to pay<sup>a</sup>. It is true indeed, tho I cannot see with another man's eyes, yet I may be assisted by another, who has better eyes, in finding an object and the circumstances of it; and so men may be *assisted* in making their judgments of things. They may be informed of things, which they did not know before, and which yet require a place among those that are to be

<sup>a</sup> Religio cogi non potest, verbis potius quam verberibus res agenda est, ut sit voluntas. Lact.

considerd: and they may be directed what to advert principally upon; how to state the question; how to methodize their thoughts, and in general, how to reason: especially if they want learning, or have only that part of it, which is little conversant in close reflexions, and doth not teach them to reason, or (as the case too often is) teaches them not to reason. But still this is all in order to produce such a light in them, that by it *they* may see and judge for themselves. An opinion, tho ever so true and certain to one man, cannot be transfused into another as true and certain by any other way, but by opening his understanding, and assisting him so to order his conceptions, that he may find the reasonableness of it *within himself*.

To prevent mistakes let it be noted here, that, tho I say men must judge for themselves, I do not say they must in all cases *act* according to their private and single judgments. In respect of such things, as are private, and concern themselves *only*, or such as are left open and subject to every man's own sense, they may and ought; only preserving a due deference to them, who differ from them, and are known upon other occasions to have more knowledge and literature than themselves: but when a society is concerned, and hath determin'd any thing, it may be considerd as one person, of which he, who dissents from the rest, is only perhaps a small particle; and then his judgment will be in a manner absorbed and drown'd in that of the majority, or of them to whom the power of judging is intrusted. But I must not digress too far from the main business, the ways of coming at *truth*.

XIII. *The reports of sense are not of equal authority with the clear demonstrations of reason, when they happen to differ.* It is true, the *ideas* caus'd by the impression of sensible objects are real ideas, and truly known to the mind as they are in themselves; and the mind may use them, and reason truly upon them: *that is*, the mind may make a right use of the *ideas*, which it finds in itself. But then whether these are the true ectypes of their originals, and drawn to the life, is many times a question; and many times it is evident they are not. For that which has been anticipated under pr. III. but properly belongs to this, must be acknowledged. They are convey'd through *media* and by instruments susceptible of different dispositions and alterations, and may consequently produce different representations: and these cannot all be right. But suppose those instruments and *media* to be as intire and pure, as when intirest and purest; yet still there may be in many respects an incapacity in the faculty to notify things just as they are. How mightily does a visible object vary upon us its shape and size according to its distance, and the situation of the place, from whence the prospect is taken? Now these things cannot be said of the reports, or rather determinations of reason. For in pure reasoning we use our own ideas for *themselves*, and such as the mind knows them to be, not as representatives



of things, that may be falsely exhibited. This *internal* reasoning may indeed be wrongly applied to *external* things, if we reason about them as being what they are not: but then this is the fault not of reason, but of sense, which reports the case wrong; or perhaps of the person, who has not been sufficiently industrious to inform himself.

That same familiar instance of vision proves further, that reason may be applied to *over-rule* and *correct* sense. For when the pictures of objects are pricked out by the pencils of rays upon the *retina* of the eye, and do not give the true figure of those objects (as they not always do, being variously projected, as the lines proceeding from the several points happen to fall upon that concave surface); this, tho it might impose upon a being, that has no faculty superior to sense, doth not impose upon reason, which knows *how* the appearance is altered, and *why*. To think the sun<sup>a</sup> is not bigger, than it appears to the eye to be<sup>b</sup>, seems to be the last degree of stupidity. He must be a brute (so far from being a philosopher), who does not know, that the same line (*v. g.* the diameter of the sun) at different distances subtends different angles at the eye. A small matter of reason may serve to confute sense in this and the like cases.

*Obj.* How can *reason* be more certain than *sense*, since reason is founded in abstractions, which are originally taken from sensible objects? *Ans.* Perhaps the mind may by being exercised at first about particular objects by degrees find in itself this *capacity* of considering things by their *species*, making abstractions, &c. which it would not have done, had it never known any of these particulars. But then after it has found this capacity in itself, and attained to the knowledge of abstract and general *ideas*, I do not see why this capacity of reasoning by the help of them may not be used, upon this proficiency, to censure and correct the advices of sense concerning even such particulars, as first gave occasion to the mind to exert this capacity and raise it self. Is it a new thing for a scholar to make such a progress in learning, as to be able *afterward* to teach the master, from whom he received his first rudiments? May not the modern philosophers correct the ancients, because these first shewd them the way, and led them into the study of nature? If we look impartially into the history of learning, and even of religion, we shall find that truth has generally advanced by degrees, and many times (very many; as if that was the method of introducing knowledge among men) risen out of *fable* and *error*, which gave occasion to those inquiries, by which *themselves* were detected. Thus blind ignorance was succeeded by a twilight of sense: this brightend by degrees: at last

<sup>a</sup> *Tantulus ille* ——— *sol.* Lucr. Poor creature!  
*potesť, nostris quam sensibus esse videtur.* Lucr. Epicurus autem posse putat etiam minorem esse, quam  
*videatur, &c.* Cic.

<sup>b</sup> *Nec nimio solis major rota* ——— *Esse*

the sun ■ it were rose upon some parts of the commonwealth of learning, and cleared up many things: and I believe many more will in time be cleared, which, whatever men think, are yet in their *dark* and *barbarous* estate. The understanding, tho it starts from *particulars*, in time makes ■ further progress, taking in *generals*, and such notions logical, metaphysical, &c. as never could possibly come in by the senses<sup>a</sup>. Beside, further, the *capacity* itself of admitting and considering general *ideas* was originally in the mind, and is not derived from without. The intelligences communicated by sense, are only an occasion of using what it had before<sup>b</sup>. Just ■ a master may, by the exercises he sets, excite the superior capacity of his scholar.

In a word, no man doth, or can pretend to believe his senses, when he has a reason against it: which is an irrefragable proof, that reason is above sense and controls it. But,

XIV. *The reports of sense may be taken for true, when there is no reason against it<sup>c</sup>. Because when there is no reason not to believe, that alone is ■ reason for believing them. And therefore,*

XV. *In this case to act according to them (i. e. as taking the informations of sense to be true) is to act according to reason and the great law of our nature.*

Thus it appears that there are *two* ways, by which we may assure our selves of the truth of *many* things<sup>d</sup>; or at least may attain such ■ degree of certainty, ■ will be sufficient to determin our *practice*: by *reason*, and by *sense* under the government of reason; that is, when reason supports it, or at least doth not oppose it. By the former we discover speculative truths; by the latter, or both together matters of fact.

XVI. *Where certainty is not to be had<sup>e</sup>, probability must be substituted into the place of it: that is, it must be considered, which side of the question is the more probable.*

■ *Natura etiam nullo docente profecta ab iis, quorum, ex prima & inchoata intelligentia, genera cognovit, confirmat ipsa per se rationem, & perficit. Cic.* ■ *Semina nobis scientia dedit [natura], scientiam non dedit. Sen.*

■ *Si sani sunt [sensus], & valentes, & omnia removentur, qua obstant & impediunt. Cic.* ■ *Socrates's saying, ap. Cic. nihil se scire, nisi id ipsum, fa-*

vours of an affected humility, and must not be understood strictly. But they, who followed, went further (—— omnes sane veteres: qui nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt): and particularly Arcefilas negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum, quod Socrates sibi reliquisset. And thus the absurdity grew to a size, that was monstrous. For no man can act, or even be alive, if he knows nothing at all. Beside, to know that one knows no thing, is a contradiction: and not to know, that he knows even that, is not to know, whether he knows any thing, or not; and that is to know for ought he knows.

<sup>e</sup> *Nec scire fas est omnia. Hor.*

Probab-



Probability, or that, which in this case may incline one to believe any proposition to be true rather than false, or any thing *to be* rather than *not to be*, or the contrary, will generally shew itself upon the application of these and such like rules. 1. That may be reckoned probable, which, in the estimation of reason, appears to be more agreeable to the constitution of nature. No body can certainly foretell, that *six-ace* will come up upon two dies fairly thrown before *amb-ace*: yet any one would choose to lay the former, because in nature there are twice as many chances for that as for the other. If a strolling wolf should light upon a lamb, it is not evidently known, that he will tear the lamb: but there is such a natural propension in that kind to do it, that no body would much question the event. (This instance might have been taken from amongst men, who are generally as far as they can be, wolves one to another.) If a parent causes his child to be instructed in the foundations of useful learning, educates him virtuously, and gives him his first impulse and direction in the way to true happiness, he will be more likely to proceed and continue in it; than he would be to hit upon it, and continue in it too, if he was left to himself to be carried away by his own passions, or the influence of those people, into whose hands he might fall, the bias of the former lying towards vice, and misery in the end, and the plurality of the latter being either wicked or ignorant or both. So that the advantage in point of probability is on the side of good education<sup>a</sup>. When *Herodotus* writes, that the *Egyptian* priests reported the sun had within the compass of 11340 years twice risen where it now sets, and set where it rises<sup>b</sup>, what is fit to be believed concerning the truth of this relation (as of many others), is easily discernible by this rule. *Herodotus*, possibly delighting in teratological stories, might tell what he never heard: or the passage may be an interpolation; or it may be alter'd in transcribing: or the priests, who pretended much to a knowledge of great antiquities, might out of mere vanity, to shew what children the *Greeks* were in respect of them, invent such a monstrous relation, and impose it upon them, whom they thought to have not much science among them: or it might be got into their memoirs before their time, who related it to *Herodotus*, and so pass upon posterity, as many other fictions and legends have done. These are such things, as are well known to have happen often. But that the diurnal rotation of the earth about her axis should be in-

<sup>a</sup> This was the opinion of a wise man. חננך לוער על פי דרכו גם כי יזקין לא יסור ממנה. והלימוד בימי הזקנה כפתוח על החול. Prov. For הלימוד בימי הנערות הוא כפתוח על האבן. Lab ven. 'Ου μικρὸν διαφέρει τὸ ἕτας ἢ ἕτας ἐνδὺς οἱ νέαν ἐδίξασθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπόλυ μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν. Arist. <sup>b</sup> Τετράκις ἔλεγον ἐξ ἡθέων τὸν ἥλιον ἀνατεῖλαι. ἑνθά τε νῦν καταδύεται ἐνδεύτεν δις ἐπαν- τεῖλαι καὶ ἑνθεν νῦν ἀνατέλλει, ἐνθαῦτα δις καταδύναι.

verted, is a *phenomenon*, that has never been known to happen by any body else, either before or since; that is favord by no observation; and that cannot be without great alteration in the mundane system, or those laws by which the motions of the planets, and of our earth among the rest, are governed. That this account then may be false is very consistent with the humor and circumstances of mankind: but that it should be true is very inconsistent with those laws, by which the motions of the celestial bodies seem to be regulated, and tend to persevere in their present courses and directions. It is therefore *in nature* much more probable, that this account is false. The odds are on that side. 2. When any *observation* hath hitherto *constantly* held true, or *most commonly* proved to be so, it has by this acquired an establishd credit; the cause may be presumed to retain its former force; and the effect may be taken as probable, if in the case before us there doth not appear something particular, some reason for exception. No man can demonstrate, that the sun will rise again, yet every one doth, and must act, as if that was certain<sup>a</sup>: because we apprehend no decay in the causes, which bring about this appearance, nor have any other reason to mistrust the event, or think it will be otherwise a few hours hence, than it has been hitherto. There is no apodictical argument to prove, that any particular man will die: but yet he must be more than mad, who can presume upon immortality here, when he finds so many generations all gone to a man, and the same *enemies*, that have laid them prostrate, still pursuing their *victories*. These and such like, tho in strictness perhaps not certainties, are justly current for such. So great is their probability. There are other observations, which, tho not so infallible as those, deserve yet to be thought of, and to have a share in the direction of our judgments. *Ex. gr.* There have been men in the world and no doubt still are, who, having had opportunities of imposing falsities upon mankind, of cheating, or committing other wickedness, have yet in spite of temptation preserved their integrity and virtue: but, since opportunity has so seldom faild to corrupt them who have been in possession of her, and men's interests and passions continue in general the same, it is more probable her charms will still have the same power and effect, which they use to have; which whoever doth not mind, will be wofully obnoxious to be abused by frauds *pious* and *impious* b. Briefly; when there is no particular reason for the contrary, what has oftneft happend, may from experience most reasonably be expected to happen again. 3. When neither nature nor other observations point out the probable conjecture to us, we must be determind (if it be necessary for us to be determind at all) by the reports, and

<sup>a</sup> עולם כמנהגו הולך.

<sup>b</sup> פתי יאמין לכל דבר. Prov. (which sure one may conyert thus, המאמין לכל דבר פתי הוא.)



sense of them, whom we apprehend, judging with the best skill we have<sup>a</sup>, to be most *knowing*<sup>b</sup> and *honest*<sup>c</sup>. Of all these rules the *first* is that which deserves the principal regard: the other two are of use, when nature so utterly excludes *us* from her bosom, that no opportunity is allowd of making *a* judgment. *Lastly*, when nature, the frequent repetition of the same event, and the opinion of the best judges concur to make any thing probable, it is so in the highest degree.

It appears from what has been said concerning the nature and foundations of *probability*, that the force of it results from observation and reason together. For here the one is not sufficient without the other. Reason without *observation* wants matter to work upon: and observations are neither to be made justly by our selves, nor to be rightly chosen out of those made by others, nor to be aptly applied, without the assistance of *reason*. Both together may support opinion and practice in the absence of knowledge and certainty. For those observations upon the nature of men and things, which we have made our selves, we know; and our own reasoning concerning them, and deductions from them we know: and from hence there cannot but arise in many cases an internal obligation to give our assent to this, rather than that; or to act one way, rather than another. And *as* to the observations of others, they may be so cautiously and skilfully selected, *as* to become almost our own; since our own reason and experience may direct us in the choice and use of them. The remarks and advice of *old men*<sup>d</sup>, who have gone through variety of scenes, lived long enough to see the consequences of their own and other peoples actings, and can now with freedom<sup>e</sup> look back and tell where they erred, are ordinarily sure to be preferred to those of *young* and raw actors. The *gnoma*, apologues, &c. of *wise men*, and such *as* have made it their business to be useful spies upon nature and mankind, national *proverbs*, and the like<sup>f</sup>, may be taken *as* maxims commonly true. Men in their several professions and arts, in which they have been educated,

<sup>a</sup> Statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximè videtur esse sapientis. Cic. <sup>b</sup> Non numero hac judicantur, sed pondere, as Tully speaks upon another occasion. Therefore I cannot without a degree of indignation find a sort of writers pleasing themselves with having discovered some uncivilized nations, which have little or no knowledge of the Deity, &c. and then applying their observations to the service of atheism. As if *ignorance* could prove any thing, or alter its nature by being general.

<sup>c</sup> Aristotle's known rule is 'Ενδόξα, τὰ δοκῶντα πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι, ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τέτοις, ἢ τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἢ τοῖς πλείοσι, ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόχοις. But it is not applicable to all cases.

<sup>d</sup> Δοκεῖ μοι χρῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν [πρεσβυτέρων] πιπιδάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ τινα ὁδὸν προσηλυτῶσαν, ἣν καὶ ἡμᾶς ὁσως δέησαι πορεύεσθαι. ποῖα τις, ἔστι. Plato.

<sup>e</sup> When Sophocles, now grown old, was asked, Πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς τ' ἀφροδίσια, he answered, 'Ευφύμει, ὦ ἄνδρῳπε. ἀσμενέσῃ μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυτῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην δόρυ γόν. — παντάπασιν ᾧ ἢ γὰρ τοῖς τῶν ἐν τῇ γῆρᾳ πολλὴ εἰρήνη εἰσίνεταί καὶ ἐλευθερία. Plato, &c. al.

<sup>f</sup> 'Εν βραχεῖ σφυσήλατον νῦν περιέχοντα. Plut.

and exercised themselves all their days, must be supposed to have greater knowledge and experience, than others can usually have: and therefore, if through want of capacity or honesty they do not either lose, or belie their opportunities and experience, they are in respect of those things, to which they have been bred and inured, more to be relied upon. And, lastly, *histories* written by credible and industrious authors, and read with judgment, may supply us with examples, parallel cases, and general remarks, profitable in forming our manners, and opinions too. And by the frequent perusal of them, and meditation upon them a dexterity in judging of dubious cases is acquired. Much of the temper of mankind, much of the nature and tendency of their counsels, much of the course of Divine providence is visible in them.

To conclude; that we ought to follow *probability*, when certainty leaves us, is plain: because then it becomes the *only* light and guide we have. For unless it is better to wander and fluctuate in *absolute* uncertainty than to follow such a guide; unless it be reasonable to put out our *candle*, because we have not the light of the *sun*, it must be reasonable to direct our steps by probability, when we have nothing clearer to walk by. And if it be reasonable, we are obliged to do it by prop. XI. When there is nothing above *probability*, it doth govern: when there is nothing in the opposite scale, or nothing of equal weight, this in the course of nature must turn the beam. Tho a man, to resume the instance before, cannot demonstrate that *sice-ace* will come up before *ambs-ace*, he would find himself obliged (if he could be obliged to lay at all) to lay on that side: nor could he not choose to do it. Tho he would not be certain of the chance, he would be certain of his own obligation, and on which side it lay.

Here then is another way of discovering, if not *truth*, yet what in practice may be supposed to be truth. *That is*, we may by this way discover, whether such propositions are these be true, *I ought to do this, rather than that*; or, *to think so, rather than the contrary*.

*Obs.* I have done now what I chiefly intended here. But, over and above that, we may almost from the premisses collect,

*First*, the principal causes of *error*, which I take to be such as these. 1. Want of *faculties*; when men pretend to judge of things above them. As some (straying out of their proper element, and falling into the dark, where they find no *ideas* but their own dreams, come to) assert what they have no reason to assert: so others deny what there is the highest reason to believe, only because they cannot *comprehend it*. 2. Want of due *reflexion* upon those *ideas* we have, or may have: by which it comes to pass, that men are destitute of that knowledge, which is gained



by the contemplation of them, and their relations; misapply names, confusedly; and sometimes deal in a set of words and phrases, to which no *ideas* at all belong, and which have indeed no meaning. Of kin to this is, 3. Want of proper qualifications and *προπαιδεύματα*. As, when illiterate people invade the provinces of scholars; the half-lettered are forward, and arrogate to themselves what a modest, studious man dares not<sup>a</sup>, tho he knows more; and scholars, that have confined themselves to one sort of literature, lanch out into another: unsuccessfully all. 4. Not understanding in what the nature and force of a just consequence consists. Nothing more common than to hear people assert, that such a thing follows from such a thing; when it doth not follow: *i. e.* when such a consequence is founded in no axiom, no theorem, no truth that we know of. 5. Defects of *memory* and *imagination*. For men in reasoning make much use of these: memory is upon many occasions consulted, and sometimes draughts made upon the *phantasy*. If then they depend upon these, and these happen to be weak, clouded, perverted any way, things may be misrepresented, and men led out of the way by mis-shapen apparitions. There ought to be therefore a little *distrust* of these faculties, and such proper helps ought to be used, as perhaps the *best judgments* want the most. 6. Attributing too much to *sense*. For as necessary as our senses are to us, there are certainly many things, which fall not under their cognizance; many, which cannot be exhibited after the manner of sensible objects, and to which no images belong. Every one, who has but just saluted the mathematics and philosophy, must be convinced, that there are many things in nature, which seem absurd to sense, and yet must be admitted. 7. Want of *retirement*, and the practice of thinking and reasoning by our selves<sup>b</sup>. A rambling and irregular life must be attended with a loose and irregular head, ill-connected notions, and fortuitous conclusions. Truth is the offspring of *silence*, unbroken meditations, and thoughts often revised and corrected. 8. The strength of appetites, passions, prejudices. For by these the understanding may be corrupted, or overborn: at least the operations of the mind must be much obstructed by the intrusion of such sollicitors, as are no retainers to the rational powers, and yet strong, and turbulent. Among other prejudices there is one of a particular nature, which you must have observed to be one of the *greatest* causes of modern irreligion. Whilst some opinions and rites are carried to such an immoderate height, as exposes the absurdity of them to the view of almost every body but them who raise them, not only gentlemen of the *belles lettres*, but even men of common sense, many

<sup>a</sup> Sicut αμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει (ἐ Thucyd.) ita recta ingenia debilitat verecundia, perversa confirmat audacia. Plin. jun. <sup>b</sup> Όταν τι βελόριεδα ἀκρίβεις νοῆσαι, εἰς ἐρημίαν ἀποδιδράσκομεν, καταμύομεν τὰς ὄψεις, τὰ ὅσα ἐπιφράττομεν, ἀποτατόριεδα ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι Ph. Jud.

times see through them; and then out of indignation and an excessive renitence, not separating that which is true from that which is false, they come to deny both, and fall back into the contrary extreme, a contempt of all religion in general<sup>a</sup>. 9. Ill stating of a question; when men either put it wrong themselves, or accept it so put from others. A small addition or falsity slipped into the case will ferment, and spread itself: an artificial color may deceive one: an incumberd manner may perplex one. The question ought to be presented before its judge clean, and in its natural state, without disguise or distortion. To this last may be subjoind another cause, nearly allied to it; not fixing the sense of *terms*, and (which must often follow) not rightly understanding what it is, that is to be examin'd and resolv'd.

*Secondly*, the reason why the *many* are commonly in the wrong and so wretchedly misjudge things. The generality of people are not sufficiently prepared, by a proper education, to find truth by reasoning. And of them, who have liberal education; some are soon immerfed and lost in pleasures, or at least in fashionable methods of living, rolling from one visit or company to another<sup>b</sup>, and flying from nothing so much as from themselves and the quiet retreats proper for meditation and reasoning: others become involved in business and the intricate affairs of life, which demand their attention, and ingross their time: others fall into a slothful neglect of their studies and disuse of what they have learnt, or want help and means to proceed, or only design to deceive life and gratify themselves with the amusements and sensual parts of learning: and others there are, whose misfortune it is to begin wrong, to begin with the conclusion; taking their opinions from places, where they have been bred, or accommodating them to their situation in the world, and the conditions of that imployment, by which they are to get their bread, before they have ever considerd them; and then making the subsequent business of their lives to dispute for them, and maintain them, right or wrong. If such men happen to be in the right, it is luck, and part of their portion, not the effect of their improvements: and if they happen to be in the wrong, the more they study, and the more learning they get, the more they are confirmed in their errors; and having set out with their backs upon truth, the further they go, the more they recede from it. Their knowledge is a kind of negative quantity, so much worse or less than no knowledge. Of this sort there are many: and very few indeed (with respect to the bulk of mankind), whose determinations and *tenents* were ever in the form of questions: there could not otherwise be so many sects and different denominations of men, as there are, upon the face of the earth. The sum of all in a few words is this: many qualifica-

<sup>a</sup> *Aliis nullus est deorum respectus, aliis pudendus.* Plin. Sen. The former part of this observation is in truth the effect of the latter.

<sup>b</sup> *Pudet dicere frequentiam salutandi, &c.* Hieron.



tions are requisite in order to judge of some truths, and particularly those which are of *greatest importance*: proper learning and a penetration, vacancy from business, a detachment from the interest of all parties, much sincerity and a perfect *resignation* to the government of reason and force of truth; which are things not to be reconciled with the usual ignorance, passions, tumultuary lives, and other circumstances which carry most men transverse.

#### Sect IV. *Of the Obligations of imperfect Beings with respect to their power of acting.*

Here remains yet *another* question, supposed also to be proposed by an objector, which must not be forgot; and upon which I shall bestow this very short section. The question was this, *If a man can find out truth, may he not want the power of acting agreeably to it?*

I. *Nothing is capable of an obligation.* For to oblige *nothing* is the same as not to oblige.

II. *So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, so far is that being incapable of any obligation to do it: or, no being is capable of any obligation to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do.* For that being, which has not the faculties or opportunity necessary to the doing of any thing, is in respect of that thing a being utterly unactive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that act nothing at all.

To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power superior to the resistance to be met with in doing it. To require him to apply such a power is the same as to require that his power of such a kind and degree be applied. But if he has no such power, then his power of that kind and degree is *nothing*: and it is nothing, that is required to be applied. Therefore nothing is required to be done. It is just the same, as if a man was commanded to do something with his third hand, when he has but two: which would be the same as to bid him to do it with no hand, or not bid him do it.

Without more adoe, it is a truth confest by every body, that no body is obliged to impossibilities.

From hence will follow, after the manner of *corollaries*, the two following propositions.

III. *Inanimate and unactive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely sensitive of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above sense.*

IV. *The obligations of beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to their faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more.*

V. *To endeavour may fitly express the use of all the opportunities and powers, that any intelligent and active, but imperfect, being hath to act. For to endeavour is to do what one can: and this as every such being may do, where ever he stands in the scale of imperfects, so none can do more. One may exert his endeavours with greater advantage or success, than another; yet still they are but endeavours.*

VI. *The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of understanding and acting must be in proportion to their endeavours: or, their obligations reach, as far as their endeavours may. This follows again from what has been said: and so does this,*

VII. *and lastly, They who are capable of discerning truth, tho not all truths, and of acting conformably to it, tho not always or in all cases, are nevertheless obliged to do these, as far as they are able: or, it is the duty of such a being sincerely to endeavour to practice reason; not to contradict any truth, by word or deed; and in short, to treat every thing as being what it is.*

Thus the duties of rational beings, mentiond in or resulting from the preceding sections, are brought together, and finally fixt under the correction or limitation in this last proposition. This is the sum of their religion, from which no exemption or excuse lies. Every one can endeavour: every one can do what he can. But in order to that every one ought to be in earnest, and to exert himself heartily; not stifling his own conscience, not dissembling, suppressing, or neglecting his own powers.

And now needles to me seem those disputes about *human liberty*, with which men have tired themselves and the world. The case is much the same, as if a man should have some great reward or advantage offerd to him, if he would get up and go to such a place to accept it, or do some certain thing for it, and he, instead of going or doing any thing, falls into a tedious disquisition about his own *freedom*; whether he has the power to stir, or whether he is not chaind to his seat, and necessitated to sit still. The short way of knowing this certainly is to try. If he can do nothing, no labor can be lost; but if he is capable of acting, and doth not act, the consequences and blame must be justly chargeable upon himself. And I am persuaded



suaded, if men would be serious, and put forth themselves<sup>a</sup>, they would find by experience, that their wills are not so universally and peremptorily determin'd by what occurs, nor predestination and fate so rigid<sup>b</sup>, but that *much* is left to their own conduct<sup>c</sup>. Up and try<sup>d</sup>.

Sure it is in a man's power to keep his hand from his mouth: if it is, it is also in his power to forbear excess in eating and drinking. If he has the command of his own feet, so as to go either this way or that or no whither, as sure he has, it is in his power to abstain from ill company and vicious places. And so on<sup>e</sup>.

This suggests a very material thought: that *forbearances*, at least in all ordinary cases, are within our power<sup>f</sup>; so that a man may if he will forbear to do that, which contradicts truth: but where acting is required, that very often is not in his power. He may want abilities, or opportunities; and so may seem to contradict truth by his omission, which, if his infirmities and disadvantages were taken into the account, and the case was rightly stated, he would be found not to do.

<sup>a</sup> Τὰ χρηστὰ ἐπισώμεθα, καὶ γινώσκωμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκπονήμεν δ'. οἱ μὲν ἀργίας ὑπο, κλ. Eurip. <sup>b</sup> *in Arabic is to die*: and from hence the word *fatum* seems to come (as many *Latin* words do from that and other *Eastern* languages), death, if any thing, being *fatal* and necessary. Yet it doth not follow, that therefore the time or manner of dying is unmoveably fixt. Ὅτι πάντα καθαρῶς οὐδὲ διαρρήδην ἡ ἐμπαρμένη περιέχει, ἀλλ' ὅσα καθόλου. Plut. Chrysippus ap. A. Gell. seems to explain himself much after the same manner. The ancients moreover seem many times to make fate conditional. *Similis si cura fuisset, Nec pater omnipotens Trojam, nec fata vetabant stare. Ecce. Virg.* <sup>c</sup> What the *Pharisees* say, according to *Josephus*, seems to be right. Οἱ μὲν ἐν Φαρισαϊοῖς τινα καὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τῆς ἐμπαρμένης εἶναι λέγουσιν ἔργον, τινὰ δ' ἐφ' αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν, συμβαίνειν τε καὶ ἐγίνεσθαι. R. Albo, in relation to human actions (and the consequent events), explains this opinion thus. *מקצתן בחירות ומקצתן מכרחות* But for men to charge their own faults upon fate or fortune has been an old practice: ἐξελοκακήσαντας—ἐπὶ τὴν κοινὴν ἐκείνην ἀπόλογίαν καταφυγεῖν, κλ. Luc. <sup>d</sup> *Dimidium facti, qui coepit, habet. sapere aude.* Hor. *Aristotle* goes further than that old adagial saying (ἀρχὴ ἡμισυ παῖς). His words are Δοκεῖ πλεῖον ἢ τὸ ἡμισυ τῆς παντὸς εἶναι ἡ ἀρχή. <sup>e</sup> Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔτι κακῶς συντέτακται τῶν ψυχῶν ἐχόντων, ὥστε ἀβελήντος αὐτὸ προΐεναι πόδας, ἢ φθίγγεσθαι γλῶτταν, κλ. Plut. That in *Tibullus*, *Cum bene juravi, pes tamen ipse redit*, is a little poetic sally. <sup>f</sup> Ὅλως δὲ πάντα ἀργία καὶ τῆς τύχης πράξεώς ἐστιν ἐμπαρμένη. ἢ ἐφορεύσεις, οὐ μοιχέυσεις, κτλ. Ba.

SECT. V. Truths relating to the Deity. Of his existence, perfection, providence, &c.

I Have shewn in what the nature of *moral good* and *evil* consists; viz. a conformity or disagreement to *truth*, and those things that are coincident with it, *reason* and *happiness*: also, how truth is discovered; by *sense*, or *reason*, or *both*. I shall now specify some of those *truths*, which are of greatest importance and influence, and require more reasoning to discover them; leaving the rest (common matters of fact) to the common ways of finding them. They respect principally either the *Deity*, or *our selves*, or the *rest of mankind*. The first sort are the subject of *this* section.

I. Where there is a subordination of causes and effects, there must necessarily be a cause in nature prior to the rest, uncaused. Or thus, Where there is a series, in which the existence of one thing depends upon another, the existence of this again upon some other, and so upwards, as the case shall be, there must be some independent being, upon whom the rest do originally depend.

If Z (some body) be put into motion by Y, Y by X, and X by W, it is plain that X moves Y, and Y moves Z only as they are first moved, X by W, and Y by X: that Z, Y, X are *moveds*, or rather Z more Y more X, taken together<sup>a</sup>, are *one moved*: that W stands here as the first mover, or author of the motion, unmoved by any other: that therefore without W there would be a *moved* without a *mover*, which is absurd<sup>b</sup>: and lastly, that of what length soever the series may be, the case will be ever the same; i. e. if there be no *First mover*<sup>c</sup> unmoved, there must be a *moved* without a *mover*.

Further, if W, whom we will suppose to be an intelligent being, and to have a power of *beginning* motion, hath this power *originally* in himself and *independently* of all others, then here not only the first mover in this series, but a *First being* and original cause is found. Because that, which has a power of beginning motion *independent* of any other, is a *mover independent*; and therefore is *independent*, or has an independent existence, since nothing can be a mover without being. But if W has not

<sup>a</sup> Z†Y†X.

<sup>b</sup> One might with the Στασιῶται (so called by Aristotle, ap. S. Emp.) as well deny, that there is any such thing as motion, as say there is motion without a mover; or, which is the same, a *first mover*.

<sup>c</sup> Πρῶτον μετὰ πάντων. Plato. Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἀπάσης. Id. Πρῶτον κινῶν. Arist.



this power independently in himself, then he must receive it from some other, upon whom he depends, and whom we will call V. If then V has a power of *conferring a faculty* of producing motion originally and independently in himself, here will be a *First, independent cause*. And if it can be supposed, that he has it not thus, and that the *series* should rise too high for us to follow it; yet however we cannot but conclude, that there is *some* such *cause*, upon whom this train of beings and powers must depend, if we reason as in the former paragraph. For,

Universally, if Z be *any effect whatsoever*, proceeding from or depending upon Y as the *cause* of its existence, Y upon X, X upon W, it is manifest that the existence of all, Z, Y, X does *originally* come from W, which stands here as the Supreme cause, depending upon nothing: and that without it X could not be, and consequently neither Y, nor Z. Z, Y, X, being all effects (or dependents), or rather Z more Y more X *one effect*, without W there would be an effect without a cause. Lastly, let this retrogression from effects to their causes be continued ever so far, the same thing will still recur, and without such a cause as is before mentiond the whole will be an effect without an efficient, or a dependent without any thing to depend upon; *i. e. dependent, and not dependent*.

Obj. The *series* may ascend *infinitely*<sup>a</sup>, and for that reason have no *first* mover or cause. Ans. If a *series* of bodies moved can be supposed to be *infinite*, then taken together it will be equal to an *infinite body* moved: and this *moved* will not less require a mover than a finite body, but *infinitely more*. If I may not be permitted to place a first mover at the top of the *series*, because it is supposed to be infinite, and to have no beginning; yet still there must of necessity be *some* cause or author

<sup>a</sup> The greatest men among the ancients denied the possibility of such an ascent. Οὐτε γὰρ τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ δὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι εἰς ἄπειρον. *Arist.* If there could be such a process, then all the parts of it but the last would be μέσα: and then εἴπερ μὴδὲν ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον, ὅλως αἰτίου οὐδὲν ἐστὶ, κλ. To suppose one thing moved by another, this by another, and so ἐπ' ἄπειρον, is to suppose ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον. οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως εὐτε κινῶν ἔσται ἔτε κινέμενον, μὴ ἔσης ἀρχὴς τῆς κινήσεως. *Simpl.* Not only those Arabian philosophers called Hebr. מרברים, Arab. اَلْمَحْكَلَمُونَ, but many of the elder Jews have agreed with the Greeks in this matter, and added arguments of their own. Of the former see *Mor. nebok.* & al. particularly *S. Kozri*: where their first argument seems to be strong (and much the same with the fourth in *S. Emunoth*). אם היה חולף אין לו ראשית הנה האישיות הנמצאים בזמן החולף עד העת הזאת אין תכלית להם נמה שאין לו תכלית לא יצא אל הפועל. For tho, *Muscatus* observes, these reasonings of the *Medabberim* [המדרה] לפניו היו לרצון; לא לרצון; yet most certainly let the *series* of causes and effects be what it will, it is just as long downward as upward; and if they are infinite and inexhaustible one way, they must be so the other too: and then what *Saad. Ga.* says, takes place אם לא חגיו ההיה. There is another argument of this kind in *Justin M.* which deserves notice, what stress soever may be laid upon it. Εἰ τὸ μέλλον μέρος τῶ χρόνου, says he, ἔπω ἐστὶν ἢν δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενος μέρος τῶ χρόνου πρὸ τῶ γενέσθαι μέλλον ἢν ἄρα ὅτε ἐκ ἢν τὸ γεγονὸς μέρος τῶ χρόνου.

of the motion<sup>a</sup>, different from all these bodies, because there being (*by the supposition*) no one body in the *series*, that moves the next, but only in consequence of its being moved first itself, there is no one of them that is not *moved*, and the whole can be considered together but as an infinite body moved, and which must therefore be moved by *something*.

The same kind of answer holds good in respect of *all* effects and their causes in general. An *infinite* succession of effects will require an *Infinite* efficient, or a cause *infinitely effective*. So far is it from requiring *none*.

Suppose a *chain*<sup>b</sup> hung down out of the heavens from an *unknown* height, and tho every link of it gravitated toward the earth, and what it hung upon was not visible, yet it did not descend, but kept its situation; and upon this a question should arise, *What supported or kept up this chain*: would it be a sufficient answer to say, that the *first* (or lowest) link hung upon the second (or that next above it), the *second* or rather the *first and second together* upon the *third*, and so on *ad infinitum*? For what holds up the *whole*? A *chain* of *ten* links would fall down, unless something able to bear it hindered: one of *twenty*, if not staid by something of a yet greater strength, in proportion to the increase of weight: and therefore one of *infinite* links certainly, if not sustained by something *infinitely* strong, and capable to bear up an infinite weight. And thus it is in a *chain* of causes and effects<sup>c</sup> tending, or as it were *gravitating*, towards some end. The last (or lowest) depends, or (as one may say) is *suspended* upon the cause above it: this again, if it be not the first cause, is *suspended* as an effect upon something above it, &c.<sup>d</sup> And if they should be in-

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle himself, who asserts the eternity of *motion*, asserts also the necessity of a first and eternal mover.

<sup>b</sup> Σειρὴν χρυσαίνην ἐξ ἑρανόθεν — Hom. *Aurea de caelo* — *funis* is mentioned too by *Lucr.*

<sup>c</sup> אי אפשר שישתלשל ענין מעלה ועלול אל בלתי תכלית.

<sup>d</sup> The chain must be fastend περὶ πρὶν Οὐλύμποιο. *Invenietur*, says *Macrobius*, *pressius intuenti à summo Deo usque ad ultimam rerum facem* — *connexio: et hac est Homeri catena aurea, quam pendere de caelo in terras Deum jussisse commemorat.* This matter might be illustrated by other similitudes (even שלשלת הקבלה might serve for one): but I shall set down but one more: and in that indeed the motion is inverted, but the thing is the same taken either way. It occurs in *Hob. halleb.* and afterward in *Rash. bhekem.* Suppose a row of blind men, of which the last laid his hand upon the shoulder of the man next before him, he on the shoulder of the next before him, and so on till the foremost grew to be quite out of sight; and some body asking, what guide this string of blind men had at the head of them, it should be answered, that they had no guide, nor any head, but one held by another, and so went on, *ad infin.* would any rational creature accept this for a just answer? Is it not to say, that infinite blindness (or blindness, if it be infinite) supplies the place of sight, or of a guide?



finite, unless (agreeably to what has been said) there is some *cause* upon which all hang or depend, they would be but an infinite effect without an efficient: and to assert there is any such thing, would be as great an *absurdity*, as to say, that a finite or *little* weight wants something to sustain it, but an infinite one or the *greatest* does not.

II. *A Cause or Being, that has in nature no superior cause, and therefore (by the terms) is also unproduced, and independent, must be self-existent: i. e. existence must be essential to Him; or, such is his nature, that He cannot but be<sup>a</sup>.* For every being must either exist of itself, or not of itself: that which exists not of itself must derive its existence from some other, and so be *dependent*: but the Being mentiond in the proposition is supposed to be *independent*, and *uncaused*. Therefore He must exist, not *this* way, but the *other*. The root of His existence can be sought for no where, but in His own nature: to place it any where else is to make a cause *superior* to the *Supreme*.

III. *There must be such a Being.* For (beside what has been said already) if there was not at least *one* such Being, *nothing could be* at all<sup>b</sup>. For the *universe* could not produce itself; nor could any part of it produce itself, and then produce the rest: because this is supposing a thing to *act* before it is.

<sup>a</sup> So Aristotle says of the First mover, Οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ, κλ. And after him the Arabic philosophers, Maimonides, Albo, & al. pass. teach all that God exists necessarily. מן השקר העררי: to suppose him not to be implies a falsity; or, He cannot be supposed not to be. This seems to be the import of that name, by which God calls himself in Moses's history; אהיה אשר אהיה; or in one word, אהיה; which in the mouth of one who speaks of Him in the third person is יהיה or יהוה. So Philo explains it; Ἔναι πέφυκα. So Abarbanel; אני אהיה בעבוד שאהיה כי אין מציאותי תלוי באלהים; adding moreover, that it shewd God to be not, like other beings, איפשרי, but המציאות, מחוייב המציאות מצד עצמו, a Necessary being. And so R. L. b. Gersh. יורה זה השם. I omit others, who write after the same manner. There have been even Heathens, who seemd to think, that some such name as this belongd to the Deity, and for the same reason. For as אהיה and thence יהוה are used above, so Plutarch says, that in addresssing to Him the second person ἔσσι (תהיה, or יהוה) is αὐτοτελής ὁ θεὸς προσαγορεύσεις καὶ προσφώνσεις: and that by this compellation we give Him ἀληθεῖ καὶ ἀψευδῇ καὶ μόνῃ μόνῃ προσάγειν τῇ ᾧ ἔστιν αὐτοτελής. Ἡμῶν μὲν γὰρ ὅντως ἔστιν αὐτοτελής καὶ ἀψευδὲς καὶ μόνον καὶ ἀγέννητον ἔστιν αὐτοτελής that is ὄντως ὄν.

<sup>b</sup> Something must be *מחוייב המציאות*, otherwise לא יהיה כלל. every thing cannot be *אפשר מציאות*, &c. Mor. neb. & al. This needs no demonstration. But there is a very old one in S. Emun. and after in Hhob. halleb, עושה את עצמו אל ימלט מאחר משני דברים שעשה את עצמו קודם היותו או אחר היותו ושניהם אי אפשר וכד.





In inquiring after the causes of things, when we find (or suppose) this to be the cause of that, another thing to be the cause of this again, and so on, if we can proceed, it may always be demanded with respect to the last cause that we can comprehend, *What is the cause of that?* So that it is not possible for us to terminate our inquiries of this kind but in something, which is to us *incomprehensible*. And therefore the Supreme cause must certainly be such <sup>a</sup>. But tho it is impossible for us to have an adequate notion of his manner of existence, yet we may be sure that

VI. *He exists in a manner, which is perfect.* For He, who exists of himself, depends in no regard upon any other, and (as being a Supreme cause) is the fountain of existence to other beings, must exist in the *uppermost* and *best* manner of existing. And not only so, but (since He is *infinite* and *illimited*) He must exist in the best manner *illimitedly* and *infinitely*. Now to exist thus is infinite goodness of existence; and to exist in a manner *infinitely good* is to be *perfect*.

VII. *There can be but One such Being* <sup>b</sup>. That is, as it appears by prop. III. that there must be at least *one* independent Being, such as is mentiond in prop. I. so now, that in reality there is *but One* <sup>c</sup>. Because his manner of existence being perfect and *illimited*, that manner of being (if I may speak so) is *exhausted* by Him, or belongs solely to Him <sup>d</sup>. If any other could partake with Him in it, He must want what that other had; be *deficient* and *limited*. Infinite and illimited inclose all <sup>e</sup>.

If there could be *two* Beings each by himself *absolutely* perfect, they must be either of the *same*, or of *different* natures. Of the *same* they cannot be; because thus, *both* being *infinite*, their existences would be *coincident*: that is, they would be but the *same* or *one*. Nor can they be of *different* natures: because if their natures were *opposite* or *contrary* the one to the other, being equal (infinite both and every where meeting the one with the other), the one would just *destroy* or be the *nega-*

<sup>a</sup> *Simonides* had good reason still to double upon *Hiero* the number of days allowd for answering that question, *Quid, aut quale sit Deus?* Ap. Cic. <sup>b</sup> *Nec viget quidquam simile aut secundum.* Hor.

<sup>c</sup> In *Mor. neb.* *Maimonides* having proved, that there must be some Being, who exists *necessarily*, or whose existence is *necessary* בְּבַחֲיוֹת עֲצָמוֹ, proceeds from this necessity of existence to derive *incorporeity*, absolute *simplicity*, *perfection*, and particularly *unity*. הַמַּחֲזִיב הַמַּעֲצוּת אֵי אֶפְסֵר בּוֹ הַשְׁנִיּוֹת כֻּלָּל לֹא דוּמָה וְלֹא הַפֶּךְ וְכו'.

<sup>d</sup> Therefore by *Plato* He is called ὁ εἷς, *the One*.

<sup>e</sup> *Deus, si perfectus est, — ut esse debeat, non potest esse nisi unus, ut in eo sint omnia.* If there could be more Gods than one, *tantum singulis de-erit, quantum in ceteris fuerit.* Lact.

tion of the other<sup>a</sup>: and if they are supposed to be only different, not opposite, then if they differ as *disparates*, there must be some *genus* above them; which cannot be: and however they differ, they can only be said to be beings perfect in their *respective kinds*. But this is not to be *absolutely* perfect; it is only to be perfect in *this* or *that* respect: and to be only thus implies imperfection in *other* respects.

What has been here said is methinks sufficient to ruin the *Manichean* cause, and exclude the *independent principle of evil*. For if we cannot account for the existence of that *evil*, which we find by experience to be in the world, it is but one instance out of many of our ignorance. There may be reasons for it, tho we do not *know* them. And certainly no such experience must make us deny *axioms* or *truths* equally certain<sup>b</sup>. There are, beside, some things relating to this subject, which deserve our attention. For as to *moral* good and evil, they seem to depend upon our selves<sup>c</sup>. If we do but endeavour, *the most* we can, to do what we ought, we shall not be guilty of *not doing* it: and therefore it is *our* fault, and not to be charged upon any other being<sup>d</sup>, if guilt and *evil* be introduced by *our* abuse of our own liberty and powers<sup>e</sup>. Then as to *physical* evil; without it much *physical good* would be lost, the one necessarily inferring the other<sup>f</sup>. Some things *seem* to be evil, which would not appear to be such, if we could see through the *whole* contexture of things<sup>g</sup>. There are not *more* evil than good things in the world, but surely more of the *latter*<sup>h</sup>. Many evils of *this* kind, as well as of the *former*, come by our own *fault*; some perhaps by way of *punishment*; some of *physic*<sup>i</sup>; and some as the *means* to happiness, not otherwise to be obtained. And if there is a future state, that which seems to be wrong *now* may be rectified *hereafter*. To all which more may yet be added. As, that *matter* is not capable of perfection; and therefore where that is concern'd, there *must be* imperfections, and consequently evils<sup>k</sup>. So that to ask, why God permits evil, is

■ As light and darkness are. Δύο γὰρ ἐξισάζοντα ἀλλήλοις κατ' ἐναντίωσιν φθαρτικὰ ἔσται πάντα τῆς ἀλλήλων συστάσεως. *Basf.* There can be no such law between them, as is said to be among the Hea-then deities. Θεοῖσι δ' ὡδ' ἔχει νόμος. Οὐδεὶς ἀπαντῶν ἐλέγεται προθυμία τῇ ᾧ δέλονται, κλ. *Eurip.*  
<sup>b</sup> Ἀπόλαυνεν ἡ ἀλήθεια, ἐπεὶ σὺ δυσυχεῖς: *Id.* <sup>c</sup> Ψυχὴν ἔχεις ἀντεξέσσιον. — ἔ γὰρ κατὰ γένεσιν ἀμαρτάνεις, ἔτε κατὰ τύχην πορνείας, κλ. *Cyr. Hier.*

<sup>d</sup> Ὡν αὐτὸς ἔστι κύριος, τέταν τὰς ἀρχὰς μὴ ζητήσης ἐτέρωθεν. *S. Basf.* ■ Must God extinguish sun, moon, and stars, because some people worship them? Μισήν. Αὐτῶς ἔλομένεσιν αὐτὰ, Θεὸς ἀνάντιος. *Max. T.* <sup>f</sup> Ἡ δὲ ψαμὴν σάματι παρασκευάζει ἡδοὴν ποτὶς, κλ. *Max. T.* This observation might be extended ■ great way. If there was, *v. g.* no such thing as *poverty*, there could be no *riches*, or no great benefit by them; there would be scarce any arts or sciences, &c. Ἄν γὰρ ἀνέλης τὴν πέναν, ἔβλεπεν τὴν σύστασιν ἀνείλες ἀπάσαν, κλ. *Chrys.*

<sup>g</sup> Τὰ μίση πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ὅλον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ σύμφωνα καὶ ἀρμόττοντα ἐκείνῳ (with more to this purpose). *Plot.* <sup>h</sup> V. *Mor. nebok.* 3. 12. <sup>i</sup> Πολλοὶ δὲ Θεὸν ἰατρικὴν. *Simpl.* <sup>k</sup> Κακία ἐλάσημα τῆς ὕλης. *Plot.*



to ask, why he permits a *material* world, or such a being as ~~man~~ is <sup>a</sup>; indowd indeed with some noble faculties, but incumberd at the same time with *bodily* passions and propensions. Nay, I know not whether it be not to ask, why He permits any imperfect being; and that is, any being at all: which is a bold demand, and the answer to it lies perhaps too deep for us. If this world be designd for a *palestra*, where men <sup>b</sup> are to *exercise* their faculties and their virtues, and by that *prepare* themselves for a superior state <sup>c</sup> (and who can say it is not?) there must be *difficulties* and *temptations*, occasions and opportunities for this exercise. Lastly, if there are evils, of which men know not the true *origin*; yet if they would but seriously reflect upon the many marks of *reason*, *wisdom* and *goodness* every where to be observed in instances, which they *do* or *may* understand, they could scarce doubt but the same things prevail in those, which they *do not* understand. If I should meet with a *book*, the author of which I found had disposed his matter in beautiful order, and treated his subjects with reason and exactness; but at last, as I red on, came to a few leaves written in a language which I did not know: in this case I should close the book with a full persuasion, that the same vein of good sense, which shewd itself in the former and much greater part of it, ran through the other also: especially having arguments *à priori*, which obliged me to believe, that the author of it all was the same person. This I should certainly do, rather than deny the force of those arguments, in order to assert two authors of the same book. But the evil principle has led me too far out of my way, therefore to return,

VIII. *All other beings depend upon that Being mentiond in the foregoing propositions for their existence.* For since there can be but one Perfect and independent being, the rest must be imperfect and dependent: and since there is nothing else, upon which they can, *ultimately*, depend beside Him, upon Him they *must* and *do* depend.

IX. *He is therefore the Author of nature: nor can any thing be, or be done, but what He either causes (immediately, or mediately), or permits.* All beings (by the last) depend upon Him for their existence: upon whom depends their existence, upon him also must depend the intrinsic manner of their existence, or the *natures* of these beings: and

▪ To that question, Why are we not so made, ὥστε μηδὲ βελομένοις ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν; S. Basil answers, Because ἀρετὴ ἐν προαιρέσει καὶ ἐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται. And he who blames the Deity because we are not impeccable, εἰδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὴν ἄλογον φύσιν τῆς λογικῆς προτιμᾶ, καὶ τὴν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἀνόρμητον τῆς προαιρετικῆς καὶ ἐμπράκτου. <sup>b</sup> Ἀθληταὶ ἀρετῆς, εἰς Philo. ▪ In Chrysostom's style, ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελείας, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν παλαίστρᾳ ἐπὶ τῷ παρόντος εἰς ἀγωνίζεσθαι, ἵνα μετὰ τὸ λαθῆναι τὸ δέαιτρον λαμπρὸν ἀναδείξασθαι δυνήσῃμεν τὸ εἶφαινον.

again

again upon whom depend their being and nature, upon Him depend the *necessary effects* and *consequences* of their being, and being such as they are in themselves. Then, as to the *acts* of such of them as may be *free agents*, and the effects of them, He is indeed *not* the Author of those; because by the terms and supposition they proceed from agents, who have no necessity imposed upon them by Him to act either this or that way. But yet however these *free agents* must depend upon Him *as such*: from Him they derive their power of acting: and it is He, who permits them to use their liberty; tho many times, through their own fault, they use it amiss. And, lastly, as to the nature of those *relations*, which lie between ideas or things actually *existing*, or which arise from facts already *done and past*, these result from the natures of the *things* themselves: all which the Supreme being either causes, or permits (as before). For since things can be but in one manner at once, and their mutual relations, ratio's, agreements, disagreements, &c. are nothing but their manners of being with respect to each other, the natures of these *relations* will be determin'd by the natures of the *things*.

From hence now it appears, that whatever expresses the existences or non-existences of things, and their mutual relations *as they are*, is true by the *constitution* of nature: and if so, it must also be agreeable to His perfect *comprehension* of all truth, and to His *will*, who is at the head of it. Tho the act of A (some free agent) is the effect of his *liberty*, and can only be said to be *permitted* by the Supreme being; yet when it is once *done*, the relation between the *doer* and the *deed*, the agreement there is between A and the idea of one who has committed such a fact, is a *fixt* relation. From thenceforward it will *always* be predicable of him, that he was the doer of it: and if any one should deny this, he would go counter to nature and that great Author of it, whose existence is now proved. And thus those arguments in sect. I. prop. 4. which turned only upon a *supposition* that there was such a Being, are here *confirmed* and *made absolute*.

X. *The one supreme and perfect Being, upon whom the existence of all other beings and their powers originally depend, is that Being, whom I mean by the Word GOD.*

There are other *truths* still remaining in relation to the Deity, which we *may know*, and which are *necessary to be known* by us, if we would endeavour to demean our selves toward Him according to *truth* and what He is. And they are such, as not only tend to rectify our opinions concerning His nature and attributes; but also may serve at the same time as *further proofs* of His existence, and an amplification of some things touched perhaps too lightly. As,



XI. GOD cannot be corporeal: or, there can be no corporeity in God. There are many things in *matter* utterly inconsistent with the nature of such a Being, as it has been demonstrated God must be.

*Matter* exists in *parts*, every one of which, by the term, is imperfect<sup>a</sup>: but in a Being absolutely perfect there can be nothing that is imperfect.

These *parts*, tho they are many times kept closely united by some occult influence, are in truth so many *distinct* bodies, which may, at least in our imagination, be disjoind or placed otherwise: nor can we have any idea of matter, which does not imply a natural discerpibility and susceptibility of various shapes and modifications: i. e. mutability seems to be essential to it. But God, existing in a manner that is perfect, exists in a manner that must be *uniform*, always one and the same, and in nature *unchangeable*<sup>b</sup>.

*Matter* is incapable of *acting*, *passive* only, and *stupid*: which are defects, that can never be ascribed to him who is the First cause or Prime agent, the Supreme intellect, and altogether perfect.

Then, if He is *corporeal*, where ever there is a *vacuum*, He must be *excluded*, and so becomes a being bounded, finite, and as it were full of chasms.

Lastly, there is no *matter* or body, which may not be *supposed not to be*; whereas the idea of God, or that Being upon whom all others depend, involves in it existence.

XII. Neither infinite space, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, or eternally existing, nor any, nor all of these taken together, can be God. For,

*Space* taken separately from the things, which possess and fill it, is but an empty scene or *vacuum*: and to say, that infinite space is God, or that God is infinite space, is to say that He is an infinite *vacuum*: than which nothing can be more *absurd*, or *blasphemous*. How can *space*, which is but a vast void, rather the negation of all things, than positively any thing, a kind of *diffused nothing*; how can this, I say,

<sup>a</sup> Εἰ σῶμα ἔστι, φύσις ἢ σώματος μεριζομένη εἰς πλείω, ἕκασον τῶν μερῶν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. (f. ἔσαι) τῷ ὅλῳ, says Plotinus even of the Soul.

<sup>b</sup> Δέδεικται ὅτι καὶ ὅτι μέγεθος ὄν ἐνδύχεται ἔχειν ταύτην εἶσαν· ἀλλὰ ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετος ἐστίν. *Arist.*

be the First cause, &c. or indeed any cause? What attributes beside penetrability and extension, what excellencies, what perfections is it capable of<sup>a</sup>?

As *infinite space* cannot be God, tho He be excluded from no place or space; so tho He is eternal, yet *eternity* or infinite duration itself is not God<sup>b</sup>. For duration, abstracted from all durables, is nothing actually existing by itself: it is the *duration of a being*, not *a being*.

*Infinite space* and *duration*, taken together, cannot be God: because an interminable space of infinite duration is still nothing but eternal space; and that is at most but an *eternal vacuum*.

Since it has been already proved, that corporeity is inconsistent with Divine perfection, tho *matter* should be *infinitely extended*, or there should be an infinite quantity of it, yet still, where ever it is, it carries this *inconsistence* along with it.

If to *matter* be added *infinite duration*, neither does this alter the nature of it. This only supposes it to be eternally what it is; *i. e. eternally incapable* of Divine perfection.

And if to it you add the ideas of *both* infinite extension (or space) and duration too; yet still, so long as matter is matter, it must *always* and *every where* be incapable of Divinity.

Lastly, not the *universe*, or sum total of finite beings, can be God. For if it is, then *every thing* is divine, *every thing* God, or of God; and so *all things* together must make but *one being*<sup>c</sup>. But the contrary to this we see, there being evidently many beings distinct, and separable one from another, and independent each of other. Nay, this distinction and separation of existence, beside what we see without us, we may even *feel* within our selves. We are *severally* conscious to our selves of the individuation and distinction of our own minds from all other: nor is there any thing, of

<sup>a</sup> They, who call God מקום, do it ואין הכל ואין הכל מקום. *Thibbi*. Or, as *Phil. Aquin.* from the ancients, מקום של עולם ואין עולמו מקום. הקב"ה מקום. 'Ου γὰρ περιέχεται [ὁ Θεός], ἀλλὰ περιέχει τὸ πᾶν. *Ph. Jud.* By which ways of speaking (tho there is a Cabbalistic reason assignd too) they intend chiefly to express His omnipresence and immensity. That, in *Act. Ap.* seems to be of the same kind, 'Εν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἵσμεν.

<sup>b</sup> Such things as these, how incongruous and wild soever they are, have bin affirmed; that God is infinite duration, space, &c. What can be meant by that, Καλῶς ἂν λέγοιτο ὁ αἰὼν Θεός, in *Plotinus*?

<sup>c</sup> Were not they, who converse with books, accusomd to such trials, it would be shocking to find *Balbus* in *Cicero* asserting, *esse mundum deum*: and yet in another place, that it is *quasi communis deorum*, atq; *hominum domus*, aut *urbs utrorumque*; and *deorum, hominumq; causa factus*: in another, *providentia deorum mundum*, & *omnes mundi partes* & *initio constitutas esse*, & *omni tempore administrari*: in another, *mundum ipsum naturâ administrari*: with other like inconsistencies.



which we can be more certain. Were we all the *same* being, and had *one* mind, as in that case we must have, thoughts could not be private, or the peculiar thoughts of any one person; but they must be *common* acts of the whole mind, and there could be but one conscience *common* to us all<sup>a</sup>. Beside, if all things conjunctly are God or the Perfect being (I dread the mention of such things, tho it be in order to refute them), how comes this remarkable instance of imperfection, among many others, to cleave to us, that we should *not know* even our selves, and what we are<sup>b</sup>? In short, no *collection* of beings can be *one* being; and therefore not God. And the universe itself is but a collection of distinct beings<sup>c</sup>.

XIII. *It is so far from being true that God is corporeal, that there could be no such thing as either matter or motion, if there was not some Superior being, upon whom they depended. Or, God is such a Being, that without him there could be neither matter nor motion.* This must be true of *matter*: because it has been proved already, that there can be *but one* independent being; that he is *incorporeal*; and that the existence of all other beings must *depend upon Him*. But the same thing may be proved otherwise. If *matter* (I mean the existence of it) does not depend upon something above it, it must be an independent being; and if an independent being, a necessary being; and then there could be no such thing as a *vacuum*: but all bodies must be *perfectly solid*; and, more than that, the whole world could be but *one such* body, five times as firm as brass, and incapable of all motion. For that being which *exists necessarily* does *necessarily exist*: that is, it cannot *not exist*. But in a *vacuum* matter does not exist.

Moreover, if *matter* be an independent, necessary being, and exists of itself, this must be true of *every particle* of it: and if so, there could not nonly be no *vacuum*,

<sup>a</sup> Ἀποπον εἰς μία ἢ ἐμὴ [ψυχὴ] καὶ ἡ ὁμοῦν ἄλλα· ἐχρὴν γὰρ ἐμὴ ἀποθανομένη, καὶ ἄλλον ἀποθανέσθαι, — καὶ ὅλως ὁμοπαθεῖν ἡμᾶς τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ πρὸς τὸ πᾶν. Plot. Here this author is clear, tho at some other times very dark.

<sup>b</sup> Cur quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus? Cic.

<sup>c</sup> The system of Spinoza is so apparently false, and full of impieties and contradictions, that more needs not be said against it: tho much might be. What Velleius says in Cicero, is not only true, Si mundus est deus, — dei membra partim ardentia, partim refrigerata dicenda sunt: but, if there is but one substance, one nature, one being, and this being is God, then all the follies, madneses, wickednesses that are in the world, are in God; then all things done and suffered are both done and suffered by Him; He is both cause and effect; He both willes and nilles, affirms and denies, loves and hates the same things at the same time, &c. That such gross atheism as this should ever be fashionable! *Atheism*: for certainly when we inquire, whether there is a God, we do not inquire, whether we ourselves and all other things which are visible about us do exist: something different from them must be intended. Therefore to say, there is no God different from them, is to say, there is no God at all.

but every particle must be *every where*. For it could not be limited to occupy only a place of such certain dimensions by its *own nature*; since this confinement of existence within certain bounds implies non-existence in other places beyond those bounds, and is equal to a negation of existence; and when *existence* is essential to any being, a *negation of existence* cannot be so. Nor, in the next place, could its existence be limited by *any thing else*, because it is supposed to have its existence only of itself; *i. e.* to have a *principle* of existence in itself, or to have an existence that is not dependent upon or obnoxious to any other.

And I may add still, if *matter* be self-existent, I do not see, not only how it comes to be restrained to a place of some certain capacity, but also how it comes to be limited in other respects; or why it should not exist in a manner that is in all respects perfect. So that thus it appears, *matter* must derive its existence from some other being, who causes it to be just what it is. And the being, *who can do this*, must be God.

It is to no purpose to object here, that one cannot *conceive*, how the existence of matter can be derived from another being. For God being *above our conceptions*, the manner in which He operates, and in which things depend upon him, must also be *unconceivable*. Reason discovers, that this visible world must owe its existence to some invisible Almighty being; *i. e.* it discovers this to be fact, and we must not deny facts, because we know not *how* they are effected. It is far from being new, that our faculties should disclose to us the existence of things, and then drop us in our inquiry *how* they are. Thus much for *matter*.

As for *motion*; without a First cause, such as has been described, there could be none: and much less *such* motions as we see in the world. This may be immediately deduced from the foregoing paragraphs. For if *matter* itself could not be without such a cause, it is certain *motion*, which is an affection of matter, could never be.

But further, there could be no *motion*, unless either there be in matter itself a power of *beginning* it; or it is communicated from body to body in an *infinite succession*, or in a *circle*, and so has no beginning; or else is *produced* by some incorporeal being, or beings. Now as hardy as men are in advancing opinions that favor their vices, tho never so repugnant to reason, I can hardly believe any one will assert, that a parcel of *mere matter* (let it be great or small, of any figure whatsoever, &c.) left altogether to itself, could ever of itself *begin* to move. If there is any such bold assertor, let him fix his eyes upon some lump of matter, *ex. gr.* a *stone*, piece of *timber*, or a *clod* (cleard of all animals), and peruse it well; and then ask himself seriously, whether it is possible for him in earnest to *believe*, that that *stone*, *log*, or *clod*, tho  
nothing



nothing corporeal or incorporeal should excite or meddle with it, might some time or other of itself begin to *creep*. However, to be short, a power of *beginning* motion is not in the idea of matter. It is passive, as we see, to the impressions of motion, and susceptible of it; but *cannot* produce it. On the contrary, it will always persist uniformly in its *present state*, either of rest or motion, if nothing stirs, diverts, accelerates, or stops it. Nor is there any thing in all physics better settled than that, which is called *vis inertiae*, or the *inertia* of matter.

The propagation of motion from body to body, *without any First mover*, or immaterial cause of motion, has been proved impossible, prop. I.

The supposition of a perpetual motion in a *circle* is begging the question. For if A moves B, B moves C, and so on to Z, and then Z moves A; this is the same as to say, that A moves A, by the intervention of B, C, D, --- Z: that is, A *moves itself*, or can *begin* motion<sup>a</sup>.

It remains then, that all corporeal motions come originally from some mover *incorporeal*: which must be either that Supreme and self-existing *spirit* himself, who is God; or such, as will put us into the way how to find, that there is such a Being. Turn back to p. 65.

If we consider *ourselves*, and the voluntary motions begun by us, we may there see the thing exemplified. We move our bodies or some members of them, and by these move other things, as they again do others; and know these motions to spring from the operations of our minds: but then we know also, that we have not an independent power of creating motion. If we had, it could not be so limited as our loco-motive faculties are, nor confined to small quantities and certain circumstances only: we should have had it from eternity, nor could we ever be deprived of it. So that we are necessitated to look up and acknowledge some Higher being, who is able not only to *produce* motion, but to impart a *faculty of producing it*.

And if the *petty* motions of us mortals afford arguments for the being of a God, much more may those *greater* motions we see in the world, and the *phenomena* attending them: I mean the motions of the *planets* and *heavenly bodies*. For *these* must be put into motion, either by one common mighty Mover, acting upon them immediately, or by causes and laws of His appointment; or by their respective movers,

<sup>a</sup> What *Conforinus* charges upon many great men (but upon some of them surely unjustly) is to me unintelligible. He says, they believed *semper homines fuisse, &c.* and then, *Itaque & omnium, quæ in sempiterno isto mundo semper fuerunt, futuraque sunt, aiunt principium fuisse nullum; sed orbem esse quemdam generantium, nascentiumque, in quo uniuscujusque geniti initium simul & finis esse videatur.*

who also, for reasons to which you can by this time be no stranger, must depend upon some *Superior*, who furnished them with the power of doing this. And granting it to be done *either* of these ways, we can be at no great distance from a demonstration of the *existence* of a Deity.

It may perhaps be said, that tho matter has not the power of moving itself, yet it hath an *attractive* force, by which it can move other parts of matter: so that all matter equally *moves* and *is moved*. But, allowing those things which are now usually ascribed to *attraction*, we shall still be necessitated to own some Superior being, whose *influence* mixes itself with matter, and operates upon it; or at least who, some way or other, *imparts* this force. For *attraction*, according to the true sense of the word, supposes one body to act upon another at a distance, or where it is not; but nothing can be an agent, where it is *not* at all. Matter can act only by *contact*, impelling contiguous bodies, when it is put into motion by something else, or resisting those which strike against it, when it is at rest. And this it does *as matter*; *i. e.* by being impenetrable to other matter: but attraction is not of the nature or idea of matter. So that what is called *attraction*, is so called only because the same things happen, as if the parts of matter did mutually attract: but in truth this can only be an effect of something, which acts upon or by matter according to a certain law. The parts of matter seem not only to gravitate *towards* each other, but many of them to *fly* each other. Now these two *contrary* motions and seeming qualities cannot *both* proceed from matter *quà* matter; cannot *both* be of the nature of it: and therefore they must be owing to some *external* cause, or to some *other* being, which excites in them these tendencies and aversions.

Beside, as to the *revolution* of a planet about the sun, *mere gravitation* is not sufficient to produce that effect. It must be compounded with a motion of *projection*, to keep the planet from falling directly into the sun, and bring it about: and from *what hand*, I desire to know, comes this other motion (or direction)? Who impressed it?

What a vast field for *contemplation* is here opened! Such regions of matter about us, in which there is not the *least particle* that does not carry with it an argument of God's existence; not the *least stick* or *straw* or other *trifle* that falls to the ground, but shews it; not the slightest motion produced, the *least whisper* of the air, but tells it.

XIV. The frame and constitution of the world, the astonishing magnificence of it, the various phenomena and kinds of beings, the uniformity observed in the productions of things, the uses and ends for which they serve, &c. do all shew that there is some Almighty designer, an  
2.
infinite



infinite wisdom and power at the top of all these things: such marks there are of both<sup>a</sup>. Or, God is that Being, without whom such a frame or constitution of the world, such a magnificence in it, &c. could not be. In order to prove to any one the grandness of this fabric of the world, one needs only to bid him consider the sun with that insupportable glory and lustre that surrounds it: to demonstrate the vast distance, magnitude, and heat of it: to represent to him the chorus of planets moving periodically, by uniform laws, in their several orbits about it; affording a regular variety of aspects; guarded some of them by secondary planets, and as it were emulating the state of the sun; and probably all possessed by proper inhabitants: to remind him of those surprising visits the comets make us; the large trains, or uncommon splendor, which attends them; the far country they come from; and the curiosity and horror they excite not only among us, but in the inhabitants of other planets, who also may be up to see the entry and progress of these ministers of fate<sup>b</sup>: to direct his eye and contemplation, through those azure fields and vast regions above him, up to the fixt stars, that radiant, numberless host of heaven; and to make him understand, how unlikely a thing it is, that they should be placed there only to adorn and bespangle a canopy over our heads (tho that would be a great piece of magnificence too), and much less to supply the places of so many glow-worms, by affording a feeble light to our earth, or even to all our fellow-planets: to convince him, that they are rather so many other suns, with their several regions and sets of planets about them: to shew him, by the help of glasses, still more and more of these fixt lights, and to beget in him an apprehension of their unaccountable numbers, and of those immense spaces, that lie retired beyond our utmost reach and even imagination: I say, one needs but to do this, and explain to him such things as are now known almost to every body; and by it to shew, that if the world be not infinite, it is *infinito similis*<sup>c</sup>; and therefore sure a magnificent structure, and the work of an infinite Architect. But if we could take a view of all the particulars containd within that astonishing compass, which we have thus hastily run over, how would wonders multiply upon us? Every scene and part of the world is as it were made up of other worlds. If we consider this our seat (I mean this

<sup>a</sup> So far is that from being true, *Nequaquam — divinitus esse creatam Naturam mundi, qua tanta est prædita culpa. Lucret.* Men rashly (impiously) censure what they do not understand. Like that king of Castile, who fancied himself able to have contrived a better system of the world; because he knew not what the true system is, but took it to be as described to him by R. Is. ab. Sid. and other astronomers of those times.

<sup>b</sup> Since they have, or may have great effects upon the several parts of the solar system, one may speak thus without falling into the superstition of the multitude, or meaning what is intended by that, *Nunquam talo spectatum impune cometen* (in *Cand.*), or the like.

<sup>c</sup> *Finitus, et infinito similis.* *Pain.*

earth), what scope is here for admiration? What *variety* of mountains, hills, valleys, plains, rivers, seas, trees, plants! The many tribes of different *animals*, with which it is stocked! The multifarious *inventions* and *works* of one of these; that is, of us *men*, &c. And yet when these are all survey'd as *nicely* as they can be by the help of our unassisted senses, and even of telescopical glasses, by the assistance of good *microscopes* in very *small* parts of matter as many *new* wonders<sup>a</sup> may perhaps be discovered, as those already observed; new *kingdoms* of animals; new *architecture* and *curiosity* of work. So that as before our senses and even conception fainted in those *vast* journeys we were obliged to take in considering the expanse of the universe; so here again they fail us in our researches into the *principles* and constituent parts of it. Both the *beginnings* and the *ends* of things, the *least* and the *greatest*, all conspire to baffle us: and which way ever we prosecute our inquiries, we still fall in with *fresh* subjects of amazement, and *fresh* reasons to believe that there are indefinitely still *more* and *more* behind, that will for ever escape our eagerest pursuits and deepest penetration.

This mighty *building* is not only thus grand, and the appearances stupendous in it, but the *manner* in which things are effected is commonly unintelligible, and their causes *too profound* for us. There are indeed many things in nature, which we know; and some, of which we seem to know the *causes*: but, alas! how *few* are these with respect to the whole sum? And the causes which we assign, what are they? Commonly such, as can only be expressed in general terms, whilst the *bottoms* of things lie undiscovered. Such, as have been collected from *experience*, but could scarcely be known beforehand, by any arguments *à priori*, to be capable of rendering such effects: and yet till causes are known after that manner, they are not *thoroughly* understood. Such, as seem disproportionate and *too little*, and are so insufficient and unsatisfactory, that one cannot but be inclined to think, that something *immaterial* and *invisible* must be immediately concerned. In short, we know many times, that such a thing will have such an effect, or perhaps that such an effect is produced by such a cause, but the manner *how* we know not; or but grossly, and if such an *hypothesis* be true. It is impossible for us to come at the true *principles* of things, or to see into the oeconomy of the *finest* part of nature and workings of the *first* springs. The causes that appear to us, are but *effects* of other causes: the *vessels*, of which the bodies of plants and animals consist, are made up of *other*, *smaller* vessels: and the *subtlest* parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as animal spirits, or particles of light), have *their parts*, and may for ought we know be *compound* bodies: and as to the *substances*

<sup>a</sup> Ποικίλη θαυματουργία. Plot.



themselves of all these things, and their *internal constitution*, they are hid from our eyes. Our philosophy dwells in the surface of nature.

However, in the next place, we our selves cannot but be witnesses, that there are *stated methods*, as so many set forms of proceeding, which things punctually and religiously keep to. The same *causes*, circumstanced in the same manner, have always the same success: all the *species* of *animals*, among us, are made according to one general *idea*; and so are those of *plants* also, and even *minerals*: no *new* ones are brought forth or arisen any where: and the old are preserved and continued by the *old ways*.

Lastly, it appears I think plainly enough in the parts and model of the world, that there is a *contrivance* and a respect to certain reasons and *ends*. How the *sun* is posited near the middle of our system for the more *convenient* dispensing of his benign influences to the *planets* moving about him; how the plain of the earth's *aquator* intersects that of her *orbit*, and makes a proper angle with it, in order to diversify the *year*, and create a useful variety of *seasons*, and many other things of this kind, tho a thousand times repeated, will *always* be pleasing observations to good men and true scholars. Who can observe the *vapors* to ascend, especially from the sea, meet above in clouds, and fall again after condensation, and not understand this to be a kind of *distillation* in order to clear the water of its grosser salts, and then by rains and dews to supply the fountains and rivers with fresh and wholsom liquor; to nourish the vegetables below by showers, which descend in drops as from a *watering-pot* upon a garden, &c. who can view the *structure* of a plant or animal; the *indefinite* number of their fibres and fine vessels, the *formation* of larger vessels and the several members out of them, and the apt *disposition* of all these; the provision that is made for the reception and distribution of *nutriment*; the *effect* this nutriment has in extending the vessels, bringing the vegetable or animal to its full growth and expansion, continuing the *motion* of the several fluids, repairing the *decays* of the body, and preserving *life*: who can take notice of the several *faculties* of animals, their *arts* of saving and providing for themselves, or the ways in which they are provided for; the *uses* of plants to animals, and of some animals to others, particularly to mankind; the care taken that the several *species* should be *propagated* out of their proper seeds (without confusion<sup>a</sup>), the strong *inclinations* implanted in animals for that purpose, their *love* of *their young*, and the like: I say, who can do this, and not see a *design*, in such *regular* pieces, so nicely wrought, and so preserved? If there was but *one* animal, and

<sup>a</sup> If any one, sitting upon mount *Ida*, had seen the *Greek* army coming on in proper order [*μετὰ πολλῷ κόσμῳ καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσεῖσαν*], he ought most certainly, notwithstanding what *Sext. Emper.* says, to have concluded, that there was some commander, under whose conduct they moved.

in that case it could not be doubted but that his *eyes* were made that he might *see* with them, his *ears* that he might *hear* with them, and so on, through at least the most considerable parts of him; if it can much less be doubted, when the same things are *repeted* in the individuals of all the tribes of animals; if the like observations may be made with respect to *vegetables*, and other things; and if all these *kinds* of things, and therefore much more their *particulars*, upon and in the earth, waters, air, are unconceivably *numerous* (as most evidently they are), one cannot but be convinced from that, which is so *very* obvious to every understanding, and *plainly* runs through the *nobler* parts of the visible world, that other things, even those that seem to be *less noble*, have their *ends* too, tho not so well understood.

And now since we cannot suppose the *parts* of matter to have *contrived* this wonderful form of a world among themselves, and then by agreement to have taken their respective posts, and pursued constant *ends* by certain methods and measures *concerted* (because these are acts, of which they are not capable), there must be some other Being, whose wisdom and power are equal to such a mighty work, as is the *structure* and *preservation* of the world. There must be some almighty *Mind*, who models and adorns it; lays the causes of things so deep; prescribes them such uniform and steady laws; destines and adapts them to certain purposes; and makes one thing to fit and answer to another<sup>a</sup>.

That *such* a beautiful scheme, *such* a just and geometrical arrangement of things, composed, of *innumerable* parts, and placed as the offices and uses and wants of the several beings *require*, through such an *immense* extent, should be the effect of *chance* only, is a conceit so prodigiously absurd, that certainly no one can espouse it heartily, who understands the *meaning* of that word. *Chance* seems to be only a term, by which we express our *ignorance* of the cause of any thing. For when we say any thing comes *by chance*, we do not mean, that it had no other cause; but only, that we do *not know* the true cause, which produced it, or interposed in such a manner, as to make that fall out which was not expected. Nor can I think, that any body has such an idea of *chance*, as to make it an *agent* or really existing and acting cause of any thing, and much less sure of all things. Whatever events or effects there are, they must proceed from some agent or cause, which is either *free* or *not free* (that is, necessary). If it be free, it wills what it produces: and therefore that which is produced is produced with *design*, not by chance. If it acts necessarily, the event must *necessarily* be, and therefore it is not by accident. For that, which is by accident or chance only, might not have been; or it is an accident

<sup>a</sup> Τις ὁ ἀετιόζων τὴν μάχαιραν πρὸς τὴν κόλπον, καὶ τὴν κόλπον πρὸς τὴν μάχαιραν, κτλ; Arr. Even such a thing as this doth not come by accident.



only that it is. There can be therefore *no such cause* as chance. And to omit a great deal that might yet be said, *matter* is *indefinitely* divisible, and the first particles (or atoms) of which it consists must be small beyond all our apprehension; and the chances, that must all hit to produce *one* individual of any *species* of material beings (if *only* chance was concerned), must consequently be *indefinitely many*: and if *space* be also *indefinitely* extended, and the number of those orderly systems of matter that lie dispersed in it *indefinite*, the *chances* required to the production of them all, or of the universe, will be the rectangle of one *indefinite* quantity drawn into *another*. We may well call them *infinite*. And then to say, that any thing cannot happen, unless *infinite* chances coincide, is the same as to say, there are *infinite* chances against the happening of it, or odds that it will not happen: and this again is the same as to say, it is *impossible* to happen; since if there be a possibility that it *may* happen, the hazard is *not* infinite. The world therefore cannot be the child of *chance*<sup>a</sup>. He must be little acquainted with the works of nature, who is not sensible how delicate and fine they are: and the *finer* they are, the *grosser* were those of *Epicurus*<sup>b</sup>.

If it should be objected, that many things seem to be *useless*, many births are *monstrous*, or the like, such answers as these may be made. The *uses* of some things are known to *some* men, and not to *others*: the uses of some are known *now*, that were not known to any body *formerly*: the uses of many may be discovered *hereafter*: and those of some other things may *for ever* remain unknown to all men, and yet *be in nature*, as much as those discovered were before their discovery, or are now in respect of them who know them not. Things have not therefore no uses, because they are conceal'd from us. Nor is *nature* irregular, or without method, because there are some *seeming* deviations from the common rule. These are generally the effects of that influence, which free agents and various circumstances have upon natural productions; which may be deformed, or hurt by external *impressions*, heterogeneous *matter* introduced, or disagreeable and unnatural *motions* excited: and if the case could be *truly* put, it would no doubt appear, that nature proceeds as *regularly* (or the laws of nature have as regular an effect), when a *monster* is produced, as when the *usual* issue in common cases. Under these circumstances the monster is the *genuine* issue: that is,

<sup>a</sup> Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius & viginti forma literarum, ——— aliquò conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effici: quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere fortuna. Cic. But alas, what are Ennius's annals to such a work as the world is! <sup>b</sup> He was πολυγραφώτατος, πάντας υπερβαλλόμενος πλήθει βιβλίων. D. L. But that part of his physics is here meant, in which he treated of the origin of the world; or rather of *infinite* worlds; which makes his thought the grosser still. For infinite worlds require *infinite* chances *indefinitely* repeated.

in the same circumstances there would always be the same kind of production. And therefore if things are now and then mis-shaped, this infers no unsteadiness or mistake in nature. Beside, the magnificence of the world admits of some *perturbations*; not to say, requires some *variety*. The question is, Could all those things, which we *do know* to have uses and ends, and to the production of which such wonderful contrivance and the combinations of so many things are required, be produced, and method and regularity be preserved *so far as it is*, if nothing but *blind* chance presided over all? Are not the innumerable instances of things, which are *undeniably* made with reference to certain ends, and of those which are propagated and repeted by the *same* constant methods, *enough* to convince us, that there are ends proposed, and rules observed, even where we do not see them. And, lastly, if we should descend to particulars, what are those seemingly useless or monstrous productions in respect of the *rest*, that *plainly* declare the ends, for which they were intended, and that come into the world by the *usual* ways, with the *usual* perfection of their several kinds? If the comparison could be made, I verily believe these would be found to be almost infinituple of the other; which ought therefore to be reputed as *nothing*.

They, who content themselves with words, may ascribe the formation of the world to *fate* or *nature*, as well as to *chance*, or better. And yet *fate*, in the first place, is nothing but a *series* of events, considered as necessarily following in some certain order; or, of which it has always been true, that they *would be* in their determinate times and places. It is called indeed ■ *series* of *causes*<sup>a</sup>: but then they are such causes as are also *effects*, all of them, if there is no First cause; and may be taken for *such*. So that in this description is nothing like such ■ *cause*, as is capable of giving this form to the world. A *series* of events is the same with events happening *seriatim*: which words declare nothing concerning the *cause* of that concatenation of events, or why it is. Time, place, manner, necessity are but *circumstances* of things that come to pass; not causes of their existence, or of their being ■ they are. On the contrary, some external and superior cause must be supposed to put the *series* in motion, to project the order, to connect the causes and effects, and to *impose* the necessity<sup>b</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> *Series implexa causarum*. Sen.      ■ Seneca says himself, that in this series God is *prima omnium causa, ex qua cetera pendent*. Indeed it is many times difficult to find out what the ancients meant by *fate*. Sometimes it seems to follow the motions of the *heavenly bodies* and their aspects. Of this kind of fate is that passage in *Suetonius* to be understood, where he says that *Tiberius* was *addictus mathematica, persuasionisq: plenus cuncta fato agi*. Sometimes it is confounded with *fortune*. So in *Lucian* we find τὴν τύχην πράξουσιν τὰ μεμειωμένα, καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκείτω ἐπεκλώσθι. And sometimes it is the same with God: as when the *Stoics* say, εἰ τε εἶναι θεόν καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐμειωμένον καὶ Δία, ap. *Diog. L.* and the like elsewhere.

Then



Then for *nature*, 1. If it be used for the *intrinsic manner* of existing; that constitution, make, or disposition, with which any thing is produced or *born*, and from which result those properties, powers, inclinations, passions, qualities, and manners, which are called *natural* (and sometimes *nature*), in opposition to such as are *acquired*, adventitious, or forced (which use is common): then to say, that nature formed any thing, or gave it its manner of existence, is to say, that it formed itself, or that the *effect* is the *efficient*<sup>a</sup>. Beside, how can *manner* (manner of existing) be the cause of existing, or properly do any thing. An agent is an acting being, some substance, not a *manner* of being. 2. If it be used in that other sense, something analogous to the former, by which it stands for the *ideas* of things, what they are in themselves, and what in their circumstances, causes, consequences, respects; or, in short, that which determines them to be of this or that kind (as when we say, the *nature* of justice<sup>b</sup> requires this or that; *i. e.* the idea of justice requires or supposes it: a crime is of such a *nature*; that is, bears such a respect to the law, and is attended with such circumstances, or the like): then none of *these* senses can do an atheist any service. 3. If it be used for the *world*<sup>c</sup> (as, the laws of *nature* may be understood to be the laws of the world, by which it is governed, and the *phenomena* in it produced; after the same manner of speaking as when we say, the laws of *England, France, &c.*) then it stands for *that very thing*, the former and architect of which is the object of our inquiry; and therefore cannot be that architect *itself*. Under this sense may be comprehended that, when it denotes *reality of existence*, as when it is said that such a thing is not in *nature* (not to be found in the *world*). 4. If it signifies the forementioned *laws* themselves; or that course, in which things by virtue of these laws proceed (as when the effects of these laws are styled the works of *nature*): then, laws suppose some legislator, and are posterior to that, of which they are the laws. There can be no laws of any nation, till the people are, of which that nation consists. 5. If it be used after the same manner as the word *habit* frequently is; to which many things are ascribed (just as they are to *nature*), though it be nothing existing distinct from the *habits*, which *particular* men or beings contract: then *nature* is a kind of *abstract* notion, which can do nothing. Perhaps *nature* may be put for *natures*, all *natures*, after the manner of a collective noun; or it may be mentioned as an *agent*, only as we personify virtues and attributes, either for variety, or the shorter and more convenient expres-

<sup>a</sup> As when Strato Lamps. according to Tully, docet omnia esse effecta natura. *natura justitie.* Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Vis & *natura* justitie. Cic. <sup>c</sup> Almost as if it stood for *nata*, or *res nata*; all things, that are produced. (So *fatuta* seems to be put sometimes for *fatus*.) Sunt, qui omnia natura nomine appellant; — corpora, & inane, quaq; his accidunt. Cic.

sing of things. Lastly, if it denotes the *Author of nature*, or God<sup>a</sup> (the effect seeming, tho by a hard metonymy in this case, to be put for the *efficient*): then, to *Him* it is that I ascribe the formation of the world, &c. To all which I must subjoin, that there is an unaccountable *liberty* taken in the use of this word: and that frequently it is used merely as a *word*, and nothing more, they who use it not knowing themselves, what they mean by it<sup>b</sup>. However in *no sense* can it supersede the being of a Deity.

XV. *Life, sense, cogitation, and the faculties of our own minds shew the existence of some superior Being, from whom they are derived.* Or, *God is that Being, without whom neither could these be, any more than the things before mentiond.* That they cannot flow from the nature of any *matter* about us as matter, or from any modification, size, or motion of it, if it be not already apparent, may perhaps be proved more fully afterwards. And that our *souls* themselves are not self-existent, nor hold their faculties independently of all other beings, follows from pr. IV. and VII. Therefore we must necessarily be indebted for what we have of this kind, to some great Benefactor, who is the *fountain* of them. For since we are conscious, that we have them, and yet have them not of our selves, we must have them from *some other*.

A man has little reason, God knows, to fancy the *suppositum* of his life, sense, and cogitative faculties to be an independent being, when he considers how *transitory* and *uncertain* at best his life and all his enjoyments are; *what* he is, *whence* he came, and *whither* he is going<sup>c</sup>. The mind acts not, or in a most imperceptible manner in *animalculo*, or the seminal state of a man; only as a principle of vegetation in the state of an *embryon*; and as a sensitive soul in the state of *infancy*, at least for some time, in which we are rather below, than above, many other animals. By degrees indeed, with age and exercise and proper opportunities, it seems to open itself, find its own *talents*, and *ripen* into a rational being. But then it reasons not without labor, and is forced to take many tedious steps in the pursuit of truth; finds all its powers subject to great *eclipses* and diminutions, in the time of sleep, indisposition,

<sup>a</sup> *Natura, inquit, hac mihi prestat. Non intelligis te, cum hoc dicis, mutare nomen Deo? Quid enim aliud est Natura, quam Deus, & divina ratio, &c? Sen.* When it is said, *Neceffe est mundum ipsum natura administrari*, ap. *Cic.* what sense are those words capable of, if by *nature* be not really meant *God*? For it must be something different from the world, and something able to govern it.

<sup>b</sup> *Alii naturam censent esse vim quandam sine ratione, cientem motus in corporibus necessarios, &c.* says *Balbus* in *Cic.* What can this *vis* be: *vis* by itself, without the mention of any subject, in which it inheres; or of any cause, from whence it proceeds? A *soul* of the world, *plastic nature*, *hylarchic principle*, שכל פועל, and the like, are more intelligible than that. רע

וכו' כמאין באמת ולאן אתה הולך וכו' P. Ab.



sickness, &c. and at best to reach but a few objects in respect of all, that are in the immensity of the universe; and, lastly, is obnoxious to many painful sensations and reflexions. Had the *soul* of man the principle of its own existence and faculties *within itself*, clear of all dependence, it could not be liable to all these *limitations* and *defects*, to all these *alterations* and *removes* from one state to another: it must certainly be constant to itself, and persist in an *uniform* manner of being.

There may be perhaps who will say, that the *soul*, together with life, sense, &c. are propagated by *traduction* from parents to children, from them to their children again, and so from eternity<sup>a</sup>: and that therefore nothing can be collected from the nature of them as to the existence of a Deity. *Ans.* If there could be such a *traduction*, yet to suppose one *traduced* to come from another *traduced*, and so *ab eterno*, without any further account of the original of mankind, or taking in any author of this *traductive* power, is the same as to suppose an infinite series of *moveds* without a *mover*, or of *effects* without a *cause*: the absurdity of which is shewn already prop. I. But concerning this matter I cannot but think, further, after the following manner. What is meant by *tradux animæ* ought to be clearly explained: for it is not easy to conceive how thought, or thinking substances, can be propagated after the manner of *branches*, or in any manner that can be *analogous* to it, or even warrant a *metaphorical* use of that phrase<sup>b</sup>. It should also be told, whether this *traduction* be made from *one* or from *both* the parents. If from one, from *which* of them is it? And if from both, then the same *tradux* or branch must always proceed from *two* stocks: which is a thing, I presume, that can no where else be found, nor has any parallel in nature. And yet such a thing may much better be supposed of vines, or plants, than of *thinking* beings, who are simple and uncompound substances<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> For I cannot think, that any body will now stand by that way of introducing men first into the world, which is mentioned by *Diodorus Sic.* but asserted by *Lucretius*. *Ubi quæq; loci regio opportuna dabatur, Crescebant uteri terra radicibus apti, &c.*

<sup>b</sup> What by *Tertulian* in one place is called *animæ ex Adam tradux*, in another is *velut surculus qui a n ex matrice Adam in propaginem deducta*, and equally unintelligible. Nor doth he explain himself better, when he confesses there to be *duas species seminis, corporalem & animalem* (al. *corporis semen & animæ*): or more fully *semen animale ex animæ distillatione, sicut & virus illud, corporale semen, ex carnis defecatione*.

<sup>c</sup> According to the fore-cited author the soul is derived from the father only, & *genitalibus feminæ forceis commendata*: and all souls from that of *Adam*. *Defiximus animam, says he, Dei flatu natam, ex una redundantem*: and in another place, *ex uno homine tota hæc animarum redundantia agitur*. But this doth not well consist with his principal argument for *traduction*, that children take after their parents. For beside what will here be said by and by, if there is a *traduction* of all men from one man, and *traduction* causes likeness; then every man must be like the first, and (consequently) every other.

This opinion of the *traduction* of souls seems to me to stand upon an unsound foundation. For I take it to be grounded chiefly on these two things: the *similitude* there is between the features, humors, and abilities of children and those of their parents<sup>a</sup>; and the difficulty men find in forming the *notion* of a *spirit* b. For from hence they are apt to conclude, that there can be no other substance but *matter*: and that the *soul* resulting from some disposition of the body, or some part of it, or being some merely material appendix to it, must *attend* it, and come along with it from the parent or parents; and as there is a derivation of the *one*, so there must be also of the *other* at the same time.

Now the former of these is not always *true*; as it ought to be, to make the argument valid. Nothing more common than to see children *differ* from their parents, in their understandings, inclinations, shapes, complexions, and (*I am sure*) one from another. And this *dissimilitude* has as much force to prove there is *not* a *traduction*, as *similitude*, when ever that happens, can have to prove there is. Besides, it seems to me not hard to account for *some* likeness without the help of *traduction*. It is plain the meat and drink men take, the air they breath, the objects they see, the sounds they hear, the company they keep, &c. will create *changes* in them, sometimes with respect to their intellectuals, sometimes to their passions and humors, and sometimes to their health and other circumstances of their bodies: and yet the *original stamina* and fundamental parts of the man remain still the *same*. If then the *semina*, out of which animals are produced, are (as I doubt not) *animalcula* already formed<sup>c</sup>; which, being distributed about, especially in some opportune places, are *taken in* with aliment, or perhaps the very air; being separated in the bodies of the *males* by strainers proper to every kind, and then lodged in *their* feminal vessels, do *there* receive some kind of addition and influence; and being thence transferred into the wombs of the *females*, are *there* nourished more plentifully, and grow, till they become too big to be longer confined<sup>d</sup>: I say, if this be the case, why may not those

*additions*

<sup>a</sup> Unde, oro te, says the same author, *similitudine anima quoque parentibus de ingeniis respondemus*, — *si non ex anima, semine educimur?* Then, to confirm this, he argues like a father indeed, thus: *in illo ipso voluptatis ultimo actu, quo genitale virus expellitur, nonne aliquid de anima quoque sentimus exire?* I am ashamed to transcribe more.

<sup>b</sup> Therefore the said father makes the soul to be corporeal.

<sup>c</sup> This might seem to be favored by them who hold, that all souls were created in the beginning (an opinion mentiond in *Nabh. ab. & al.* often), did not the same authors derive the body מִשְׁפָּה סְרוּחָה: as may be seen in *P. Ab. & pass.* Particularly R. D. *Qimbi* says of man, נִפְּוּ בְּרָא מִשִּׁפְּחָה הַזֶּה וְאִשְׁרָה תְּהֵפֵךְ לָרֵם וּמִשָּׁם וְגַרְל מַעֲט עַד שִׁישְׁחִלְמוּ אִיבְרִיו.

<sup>d</sup> This account destroys that argument, upon which *Censorinus* says many of the old philosophers asserted the eternity of the world: *quod negent omnino posse reperiri, aevae ante, an*



*additions* and the *nutriment* received from the parents, being prepared by their vessels, and of the same kind with that with which they themselves are nourished, be the same in great measure to the *animalcula* and *embrya* that it is to *them*, and consequently very much assimilate their young, without the derivation of any thing else from them? Many impressions may be made upon the *fetus*, and tinctures given to the *fluids* communicated to it from the parents; and yet it, the *animal itself*, may not be originally raised in them, or traduced from them. This hypothesis (which has long been mine) suggests a reason, why the *child* is sometimes more like the *father*, sometimes the *mother*: viz. because the vessels of the *animalculum* are disposed to receive a greater proportion of aliment sometimes from the *one*, sometimes from the *other*: or the fluids and spirits in one may ferment and operate *more strongly* than in the other, and so have a *greater* and more signal effect. (Here it ought to be observed, that tho what the *animalculum* receives from the father, is in quantity little in respect of all that nutriment, which it receives by the mother; yet the former, being the first accretion to the original *stamina*, adhering immediately, and being early interwoven with them, may affect it more.)

Since there cannot be a proper *traduction* of the child (*one* mind, and *one* body) from both the *two* parents, all the similitude it bears to *one* of them must proceed from some such cause as I have assigned, or at least not from *traduction*. For the child being *sometimes* like the father, and *sometimes* the mother, and the *traduction* either *always* from the father, or *always* from the mother, there must sometimes be *similitude*, where there is no *traduction*: and then if the child may resemble one of them without it, why not the other too? The account I have given, appears, many times at least, to be true in *plants*, which raised from the *same* seed, but in *different* beds and soil, will differ. The different nutriment introduces some diversity into the seed or original plant, and assimilates it in some measure to the rest raised in the same place.

The other thing, which I take to be one of the *principal* supports to this doctrine of *traduction* (a supposition, that the *soul* is merely material, or but the result of some disposition in matter) has been undertaken to be refuted hereafter. But I may premise this here: tho we can have no *image* of a *spirit* (because no being can be portraited or represented by an image, but what is material), yet we may have reason to assert the existence of *such* a substance<sup>a</sup>. *Matter* is a thing, which we converse with, of which we know pretty well the nature, and properties; and since we cannot find

*οὐα γενεrata sint; cum ex ovum sine ave, ex avis sine ovo gigni non possit.* This question was once much agitated in the world, as may be seen by *Macrobius*, and *Plutarch*; who calls it, τὸ ἀπορον καὶ πολλὰ πράγματα τοῖς ζητητικοῖς παρέχον — πρόβλημα.

<sup>a</sup> This is as much as *Epicurus* had to say for his atoms: for they were only σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά, κλ. *Just. M.*

among

among them any that are *cogitative*, or such a thing as *life*, but several things *inconsistent* with them, we are under a necessity of confessing that there is some *other* species of substance beside that which is corporeal, and that our *souls* are of that kind (or rather of one of those kinds, which are not corporeal: for there must be more than one), tho we can draw no image of it in our own minds. Nor is it at all surprising, that we should not be able to do this: for how can the mind be the object of itself<sup>a</sup>? It may contemplate the body which it inhabits, may be conscious of its own acts, and reflect upon the ideas it finds: but of its own substance it can have no adequate notion, unless it could be as it were *object* and *spectator* both. Only that perfect Being, whose knowledge is infinite, can thus *intimately* know himself.

They, who found the *traduction* of the soul upon this presumption, that it is *material*, and attends the body as some part or affection of it, seem further to be most wofully mistaken upon this account: because the body *itself* is not propagated by *traduction*. It passes indeed *through* the bodies of the parents, who afford a transitory habitation and subsistence to it: but it cannot be *formed* by the parents, or *grow out* of any part of them. For all the *vital* and *essential* parts of it must be one *coeval* system, and formed *at once* in the first article of the nascent *animalculum*; since no one of these could be *nourished*, or ever come to any thing, without the rest: on the contrary, if any one of them could prevent and be before the rest, it would soon wither and decay again for lack of nourishment received by proper vessels; as we see the limbs and organs of animals do, when the supply due from the animal œconomy is any way intercepted or obstructed. And since an organized body, which requires to be thus *simultaneously* made (fashioned as it were at one stroke) cannot be the effect of any natural and *gradual* process, I cannot but conclude, that there were *animalcula* of every tribe originally formed by the almighty Parent, to be the *seed* of all future generations of animals. Any other manner of production would be like that, which is usually called *equivocal* or spontaneous generation, and with great reason now generally *exploded*. And it is certain, that the analogy of nature in other instances, and microscopical observations do abet what I have said *strongly*.

Lastly, if there is no *race* of men that hath been from eternity, there is no man who is not descended from two *first parents*: and then the souls of those two first parents could be traduced from *no other*. And that there is no such race (none that has been upon this earth from eternity), is apparent from the face of earthly things, and the *history* of mankind<sup>b</sup>, arts, and sciences. What is objected against this argument

<sup>a</sup> 'Ου γὰρ ἐν τῷ θεωρούμενῳ τὸ θεωρεῖν. Plot.

<sup>b</sup> Si nulla fuit genitalis origo Terrarum & cali—  
Cur supra bellum Thebanum & funera Troja Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poeta. Lucr.



from fancied *inundations, conflagrations, &c.* has no weight with me. Let us suppose some such great calamity to happen now. It must be either universal, or not. If *universal*, so that no body at all could be saved, then either there must never be any more men, or they must begin again in some *first parents*. If it was only *topical*, affecting some one tract of the globe, or if the tops of mountains more eminent, or rocks more firm remaind unaffected, or if there were *any* natural means left by which men might escape, considerable numbers must certainly *survive*: and then it cannot be imagined, that they should all be *absolutely* so ignorant of every thing, that no one should be able to give an account of such things as were *common*; no one able to write, or read, or even to recollect that there were such things as letters; none, that understood any trade; none, that could tell what kind of habitations they had, how they used to be clothed, how their meat drest, or even what their food was: nor can it be thought, that *all* books, arms, manufactures of every kind, ships, buildings, and all the product of human skill and industry now extant in the world should be so *universally* and *utterly* abolisht, that no part, no *vestigium* of them should remain: not so much, as to give a hint toward the speedy restoration of necessary arts at least. The people escaping must sure have clothes on, and many necessaries about them, without which they could not escape, nor outlive such a dreadful scene. In short, no *conflagration*, no *flood*, no *destruction* can serve the objectors purpose, to reduce mankind to that state, which by ancient memoirs and many undeniable symptoms we find them to have been in *not many* thousands of years since; I say, no destruction can serve his purpose, but such an one as makes *thorough* work, only sparing two or three couples, stript of every thing, and the most stupid and veriest blocks<sup>b</sup> to be picked out of the whole number: natural fools, or mere *homines sylvestres* would retain habits, and fall to their old way of living, as soon as they had the opportunity to do it. And suppose they never should have such an opportunity; yet neither would *this* serve him effectually: since without some *supernatural* Power interposing such a revolution could not be brought about, nor the naked creatures preserved, nor the earth reformed out of its ashes and ruins after such a calcination, or dissolution, such a *total* demolition of every thing. To this give me leave to add, that tho many inundations, great earthquakes, vulcano's and fiery eruptions have been in particular countries; yet there is no memory or testimony of any such thing, that has ever been *universal*, except perhaps of one deluge: and as to that, if the *genius* of the

<sup>a</sup> Πολλὰ ἢ καὶ πολλὰ φθοραὶ γέγοναν ἀνθρώπων, ἢ ἔσθαι, περὶ μὲν ἢ ὕδατι μέγισται. Plato.

<sup>b</sup> Τὰς ἀγεγραμμάτους ἢ ἀμέσους, as Plato speaks.

<sup>c</sup> For what has been said only in general, and presumptively, to serve a cause, signifies nothing: no more than that testimony in *Arnobius*, where he seems to allow, that there have been universal conflagrations. *Quando, says he, mundus incensus in favillas & cineres dissolutus est? Non ante nos?*

language in which the relation is deliverd, and the manner of writing history in it were well understood, some labourd and moliminous attempts to account for it had perhaps been prevented. And beside that, the same *record*, which tells the thing was, tells also how immediately God was concernd in it; and [that the people who then perishd, as well as they who survivd, all descendd from two *first parents*: and if that authority be a sufficient proof of *one part* of the relation, it must be so of the *rest*.

We may conclude then, that the *human soul* with its faculties of cogitation, &c. depends upon a *Superior* being. And who can this be but the *Supreme* being, or God? Of whom I now proceed to affirm, in the next place, that,

XVI. *Though His essence and manner of being is to us altogether incomprehensible, yet we may say with assurance, that He is free from all defects; or One, from whom all defects must be removed.*

This proposition hath in effect been proved already<sup>a</sup>. However I will take the liberty to enlarge a little further upon it here. As our minds are *finite*, they cannot without a contradiction comprehend what is *infinite*. And if they were enlarged to ever so great a capacity, yet so long as they retain their general nature, and continue to be of the *same kind*, they would by that be only renderd able to apprehend *more* and *more finite* ideas; out of which, howsoever increased or exalted, no positive idea of the *perfection* of God can ever be formed. For a *Perfect* being must be *infinite*, and perfectly *One*: and in such a nature there can be nothing *finite*, nor any *composition* of finites.

How should we comprehend the nature of the Supreme incorporeal being, or how He exists, when we comprehend not the nature of the most *inferior spirits*, nor have any conception even of matter itself divested of its accidents; I mean, of that which is the *suppositum* of those accidents? How should we attain to an *adequate* knowledge of the Supreme author of the world, when we are utterly incapable of knowing the *extent* of the world itself, and the numberless undescried regions, with their several states and circumstances, containd in it, never to be frequented or visited by our philosophy; nor can turn our selves any way, but we are still accosted with something *above* our understanding? If we cannot penetrate so far into *effects*, as to discover them and their nature thoroughly, it is not to be expected, that we should, that we can ever be admitted to see through the mysteries of His nature, who is the *Cause*, so

<sup>a</sup> Prop. V, VI.



far above them all. The Divine perfection then, and manner of being must be of a kind different from and above all that we can conceive.

However, notwithstanding our own defects, we may positively affirm there can be none in God: since He is perfect, as we have seen, He cannot be defective or imperfect. This needs no further proof. But what follows from it, I would have to be well understood and remembered: viz. that from Him must be removed want of life and activity, ignorance, impotence, acting inconsistently with reason and truth, and the like. Because these are defects; defect of knowledge, power, &c. These are defects and blemishes even in us. And tho His perfection is above all our ideas, and of a different kind from the perfections of men or any finite beings; yet what would be a defect in them, would be much more such in Him, and can by no means be ascribed to Him<sup>a</sup>.

Though we understand not His manner of knowing things; yet ignorance being uniform and the same in every subject, we understand what is meant by that word, and can literally and truly deny that to belong to Him. The like may be said with respect to His power, or manner of operating, &c. And when we speak of the internal essential attributes of God positively, as that He is omniscient, omnipotent, eternal, &c. the intent is only to say, that there is no object of knowledge or power, which He does not know or cannot do, He exists without beginning and end, &c. and thus we keep still within the limits allowed by the proposition<sup>b</sup>. That is, we may speak thus without pretending to comprehend His nature. And so,

XVII. We may consider God as operating in the production and government of the world, and may draw conclusions from His works, as they are called, notwithstanding any thing which has been said<sup>c</sup>. Because this we can do without comprehending the manner of His existence. Nay, the contemplation of His works leads us into a necessity of owning, that there must be an incomprehensible Being at the head of them.

Though I do not comprehend the mode, in which the world depends upon him and He influences and disposes things, because this enters into His nature, and the one cannot be understood without the other: yet if I see things, which I know cannot be self-existent, and observe plainly an oeconomy and design in the disposition of them, I may conclude that there is some Being, upon whom their existence doth depend, and by whom they are modeld; may call this Being G O D, or the Author

<sup>a</sup> If that in Terence had been (not a question, as it is there, but) an affirmation, *Ego homuncio hoc non facerem*, what a bitter reflexion had it been upon the heathen deity? <sup>b</sup> Λέγομεν ὅ μὴ εἶναι  
ὁ δὲ εἶναι, ἢ λέγομεν. Plotin. <sup>c</sup> אין ררך להשיגו אלה ממעשיו. Maim.

and Governor of the world, &c. without *contradicting* my self or truth; as I hope it will appear from what has been said, and is going to be said in the next proposition.

XVIII. *God, who gives existence to the world, does also govern it by His providence.* Concerning this grand question, *Whether there is a Divine providence, or not*, I use to think, *for my self*, after the following manner.

*First*, The world may be said to be *governed* (at least cannot be said to be ἀνεξέτητος, or left to fluctuate fortuitously), if there are *laws*, by which *natural causes* act, the several *phenomena* in it succeed regularly, and, in general, the constitution of things is preserved: if there are *rules* observed in the production of *herbs, trees*, and the like: if the several kinds of *animals* are, in proportion to their several degrees and stations in the animal kingdom, furnished with *faculties proper to direct* and determine their actions; and when they act according to them, they may be said to follow the *law* of their nature: if they are *placed and provided for* suitably to their respective natures and wants<sup>a</sup>, or (which amounts to the same thing) if their natures are adapted to their circumstances: if, lastly, *particular cases* relating to *rational beings* are taken care of in such a manner, as will at last agree best with *reason*.

*Secondly*, If there are such *laws and provisions*, they can come originally from no other being, but from Him who is the *Author of nature*. For those laws, which result from the *natures* of things, their properties, and the use of their faculties, and may be said to be written upon the things themselves, can be the laws of no other: nor can those things, whose very *being* depends upon God, exist under any condition *repugnant* to His will; and therefore can be subject to no laws or dispositions, which He would not have them be subject to; that is, which are not *His*. Beside, there is *no other* being capable of imposing laws, or any scheme of government upon the world; because there is no other, who is not himself *part* of the world, and whose own existence doth not *depend* upon Him.

*Thirdly*, By the *providence of God* I mean His governing the world by *such laws*, and making *such provisions*, as are mentioned above. So that if there are *such*, there is a Divine providence.

<sup>a</sup> מקרני ראמים ער ביצי כנים, as the *Jews* speak. I shall not pretend here to meddle with particular cases relating to *inanimate* or *irrational* beings; such as are mentioned in *Mo. nebok*. (a leaf's falling from a tree, a spider's catching a fly, &c.) and which are there said to be במקרה גמור. Tho it is hard to separate these many times from the cases of rational beings; and also to comprehend what במקרה גמור, *perfect accident*, is.

*Lastly,*



*Lastly*, It is not *impossible*, that there should be *such*: on the contrary, we have just reasons to believe there are. It would be an absurd assertion to say, that any thing is *impossible* to a being whose nature is infinitely above our comprehension, if the terms do not *imply a contradiction*: but we may with confidence assert, that it is *impossible* for any thing, whose *existence* flows from such a being, ever to grow so far out of His reach, or be so emancipated from under Him, that the *manner* of its existence should not be regulated and determin'd by Him.

As to *inanimate substances*, we see the case to be really just as it was supposed before to be. The heavenly and greater bodies keep their stations, or persevere to go the same circuits over and over by a *certain law*. Little bodies or particles, of the same kind, observe continually the same *rules* of attracting, repelling, &c. When there are any seeming variations in nature, they proceed only from the different circumstances and combinations of things, acting all the while under their ancient *laws*. We are so far acquainted with the *laws* of gravitation and motion, that we are able to calculate their effects, and serve our selves of them, supplying upon many occasions the defect of power in our selves by mechanical powers, which never fail to answer according to the *establishment*. Briefly, we see it so far from being *impossible*, that the *inanimate* world should be govern'd by *laws*, that all the parts of it are obnoxious to *laws*, by them *inviolable*.

As to *vegetables*, we see also how they are determin'd by *certain methods* prescribed them. Each sort is produced from its *proper* seed; hath the *same* texture of fibres; is nourish'd by the *same* kind of juices out of the earth, digested and prepared by the *same* kind of vessels, &c. Trees receive annually their *peculiar* liveries, and bear their *proper* fruits: flowers are dress'd, each family, in the *same* colors, or diversify their fashions after a certain manner *proper* to the kind, and breath the *same* essences: and both these and all other kinds *observe* their seasons; and seem to have their several professions and trades *appointed* them, by which they produce such food and manufactures (pardon the *catarchesis*), as may *supply the wants* of animals. Being so very necessary, they, or at least the most useful, grow *easily*: being fixt in the earth, inflexible, and not made for society, they are generally ἀρρενωδάλεα: being liable to a great consumption both of them and their seeds, they yield *great quantities* of these, in order to repair and multiply their race, &c. So that here is evidently a *regulation*, by which the several orders are preserved, and the ends of them answer'd according to their first *establishment* too.

Then as to *animals*, there are *laws*, which *mut. mutand.* are common to them with inanimate beings and vegetables, or at least such as resemble<sup>a</sup> their laws. The individuals

<sup>a</sup> Pliny in his chapter *De ordine naturæ in satis*, &c. treats of trees in terms taken from animals.

of the several kinds of those, <sup>■</sup> of these, have the *same* (general) shape, and members, to be managed after the *same* manner: have the *same* vessels replenishd with the *same* kinds of fluids, and furnishd with the *same* glands for the separation and distribution of such parts of them, as answer the *same* intentions in them all: are stimulated by the *same* appetites and uneasinesses to take in their food, continue their breed &c. And whatever it is, that proceeds thus in like manner, according to *fixed* methods, and keeps in the *same* general track, may be said to observe and be under some like *rule* or *law*, which either operates upon and limits it *ab extra*, or was given it with its nature. But there are, moreover, certain obligations resulting from the several degrees of reason and sense, or sense only, of which we cannot but be conscious in our selves, and observe faint traces in the kinds below us, and which can be lookt upon as nothing less than *laws*, by which animals are to move and manage themselves: that is, otherwise expressd, by which the Author of their natures *governs* them. 'Tis true *these laws* may not impose an absolute necessity, nor be of the *same* kind with those of inanimate and merely passive beings, because the beings which are subject to these (men at least) may be supposed in some measure free, and to act upon some kind of principles or motives: yet still they may have the nature of *laws*, tho they may be broken; and may make <sup>■</sup> part of that *providence* by which God *administers* the affairs of the world. Whatever advantages I obtain by my own free endeavours, and right use of those faculties and powers I have, I look upon them to be as much the effects of God's *providence* and government, as if they were given me *immediately* by Him without my acting; since all my faculties and abilities (whatever they are) depend upon *Him*, and are as it were *instruments* of His providence to me in respect of such things as may be procured by them.

To finish this head: it is so far from being *impossible*, that the several tribes of *animals* should be so made and placed, as to find proper ways of supporting and defending themselves (I mean, so far as it is consistent with the general oeconomy of the world: for some cannot well subsist without the destruction of some others), that, on the contrary, we see men, beasts, birds, fishes, insects all have organs and faculties adapted to their respective circumstances and opportunities of finding their proper food or prey, &c. even to the astonishment of them who attend to the history of nature. If *men*, who seem to have more wants than any other kind, find difficulties in maintaining life, it is because they themselves, not contented with what is *decent* and *convenient* only, have by their luxuries and scandalous neglect of their reason *made* life expensive.

■ Therefore if those *Essenes* in *Josephus*, who are said ἐπὶ μὲν Θεῷ καὶ ἀλιπτύν τὰ πάντα, excluded human endeavours, they must be much in the wrong.



The *world* then being not left in a state of confusion or as a chaos, but reduced into order and methodized for ages to come; the several species of beings having their offices and provinces assigned them; plants and animals subsistence set out for them; and as they go off, successors appointed to relieve them, and carry on the scheme, &c. that the possibility only of a general providence should be allowed, is certainly too modest a demand. We see, or may see, that in fact there is such a providence<sup>a</sup>.

The great difficulty is, how to account for that providence, which is called particular; or that, which respects (principally) particular men. For rational beings and free agents are capable of doing and deserving well, or ill. Some will make a right use of their faculties and opportunities, some will not: the vicious may, or may not repent, or repent and relapse: some fall into evil habits through inadvertence, bad examples, and the like, rather than any design; and these want to be reclaimed: some may be supposed to worship God and to crave His protection and blessing, &c. and then a proper answer to their prayers may be humbly expected. Hence many and great differences will arise, which will require from a governor suitable encouragements, rewards, corrections, punishments; and that some should be protected and fortunate, others not, or less. Now the good or ill state of a man here, his safety or danger, happiness or unhappiness depend upon many things, which seem to be scarce all capable of being determined by providence. They depend upon what he does himself, and what naturally follows from his own behaviour: upon what is done by others, and may either touch him immediately, or reach him afterward: upon the course of nature, which must affect him: and, in fine, upon many incidents, of which no account is to be given<sup>b</sup>. As to what he does himself, it is impossible for him, as things are in this maze of life, to know always what tends to happiness, and what not: or if he could know, that, which ought to be done, may not be within the compass of his powers. Then, if the actions of other men are free, how can they be determined to be only such, as may be either good or bad (as the case requires) for some other particular man; since such a determination seems inconsistent with liberty? Beside, numbers of men acting every one upon the foot of their own private freedom, and the several degrees of sense and ability which they respectively have, their acts, as they either conspire, or cross and obliquely impede, or perhaps directly meet

<sup>a</sup> Ut si quis in domum aliquam, aut in gymnasium, aut in forum venerit, cum videat omnium rerum actionem, modum, disciplinam, non possit ea sine causa fieri judicare, sed esse aliquem intelligat, qui praesit, & cui pareatur, &c. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Little things have many times unforeseen and great effects: & contra. The bare sight of a fig, shewn in the senate-house at Rome, occasioned Carthage to be destroyed: quod non Trebia, aut Trasymenus, non Cannae busto insignes Romani nominis perficere potuerunt; non castra Punica ad tertium lapidem vallata, portaque Collina adequitans ipse Hannibal. Plin.





pass in *that way*: nay, it is *impossible*, that He should *not* do it. We our selves, if we are satisfied of the goodness of the materials of which a machine is made, and understand the force and determination of those powers by which it is moved, can tell what it will do, or what will be the effect of it. And as to those things which depend upon the *voluntary* motions of free agents, it is well known, that men (by whom learn how to judge of the rest) can only be free with respect to such things as are within their *sphere*; not great, God knows: and their freedom with respect to these can only consist in a liberty either to act, without any incumbent necessity, as their *own reason* and judgment shall determin them; or to *neglect* their rational faculties, and not use them at all, but suffer themselves to be carried away by the tendencies and inclinations of the body, which left thus to itself acts in a manner *mechanically*. Now He, who knows what *is* in men's power, what not; knows the make of their bodies, and all the *mechanism* and propensions of them; knows the *nature* and *extent* of their understandings, and what will determin them this or that way; knows all the process of natural (or second) causes, and consequently how these may work upon them<sup>b</sup>: He, I say, who knows all this, may know *what* men will do, if He can but know this one thing more, *viz.* whether they *will use* their rational faculties or *not*. And since even we our selves, mean and defective as we are, can in *some measure* conceive, how so much as this may be done, and seem to want but one step to finish the account, can we with any shew of reason deny to a *Perfect* being this one article more, or think that He cannot do that too; especially if we call to mind, that this very power of *using* our own faculties is held of Him<sup>c</sup>?

Observe what a sagacity there is in some *men*, not only in respect of physical causes and effects, but also of the future actings of mankind; and how very easie it is many times, if the persons concern'd, their characters, and circumstances are given, to foresee what they will do: as also to foretell many general events, tho the intermediate transactions upon which they depend are not known<sup>d</sup>. Consider how much more remarkable this penetration is in *some men*, than in *others*: consider further, that if there be any *minds* more perfect than the human, (and who can be so conceited of himself as to question this?) they must have it in a still more eminent degree, *proportionable* to the excellence of their natures: in the last place, do but allow

\* What *Seneca* says of the Gods (in the Heathen style), may be said of the true God. *Nota est illi operis sui series: omniumque illi rerum per manus suas iturarum scientia in aperto semper est; nobis ex abdito subit, &c.*

<sup>b</sup> Ο ὁ ζῶοντάς τινος θεὸς ἐπιστάται τὰ ἐαυτοῦ καλῶς δημιουργήματα. *Ph. 7.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ipsa nostra voluntates in causarum ordine sunt, qui certus est Deo, ejusque praescientia continetur, &c.* S. Aug.

<sup>d</sup> *Et si quem exitum acies habitura sit, divinare nemo potest; tamen belli exitum video, &c.* and after, *quem ego tam video animo, quam ea, quae oculis cernimus.* Cic.

(as you must) this power of discerning to be in God *proportionable* to His nature, as in lower beings it is proportionable to *theirs*, and then it becomes *infinite*; and then again, the *future* actions of free agents are at once all unlocked, and exposed to His view. For that knowledge is not infinite, which is limited to things *past* or *present* or which come to pass *necessarily*.

After all, what has been said is only a feeble attempt to shew, how far *even we* can go toward a conception of the *manner*, in which future things may be known: but as we have no adequate idea of an infinite and perfect Being, His powers, and among them His *power of knowing*, must infinitely pass all our understanding. It must be something different from and *infinitely* transcending all the modes of apprehending things, which we know any thing of.

We know matters of fact by the help of our *senses*, the strength of *memory*, impressions made upon *phancy*, or the *report* of others (tho that indeed is comprehended under *senses*. For that, which we know only by report, in proper speaking we only know the report of, or we have heard it); and all these ways do suppose those matters either to be *present*, or once to *have been*: but is it therefore *impossible*, that there should be any *other* ways of knowing? This is so far from being true, that, since God has no organs of sensation, nor such mean faculties as the best of ours are, and consequently cannot know things in the way which we know them in, if He doth not know them by some *other* way, He cannot know them *at all*, even tho they were present: and therefore there must be *other* ways, or at least *another* way of knowing even matters of fact. And since the difficulty we find in determining, whether *future* matters of fact may be known, arises chiefly from this, that we in reality consider, without minding it, whether they may be known in *our way* of knowing; it vanishes, when we recollect, that they are and must be known to God by some other way: and not only so, but this must be some way, that is perfect and worthy of Him. *Future*, or what to us is future, may be as truly the object of Divine knowledge, as *present* is of ours: nor can we tell, what respect *past*, *present*, *to come*, have to the Divine mind, or wherein they differ. To deaf men there is no such thing as *sound*, to blind no such thing as *light* or *color*: nor, when these things are defined and explained to them in the best manner, which their circumstances admit, are they capable of knowing *how* they are apprehended. So here, we cannot tell *how* future things are known perhaps, any more than deaf or blind people what sounds or colors are, and *how* they are perceived; but yet there may be a way of knowing *those*,

אין זה ידוע ממין ידיעתו. Maim. It differs not במין המציאות. Id. ברב ובמעט לבר אבל במין המציאות. Id.  
 Ignari, quid queat esse. Quid nequeat: to use *Terentius's* words more properly.



■ well ■ there is of perceiving *these*. As they want ■ *fifth* sense to perceive sounds or colors, of which they have no notion: so perhaps we may want a *sixth* sense, or *some faculty*, of which future events may be the proper objects. Nor have we any more reason to deny, that there is in nature *such* ■ sense or faculty, than the deaf or blind have to deny there is such a sense as that of *hearing* or *seeing*.

We can never conclude, that it is *impossible* for an infinitely perfect Being to know what ■ free agent will *choose* to do, till we can comprehend *all* the powers of such ■ Being, and that is till we our selves are infinite and perfect <sup>a</sup>. So far are we from being able to pronounce with any shew of reason, that it is *impossible* there should be such knowledge in God.

In the last place, this knowledge is not only not *impossible*, but that which has been already proved concerning the Deity and His perfection doth necessarily infer, that nothing can be hid from Him. For if *ignorance* be an imperfection, the ignorance of *future* acts and events must be so: and then if *all* imperfections are to be denied of Him, *this must*.

There is indeed ■ common prejudice against the *prescience* (as it is usually called) of God; which suggests, that, if God foreknows things, He foreknows them infallibly or *certainly*: and if so, then they are *certain*; and if certain, then they are no longer matter of *freedom*. And thus prescience and freedom are inconsistent. *But sure* the nature of a thing is not *changed* by being known, or known before hand. For if it is known truly, it is known to be what it is; and therefore is not altered by this. The truth is, God foresees, or rather sees the actions of free agents, because they *will be*; not that they will be, because He *foresees* them <sup>b</sup>. If I see an object in ■ certain place, the veracity of my faculties supposed, it is *certain* that object is there: but yet it cannot be said, it is there *because* I see it there, or that my seeing it there is the *cause* of its being there: but because it *is there*, therefore I *see* it there. It is the object, that determines my sensation: and so in the other case, it is the future *choice* of the free agent, that determines the prescience, which yet may be infallibly true <sup>c</sup>.

Let us put these two contradictory propositions, *B* (some particular man) *will go to church next Sunday*, and *B will not go to church next Sunday*; and let us suppose withall,

■ To attempt to comprehend the manner of God's knowing is the same as to endeavour שנהיה אנוחנו הוא. Maim. <sup>b</sup> ידעתי במה שיהיה לא יוציא הדבר האפשר משבעו. Maim. Much

might be inserted upon this subject (out of *Abarb.* particularly) which I shall omit. <sup>c</sup> Si-

cut enim tu memoriâ tuâ non cogis facta esse qua praterierunt; sic Deus prescientiâ suâ non cogit faciendâ qua futura sunt. S. Aust.

that B is free, and that his going or not going depends merely upon his *own will*. In this case he may indeed do either, but yet he can do but *one* of these two things, either *go*, or *not go*; and one he must do. One of these propositions therefore is now *true*; but yet it is not the truth of that proposition, which forces him *to do* what is containd in it: on the contrary, the *truth* of the proposition arises from what he shall *choose* to do. And if that truth doth not force him, the *foreknowledge* of that truth will not. We may sure suppose B himself to *know certainly* before hand, which of the two he will choose to do, whether to go to church or not (I mean so far as it depends upon his choice only): and if so, then here is B's own *foreknowledge* consistent with his freedom: and if we can but, further, suppose God to know *as much* in this respect as B does, there will be God's *foreknowledge* consistent with B's *freedom*.

In a word, it involves no *contradiction* to assert, that God certainly knows what any man will choose; and therefore that he should do this cannot be said to be *impossible*.

2. It is not *impossible*, that such *laws* of nature, and such a *series* of causes and effects may be *originally* design'd, that not only general provisions may be made for the several species of beings, but even *particular cases*, at least many of them, may also be provided for without any *innovation* or *alteration* in the course of nature<sup>a</sup>. It is true this amounts to a prodigious scheme, in which all things to come are as it were comprehended under one view, estimated, and laid together: but when I consider, what a mass of *wonders* the universe is in other regards; what a Being God is, *incomprehensibly* great and perfect; that He cannot be ignorant of any thing, no not of the *future* wants and deportments of *particular* men; and that all things, which derive from Him as the First cause, must do this so as to be *consistent* one with another, and in such a manner, as to make *one compact* system, befitting so great an Author: I say, when I consider this, I cannot deny such an *adjustment* of things to be within His power<sup>b</sup>. The order of events, proceeding from the settlement of nature, may be as compatible with the due and reasonable success of *my* endeavours and prayers (as inconsiderable a part of the world as I am<sup>c</sup>), as with any other thing or *phenomenon* how great soever.

<sup>a</sup> Things come to pass κατὰ φυσικὰς ἀκολουθίας καὶ κατὰ λόγον and even τὰ μικρότερα δὲ συντεταχθῆναι καὶ συνωφάνθαι νομίζω. Plot. That in Seneca looks something like this: Hoc dico, fulmina non mitti a Jove, sed sic omnia disposita, ut ea etiam, quæ ab illo non sunt, tamen sine ratione non fiant: quæ illius est. — Nam etsi Jupiter illa nunc non facit, fecit ut fierent.

<sup>b</sup> This seems to be what Eusebius means, when he says, that Divine providence does (among other things) τοῖς ἐκτὸς συμβαίνειν τὴν δεῦσαν τάξιν δυνάμεναι. <sup>c</sup> Τὴν ὅσον ἐξένειαν τὴν ἑμαυτῷ μετρεῖν ἑμαυτοῦ, in Philo's words.



Perhaps my meaning may be made more intelligible thus. Suppose M (some man) certainly to *foreknow* some way or other that, when he should come to be upon his death-bed, L would *petition* for some *particular legacy*; in a manner so earnest and humble, and with such a good disposition, as would render it proper to grant his request: and upon this M makes his *last will*, by which he devises to L that which was to be asked, and then locks up the *will*; and all this many years before the death of M, and whilst L had yet no expectation or thought of any such thing. When the time comes, the *petition* is made, and *granted*; not by making any *new will*, but by the *old* one already made, and without *alteration*: which legacy had, notwithstanding that, never been left, had the petition never been preferred. The grant may be called an effect of a future act, and depends as much upon it, as if it had been made after the act. So if it had been foreseen, that L would not *so much* ask, and had therefore been left out of the will; this *preterition* would have been caused by his carriage, tho much later than the date of the will. In all this is nothing hard to be admitted, if M be allowd to *foreknow* the case<sup>a</sup>. And thus the *prayers*, which good men offer to the *All-knowing* God, and the *neglects* of others, may find fitting effects *already* fore-casted in the course of nature. Which *possibility* may be extended to the labors of men, and their behaviour in general.

It is obvious to every one's observation, that in *fact* particular men are very commonly (at least in some measure) rewarded or punished by the *general* laws and methods of nature. The *natural* (tho not constant) attendents and consequences of virtue are peace, health, and felicity; of vice loss of philosophical pleasures, a diseased body, debts, and difficulties. Now then, if B be *virtuous* and *happy*, C *vitious* and at last *miserable*, laboring under a late and fruitless remorse; tho this comes to pass through the *natural tendency* of things, yet these two cases, being supposed such as require, the one that B should be favored, the other that C should suffer for his wickedness, are as effectually *provided for*, as if God exerted his power in some peculiar way on this occasion.

3. It is not *impossible*, that men, whose natures and actions are foreknown, may be introduced into the world in such *times*, *places*, and other *circumstances*, as that their acts and behaviour may not only coincide with the *general* plan of things, but also answer many *private* cases too<sup>b</sup>. The *planets* and bigger parts of the world we cannot

<sup>a</sup> The case here put may perhaps supply an answer to that, which is said in *Mishn. maff. Berak.* צועק לשעבר הרי זו תפלת שוא וכו'. <sup>b</sup> If *Plato* had not been born in the time of *Socrates*, in all probability he had not been what he was. And therefore, with *Lactantius's* favor, he might have reason to thank God, *quod Atheniensis [natus esset]*, & *quod temporibus Socratis*. Just as *M. Antoninus* ascribes, gratefully, to the Gods τὸ γινῆναι Ἀπολλώνιον, ῥέσιμον, Μάξιμον.

but see are disposed into such *places* and *order*, that they together make a noble *system*, without having their natural powers of attraction (or the force of that which is equivalent to attraction) or any of the laws of motion *restrained* or *altered*. On the contrary, being *rightly placed*, they by the observation of *these* become subservient to the main design. Now why may there not be in the Divine mind something like a projection of the *future history* of mankind, as well as of the order and motions and various aspects of the greater bodies of the world? And then why should it not be thought *possible* for *men*, as well as for *them*, by some secret law, tho of another kind, or rather by the presidence and guidance of an unseen governing power, to be brought into their places in such a manner as that by the *free* use of their faculties, the conjunctions and oppositions of their interests and inclinations, the natural influence and weight of their several magnitudes and degrees of parts, power, wealth, &c. they may conspire to make out the scheme? And then again, since generals consist of particulars, and in this scheme are comprehended the actions and cases of *particular* men, they cannot be so situated respectively among the rest of their species as to be serviceable to the principal intention, and fall properly into the *general diagram* of affairs, unless they and their several actings and cases do in the main correspond one to another, and fit among themselves, or at least are not *inconsistent*.

Here is no implication of any *contradiction* or *absurdity* in all this: and therefore it may at least be fairly *supposed*. And if so, it will follow, that a *particular providence* may be compatible with the natural *freedom* of mens actions. Such a supposition is certainly not beyond the power of an *almighty, perfect* Being: it is moreover worthy of Him, and what they, who can dwell a while upon those words, and take their import, must believe.

The ancients I am persuaded had some such thoughts as these For they were generally *fatalists*, and yet do not seem to have thought, that they were *not masters* of their own actions<sup>a</sup>.

4. It is not *impossible* (for this is *all* that I contend for here), that many things, suitable to several cases, may be brought to pass by means of *secret* and sometimes *sudden influences* on our minds<sup>b</sup>, or the minds of other men, whose acts may af-

<sup>a</sup> Plato and the Stoics, ap. Plut. make fate to be συμπλοκή αἰών τεταγμένη, ἐν ᾗ συμπλοκή καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν ὥστε τὰ μὲν ἐμάρθαι, τὰ δὲ ἀναιμάρθαι.

<sup>b</sup> The Heathen were of this opinion: otherwise Homer could have had no opportunity of introducing their Deities as he doth. Τῷ δ' ἄλλῃ ἰφρὸς δῖος θεὸς γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη· Ἀλλὰ τις ἀθανάτων τρέφε φρένας· and the like often. Plutarch explains these passages thus. Οὐκ ἀναιρῶντα ποιεῖ [Ὅμηρος] τὸν θεόν, ἀλλὰ κινεῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν. οὐδ' ὁρμῆς ἐργαζόμενον ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγῆς· and afterwards the Gods are said to help men, τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πρακτικόν καὶ προαιρετικόν ἀρχαίς τισι καὶ φαντασίαις καὶ ἐπινύλαις ἐγείροντες, ἢ τένοντιον ἀποτρέφοντες καὶ ἱσάντες.



fect us. For instance; if the case should require, that N should be deliverd from some threatening *ruin*, or from some *misfortune*, which would certainly befall him, if he should go such a way at such a time, as he intended: upon this occasion some *new* reasons may be presented to his mind, why he should not go *at all*, or not *then*, or not *by that road*; or he may forget to go. Or, if he is to be deliverd from some dangerous *enemy*, either some new turn given to his thoughts may divert him from going where the *enemy* will be, or the *enemy* may be after the same manner diverted from coming where *he* shall be, or his [the *enemy's*] resentment may be *qualified*, or some proper method of *defence* may be suggested, or degree of resolution and vigor excited. After the same manner not only deliverances from dangers and troubles, but advantages and successes may be conferred: or on the other side, men may, by way of punishment for crimes committed, incurr mischiefs and calamities. I say, these things and such like *may be*. For since the motions and actions of men, which depend upon their wills, do also depend upon their judgments, as these again do upon the *present appearances* or *non-appearances* of things in their minds; if a *new* prospect of things can be any way produced, the lights by which they are seen *alterd*, *new* forces and directions imprest upon the spirits, passions *exalted* or *abated*, the power of judging *inlivend* or *debilitated*, or the attention taken off, without any suspension or alteration of the standing laws of nature, then without that *new* volitions, designs, measures, or a cessation of thinking may also be produced, and thus many things prevented, that otherwise would have *been*, and many brought about, that would *not*. But that this is far from being *impossible*, seems clear to me. For the operations of the mind following in great measure the present disposition of the *body*, some thoughts and designs, or absences of mind, may proceed from *corporeal* causes, acting according to the common laws of matter and motion themselves; and so the case may fall in with n. 2. or they may be occasiond by something said or done by *other men*; and then the case may be brought under n. 3. or they may be caused by the suggestion, and impulse, or other silent communications of some *spiritual being*; perhaps the Deity himself. For that such imperceptible influences and still whispers may be, none of us all can positively deny: that is, we cannot know certainly, that there are no such things. On the contrary, I believe there are but few of them who have made observations upon themselves and their affairs, but must, when they reflect on life past and the various adventures and events in it, find many instances, in which their usual judgment and sense of things cannot but seem to themselves to have been *over-ruled* they knew not *by what*, nor *how*, nor *why* (i. e. they have done

<sup>a</sup> Σφαλὲς [ὁ μετρακίσκος] ἐκ δὲ ὅπως, ἐμοὶ μὲν τὸ φάρμακον, Πτοιοδάρῳ δὲ ἀφάρμακτον [κύλικα] ἐπέδωκε, says Callidemidas, who designd the poison for Ptoeodorus, in Lucian.

things, which afterwards they wonder how they came *to do*); and that these actions have had consequences very *remarkable* in their history<sup>a</sup>. I speak not here of men dementated with wine, or enchanted with some temptation: the thing holds true of men even in their sober and more considering seasons.

That there may be *possibly* such inspirations of new thoughts and counsels may perhaps further appear from this; that we so frequently find thoughts arising in our heads, into which we are led by *no* discourse, *nothing* we read, *no* clue of reasoning; but they surprise and come upon us from *we know not* what quarter<sup>b</sup>. If they proceeded from the mobility of spirits, straggling out of order, and fortuitous affections of the brain, or were of the nature of *dreams*, why are they not as wild, incoherent, and extravagant as they are? Not to add, that the world has generally acknowledged, and therefore seems to have *experienced* some assistance and directions given to good men by the Deity; that men have been many times infatuated, and lost to themselves, &c. If any one should object, that if men are thus over-ruled in their actions, then they are deprived of their *liberty*, &c. the answer is, that tho man is a free agent, he may not be free as to *every thing*. His freedom may be restrained, and he only accountable for those acts, in respect of which he *is free*.

If this then be the case, as it seems to be, that men's minds are susceptible of such *insinuations* and *impressions*, as frequently by ways unknown do affect them, and give them an inclination toward this or that, how many things may be brought to pass by these means without *fixing* and *refixing* the laws of nature: any more than they are unfixed, when one man alters the opinion of another by throwing a book, proper for that purpose, in his way? I say, how many things may be brought about thus, not only in regard of *our selves*, but *other people*, who may be concerned in our actions, either *immediately*<sup>c</sup>, or *in time* through perhaps many intermediate events? For the prosperity or improsperity of a man, or his fate here, does not intirely depend upon his *own* prudence or imprudence, but in great measure upon his *situation* among the rest of mankind, and what *they* do. The natural effect of his management meeting with such things, as are the natural effects of the actions of other men, and being blended with them, the result may be something not intended or foreseen.

5. There *possibly* may be, and most probably are beings *invisible*, and *superior* in nature to us, who may by other means be in many respects *ministers* of God's provi-

<sup>a</sup> When Hannibal was in sight of Rome, *non ausus est obsidere*. S. Her.—Sed religione quadam abstinuit, quod diceret, capiendæ urbis modò non dari voluntatem, modò non dari facultatem, ut testatur et Orofius. Schol.

<sup>b</sup> Non enim cuiquam in potestate est quid veniat in mentem. S. Ault. <sup>c</sup> They.

who called Simo[n]ides out from Scopas and his company, as if it were to speak with him, saved his life. The story known.



dence, and authors under Him of many events to particular men, without *altering* the laws of nature. For it implies no *contradiction* or *absurdity* to say there are such beings: on the contrary we have the greatest reason to think what has been intimated already; that such imperfect beings, as we are, are far below the *top* of the scale. Tho *pictures* of spiritual beings cannot be drawn in our imagination, as of corporeal; yet to the upper and reasoning part of the mind the idea of *spiritual substance* may perhaps be as clear, as that of *corporeity*<sup>a</sup>. For what *penetrability* is, must be known just as well as what *impenetrability* is: and so on.

And since it has been proved (p. 77, 78), that all corporeal motions proceed originally from something *incorporeal*, it must be as certain, that there are incorporeal substances, as that there is motion. Beside, how can we tell but that there may be above us beings of greater powers, and more perfect intellects, and capable of mighty things, which yet may have *corporeal* vehicles as we have, but *finer* and *invisible*? Nay, who knows but that there may be even of these many *orders*, rising in dignity of nature, and amplitude of power, one above another? It is no way below the *philosophy* of these times, which seems to delight in enlarging the capacities of matter, to assert the *possibility* of this. But however, my own defects sufficiently convince me, that I have no pretension to be one of the *first* rank, or that which is *next under* the All-perfect.

Now then, as *we our selves* by the use of our powers do many times interpose and alter the course of things within our sphere from what it would be, if they were left intirely to the laws of motion and gravitation, without being said to alter those *laws*; so may these *superior* beings likewise in respect of things within their spheres, much larger be sure, the least of them all, than ours is: only with this difference, that as their knowledge is more extensive, their intellects purer, their reason better, they may be much *properer* instruments of Divine providence with respect to *us*, than we can be with respect *one to another*, or to the *animals* below us. I cannot think indeed, that the power of these beings is so large, as to alter or suspend the *general laws* of the world; or that the world is like a bungling piece of clock-work, which requires to be oft set backward or forward by them; or that they can at pleasure change their condition to ape us, or inferior beings; and consequently am not apt hastily to credit stories of *portents*, &c. such as cannot be true, unless the natures of things and their manner of being be

<sup>a</sup> They, who believe there is nothing but what they can handle or see (οἱ ἔθεν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ ὅν ἂν δύνανται ἀπρὸς τῶν χειρῶν λαβεῖν, — πᾶν ὃ τὸ ἀόρατον ἐκ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμοῦ ὡς εἰς ἐστὶν μέγεθος) are by *Plato* reckoned to be void of all philosophy, ἀμύητοι, σκληροὶ, ἀντίτυποι, μάλ' ἐν ἁμαρτίαις.

quite renverſed: yet (I will repeat it again) as men may be ſo placed as to become, even by the free exerciſe of their own powers, *inſtruments* of God's particular providence to other men (or animals); ſo may we well ſuppoſe, that theſe *higher* beings may be ſo *diſtributed* through the univerſe, and ſubject to ſuch an œconomy (tho I pretend not to tell what that is), as may render *them alſo* inſtruments of the ſame providence; and that they may, in proportion to their greater abilities, be capable, *conſiſtently with the laws of nature*, ſome way or other, tho not in our way, of influencing human affairs in proper places.

*Laſtly*, what I have ventured to lay before you I would not have to be ſo underſtood, as if I peremptorily *aſſerted* things to be juſt in this manner, or pretended to *impoſe* my thoughts upon any body elſe: my deſign is only to ſhew, how I *endeavour* to help my own narrow conceptions. There muſt be *other ways* above my underſtanding, by which ſuch a Being as God is may take care of *private caſes* without interrupting the order of the univerſe, or putting any of the parts of it out of their channels. We may be ſure He regards every thing *as being what it is*; and that therefore His *laws* muſt be accommodated to the true genius's and capacities of thoſe things, which are affected by them. The *purely material* part of the world is govern'd by ſuch, as are ſuited to the ſtate of a being, which is *inſenſible, paſſive only*, and every where and always *the ſame*: and theſe ſeem to be ſimple and few, and to carry natural agents into one conſtant road. But *intelligent active, free* beings muſt be under a government of another form. They muſt, truth requiring it, be conſider'd *as beings*, who may behave themſelves as they ought, or not; *as beings* ſuſceptive of pleaſure and pain; *as beings*, who not only owe to God all that they are or have, but are (or may be) ſenſible of this, and to whom therefore it muſt be *natural* upon many occaſions to ſupplicate Him for mercy, defence, direction, aſſiſtance; laſtly, *as beings*, whoſe caſes admit great variety: and therefore that *influence*, by which He is preſent to them, muſt be different from that, by which gravitation and common *phenomena* are produced in matter. This ſeems to be as it were a public influence, the other private, anſwering private caſes, and prayers; this to operate directly upon the body, the other more eſpecially upon the mind, and upon the body by it, &c. But I forbear, leſt I ſhould go too far out of my depth: only adding in general, that God cannot put things ſo far out of His own power, as that He ſhould not *for ever govern* tranſactions and events in His own world; nor can *perfect* knowledge and power ever want *proper* means to atchieve

α 'Ουχ ὁμοίως ἀνδρῶν ἀμύνεται καὶ Θεός. Ph. Jud.



what is fit to be done. So that, tho what I have advanced should stand for nothing, there *may* still be a *particular providence* notwithstanding the forementioned difficulty. And then, if there *may* be one, it will unavoidably follow, that there *is* one: because in the description of providence, p. 95, nothing is supposed with respect to *particular cases*, but that they should be provided for in such a manner as will at last *agree best with reason*; and to allow, that this may be done, and yet say, that it is not done, implies a blasphemy that creates horror; it is to charge the *Perfect* being with one of the greatest *imperfections*, and to make Him not so much as a *reasonable* being.

I conclude then, that it is as certain, that there is a *particular providence*, that God is a Being of *perfect reason*. For if men are treated according to reason, they must be treated according to what they are: the virtuous, the just, the compassionate, &c. *as such*, and the vicious, unjust, cruel, &c. according to *what they are*: and their several cases must be taken and considered as *they are*: which cannot be done without *such* a providence.

Against all this it has been, as one might well expect, *objected* of old, that things do not seem to be dealt according to *reason*, virtuous and good men very oft laboring under adversity, pains, persecutions, whilst vicious, wicked, cruel men prevail and flourish<sup>a</sup>. But to this an *answer* (in which I shall a little further explain my self) is ready. It might be taken out of that, which has been given to the *Manichean* objection under prop. VII. But I shall here give one more direct: and let *that* and *this* be mutually assisting and supplements each to the other. 1. We are not always certain, who are *good*, who *wicked*<sup>b</sup>. If we trust to fame and reports, these may proceed, on the one hand, from partial friendship, or flattery; on the other, from ill-natured surmises and constructions of things, envy, or malice; and on either, from small matters aggrandized, from mistake, or from the unskilful relation even of *truth* itself. Opposite parties make a merit of blackening their adversaries<sup>c</sup>, and brightening their friends, un-

<sup>a</sup> Si curent [Dij] homines, bene bonis sit, male malis: quod nunc abest. Ap. Cic. The Jews, who call this case צדיק ורע לו רשע ושוו לו צדיק, have written many things about it, to be seen in their books; Mo. nebok. S. Iqquar. Men. hamma. Nahh. ab. &c. So have the Heathen philosophers too; Seneca, Plutarch, Plotinus, Simplicius, al. But the answers of neither are always just. God forbid that should be thought true, which is asserted by Glauco, ap. Plat. that the just, if they had Gyges's ring, would do as the unjust, and ὅτι ἐδίδεξεν ἐκείνῳ δαίμονι, ἀλλὰ ἀπαγορεύοντι, κλ. Or that in S. Hhasid. and Men. hamma. צדיק ורע לו צדיק בן רשע. The reason assigned for this case in another place is something better: צדיק לא היה בשוטה לא היה צדיק. But the way of salving it in Nishm. hhaiy. by גלגול הנשמות, or what the Cabbalists call עיבור, is worst of all.

<sup>b</sup> Cadit & Rhipheus, justissimus unus Qui fuit in Teucris, & servantissimus equi. Dis aliter visum, Virg.

<sup>c</sup> Virtutes ipsas invertimus. Hor.

*deservedly* and *unmeasurably*: and to idle companions and gossips it is diversion, and what makes the principal part of their conversation<sup>a</sup>, to rehearse the characters of men, drest up out of their own *dreams* and *inventions*. And beside all this, the good or bad repute of men depends in great measure upon *mean* people, who carry their stories from family to family, and propagate them very fast: like little insects, which lay apace, and the *less* the *faster*. There are few, very few, who have the opportunity and the will and the ability to represent things *truly*<sup>b</sup>. Beside the matters of fact themselves there are many *circumstances* which, before sentence is passed, ought to be known and weighed, and yet scarce ever can be known, but to the person *himself* who is concerned. He may have other views, and another sense of things, than his judges have: and what he understands, what he feels, what he intends, may be a *secret* confined to his own breast. A man may through bodily indispositions and faults in his constitution, which it is not in his power to correct, be subject to *starts* and *inadvertencies*, or obnoxious to *snarcs*, which he cannot be aware of; or through want of information or proper helps he may labor under *invincible* errors, and act as in the dark: in which cases he may do things, which are in themselves wrong, and yet be innocent, or at least rather to be pitied, than censured with severity. Or perhaps the *censurer*, notwithstanding this kind of men talk as if they were infallible, may be mistaken himself in his opinion, and judge that to be *wrong*, which in truth is *right*<sup>c</sup>. Nothing more common than this. Ignorant and superstitious wretches measure the actions of *lettered* and *philosophical* men by the rattle of their nurses or illiterate parents and companions, or by the fashion of the country: and people of differing religions judge and condemn each other by their own tenents; when *both* of them cannot be in the right, and it is well if *either* of them are. To which may be added, that the true

<sup>a</sup> Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτως ἡδὺ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥς τὸ λαλεῖν τὰ ἀλλότρια· καὶ μάλιστα ἐὰν τύχωσιν ὑπὸ ἐυνόιας τινος ἢ μίσους ἐλκόμενοι, ὑφ' ὧν καὶ φιλεῖ κλέπτεσθαι ὥς τὰ πολλὰ ἡ ἀλήθεια. Greg. Naz.

<sup>b</sup> Therefore, with *Socrates* in *Plato*, we ought not much to care what the multitude [οἱ πολλοί] say of us, ἀλλ' ὅ, τι ὁ ἐπαίων περὶ τῶν δικαίων, καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἶς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια.

<sup>c</sup> Or, *v. v.* he may judge that to be *right*, which is *wrong*. This seems to be pretty much the case in that enumeration of good men, who suffered, *ap. Cic. Cur duo Scipiones, fortissimos & optimos viros, in Hispania Poenus oppressit? Cur Maximus extulit filium consularem? Cur Marcellum Hannibal interemit, &c.* For here they are reckoned *boni*, only because they were *fortes*; that is, because they had been zealous and successful instruments in conquering and destroying them, who happened to be so unfortunate as to be neighbours to the *Romans*, upon various pretences indeed, but in truth only to enlarge their own territories. Is this to be *good*? Doth it deserve such a particular observation, that *F. Maximus* buried a son after he had been Consul too? How doth it appear, that *Marcellus* was a better man than *Hannibal*? Is it such a wonder, if they, who spend their lives in slaughter, should at length be slain themselves? If the margin permitted, more remarks might be made upon this catalogue: as also some upon that, which follows in the same place, of others, *quibus improbis optime evenit*.



characters of men must chiefly depend upon the *unseen* part of their lives; since the truest and best religion is most private, and the greatest wickedness endeavours to be so<sup>a</sup>. Some are modest, and hide their virtues: others hypocritical, and conceal their vices under shews of sanctity, good nature, or something that is *specious*. So that it is many times hard to discern, to which of the two sorts, the *good* or the *bad*, a man ought to be aggregated. 2. It rarely happens, that we are competent judges of the *good* or *bad* fortune of other people<sup>b</sup>. That, which is disagreeable to one, is many times agreeable to another, or disagreeable in a less degree. The misery accruing from any affliction or bad circumstance of life is to be computed as in p. 32, 33: or according to the resistance and capacity of bearing it, which it meets with. If one man can carry a weight of four or five hundred pounds as well as another can the weight of one hundred, by these *different* weights they will be *equally* loaded. And so the same poverty or disgrace, the same wounds, &c. do not give the *same* pain to all men. The apprehension of but a *vein* to be opened is worse to some, than the *apparatus* to an execution is to others: and a *word* may be more terrible and sensible to tender natures, than a *sword* is to the senseless, or intrepid breed. The same may be said with respect to enjoyments: men have different tastes, and the use of the same things does not beget *equal* pleasure in all. Beside, we scarce ever know the whole case. We do not see the *inward* stings and secret pains, which many of those men carry about them, whose *external* splendor and flourishing estate is so much admired by beholders<sup>c</sup>: nor perhaps sufficiently consider the *silent* pleasures of a lower fortune, arising from temperance, moderate desires, easy reflexions, a consciousness of knowledge and truth; with other pleasures of the *mind*, much greater many times than those of the *body*<sup>d</sup>. Before one can pronounce another happy or otherwise, he should

<sup>a</sup> *Vita postscenia celant* (in *Lucr.*) may be aptly applied to the wicked. *Multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur.* Plin. jun.

<sup>b</sup> *Neq; mala vel bona, qua vulgus putat: multi, qui conflictari adversis videntur, beati; ac pleriq; quanquam magnas per opes, miserrimi, &c.* Tacit.

<sup>c</sup> *Feliciorem tu Mecanatem putas, cui amoribus anxio, & morosa uxoris quotidiana repudia deslenti, somnus per symphoniarum cantum, ex longinquo bene resonantium, quaritur? Mero se licet sopiat,—; tam vigilabit in plumâ, quàm ille [Regulus] in cruce.*—— *ut dubium [non] sit, an electione fati datâ, plures Reguli nasci, quàm Mecanates velint.* Sen. *Isti, quos pro felicibus aspicitis, si non qua occurrunt, sed qua latent, videritis, miseri sunt.* Id.

<sup>d</sup> *Archimedes*, having found the way of solving a problem (*examinandi, an corona aurea prorsus esset*), ran in an ecstasy out of the bath, crying *Εὕρηκα*: but who ever heard of a man, that after a luxurious meal, or the enjoyment of a woman, ran out thus, crying *Βέβρωκα*, or *Πεφύληκα*? *Plut.*

know all the others enjoyments and all his sufferings<sup>a</sup>. Many misfortunes are compensated<sup>b</sup> by some larger indowments, or extraordinary felicities in other respects. But suppose the pleasures of some, and the sufferings of some others, to be just as they appear: still we know not the *consequences* of them<sup>c</sup>. The pleasures of those men may lead to miseries greater than those of the latter, and be in reality the greater misfortune: and, again, the sufferings of these may be preludes to succeeding advantages<sup>d</sup>. So that indeed we know not how to name these outward appearances of particular men, nor which to call *happiness*, which the *contrary*; unless we knew the inward sense of the persons themselves, all their true circumstances, and what will be hereafter consequent upon their present success or adversity. 3. Men ought to be considered as *members* of families, nations, mankind, the universe, from which they cannot be separated: and then from the very *condition of their being* it will appear, that there must be great inequalities<sup>e</sup>; that the innocent cannot but be sometimes involved in general calamities or punishments, nor the guilty but share in public prosperities<sup>f</sup>; and that the good of the *whole* society or kind is to be regarded preferably to the present pleasure of any *individual*, if they happen to clash<sup>g</sup>. *Lastly*, if the *virtuous* man has undergone more in *this life*, than it would be reasonable he should suffer, if there was *no other*; yet those sufferings may not be unreasonable, if *there is* another. For they may be made up to him by such enjoyments, as it would be reasonable for him to prefer, even with those previous mortifications, before the pleasures of this life with the *loss of them*. And moreover, sometimes the *only* way to the felicities of a better state may lie through dark and difficult passes, discipline to some men being necessary, to bring them to reflect, and to force them into such *methods* as may produce in them proper improvements; such, as otherwise and of themselves they would never have fallen into. On the other side, if *vitious* and wicked men do prosper and make a figure; yet it is possible their sufferings hereafter may be such, as that the *excess* of them above their past in-

<sup>a</sup> *Fatis contraria fata rependens*. Virg. See what Pliny writes of Agrippa, the other great favorite and minister of Augustus, whom he reckons to be the only instance of felicity among them who were called Agrippa. *Is quoq, adversa pedum valetudine, misera juventa, exercito avo inter arma mortisque, — infelici terris stirpe omni, — praterea brevitate avi, — in tormentis adulteriorum conjugis, soceriq; pragravi servitio, luisse augurium praposteri natalis existimatur.*

<sup>b</sup> Ὁφθαλμων μὲν ἄμερσε, διδὼς δ' ἡδεῖαν αἰοιδῆν. Hom.

he was shipwrecked. Diog. L.

<sup>c</sup> If a good man labors under poverty, sickness, or the like, εἰς ἀγαθὸν τι τελευτήσει, ζῶντι ἢ καὶ ἀποθανόντι for how can he be neglected of God, who studies according to his poor abilities to be like Him? Plato.

<sup>e</sup> Who blames a drama, because all the persons are not heroes? Plot.

<sup>f</sup> העולם נידון אחר רובו. Abarb. & pass.

<sup>g</sup> μὴ ἕνεκα ὅλων, καὶ ἔχ' ὅλον μέρος ἕνεκα ἀπεργάζεται, κτλ. Plato.



joyments may be equal to the *just mult* of their villanies and wickedness. And further, their worldly pleasures (which must be supposed to be such as are not philosophical, or moderated and governed by reason and habits of virtue) being apt to fill the mind, and ingross the whole man, and by that means to exclude almost all right reflexions, with the proper applications of them, may be the very causes of their ruin; whilst they leave them under such defects *at the end of their days*, as we shall see afterward tend to unhappiness.

If what is objected be in many instances true, this only infers the *necessity* of a future state: that is, if good and bad men are not respectively treated according to reason in *this life*, they may yet be so treated, if *this* and *another* to follow be taken together into the account<sup>a</sup>. And perhaps it is (as I have been always apt to think) in order to convince us of the certainty of a future state, that instances of that kind have been so *numerous*. For he must not only be guilty of blasphemy, but reduced to the greatest absurdity, who, rather than he will own there is such a state, is forced to make God an *unreasonable Being*<sup>b</sup>: which I think amounts to a strong demonstration, that *there is one*. But of that more hereafter.

XIX. *If we would behave our selves as being what we cannot but be sensible we are, towards GOD as being what He is according to the foregoing propositions; or, if we would endeavour to behave our selves towards Him according to truth, we must observe these following and the like particulars.*

1. *We must not pretend to represent Him by any picture or image whatsoever*<sup>c</sup>. Because this is flatly to deny his incorporeity, incomprehensible nature, &c.<sup>d</sup>

2. *We ought to be so far from doing this, that even the language we use, when we speak of Him, and especially of His positive nature and essential properties, ought not only to be chosen with the utmost care, but also to be understood in the sublimest sense: and the same is true with respect to our thoughts, mut. mutand*<sup>e</sup>. Or thus: we must endeavour to think and

<sup>a</sup> Divine providence and immortality of the soul must stand and fall together. *Θέτερον ἐκ ἑστίν ἀπολεῖν ἀναιρέοντα θέτερον. Plut.*

<sup>b</sup> Τὸ το αὐτόν ἐστι τὸ μὴ εἶναι εἶναι Θεόν· ἢ ὄντα μὴ προνοεῖν ἢ προνοῦντα μὴ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον. Hierocl.

<sup>c</sup> Sure no body ever did in reality pretend to do this. According to Diog. L. the Egyptians set up ἀγάλματα in their temples τὰ μὴ εἶδεναι τὴν ὁ Θεὸς μορφήν: for that very reason, because they did not know his shape; or, how to represent Him. Their images seem to have been symbols or hieroglyphics, expressing something of their sense or opinion concerning Him. For, as Maimonides observes, no man ever did, or ever will worship an idol, made of metal, stone, or wood, as that Being who made heaven and earth.

<sup>d</sup> *Nou est dubium, quin religio nulla sit, ubicunq; simulachrum est. Lact.*

<sup>e</sup> Ὡς γὰρ ἔργον σώματος τὸ σωματικῶς τι ἐπιτελεῖσαι, ἔτω καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργον τὸ ταῖς ἐννοίαις τὰς ἀρεσκέσας φαντασίας τελεσιουργῆσαι ὡς θέλει. διὸ καὶ τὰς ἐννοίας ἀμαρτίας, μὴ ὡς φαντασίας ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἔργα ἐν ψυχῇ γινόμενα δίκαιον κρίνεται. S. Bas.

Speak of Him in the most *reverent* terms and most proper manner *we are able*<sup>a</sup>; keeping withall this general conclusion, and as it were habitual reflexion in our minds, that, tho we do the best we can, He is still Something *above all our conceptions*; and desiring, that our faint expressions may be taken as aiming at a *higher* and more *proportionable* meaning. To do otherwise implies not only, that His mode of existence and essential attributes are comprehensible by us, but also (which is more) that our words and phrases, taken from among our selves<sup>b</sup> and the objects of our faculties, are adequate expressions of them: *contrary to truth*.

To explain my self by a few instances. When we ascribe *mercy* to God, or implore His *mercy*, it must not be understood to be *mercy* like that, which is called *compassion* in us. For tho this be a very distinguishing affection in human nature<sup>c</sup>, to which we are made subject for good reasons, the constitution of the world and circumstances of our present state making it necessary for us to *compassionate* each the sufferings of another; yet it is accompanied with *uneasiness*, and must therefore not be ascribed strictly to God in that *sense*, in which it is used when ascribed to our selves. It perhaps may not be amiss to call it *Divine mercy*, or the like; to distinguish it, and to shew, that we mean something, which, tho in our low way of speaking and by *way* of analogy we call it by the same name, is yet in the perfect nature of God very different. Or we may consider it in general as the manner, in which God *respects* poor suppliants and proper objects *for their good*. For certainly the *respect* or relation, which lies between God, considered as an *unchangeable* Being, and *one* that is humble and supplicates and endeavours to qualify himself for mercy, cannot be the *same* with that, which lies between the same *unchangeable* God and *one* that is obstinate, and will not supplicate, or endeavour to qualify himself<sup>d</sup>: that is, the same thing, or Being, cannot respect *opposite* and *contradictory* cases in the *same* manner; him who does behave himself as before, and him who does not. Therefore when we apply to the mercy of God, and beg of Him to pity our infirmities and wants, the design is not to move His *affections*, as good speakers move their auditors by the pathetic arts of rhetoric, or hearty beggars theirs by importunities and tears; but to express our own sense of our selves and circumstances in such a manner, as may render us more *capable* of the emanations of Divine goodness, and *fit* to receive such

<sup>a</sup> Θεοπρεπῶς πάντα νοῦντες. S. Chrys. where inculcate, (כלשון בני אדם) only ἀπορία δικίας προσηγορίας. — τὰ ὀνόματα κατ' ἡμῶν ἀγαπώμενα μεταφέροντες. Plot.  
<sup>b</sup> We use them (and speak, as the Jews every  
<sup>c</sup> Mollissima corda Humano generi dare se natura fatetur, Quæ lacrymas dedit. hac nostri pars optima sensus. — separat hoc nos à grege mutorum, &c. Juv.  
<sup>d</sup> The ratio of G to M + q is different from that of G to M — q; and yet G remains unaltered.



instances of His beneficence, as to us may seem to be the effects of *compassion*, tho they proceed not from any alteration in the Deity. For it may be, and no doubt is agreeable to perfect reason *always* and *without alteration*, that he, who labors under a sense of his own defects, honestly uses his best endeavours to mend what is amiss, and (among other things) flies for relief to Him, upon whom his being and all that he has do depend, should have many things granted *him*, which are not given to the careless, obdurate, *unmasking*<sup>a</sup> part of mankind; tho his expressions and manner of address, with all his *care*, are still *inadequate*, and below the Divine nature. In short, by our applications we cannot pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in our selves we may alter the relation or respect lying between Him and us.

As God is a pure, uncompounded Being, His attributes of *mercy*, *justice*, &c. cannot be as we conceive them: because in him they are *one*. Perhaps they may more properly be called together *Divine reason*: which, as it exerts itself upon this or that occasion, is by us *variously* denominated.

Here it must not be forgot, that *mercy* or *mercies* are many times taken for advantages or benefits injoyd by us: and then they are *properly* ascribed to God, from whom they proceed as the effects of His beneficence and providence.

When we speak of the *knowledge* of God, we must not mean, that He knows things *in the way that we do*: that any intention or operation of His mind is requisite to produce it: that He apprehends things by any impressions made upon Him: that He reasons by the help of ideas: or even that the knowledge, which in us is most *intuitive* and *immediate*, does in any degree come up to the mode in which He knows things. We must rather intend, in general, that there is nothing, of which He is, or can be *ignorant*: which has been said already; and is, I am afraid, as much as we can *safely* say.

When *glory*, *honor*, *praise*<sup>b</sup> are given to God; or He is said to do any thing for His own *glory*, or we to propose the *glory* of His name in what we do; those words should not be taken as standing for *that kind* of glory and applause, which is so industriously sought, and capriciously<sup>c</sup> distributed among us mortals, and which I will take this opportunity to handle a little more *largely*, in order to give here a specimen of the world, and save that trouble in another place. Among us some are celebrated for

<sup>a</sup> Πῶς οὐ δὲν τὰς πρὸς τὰς ὁρμὰς αὐτεξσίωμῃ αὐτῶντι ὁ δίδοναι πεφυκὸς Θεός; Hierocl.  
ἀρίστων ἢ ἐν ἑκαστῷ, ἀλλὰ μείζον τι καὶ ἐέλτιον. Therefore ὁ Θεὸς καὶ ταγαδὸν are above praise. Arist.  
Οἱ τὰς θεῶν ἐπαινεῖντες γελοῖοι εἰσιν, ἡρῶν αὐτὰς ἐξισῶντες. Andron. Rh.

<sup>b</sup> Τῶν  
<sup>c</sup> Cleon, only a songster  
[ᾠδὸς]; had a statue at Thebes, kept as sacred, when Pindar himself had none. See the story in Atheniens.

small matters, either through the ignorance of the multitude, the partiality of a faction, the advantage of great friendships, the usual deference paid to men in eminent stations, or mere good luck<sup>a</sup>; and others for achieving *such things*, as if they were duly weighed, and people were not imposed upon by *false notions*, first introduced in barbarous times, and since polished and brought into fashion by historians, poets, and flatterers, would appear rather to be a disgrace to *savages* than any recommendation of rational and *civilized* natures. Strength, and courage, and beauty, and parts, and birth are followed with *encomiums* and honors, which, tho they may be the felicities and *privileges* of the possessors, cannot be their *merit*, who received them *gratis*, and contributed nothing<sup>b</sup> themselves toward the acquisition of them: whilst real virtue and industry (which, even when unsuccessful, or oppressed by ill circumstances of health or fortune, give the *truest* title to praise) lie disregarded. Thirst after glory, when that is desired merely for its own sake, is founded in *ambition* and *vanity*<sup>c</sup>: the thing itself is but a *dream*, and imagination; since, according to the differing humors and sentiments of nations and ages, the same thing may be either *glorious* or *inglorious*: the effect of it, considered still by itself, is neither more health, nor estate, nor knowledge, nor virtue to him who has it; or if that be any thing, it is but *what must cease* when the man<sup>d</sup> dies: and, after all, as it lives but in the *breath* of the people, a little fly envy or a new turn of things extinguishes it<sup>e</sup>, or perhaps it goes quite out of itself<sup>f</sup>. Men please themselves with notions of *immortality*, and fancy a perpetuity of fame secured to themselves by books and testimonies of historians: but, alas! it is a stupid delusion, when they imagin themselves *present*, and *injoying* that fame at the reading of their story after their death. And, beside, *in reality* the man is not known ever the more to posterity, because his name is transmitted to them: *he* doth not live, because his *name* does. When it is said, *J. Caesar* subdued *Gall*, beat *Pompey*, changed the *Roman* commonwealth into a monarchy, &c. it is the same thing, as to say, the conqueror of *Pompey*, &c. was *Cæsar*: that is, *Cæsar* and the conqueror of *Pompey* are the same thing; and *Cæsar* is as much known by the one designation as by the other. The amount then is only this: that the conqueror of *Pompey* conquerd *Pompey*; or some body con-

<sup>a</sup> What *Seneca* says of *Alexander*, is true of many an other heroe: *pro virtute erat felix temeritas.*

<sup>b</sup> *Tumes alto Drusorum sanguine, tanquam Feceris ipse aliquid, &c. Juv.*

<sup>c</sup> *Gloria quantalibet quid erit, si gloria tantum est? Juv.*

<sup>d</sup> היום כאן ומחר בקבר היום חו

<sup>e</sup> *Κτήματα σφαλερώτατον. Ph. Jud.*

<sup>f</sup> Even the great pyramid in *Egypt*, tho it still remains, hath not been able to preserve the *true name* of its builder; which is lost, one may justly wonder how.



querd *Pompey*; or rather, since *Pompey* is as little known now as *Cæsar*, *some body* conquerd *some body*<sup>a</sup>. Such a *poor business* is this boasted immortality<sup>b</sup>: and such, as has been here described, is the thing called *glory* among us! The notion of it may serve to excite them, who having abilities to serve their countrey in time of real danger, or want, or to do some other good, have yet not *philosophy* enough to do this upon principles of virtue, or to see through the glories of the world (just as we excite children by *praising* them; and as we see many good inventions and improvements proceed from emulation and vanity): but to discerning men this *fame* is mere air, and the next remove from nothing<sup>c</sup>; what they despise, if not shun. I think there are two considerations, which may justify a desire of *some* glory or honor: and scarce more. When men have performed any *virtuous* actions, or such as sit easy upon their memories, it is a *reasonable pleasure* to have the testimony of the world added to that of their own consciences, that they have done well<sup>d</sup>: and more than that, if the *reputation* acquired by any qualification or action may produce a man any *real* comfort or advantage (if it be only protection from the infolencies and injustice of mankind; or if it enables him to do by his authority more good to others), to have this privilege must be a great satisfaction, and what a *wise* and *good* man may be allowd, as he has opportunity, to propose to himself. But then he proposes it no further than it may be *useful*: and it can be no further useful than he *wants* it. So that, upon the whole, *glory*, *praise*, and the like, are either mere *vanity*, or only valuable in proportion to our *defects* and *wants*. If then those words are understood according to the import and value they have *among men*, how dares any one think, that the Supreme being can propose such a *mean* end to Himself as our praises? He can neither *want*, nor *value* them. *Alexander*, according to his taste of things, it may well be supposed would have been proud to have heard that he should be the subject of *some* second *Homer*<sup>e</sup>, in whose sheets his name might be embalmed for ages to come; or to have been celebrated at *Athens*, the mother of so many wits and captains: but sure *even he*, with all his vanity, could not propose to himself as the end of all his fatigues and dangers only to be praised by *children*, or rather by *worms* and *insects*, if they were capable of shewing some faint

<sup>a</sup> Τα ὀνόματα τῶν πάλαι πολυμνήτων οὕν τρόπον τινα γλωσσήματα ἔστι. *M. Anton.*

<sup>b</sup> Μικρὸν ἢ μηκίστη ὑπεροφημία, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κατὰ διαδοχὴν ἀνδραπαρίαν τάχιστα τεθνησκομένη, καὶ ἐκ ἐιδόταν ἐδὲ ἑαυτῆς, ἔτε γε τὸν πρόκαλαι τεθνηκότα. *Id.*

<sup>c</sup> *Expende Hannibalem: quot libras in duce summo invenies?*

<sup>d</sup> Μέχρι τούτου οἱ ἑπαινοὶ ἀνεκτοὶ εἰσιν, εἰς ὅσον ἂν ὁ ἐπαινεύμενος γνωρίζῃ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων προσὸν ἑαυτοῦ. τὸ δὲ ὑπὲρ τούτου, ἀλλότριον, κλ. *Luo.*

<sup>e</sup> Μακαρίσας αὐτὸν [Ἀχιλλέα] ὅτι καὶ ζῶν φίλος πιστῶς, καὶ τελευτήσας μεγάλῃ κήρυξι ἔτυχεν. *Plus.*

sense of his greatness<sup>a</sup>. And yet how far short is this comparison! In conclusion therefore, tho men have been accustomed to speak of the Deity in terms taken from princes, and such things as they have, in their weakness, admired; tho these are now incorporated into the language of Divines; and tho, considering what defects there are in our ways of thinking and speaking, we cannot well part with them all: yet we must remember to *exalt* the sense of them, or annex some *mental* qualification to the use of them. As, if God be said to do things for His own glory, the meaning I *humbly* conceive must be, that the transcendent excellence of His nature may be collected from the form of the world and administration of things in it; where there occur such *marks* of inexpressible wisdom and power, that He needed not to have given us *greater*, had He only intended His own *glory*: or something to this purpose. Or if the glory of what *we* do, be ascribed to *Him*; by this must be signified, that no glory is due to us, who have no powers, but what originally depend upon Him; and that we desire therefore to acknowledge Him to be the true author of all that, which is *laudable* in us<sup>b</sup>.

When we *thank* God for any deliverance or injoyment, this must not be so understood, as if He could value Himself upon our *ceremonious acknowledgments*, or wanted complements, or any return from us. *It is* rather a profession of the *sense we have* of our wants and defects, of the beneficence of His nature, and the greatness or seasonableness of the mercies received: an effort of a poor dependent being, who desires to own things, as far as he is able, to be *what they are*<sup>c</sup>; and especially to beget in himself such a disposition of mind, as he ought to have towards his Almighty benefactor.

When we are said to be *servants of God*, or to *serve* Him, or do Him *service*, these phrases are not to be taken as when *one* man is said to be servant of *another*, or to do him service. For here it implies the doing of something, which is useful and beneficial to the man who is served, and what he *wants*, or fancies he wants: but nothing of *want* can be supposed in God, nor can we any way be *profitable* or serviceable to Him. To *serve Him* therefore must rather be *to worship* or adore Him (of which something by and by). And thus that word in another language, of which our *serve*

<sup>a</sup> As Psaphon was celebrated by the birds, singing Μέγας θεὸς ψάλλον. M. Tyr. <sup>b</sup> Honoribus autem ——— cum diis gratias agimus, tum nihil nostræ laudis assumptum arbitramur. Cic. Ὅτι ἂν ἀγαθὸν πρῶτης εἰς Θεὸν ἀνάπεμπε. A saying of Bias ap. Diog. L. <sup>c</sup> Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ δύναμεθα κατ' ἀξίαν ποτὲ τὸτο ποιῆσαι, ——— ἀλλ' ὅμως τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἀνευγχεῖν εὐχαριστίαν δίκαιον ἂν ᾖ. Chrys.



is but the translation, is frequently used: as *to serve a graven image*<sup>a</sup> is *to worship the image*; but cannot signify the doing of any thing, which may be serviceable or useful to the dead stone. Or *to serve God* may be understood in a sense something like that: *Serve the king of Babylon*<sup>b</sup>. For they were said to serve the king of *Babylon*, who owned his authority, and lived according to his laws, tho they did nothing, nor had any thing perhaps, which could be particularly *serviceable* to him: and so they may be said to *serve God*, or to be His *servants*, who live in a continual sense of His sovereign nature and power over them, and endeavour to conform themselves to the *laws* which He has imposed upon them<sup>c</sup>. In these senses we pray, that we may live *to serve Him*: that is, we pray, that we may live to worship Him, and practice those *laws* of reason and virtue, to which rational natures are by Him subjected<sup>d</sup>.

Many more reflexions might be made upon *epithets* and *ways of speaking*, introduced by custom, from rude antiquity, or by necessity following from the narrowness either of men's minds, or their language. It is plain, that *love, anger, hands, eyes, &c.* when ascribed to God, cannot import such *bodily* parts or passions as are found in us. Even the pronouns *my, thy, his* (as His people, His house, &c.) require much *temper* in the use of them<sup>e</sup>.

3. *We shall find our selves bound to worship Him, in the best manner we can.* For by worshipping Him I mean nothing but owning Him to be *what He is*, and our selves to be *what we are*, by some more *solemn* and proper act: that is, by addressing our selves as *His dependents* to Him as the *Supreme cause*, and *Governor of the world*, with acknowledgments of what we enjoy, petitions for what we really want, or He knows to be convenient for us<sup>f</sup>, and the like. As if, *ex. gr.* I should in some humble and composed manner<sup>g</sup> pray to that *Almighty being, upon whom depends the existence of the world, and by whose providence I have been preserved to this moment, and enjoyd many undeserved advantages, that He would graciously accept my grateful sense and acknowledgments of all His beneficence toward me: that He would deliver me from the evil consequences of all my*

<sup>a</sup> כל עובדי פסל: אח פסיליהם היו עובדים *et sim. pass.* Deut. 12. mention is made of the places, אשר עברו שם הגוים וגו' in *Chald. par.* פלחו, *Sept.* ἐλάτρευσαν (in the ecclesiastical sense), *Vulg.* v. coluerunt.

<sup>b</sup> עברו את מלך בבל. <sup>c</sup> Plato applies the word *serve* even to the laws themselves in that phrase, δαλύνει τοῖς νόμοις.

<sup>d</sup> Ἐκείνῳ ἔδεν ἔγω φιλοδοσπότης γνώμης παρέχοντες. *Ph. Jud.*

<sup>e</sup> משכיל יבין. <sup>f</sup> Care must be taken how we pray, lest we should ask what may be hurtful to us. Οὐκοῦν δοκεῖ πολλῆς προμηθείας γε προσδεῖσθαι, ὅπως μὴ λήσῃσις αὐτὸν εὐχόμενοι μεγάλα κακὰ, δοκῶν δ' ἀγαθὰ. Plato. *Evertere domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Di faciles, &c.* is a poet's observation.

The author of *S. Hhaf.* addes, that we should not pray for that שאני אפשר לעשות, or שאין נעשה כפי הטבע, or שאינו ראוי, or נס בשגוי שיעשה קב"ה עיני למטה לבי למעלה <sup>g</sup> עולם.

transgressions and follies: that He would indue me with such dispositions and powers, as may carry me innocently and safely through all future trials; and may enable me upon all occasions to behave myself conformably to the laws of reason, piouſly, and wiſely: that He would ſuffer me being to injure me, no miſfortune to befall me, nor me to hurt myſelf by any error or miſconduct of my own: that He would vouchſafe me clear and diſtinct perceptions of things; with ſo much health and proſperity, as may be good for me: that I may at leaſt paſs my time in peace, with contentment, and tranquillity of mind: and that, having faithfully diſcharged my duty to my family and friends, and endeavourd to improve myſelf in virtuous habits and uſeful knowledge, I may at laſt make a decent, and happy exit, and then find myſelf in ſome better ſtate. Not to do this, or ſomething like it, will certainly fall among thoſe criminal omiſſions mentioned Sect. I. prop. V. For never to acknowledge the enjoynments and privileges we have received, and hold of God, is in effect to deny that we receive them from Him; not to apply to Him for a ſupply of our wants is to deny, either our wants, or His power of helping us; and ſo on: all contrary to truth<sup>a</sup>.

It muſt ever be own'd, that no worſhip can be proportionable to the Divine nature and perfections; but yet that we are obliged to do what we can: therefore I added thoſe words *in the beſt manner we can*. And it muſt be acknowledged further, that thoſe words do not oblige us to be *always* at our devotions neither<sup>b</sup>. For as in the worſhip of God we own Him to be *what He is*, ſo muſt we do this as not denying our ſelves to be *what we are*: beings not capable of bearing continual *intention* of mind; beings, that are incompaſſed with many *wants*, which by the conſtitution of our nature require to be ſupplied, not without *care* and *activity*; beings, that are made for many *harmleſs enjoynments*; beings, that have *many offices* to perform one for another; and beings, in whom, all things conſider'd, it would be *leſs reſpect* to be conſtantly in the formal act of devotion, than it is to addreſs our ſelves to Him with prepared minds, at certain times, or upon certain occasions. To be *always* thus ingaged, if it could be, would be to make God *what He is not*: ſince it ſeems to ſuppoſe, that He wants it and we merit of Him by it; or that He is bound to give what we aſk, without our endeavouring; or, at leaſt, that He is a Being obnoxious to importunity and teazing. For theſe reaſons I have alſo in the explication of my meaning inſerted that limitation, *by ſome ſolemn and proper act*.

<sup>a</sup> כל מגמין בהשגחה יאמין שהתפלה מועיל לו. *Albo.* התפלה—ענף מסתעף מן ההשגחה וכו'. *Id.*  
<sup>b</sup> Like thoſe *Ἀκοιμηταί* at *Constantinople* particularly, who continued divine ſervice night and day *without intermiſſion*. Or the *Meffalians* perhaps (מצלין, *Ἐυχῆται*), who placed (or pretended to place) all religion in prayer, *μόνη χολάζειν τῇ προσευχῇ ἀποποιούμενοι*. *V. Suid.*



Tho every man knows best his own opportunities and circumstances, and therefore may be most able to judge for himself, how he may best perform this duty; yet in general it may be said, that to the doing of it solemnly and in the best manner we can these things are required: an intent *mind*<sup>a</sup>, proper *times* and *places*, a proper *form* of words, and a proper *posture*. For if the *mind* be absent, or attends not to what is said, it is not the *man* that prays: this is only as it were the noise of a machine, which is put into motion indeed, but without any consciousness of its own act. To repeat one's prayers with moving *lips*, but alienated *thoughts*, is not to pray in the best manner we can: because it is not in a manner agreeable to what we are, or to *truth*. For this is to do it only as *speaking*, and not as *thinking* beings.

Upon this account it will be certain, that all times and places cannot be equally proper<sup>b</sup>. Some times are ingrossed by the business of life, and some places lie exposed to interruptions. Those of *retreat* and *silence* ought to be sought, and, as far as fairly it may be, contrived. And for this further reason, because the farther we are removed from the notice of others, the clearer we stand of all *ostentation*: that is, the more we do it upon the score of *truth* and *duty*; and this is again, the more *truly* and *dutifully* we do it.

Our next care is a proper *form* of words. All prayer must either be vocal, or mental. Now even that which is called *mental* can scarce be made without words, or something equivalent<sup>d</sup>. (I believe, that even the *deaf* and *dumb* form to themselves some kind of language: I mean something, which supplies the room of language.) For thoughts in their naked state, destitute of all words, and taken *merely by themselves*, are such subtle and fleeting things, as are scarce capable of making any *appearance* in the mind; at least of being detain'd, compared together, and ranged into *sentences*. If a sentence may be so made up of sensible ideas as to subsist in the mind by the help of those images which remain in the phantasy, after the manner of a sentence expressed in *pictures*, or by *hieroglyphics*: yet such a sentence must be very imperfect, through the *want* of grammatical inflexions, particles, and other additions necessary

<sup>a</sup> כל תפלה חלילה בלב. Maim. S. Hbaf. and the like every where.

<sup>b</sup> This in general is true: notwithstanding which I do not deny but there may be occasions, when ἔδεν καλύει τόπος, ἔδεν ἐμποδίζει καιρός: ἀλλὰ καὶ γόνυ μὴ κλίνει, — διανοίαν δὲ μόνον ἐπιδείξει θερμὴν, τὸ πᾶν ἀπήρτισας τῆς εὐχῆς. ἔξεσι καὶ γυναῖκα ἡλακάτην καίχουσιν καὶ ἱεργῶσαν ἀναδύσαι εἰς τὸν ἕραν τῇ διανοίᾳ, καὶ καλέσαι μετὰ θερμότητος τὸν θεόν. ἔξεσι καὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐμβάλλοντα καὶ καθ' αὐτὸν βαδίζοντα εὐχὰς ποιεῖν ἑκτενεῖς, κλ. S. Chrys.

<sup>c</sup> Ὁ μὲν λόγος ἐρμηνεύς διανοίας πρὸς ἀνθρώπους. ἡ δὲ διάνοια γίνεταί τῳ λόγῳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. Ph. Jud.

<sup>d</sup> Cogitation itself, according to Plato, is a kind of speech of the mind. For he calls τὸ διανοεῖσθαι (cogitation) λόγον, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται, περὶ ᾧ ἂν σκοπῇ. And so Plotinus, Ὁ ἐν φωνῇ λόγος μίμημα τῷ ἐν ψυχῇ.

to modify and connect the ideas, of which (particles, &c.) there can be no images<sup>a</sup>; and indeed little more than a set of *disjointed* conceptions, scarce exhibiting *any sense* without the assistance of language to fill up the blanks: and beside that, a *prayer* cannot be made out of such sentences as those. It is by the help of *words*, at least in great measure, that we even reason and discourse within our selves, as well as communicate our thoughts and discourse with others: and if any one observes himself well, he will find, that he *thinks*, as well as *speaks* in some language, and that in thinking he supposes and runs over silently and habitually those sounds, which in speaking he actually makes. This is the cause, why men can scarce write *well* in any language but *their own*: for whilst they think in their own, their style and speech, which is but the protraiture of their thoughts, must have the *turn* and *genius* of their own language, to what language soever the particular words belong. In short, *words* seem to be as it were *bodies* or *vehicles* to the sense or meaning, which is the *spiritual part*<sup>b</sup>, and which without the other can hardly be fixt in the mind. Let any man try ingenuously, whether he can think over but that short prayer in *Plato*, τὰ μὲν ἐσθ' ἄρα, κτλ.<sup>c</sup>, abstracted quite from those and all other *words*. One may apply his mind to the words of a prayer pronounced by *another*, and by taking them in make them *his own*; or he may be as it were his own reader, and pronounce them *himself*; or he may lay before him a prayer in *writing*, and so carry his eyes and his mind together through it; or he may go over a form of words imprinted on his *memory*; or he may put words together in his mind *ex tempore*: but still in all these ways *words* and language are used. And since to *think* over a set of words cannot be a more adequate manner of addressing to God (who neither speaks, nor thinks like us) than to *speak* it over and *think* too; and moreover, since the very *sound* of the words affects us, and, when the form is ready prepared, and the mind freed from the labor of composing, doth really help *attention*<sup>d</sup>: I say, since this is the case, it must be better, when we have opportunity, to *pronounce* a prayer<sup>e</sup>, than only to *think* it over. But then it should be spoken no louder (I mean when we pray privately), than just to make it audible to *our selves*<sup>f</sup>. It is not upon God's account that we speak, since he would know

<sup>a</sup> *Multa sunt verba, quæ quasi articuli, connectunt membra orationis, quæ formari similitudine nulla possunt.* Cic. <sup>b</sup> תפלה בלא כונה כגוף בלא נשמה. *Nabb. ab.* <sup>c</sup> *Alcib. 2.* <sup>d</sup> רבור אדם הוא בכונה וכו'. *Abarb.* That in *S. Hared.* quoted out of סמ"ק exp'ns this thus: יקרק בכל מלה ומלה כאלו מונה. <sup>e</sup> —*Ut eos [deos, in the style of the Heathens] semper pura—mente et voce veneremur.* Cic. <sup>f</sup> Ὁ τῶν ἀλλῶν ζῶων ὑπὸ σῶ, Δέσποτα, κρείττονες γειγόναιμεν, τὴν σὺ εὐλογεῖς μεγαλειότητα πρέπει, says *Solomon* in his prayer *ap. Jos.* <sup>f</sup> This we find often among the *Dinim* of the *Jews*. הברכות כולן צריך הכנימו. *Maim.* And *R. Elaz. Azquari*, having cited this passage, adds הסכימו רוב פוסקים שאם לא השמיע לאזניו לא יצא וכו'. *Maimonides* in another place expresses himself thus: לא יתפלל בלבו [לבר] אלא מחתך הרברים בשפתיו ומשמיע לאזניו בלחש. (That לבר I inserted from *Shulbb. aruk.*) The same occurs in *Or phadash*, &c. *pass.*



even our thoughts: but it is upon *our own* account, and to make our *adorations*, tho imperfect at the best, as compleat as we are able. (Which, by the way, is an answer to them, who object against prayer the *impertinence* of talking to God.) This being premised, and it being found that we must make use of *words*, it cannot be denied that we ought to use the *best* and *propereſt* we can. This cannot be done in *extemporaneous* effusions: and therefore there must be forms *premeditated*; the *best*, that we are capable of making or procuring, if we would worship God to the best of our capacity. As a prayer ought to have all the marks of seriousness and being in earnest, it ought to be the *plainest*, and at the same time is perhaps the *hardest* of all compositions. It ought to take in a general view of what we have *injoyd*, what we *want*, what we have *done*, &c. and every thing ought to be exprest with *method*, in phrases that are *grave* and *pointing*, and with such a *true* eloquence, as engages all our attention, and represents our *deepest* sense, without *affectation* or *needless repetitions*. These considerations have caused me many times to wonder at those men, who dispute against pre-conceived forms of prayer. They, who talk so much of the *spirit* of prayer, seem to know but little of it.

As to the *posture*, that is best, which best *expresses* our humility, reverence, and earnestness, and affects us most. Tho perhaps some regard is to be paid to the customs of the *place* where we are; or of our own *country*, to which we have been most used. Several nations may denote the same thing by different gestures: and we may take these, as we do their words; *i.e.* as having that signification which they put upon them.

Tho I have not hitherto mentiond it, there ought to be also a *public worship* of the Deity. For a man may be considerd as a member of a *society*, and *as such* he ought to worship God (if he has the opportunity of doing it: if there are proper prayers used publicly, which he may resort to; and his health, &c. permit). Or the *society* may be considerd as *one body*, that has common interests and concerns, and *as such* is obliged to worship the Deity, and offer one common prayer. Beside, there are many, who know not of themselves, *how* to pray; perhaps cannot so much as read. These too must be taken *as they are*, and consequently some time and place *appointed*, where they may have suitable prayers red to them, and be guided in their devotions. And further, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is *necessary* there should be some religion professd, and even establishd; which cannot be without some public worship. And were it not for that sense of virtue, which is *principally* preserved (so far as it is preserved) by national *forms* and *habits* of religion, men would soon lose it all, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst of savages do.

המתפלל --- יחשוב כאילו שכינה כנגדו יכו : Or *bhay*.

But

But how does this *public* worship, it may be demanded, comport with that retreat and *privacy* recommended above? *Ans.* I spoke there of prayer *in general*, to which those circumstances give a great advantage: but then they are recommended no farther, than they can be had, and the nature of the prayer admits of them. And moreover, tho he who reads the form of public prayer reads it to *all* at the same time, that *all* may unite in one common act, which otherwise they could not do: yet still every *particular* person, who minds the prayers at all, has a separate perception of the words in his *mind*, and *there* he offers them, or the sense contained under them, with more or less application and ardor. And since no man can be said to *pray* any further than he *does this*; and it cannot be known to any body in the congregation beside himself, how far he *doth do it*; his prayer is in reality as *private*, as if he was inclosed within a thousand walls. So that, though there are reasons for a public worship, yet I will venture to affirm, that all *true* prayer is *private*: and the true seat of it being in the *mind*, toward the interesting of whose powers all the circumstances of worship are mainly designed to contribute, it may be said upon that account to be always made in the most retired and *undiscerned* of all retreats<sup>a</sup>: nor can more be said in respect of a worship, which by the terms is in other respects *public*. A man may be present in a congregation, and either pray the same prayer in which others seem to join, or some other, or none at all<sup>b</sup>, for ought any body there can tell besides himself.

I am not insensible how much I may expose my self by these things to the laughter of some, who are utter strangers to all this language. What a stir is here, *say they* about *praying*? Who ever observed, that they who pray are more *successful* or happy, than they are who do not? *Ans.* All observations of this kind must be very *lubricous* and uncertain. We neither *know* what other men are inwardly and really, nor how they pray<sup>c</sup>, nor what to call success<sup>e</sup>. That, which is *good* for one, may be *bad* for another: and that, which seems good at present, may at length be evil, or introduce something which is so<sup>f</sup>. And as to the *prosperity* of them, who endeavour

<sup>a</sup> Ἐν τῷ ἑσῶ ὅιον νεῶ. Plotin. <sup>b</sup> S. Chrysostom says some are so unmindful of what they are about, that they know not so much as what they say themselves. Ἐισέρχονται πολλοὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, — καὶ ἐξέρχονται, καὶ ἐκ ἰδίας τι ἔπουν τὰ χεῖλη κινεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἀκοὴ ἐκ ἀκῆι.

<sup>c</sup> The very Heathens thought, that the Gods would not hear the prayers of wicked men. Bias happening to be with some such in the same ship, when a great storm arose and they (being now frightened) began to invoke their deities, cries out, Σιγᾶτε, μὴ ἀκούσονται ὑμᾶς ἐνθάδε πλέοντες. D. L.

<sup>d</sup> C. Cestius ap. Tac. says, principes quidem instar deorum esse: sed neque diis nisi justas supplicum preces audiri.

<sup>e</sup> Sometimes πλεον ἡμῖν παντός: that is, as Plato paraphrases those words of Hesiod, Τὸ ἡμῖν τῷ παντός πολλάκις ἐστὶ πλεον, ὅπῃ ταν ἡ τὸ μὲν ἔλον λαμβάνειν ζημιῶδες, κλ.

<sup>f</sup> Quid quod iste calculi candore laudatus dies originem mali habuit? Quam multos accepta affligere imperia? quam multos bona perdidere, & ultimis mersere suppliciis? Plin.



to worship God in a proper and reasonable manner, *whatever it is*, perhaps it might be *less*, if they did not; or their misfortunes might be *greater*: who can be certain of the contrary? If these gentlemen have any way of discovering it, I wish they would impart their *secret*. In the mean time sure they cannot expect, that even in the most imperfect sketch of *natural religion* the *worship of the Deity* should be omitted: that very thing, which hath been principally intended by the word *religion*<sup>a</sup>.

4. And lastly, to deliver what remains, summarily; *Rational beings, or they, to whom reason is the great law of their nature, if they would behave themselves as above, should consider in earnest, what a mighty being He is, who by the constitution of their nature has laid them under an obligation of being governed by it, and whose laws the dictates of right reason may be said to be.* They ought to keep it well imprest upon their minds, that He is the being, upon whom their very *existence* depends: that it is He who superintends and administers the affairs of the world by His *providence*: that the effects of His *power* and *influence* are visible before their faces, and round about them, in all the *phenomena* of nature, not one of which could be without Him: that they are always in His *presence*: that He is a being of *perfect reason*: that, if it be *reasonable*, that the transgressors of *reason* should be punished, they will most certainly, *one time or other*, be punished, &c. And then, if they do this, it is easy to see what effect it must have upon all their *thoughts, words*<sup>b</sup>, and *actions*.

By what is said here, no *superstition* is intended to be introduced: it is only the practice of *reason* and *truth*, which is required: and any thing, that is *not inconsistent with them*, may be freely done, though under the inspection of our great Lawgiver himself.

<sup>a</sup> Religio deorum cultu pio continetur. Cic. Qui omnia, quæ ad cultum deorum pertinerent, diligenter retractarent, et tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti religiosi, &c. Id. <sup>b</sup> Particularly with respect to *customary swearing*; which, beside the ill consequences it has in making oaths cheap, &c. is a great instance of disregard and irreverence. For they, who use themselves to it do, at least, make the tremendous name of God to serve for an *expetive* only; and commonly to rude, passionate, or debauched discourse (λόγων ἀναπλήρωμα ποιεῖμενοι τὸ ἀγίατατον καὶ θεῖον ὄνομα. Ph. Jud.)

SECT. VI. Truths respecting Mankind in general, antecedent to all human laws.

IN this and the following sections I shall proceed as in the foregoing.

I. Every man hath in himself a principle of individuation, which distinguishes and separates him from all other men in such a manner, as may render him and them capable of distinct properties in things (or, distinct subjects of property). That is, B and C are so distinguished, or exist so distinctly, that if there be any thing which B can call *his*, it will be for that reason not C's: and *v. v.* what is C's will for that reason not be B's. The proof of this I put upon every man's own conscience. Let us see then whether there is any thing, which one man may truly call his.

II. There are some things, to which (at least before the case is altered by voluntary subjection, compact, or the like) every individual man has, or may have, such a natural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his.

The life, limbs, &c. of B are as much *his*, as B is *himself*<sup>a</sup>. It is impossible for C, or any other to see with the eyes of B: therefore they are eyes only to B: and when they cease to be *his* eyes, they cease to be eyes at all. He then has the sole property in them, it being impossible in nature, that the eyes of B should ever be the eyes of C.

Further, the labor of B cannot be the labor of C: because it is the application of the organs and powers of B, not of C, to the effecting of something; and therefore the labor is as much B's, as the limbs and faculties made use of are his.

Again, the effect or produce of the labor of B is not the effect of the labor of C: and therefore this effect or produce is B's, not C's; as much B's, as the labor was B's, and not C's<sup>b</sup>. Because, what the labor of B causes or produces, B produces by his labor;

<sup>a</sup> Οὐδὲν ἕτως ἡμέτερόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἡμῶν αὐτοῖς. Xen.

man's labor is often still called his labor. So יבנו זרים יגיעו and יגיע כפיד תאכל in Psalm. & al. *passim*. — *Ilia dumque labor vestes*. Virg.

<sup>b</sup> And therefore the produce of a



or it is the product of B by his labor: that is, it is B's product, not C's, or any other's. And if C should pretend to any *property* in that, which B only can truly call *his*, he would act contrary to *truth* <sup>a</sup>.

Lastly, there may be *many* things, which B may truly call *his* in some such *sense*, or upon some such account, as *no other* can; and to which C has no more right than D, nor D than F, &c. the *property* of which will therefore be in B. Because C has no more title than D, nor D than F, &c. and that, to which every one *besides B* has an *equal* title, no one besides B can have *any title* to at all <sup>b</sup>, their pretences mutually balancing and *destroying* each other, whilst his only *remains*. And in this case a small matter, being opposed to nothing, will be strong enough to maintain the claim of B.

III. *Whatever is inconsistent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of mankind, is inconsistent with the laws of humane nature, wrong, intolerable.* Those maxims may be esteemed the natural and true laws of any particular society, which are most proper to procure the *happiness* of it. Because *happiness* is the end of society and laws: otherwise we might suppose *unhappiness* to be proposed as the right end of them; that is, *unhappiness* to be desirable, contrary to *nature* and *truth*. And what is said of a *particular* society is not less true, when applied to the *universal* society of mankind. Now those things are *most apt* to produce happiness, which make the *most men* happy. And therefore those maxims or principles, which promote the general tranquillity and *well-being* of mankind, if those words express the *happiness* of mankind, must be the *true* laws of humanity, or the basis of them: and all such practices, as interfere with these, must also interfere with those. It is contradictory to say, that any thing can be a *general* law of *human* nature, which tends only to favour the pleasures of *some particulars* to the prejudice of the rest, who partake of the same common nature; and especially if these pleasures are of the lower and *brutal* kind. As a *million* of men are more than *one*; so in fixing the public laws of human nature, and what ought to be, or not to be, they must in reason be more regarded by a *million of times*: for here we consider men only as men.

It will be easy now to shew, that the *transgression* of these laws, conducing to the general good of the world, is *wrong* and *morally evil*. For if mankind may be said in general to be a *rational animal*, the general welfare of it must be the welfare of a

<sup>a</sup> If B works for another man, who pays him for his work, or labor, that alters not the case. He may commute them for money, because they are *his*. <sup>b</sup> *Tanquam Sparti illi poetarum, sic se invicem jugulant, ut nemo ex omnibus restet*, as Lactantius says in another case.

*rational nature*: and therefore that, and the laws which advance it, must be founded in *reason*; nor can be opposed by any thing, but what is opposite to *reason*, and consequently to *truth*.

Let us suppose *some* rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern themselves, it would be in general good for the world: that is, such a practice would be agreeable to the *nature* and *circumstances* of mankind. If *all* men should transgress this rule, what would be the consequence of such an *universal* revolt? A general *evil*, or something disagreeable to our *nature* and the *truth* of our circumstances: for of contrary practices there must be contrary effects; and contraries cannot both be agreeable to the same thing. This then would be *wrong* by the terms. And as wrong it would be in any *one* man: because all the individuals have *equal* right to do it, one as much as another; and therefore *all* as much as any *one*. At least it is certain, that whoever should violate that *rule*, would contribute his share towards the introduction of universal *disorder* and *misery*; and would for his part *deny* human circumstances to be what they are, public happiness to be what it is, and the rule to be what it really is, as much as if all others conspired with him in this iniquity and madness.

With what face can any *particular* man put his own humor or unreasonable pleasure into the scale against such a weight of happiness as that of *all the world*? Does not he, who thus centers in *himself*, disregards the good of *every body else*, and intirely separates his enjoyments and interests from those of the *public*; does not he, I say, strike himself out of the roll of *mankind*<sup>a</sup>? Ought he to be ownd as one of them? Ought he not rather to be repelled, and treated as an *alien* and *enemy* to the common happiness and tranquillity of our *species*?

IV. *Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with respect to C, would be just the same in C with respect to B, if the case was inverted*<sup>b</sup>. Because reason is universal, and respects cases<sup>c</sup>, not persons. (see sect. III. pr. II.)

Cor. Hence it follows, that a good way to know what is right or wrong in relation to *other men*, is to consider what we should take things, to be were *we* in their circumstances<sup>d</sup>.

V. *In a state of nature men are equal in respect of dominion*<sup>e</sup>. I except for the present the case of *parents* and their *children*, and perhaps of some few other near relati-

<sup>a</sup> Ἀνθρωπόμορφον θεῖον. Ph. Jud.  
alienâ causâ, sententiam fert. Sen.

<sup>b</sup> Nec enim aquus iudex aliam de sua, aliam de

<sup>c</sup> Αἰ ταυτὰ περί γε τῶν αὐτῶν γίνωσκε. Isocr.

<sup>d</sup> אל תרין

חברך ער שתגיע למקומו. P. Aboth. Eo loco nos constituamus, quo ille est, cui irascimur. Sen.

<sup>e</sup> He was a mere flatterer, who told Cyrus, βασιλεὺς μὲν ἔμοι γε δοκεῖς σὺ φύσει πεφυκέναι εἶδέν ἤττον ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ σμνηνὶ φύσσει τῶν μελιττῶν ἡγεμῶν. Xen.



ons. Here let me be understood to mean only those, between whom there is no family relation (or between whom all family relation is vanished).

In a state, where no *laws* of society make any subordination or distinction, *men* can only be considered *as men*, or only as individuals of the same *species*, and equally sharing in one common definition <sup>a</sup>. And since by virtue of this *same* definition B is the *same* to C, that C is to B; B has no more *dominion* over C than C *reciprocally* has over B: that is, they are in this regard *equal*.

*Personal* excellencies or defects can make no difference here: because, 1. Who must *judge*, on which side the advantage lies? To say B (or D, or any body else) has a right to judge to the disadvantage of C, is to *suppose* what is in question, a dominion over him; not to *prove* it. 2. Great natural or acquired *indowments* may be privileges to them who have them: but this does not deprive those, who have less, of *their title* to what they have; or, which is the same, give any one, who has greater abilities, a *right* to take it, or the use of it from them. If B has better *eyes* than C, it is well for him: but it does not follow from this, that C should not therefore see for himself, and use *his eyes*, as freely as B may *his*. C's eyes are accommodated by nature to his use, and so are B's to his; and each has the sole property in his own: so their respective properties are *equal*. The case would be parallel to this, if B should happen to have better *intellectual faculties* than C. And further, if B should be *stronger* than C, he would not yet for that reason have any right to be his *lord*. For C's less degree of strength is *as much his*, as B's greater is *his*: therefore C has *as much right* to his, and (which is the natural consequence) to use his, ■ B has to use his: that is, C has as much right to *resist*, as B has to impose or *command*, by virtue of his strength: and where the *right* (tho not the power) of resisting is equal to the right of commanding, the right of commanding or *dominion* is nothing. 3. Since strength and power are most apt to pretend a title to dominion <sup>b</sup>, it may be added further, that *power* and *right*, or a power of doing any thing and right to do it, are quite different ideas: and therefore they may be separated, nor does one infer the other. Lastly, if *power*, *quod* power, gives a right to dominion, it gives a right to *every thing*, that is obnoxious to it; and then nothing can be done that is wrong. (For no body can do any thing which he has not the *power* to do.) But this is not only contrary to what has been proved in Sect. I. but to assert it would be to advance a plain *absurdity* or

■ Nihil est unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosmet ipsos sumus. — Quotiesque est hominis definitio, una in omnes valet. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> When the Romans, in Livy, asked the Gauls, Quodnam id jus esset, agrum ■ possessoribus petere, aut minari arma, they answered, se in armi. jus ferre, & omnia fortium virorum esse. Like barbarians indeed!

contradiction rather. For then to oppose the man who has this power, as far as one can, or (which is the same) as far as one has the power to do it, would not be wrong: and yet so it must be, if he has a right to dominion, or to be not opposed. Moreover, that a man should have a right to any thing, merely because he has the power to take it, is a doctrine indeed, which may serve a few tyrants, or some banditti and rogues, but is directly opposite to the peace and general good of mankind; and therefore to be exploded, by prop. III. It is also what the powerful themselves could not allow, if they would but imagine themselves to be in the state of the weak and more defenceless; and therefore unreasonable, by prop. IV<sup>a</sup>.

VI. No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happiness of another. Because, in the first place, this supposes a dominion over him, and the most absolute too that can be. In the next, for B to begin to disturb the peace and happiness of C is what B would think unreasonable, if he was in C's case. In the last, since it is supposed, that C has never invaded the happiness of B, nor taken any thing from him, nor at all meddled with him, but the whole transaction begins originally from B (for all this is couched in the word *begin*), C can have nothing that is B's; and therefore nothing, to which C has not at least as good a title as B has; or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to keep as B to claim. These two rights being then at least equal, and counterpoising each other, no alteration in the present state of things can follow from any superiority of right in B: and therefore it must of right remain as it is; and what C has must, for any right that B has to oppose this settlement, remain with C in his undisturbed possession. But the argument is still stronger on the side of C: because he seems to have such a property in his own happiness, as is mentiond in prop. II. such a one as no other can have<sup>b</sup>.

VII. Tho no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man's happiness, or to hurt him; yet every man has a right to defend himself and his against violence, to recover what is taken by force from him, and even to make reprisals, by all the means that truth and prudence permit<sup>c</sup>. We have seen already, that there are some things, which

<sup>a</sup> Josephus, when he says, νόμον γε μὴν ὀφείδω, καὶ παρὰ θεοῦ ἰσχυρότατον, καὶ παρὰ ἀνθρώποις, εἶναι τοῖς δυνατωτέροις, can only mean, that necessity, or perhaps prudence, obliges to do this; not any law in the stricter sense of that word.

<sup>b</sup> Societatis [inter homines] arctissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam, hominem homini detrabere, sui commodi causa, quam omnia incommoda subire, &c. Cic.

<sup>c</sup> All this is supposed to be in a state of nature and the absence of human laws.



a man may truly call *his*; and let us for the present only suppose, that there may be *more*. This premised, I proceed to make good the proposition.

To deny a man the privilege mentiond in it is to assert, contrary to *truth*, either that he *has not* the faculties and powers, which he *has*; or that the Author of nature has given them to him in vain. For to what end has he them, if he may not *use* them? And how may he use them, if not for his own *preservation*, when he is attacked, and like to be abused, or perhaps destroyd.

All *animals* have a principle of *self-preservation*, which exerts itself many times with an uncontrollable elasticity. Nature is *uniform* in this, and every where constant to itself. Even *inanimate* bodies, when they are acted upon, react. And one may be sure, that no position can have any foundation *in nature*, or be consistent with it and *truth* (those inseparable companions), which turns upon nature itself, and tends to its *destruction*.

Great part of the general happiness of mankind depends upon those *means*, by which the innocent may be saved from their cruel invaders: among which the opportunities they have of *defending* themselves may be reckond the chief. Therefore to debar men of the use of these opportunities, and the right of defending themselves against injurious treatment and violence must be inconsistent with the laws of nature by prop. III.

If a man has no right to *defend* himself and what is his, he can have no right to *any thing* (the contrary to which has been already in part, and will by and by be more amply proved); since that cannot be his right, which he may not *maintain* to be his right.

If a man has no right to *defend* himself against insults, &c. it must be because the aggressor has a right to *assail* the other, and *usurp* what is his: but this pretension has been prevented in the foregoing proposition. And, more than that, it includes a great absurdity, to *commence* an injury, or to *begin* the violence, being in nature more than only to *repell* it. He, who begins, is the true cause of all that follows: and whatever falls upon him from the opposition made by the defending party, is but the effect of his own act: or, it is that violence, of which he is the author, *reflected* back upon himself. It is as when a man spits at heaven, and the spittle falls back upon his own face.

Since he, who begins to violate the happiness of another, does what is *wrong*, he, who endeavours to obviate or put a stop to that violence, does in that respect what is *right*, by the terms.

Lastly, since every man is obliged to consult his own happiness, there can be no doubt but that he not only *may*, but even *ought* to defend it; in such a manner I mean,

mean, as does not interfere with *truth*<sup>a</sup>, or his own design of being happy. He ought indeed not to act *rashly*, or do *more* than the end proposed requires: that is, he ought by a prudent carriage and wise forecast to shut up, *if he can*, the avenues by which he may be invaded; and when that *cannot be done*, to use arguments and persuasives, or perhaps withdraw out of the way of harm: but when these measures are ineffectual or impracticable, he must take such other as he can, and confront *force with force*. Otherwise he will fail in his duty to himself, and deny happiness to be happiness.

By the same means, that a man may *defend* what is his, he may certainly endeavour to *recover* what has been by any kind of violence or villainy taken from him. For it has been shewn already, that the *power* to take any thing from another gives no *right* to it. The *right* then to that, which has been taken from its owner against his will, remains still where it was: he may still truly call it *his*: and if it be *his*, he may use it as *his*: which if he who took it away, or any other, shall hinder him from doing, that man is even here the aggressor, and the owner does but *defend* himself and what is his. Besides, he, who uses any thing *as his*, when it is *his*, acts *on the side* of truth: but that man, who opposes him in this, and consequently asserts a right to that, which is not his, acts *contrary* to truth. The former therefore does what cannot be amiss: but what the latter does, is wrong by the fundamental proposition.

Then further, if a man hath still a *right* to what is forceably or without his consent taken from him, he must have a *right* to the *value* of it. For the thing is to him what it is *in value* to him: and the right he has to it, may be considered as a right to a thing of *such a value*. So that if the very thing which was taken be destroyed, or cannot be retrieved, the proprietor nevertheless retains his right to a thing of *such a value to him*; and something must be had *in lieu* of it: that is, he has a right to make *reprisals*. Since every thing is to every man what it is *in value* to him, things of the same *value* to any one may be reckoned as to him *the same*, and to recover the *equivalent* the same as to recover the *thing itself*: for otherwise it is not an equivalent. If the thing taken by way of reprisal should be *to the man*, from whom it is taken, of *greater* value than what he wrongfully took from the recoverer, he must charge himself with that loss. If injustice be done him, it is done by himself: the other has no more than what he has a *right* to. To which add, that as a man has a right to recover *what is his*, or *the equivalent*, from an invader; so he seems for the same reasons to have a right to an equivalent for the *expense* he is at in recovering his own, for the loss of *time* and *quiet*, and for the *trouble*, *hazards*, and *dangers* undergone: be-

<sup>a</sup> For ἐῖ ἐ ἀδικοῦν κακῶς ποιεῖ, ἐ ἀντιποιοῦν κακῶς ἐδὲν ἥττον ποιεῖ κακῶς, καὶ ἀμύνεται. ΜΑΧ. Τ.



cause all these are the effects of the invasion, and therefore to be added to the invader's account.

VIII. *The first possession of a thing gives the possessor a greater right to it, than any other man has, or can have, till he and all, that claim under him, are extinct.* For, 1. till then no other man can be the *first possessor* again: which is more than *nothing*; since he comes into it by God's providence, and as it were *donation*. 2. That, which no man has yet any title to<sup>a</sup>, the finder may take without the violation of *any truth*. He doth not *deny* that to be another man's, which is another man's: he doth not *begin* to interrupt the happiness of any body, &c. Therefore to possess himself of it is *not wrong*. So far from it, that, since every man is *obliged* to consult his own happiness (that is, his own interest and advantages, whenever he can do it without the violation of truth) not to act consonantly to this *obligation* is an omission that would be *wrong*. What he does therefore is *right*. And then if he does right in taking possession of it, he must from thence be the *rightful possessor*; or, it becomes his. 3. There are many things, which cannot be possessed without *cultivation* and the contrivance and labor of the first possessor. This has generally been the case of *lands*: and these are indeed more eminently meant by the word *possessions*. Now to deprive a man of the fruit of *his own* cares and sweat, and to enter upon it, as if it was the effect of the *intruder's* pains and travel, is a most manifest violation of *truth*. It is asserting in fact that to be his, which cannot be his. See prop. II. 4. The contrary doctrine, *viz.* that *prime occupancy* gives no right, interferes with prop. III. for it must certainly be inconsistent with the *peace* and *happiness* of mankind in general to be left in endless wars and struggles for that, which *no man* can ever have any right to. And yet thus it must be, if that doctrine was true: because it has been demonstrated, that *power* confers no right; and therefore the *first right* to many things can only accrue from the first possession of them. 5. If B should endeavour by force (or fraud) to eject C out of the possession of any thing, which C enjoys, and obtained without *expelling* or *disturbing* any body, he would certainly do that, which he himself would judge *unreasonable*, were he in C's place. Therefore he acts, as if that was not reason with respect to C, which would be reason in respect of B; contrary to the nature of *reason*, and to prop. IV. 6. To endeavour to turn a man violently out of his possessions is the same as to *command* him to leave them, upon pain of suffering for non-obedience. But this is usurping a *dominion*, which he has no right to; and is contrary to prop. V. 7. No man can expell another out of his possession

<sup>a</sup> Nam propria telluris herum natura neq; illum, Nec me, nec quenguam statuit. Hor.

without *beginning* to interrupt his happiness: nor can any one do this without contravening the *truth* contained in prop VI. This therefore secures the possessor in his possession for ever: that is, it confirms his *right* to the thing possessed. Lastly, the *first possessor*, of whom I have been speaking, has undoubtedly a right to defend *his person*, and such other things as can *only be his*, against the attempts of any aggressor (see prop. II.): therefore these no one can have a right to violate. And therefore again, if he cannot be forceably dispossessed without violence offered to *these*, no one has any right to dispossess him. But this must be the case, where the possessor does not quit his possession *willingly*. The *right* consequently must remain solely in him, unless he consents to quit it.

N. The *successors* of an invader, got into possession wrongfully, may acquire a right *in time*<sup>a</sup>, by the failure of such, as might claim under him who had the right. For he, who happens to be in possession, when all these are extinct, is in the place of a *prime occupant*.

IX. *A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation*<sup>b</sup>. If B has the sole right in lands, or goods, no body has any right to the disposal of them besides B: and he has a right. For disposing of them is but using them as *his*. Therefore the act of B in *exchanging* them for something else, or *bestowing* them upon C, interferes not with *truth*: and so B does nothing that is wrong. Nor does C do any thing against *truth*, or that is wrong, in taking them: because he treats them as being *what they are*; as things, which come to him by the act of that person, in whom is lodged the sole power of *disposing* of them. Thus C gets the title *innocently*.

But in the case of *compact* the reason, on which this transaction stands, is more evident still. For the contractors are supposed to receive each from other the *equivalent* of that which they part with, or at least what is equivalent *to them respectively*, or perhaps by each party *preferable*. Thus neither of them is hurt: perhaps both advantaged. And so each of them treats the thing, which he receives upon the innocent exchange, as being *what it is*: better for him, and promoting his convenience and happiness. Indeed he, who receives the *value* of any thing, and what he likes as well, in effect has it still. His *property* is not diminished: the situation and matter of it is only altered.

<sup>a</sup> Τὰς κτήσεις, ἢ τὰς ἰδίας ἢ τὰς κοινὰς, ἢ ἐπιγίνεται πολὺς χρόνος, κυρίας καὶ πατρῷας ἀπαντες εἶναι νομίζουσιν. *Isocr.*

<sup>b</sup> To this may be reduced that title to things, which *Tully* mentions as conferred by some law (*lege*); and even those, which accrue *condizione*, or *sorte*. For I suppose the government to have a right of giving them thus.



Mankind could not well subsist without *bartering* one thing for another: therefore whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourse, is inconsistent with the *general good* of mankind, &c. If a man could find the *necessaries* of life without it, and by himself, he must at least want many of the *comforts* of it.

X. *There is then such a thing as property, founded in nature and truth<sup>a</sup>: or, there are things, which one man only can, consistently with nature and truth, call his: by prop. II, VIII, IX. <sup>b</sup>.*

XI. *Those things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, must remain his, till he agrees to part with them (if they are such, as he may part with) by compact or donation; or (which must be understood) till they fail, or death extinguishes him and his title together, and he delivers the lamp to his next man. Because no one can deprive him of them without his approbation, but the depriver must use them as his, when they are not his, in contradiction to truth. For,*

XII. *To have the property of any thing and to have the sole right of using and disposing of it are the same thing: they are equipollent expressions. For when it is said, that P has the property, or that such a thing is proper to P, it is not said, that P and Q or P and others have the property (*proprium* limits the thing to P only): and when any thing is said to be his, it is not said that part of it only is his. P has therefore the all or all-hood<sup>c</sup> of it, and consequently all the use of it. And then, since the all of it to him, or all that P can have of it, is but the use and disposal of it<sup>d</sup>, he who has this has the thing itself, and it is his<sup>e</sup>.*

## Laws

<sup>a</sup> Which must not give way to opinions of *fitness*, &c. The master was in the right, who corrected Cyrus for adjudging the great coat to the great boy, and the little one to the little. He was not τῷ ἀρμότιοντος κριτὴς, but of property. *Omnium, quæ in hominum doctorum disputatione versantur, nihil est profecto præstabilius, quàm planè intelligi nos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed naturâ constitutum esse jus.* Cic.

<sup>b</sup> There is another way of acquiring a title mentiond: which is, by the right of war, as it is called. *Sunt privata nulla naturâ: sed aut veteri occupatione, ut qui quondam in vacua venerunt; aut victoriâ, ut qui bello potiti sunt, &c.* Cic. And so in Xenophon it is said to be an eternal law among men, that if a city be taken in war, the bodies and goods of the people in it are the conqueror's; and they may possess them as their own, not ἀλλότρια. But sure this wants limitations.

<sup>c</sup> *Allodium.* <sup>d</sup> Πολλάκις ἐγέλασα διαθήκας ἀναγινώσκων λεγέσας ὁ δέῃνα μὲν ἐχέτω τὴν δεσποτείαν τῶν ἀγρῶν, ἢ τῆς οἰκίας, τὴν δὲ χρῆσιν ἄλλος. Πάντες γὰρ τὴν χρῆσιν ἔχομεν, δεσποτείαν δὲ ἑοδείς. — καὶ ἐκόντες, καὶ ἄκοντες ἐν τῇ τελευτῇ παραχωρήσομεν

Laws indeed have introduced a way of speaking, by which the *property* and the *usufruct* are distinguish'd; but in truth the usufructuary has a *temporary*, or *limited* property; and the proprietary has a *perpetual* usufruct, either at present, or in reversion. Propriety without the *use* (if the use is never to come to the proprietary) is an empty sound.

I have before upon some occasions taken it as granted, that he, who uses any thing *his* when it is *not his*, acts against *truth*, &c. but now I say further, that,

XIII. *He, who uses or disposes of any thing, does by that declare it to be his.* Because this is all, that he, whose it really is, can do. *Borrowing* and *hiring* afford no objection to this. When the borrower or hirer uses the thing borrow'd or hired, he uses what is *his own* for the time allow'd: and his doing so is only one of *those ways*, in which the true proprietary disposes of it.

XIV. *To usurp or invade the property of another man is injustice: or, more fully, to take, detain, use, destroy, hurt, or meddle<sup>a</sup> with any thing that is his without his allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of these, or assist them, who do, are acts of injustice.* The contrary; to render and permit quietly to every one what is *his*, is *justice*. Def.

XV. *He that would not violate truth, must avoid all injustice: or, all injustice is wrong and evil.* It interferes with the truths<sup>b</sup> here before laid down, and perhaps more. It denies men to be *subjects* capable of distinct properties: in some cases it denies them to have a property even in their own *bodies, life, fame*, and the like: the practice of it is incompatible with the *peace* and *happiness* of mankind: it is what every man thinks unreasonable *in his own case*, when the injury is done to himself: to take any thing from another only because I think I want it, or because I have power to take

χαρήσομεν ἑτέροις, τὴν χρῆσιν καρποσάμενοι μόνον. S. Chryf. Τέτων μὲν φύσει ἑδενός ἐσμὲν κύριοι, νόμῳ δὲ καὶ διαδοχῇ τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀόριστον παραλαμβάνοντες, ὀλιγοχρόνιοι δεσπότης νομιζόμεθα. καπειδαν ἡ προδεσμία παρέλθῃ τινικαῦτα παραλαβὴν ἄλλος ἀπολαύει τῷ ὀνόματι. Luc. <sup>c</sup> Qui te pascit ager. tuus est, &c. Horace, alluding to this truth. Περὶ παντός, says Plato, ἐν ἐργάτῳ τοίνυν δὲ τι νόμιμον βίβιον περὶ τῶν ἀλλοτριῶν μηδὲνα μηδὲν φέρειν μηδὲ ἀγεῖν and then proceeds, μηδ' αὖ χεῖσθαι μηδὲν τῶν τῷ πέλας, ἐὰν μὴ πέισῃ τὸν κεκτημένον, κτλ. In Plutarch the thing is carried farther: where it is said, that a man passing by another man's door ought μὴ βλέπειν εἰσω, κλ. according to a saying of Xenocrates, μηδὲν διαφέρειν ἢ τῶς πόδας ἢ τῶς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἀλλοτριῶν οἰκίαν τίθεναι. <sup>d</sup> Furtum fit, — cum quis alienam rem invito domino contrectat. *Just. inst.*

<sup>b</sup> On the contrary נַעֲשֶׂה אֱמֶת — רִיב. A saying of רִיב. And Cicero more than once uses *verum* for *justum*, and *veritas* for *bonitas* or *probitas*.



it, and will have it, without any title to it, is the highest pretence to *dominion*, and denial of our *natural equality*: it is setting up a right to *begin* to disturb the happiness of others: and lastly, it is to deny there is any such thing as *property*, *contrary to truth*.

In a word, if there be any thing which P can truly and properly call *his*, then, if T takes or uses it without the consent of P, he declares it to be *his* (for if it was *his* he could do no more) when it is *not his*, and so acts a lie<sup>a</sup>: in which consists the *idea* and *formal ratio* of moral evil.

The very *attempting* any instance of injustice, or *assisting* others in such an attempt, since it is attempting and promoting what is *wrong*, is being in the wrong as much as one is *able* to be; or doing what one *can* to atchieve that which is *evil*: and to do this, by the *terms*, must be *wrong* and *evil*.

Even the *desire* of obtaining any thing unjustly is evil: because to desire to do *evil*, by the terms again, is an *evil* or criminal *desire*. If the act follows such a desire, it is the child and product of it: and the desire, if any thing renders the fulfilling of it impracticable, is the act obstructed in the beginning, and stifled in the womb. They are plainly of the same nature, and spring from the same stock.

Let it be observed here by way of *scholion* concerning the thing called *covetousness*, that there seem to be three sorts of it. One is this here mentiond: a desire of getting from others, tho it be *unjustly*. This is wrong and wicked. Another is an immense desire of heaping up what one can by just methods, but without any *reasonable end* proposd<sup>b</sup>, and only in order to *keep*<sup>c</sup>, and as it were *bury* it<sup>d</sup>: and the more he accumulates, the more he craves<sup>e</sup>. This also intrenches upon truth, and seems to be a vice. But to *covet* to obtain what is another man's by *just means*, and with his consent, when it may contribute to the happiness of our selves or families, and perhaps of the other person too, has nothing surely that looks *unfriendly* upon truth, or is blameable, in it. This, if it may be called covetousness, is a virtuous *covetousness*.

<sup>a</sup> Account τὸ σὸν μόνον σὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἑλλότριον, ὥσπερ ἐστὶν ἑλλότριον. Epict's words. *Justitia primum minus est, ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi laceffitus injuria; deinde, ut communibus pro communibus utatur, privatis ut suis*, Cic. This is to use things as being what they are. <sup>b</sup> Blepsias ὁ δεισιφροσύνης, in *Lucian*, dies of hunger (λιμὸν ἄθλιος ἐλέγετο ἀπεσκληκέναι). Ridiculous enough. <sup>c</sup> Or only πρὸς τὸ ἀριθμῆν, as *Anacharsis* said of some Greeks. *Athen.* <sup>d</sup> As that man, in *Athenaus*, indeavourd literally to do; of whom it is reported, that, being much in love with his money, before he died he swallowd as much of it as he could (καταπιόντα ἐκ ὀλίγης χρυσῆς ἀποθανεῖν). <sup>e</sup> Of such it is, that *Diogenes* used to say, Ὁμοίως τὰς φιλαργύρας τοῖς ὑδραπικτοῖς, κλ. *Stob.* The *Mamshilim* mentiond in *Nabb. Ab.* compare them לַצַּמָּה שִׁישְׁתָּה מִהֵמִים הַמְלֻחִים בִּי כָל עוֹר שִׁישְׁתָּה צַמָּה הֵמִים.

XVI. When a man cares not what sufferings he causes to others, and especially if he delights in other men's sufferings and makes them his sport, this is what I call cruelty. And not to be affected with the sufferings of other people, tho they proceed not from us, but from others, or from causes in which we are not concerned, is unmercifulness. Mercy and humanity are the reverse of these.

XVII. He, who religiously regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjust, but (more) not unmerciful, and much less cruel. Not to be affected with the afflictions of others, so far as we know them, and in proportion to the several degrees and circumstances of them, tho we are not the causes of them, is the same as to consider the afflicted as persons not in affliction; that is, as being not what they are, or (which is the same) as being what they are not: and this contradicts *matter of fact*.

One can scarce know the *sufferings* of another without having at least some image of them in his mind: nor can one have these images without being conscious of them, and as it were feeling them. Next to suffering itself is to carry the representation of it about with one. So that he, who is not affected with the calamities of others, so far as they fall within his knowledge, may be said to know and not to know; or at least to cancel his knowledge, and contradict his own conscience.

There is something in *human* nature<sup>a</sup> resulting from our very make and constitution, while it retains its genuin form, and is not *alterd* by vicious habits; not *perverted* by transports of revenge or fury, by ambition, company, or false philosophy<sup>b</sup>; nor *opprest* by stupidity and neglecting to observe what happens to others: I say, there is *something*, which renders us obnoxious to the pains of others, causes us to sympathize with them, and almost comprehends us in their case. It is grievous to see or hear (and almost to hear of) any man, or even any animal whatever, in *torment*. This *compassion* appears eminently in them, who upon other accounts are justly reckond amongst *the best of men*<sup>c</sup>: in some degree it appears in *almost* all; nay, even

<sup>a</sup> Properly called *humanity*; because nothing of it appears in brutes. בְּהֵמָה אֵינָהּ מִקְדֶּרֶת וְחוֹשֶׁשׁתָּהּ בְּעֵצֶר חֲבֵרָתָהּ. S. Hhas.

<sup>b</sup> When Seneca says, *Clementiam* — *omnes boni prestabunt misericordiam autem vitabunt*, he seems only to quibble. He has many other weak things upon this subject. That, *succurret* [*sapiens*] *alienis lacrymis, non accedet*, owns one use of tears: they obtain succour even from a Stoic.

<sup>c</sup> Ἀγαθοὶ ἀγιδάκνουν ἑαυτοὺς. They, who of all writers undertake to imitate nature most, oft introduce even their heroes weeping. (See how Homer represents Ulysses Od. ε. 151, — 2, — 7, — 8.) The tears of men are in truth very different from the cries and ejulations of children. They are *silent streams*, and flow from other causes; commonly some tender, or perhaps philosophical, reflexion. It is easy to see how hard hearts and dry eyes come to be fashionable. But for all that it is certain the *glandula lacrymales* are not made for nothing.



sometimes, when they more coolly attend to things, in those hardend and execrable *monsters* of cruelty themselves, who seem just to retain only the least tincture of humanity that can be. The *Pheræan* tyrant, who had never wept over any of those murders he had caused among his own citizens, *wept* when he saw a tragedy but acted in the theatre<sup>a</sup>: the reason was, his attention was caught here, and he more observed the sufferings of *Hecuba* and *Andromache*, than ever he had those of the *Pheræans*; and more impartially, being no otherwise concerned in them but as a common spectator. Upon this occasion the principle of *compassion*, implanted in human nature, appeared, overcame his habits of cruelty, broke through his petrification, and would shew that it could not be totally eradicated. It is therefore according to *nature* to be affected with the sufferings of other people: and the contrary is *inhuman* and *unnatural*.

Such are the *circumstances* of mankind, that we cannot (or but very few of us, God knows) make our way through this world without encountering *dangers* and suffering many *evils*: and therefore since it is for the good of such, as are so exposed, or actually smarting under pain or trouble, to receive comfort and assistance from others, without which they must commonly continue to be miserable, or perish, it is for the common good and welfare of the *majority at least* of mankind, that they should *compassionate* and *help* each other<sup>b</sup>. To do the contrary must therefore be contrary to nature and *wrong* by prop. III. And beside, it is by one's behaviour and actions to affirm, that the circumstances of men in this world are *not* what they are; or that peace, and health, and happiness, and the like, are not what *they* are.

Let a man *substitute himself* into the room of some poor creature dejected with invincible poverty, distracted with difficulties, or groaning under the pangs of some disease, or the anguish of some hurt or wound, and without help abandond to want and pain. In this distress what reflexions can he imagine *he should have*, if he found that every body neglected him, no body so much as pitying him, or vouchsafing to take notice of his calamitous and sad condition? It is certain, that what it would be reasonable or unreasonable for others to do in respect of *him*, he must allow to be reasonable or unreasonable for him to do in respect of *them*, or deny a manifest *truth* in prop. IV.

If unmercifulness, as before defined, be wrong, no time need to be spent in proving that *cruelty* is so. For all that is culpable in unmercifulness is contained in cruelty, with *additions* and *aggravations*. Cruelty not only denies due regard to the suffer-

<sup>a</sup> *Plut.*

<sup>b</sup> A generous nature pities even an enemy in distress. Ἐπικτείρω δὲ τὴν Δύσινεν ἡμῶν, καὶ τὴν ἐντὶ δυσμενῆ. *Soph.*

ings of others, but *causes* them; or perhaps *delights* in them, and (which is the most insolent and cruel of all cruelties) makes them a *jest* and subject of raillery. If the one be a *defect* of humanity, the other is diametrically opposite to it<sup>a</sup>. If the one does *no good*, the other does *much evil*. And no man, how cruel soever in reality he was, has ever liked to be *reckoned* a cruel man: such a confession of guilt does nature extort; so universally doth it reject, condemn, abhor this character.

XVIII. *The practice of justice and mercy is just as right, as injustice, unmercifulness, and cruelty are wrong.* This follows from the nature of contraries. Beside, not to be just to a man is to be not just, or unjust to him: and so not to be merciful is to be unmerciful, or perhaps cruel.

Here I might end this section: but perhaps it may not be improper to be a little more particular. Therefore,

XIX. *From the foregoing propositions may be deduced the heinousness of all such crimes, as murder, or even hurting the person of another any how, when our own necessary defence does not require it* (it being not possible, that any thing should be more *his*, than his own person, life and limbs); *robbing, stealing, cheating, betraying; defamation, detraction; defiling the bed of another man, et cæc. with all the approaches and tendencies to them.* For these are not only comprised within the definition of injustice, and are therefore violations of those truths, which are violated by that; but commonly, and some of them always, come within the definition of *cruelty* too. All which is evident at first sight with respect to murder, robbery, cheating, slandering, &c. especially if a man brings *himself* into the case, and views himself in his own imagination as rendered scandalous by calumniators and liars; stript by thieves; ruined in his fortunes and undone by knaves; struggling to no purpose, convulsed and agonizing under the knife of some truculent ruffian; or the like.

The same is altogether as plain in the case of *adultery*<sup>b</sup>, when any one<sup>c</sup> insnares, and corrupts the wife of another; notwithstanding the protection it gains from false notions, great examples<sup>d</sup>, and the commonness of the crime<sup>e</sup>. For (the nature of *marimony* being for the present supposed to be such, as it will appear by and by to be) the adulterer denies the *property* a husband has in his wife by compact, the most

<sup>a</sup> *Est hominum natura, quam sequi debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas.* C. c.

*μὲν ὁ κλέπτης, ἀλλ' ἐχ' ἕτω ὡς ἡ μοιχὸς.* Chrys.

*monitorum*, as they are called in *Val. Max.*

*adulterium capite solere puniri: nunc magnatum latus est.* Schol. in *S. Hier.*

follows impunity, &c. *אשרבו מנאפיה פסקו מים המרים.* *Mishn.*

<sup>b</sup> *Δείνον*

<sup>c</sup> One of the *Subseffores alienorum matri-*

<sup>d</sup> *Palam apparet, adhuc atate Divi Hieronymi*

<sup>e</sup> For hence

express



express and sacred that can possibly be made: he does that, which tends to subvert the peace of families, confounds relation, and is altogether inconsistent with the *order* and *tranquillity* of the world, and therefore with the laws of human nature: he does what no man in his wits could think *reasonable*, or even *tolerable*, were he the person wrongd<sup>a</sup>: briefly, he impudently treats a woman as *his own woman* (or *wife*<sup>b</sup>), who is *not his*, but *another's*, contrary to *justice*, *truth* and *fact*<sup>c</sup>. Nor is this simple injustice only, but injustice, for which *no reparation* can be made if the injured man thinks so; as he generally does (see sect. II. prop. I. obs. 4.) injustice accompanied with the greatest *cruelty*; so complicated, as scarce any other can be. The *husband* is for ever robbed of all that pleasure and satisfaction, which arises from the wife's fidelity and affection to him<sup>d</sup>; presuming upon which he took her to be not only the partner of his bed, but the companion of his life, and sharer in all his fortunes<sup>e</sup>: and into the room of them succeed painful and destructive passions. The poor *woman*<sup>f</sup> herself, tho she may be deluded<sup>g</sup>, and not see at present her guilt, or the consequences of it, usually pays dear for her security and want of guard, the husband becoming cold<sup>h</sup> and averse to her, and she full of fears<sup>i</sup>, with a particular dread of his resentment. And their *affairs*, in this disjointed and distracted condition, are neglected; *innocent children* flighted, and left unprovided for, without so much as the comfort of any *certain* relations to pity them<sup>k</sup>, &c.

The adulterer may not be permitted to extenuate his crime by such impertinent *simile's* and rakish talk, as are commonly used for that purpose<sup>l</sup>. When any one

<sup>a</sup> Is, qui nullius non uxorem concupiscit, — idem uxorem suam aspici non vult: & fidei acerrimus exactor, est perfidus: & mendacia persequitur, ipse perjurus. Sen. <sup>b</sup> ἡ Πῶτα, τὴν ἑαυτῆς γυναῖκα.

<sup>c</sup> What a monster in nature must he be, who, as if it was meritorious to dare to act against all these, (to use Seneca's words again) *satis justam causam putat amandi, quod aliena est [uxor]*?

<sup>d</sup> Οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἐν ἐπιτηδείοις, ὡς τὸ σῶμα μόνον διαφθείρεται τῆς μοικευμένης γυναικὸς, ἀλλ' ἐν δὲ τῶν ἐπιτηδείοις, ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα ἐκείνου ἐκτρέφεται, διδασκομένη πάντα τὸν τρόπον ἀποστροφῆς καὶ μισοῦ τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ ἡττοῦ ἀνὴρ δεινὸν, ἐν τῷ μῦθῳ ἐπιδείκνυτο ἐμφανῆς, κτλ. Ph. Jud. <sup>f</sup> Ἀπολὸν ζῶον. S. Bas.

<sup>e</sup> Marriage is κοινανία πάντος τῆς βίης, — οικειότερα καὶ μείζονα τῶν ἄλλων [κοινανιῶν]. Isocr. <sup>g</sup> Ἐπεισας, ἐξέδωψας, says the penitent woman in Soph. ap. Plut.

<sup>h</sup> Ψυχρὸν παρακάλισμα — Γυνὴ κακὴ ζύνευσεν. Soph. <sup>i</sup> Quid enim salvi est mulieris amissâ pudicitia? Livy.

<sup>k</sup> Οἱ μὴδὲν ἡδικοῦσιν ἀδελφοὶ παῖδες μὴδ' ἐτέρω γένει προσνηγηθῆναι δυνάμενοι, μή τε τῶν γήμαντων, μή τε τῶν μοιχῶν. Ph. J.

<sup>l</sup> Such as Aristippus uses to Diogenes, ap. Athen. "Ἀρα γε μή τι σοι ἄτοπον δοκεῖ εἶναι Διογενὲς οἰκίαν οἰκεῖν, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον ἠκούσαν ἄλλοι; & γὰρ ἔφη. τίς ἡ νόμος, ἐν ᾗ πόλλοι πεπλυνκασιν; εἰ δὲ τῶτο ἔφη. ἔταως — Senseless stuff. Nor

is that of the adulterous woman in Prov. S. better: where גבר בעלמה ררך is placed with the way of an eagle in the air, of a serpent upon a rock, and of a ship in the sea, שלא יעשה בה רשע, and therefore she מקנחת פיה של משה, and then thinks that אחר זה אחר זה תוכל לומר לא פעלתי און. See *Qab venaqi*.

wrongs another of his property, he wrongs him of *what it is to him*, the proprietor : and the value must be set according to what *he* esteems it to be, not what the injurer, who perhaps has no taste of virtuous pleasures, may think it to be. (See p. 33. obs. 3, 4.) Nor may these thefts be excused from their secrecy. For 1. the injustice of the fact is the *same in itself*, whether known, or not. In either case *truth* is denied : and a *lie* is as much a lie, when it is *whisperd*, as when it is *proclaimd* at the market-cross. 2. It has been shewd (sect. II.) that the rectitude of our actions and way to happiness are coincident ; and that such acts, as are disagreeable to *truth*, and wrong in themselves, tend to make men ultimately *unhappy*<sup>a</sup>. Things are so orderd and disposd by the Author of nature, or such a constitution of things flows from Him, that it *must* be so. And since no *retreat* can be impervious to his eye, no *corner* so much out of the way, as not to be within His plan, no doubt there is to every wrong and *vitious* act a suitable degree of unhappiness and *punishment* annext, which the criminal will be sure to meet with *some time or other*<sup>b</sup>. For his own sake therefore he ought not to depend upon the darkness of the deed. But *lastly*, it can hardly be, but that it must be *discoverd*<sup>c</sup>. People generally *rise* in vice, grow impudent and vain and careless, and discover themselves<sup>d</sup> : the opportunities contrivd for it must be liable to *observation* : some *confidants* must be trusted, who may betray the secret, and upon any little distaste probably *will* do it : and beside, *love* is quick of apprehension<sup>e</sup>.

It will be easily perceived from what has been said, that if to *murder*, *rob*, &c. are unjust and crimes of a heinous nature, all those things which have any *tendency* toward them, or *affinity* with them, or any way *countenance* them, must be in their degree criminal<sup>f</sup> : because they are of the same complexion with that which they tend to, tho not of the same growth, nor maturd into the gross act, or perhaps do not operate so presently, apparently, or certainly. *Envy*, *malice*, and the like, are *conatus*'s toward the destruction or ruin of the person, who is the object of these unhappy passions. To *throw dust*<sup>g</sup> upon a man's reputation by *innuendo*'s, ironies, &c. may not indeed sully it all at once, as when *dirt* is thrown, or *gross* calumnies ; yet it infects the air, and may destroy it by a lingering poison. To *expose* another by the strength of a *jesting* talent, or harder temper of face, is to wound him, tho it

<sup>a</sup> Nemo malus felix: minime corruptor, &c. Juv.

<sup>b</sup> Ἀναπόδραστος ἡδὲ καὶ θάψας νόμος.

Plot.

<sup>c</sup> Καὶ ὅς ἐν παρατυκῇ κρύψῃ, ἕτερον ὀφείσῃ. Isocr. Μαρτυρήσαςιν ——— κλίη καὶ

<sup>d</sup> λύχνος ὁ Μεγαπένδης. Luc.

<sup>e</sup> Ἦδον μὲν ὅς ἀπάνταν ἀλαζονέσασιν. Plato.

<sup>f</sup> Quid

non sentit amor? Ov.

<sup>g</sup> Ἀγαθὸν ἔστω μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι. A genome of De-

mocrates.

אֲבֹק לְשׁוֹן הָרַע.



be in an *invisible* place<sup>a</sup>. Many *freedoms* and reputed civilities of barbarian extract, and especially gallantries<sup>b</sup>, that proceed not to consummate wickedness, nor perhaps are intended to be carried so far, may yet divert peoples affections from their proper object, and debauch the mind<sup>c</sup>. By *stories* or *insinuations* to sow the seeds of discord and quarrels between men is to murder, or hurt them, by another hand. Even for men to *intermeddle* in other peoples affairs, as busy bodies and ἀνεμπετοὶ do, is to assume a province, which is *not* theirs; to concern themselves with things, in which they are *not* concerned; to make that *public*, which in nature is *private*; and perhaps to rob the person, into whose business they intrude themselves, of his *quiet*, if of nothing else. For indeed this intermeddling looks like setting up a pretence to something further; like an unjust attack begun at a distance. All which declares what an enemy, and how irreconcilable, to *truth* this pragmatistical humor is. And so on.

If these things are so, how guilty must they be, who are designedly the *promoters* or *instruments* of injustice and wickedness; such as mercenary swearers, and false witnesses; traders in scandal; solicitors in vice; they who intend by their *conversation* to relax men's principles too much, and (as it seems) prepare them for knavery, lewdness, or any flagitious enterprize<sup>d</sup>.

There are other crimes, such as *infidelity* to friends or them who intrust us with any thing, *ingratitude*, all kinds of wilful *perjury*, and the like, which might have been *mentioned* in the proposition, being great instances of injustice: but because they are *visibly* such, and their nature cannot be mistaken, I comprise them in the *et cæc.* there. Any one may see, that he, who acts *unfaithfully*, acts against his promises and engagements, and therefore denies and sins against *truth*; does what it can never be for the *good of the world* should become an universal practice; does what he would not have *done to himself*; and *wrongs* the man, who depends upon him, of what he justly might expect. So the *ungrateful* man treats his benefactor as not being *what he is*, &c. And the *false-swearer* respects neither things, nor himself, nor the persons affected, nor mankind in general, nor God himself as being *what they are*. All this is obvious<sup>e</sup>.

המלבין פני חבריו ברבים אין לו חלק לעד הב. Maim. & sim. pass. For, according to the Jewish doctors, he who does this breaks the sixth commandment. Abarb.<sup>b</sup> See how chaste the Romans were once. Quo matronale decus verecundia munimento tutius esset, in jus vocanti matronam corpus ejus attingere non permisit, ut inviolata manus aliena tactu sola relinqueretur. Val. M. And it is told of P. Manius, that tristi exemplo praecepit [filia sua], ut non solum virginitatem illibatam, sed etiam oscula ad virum sincera perferret. Id.<sup>c</sup> Quanto autem praestantior est animus corpore, tanto sceleratius corrumpitur. S. Aust.<sup>d</sup> Οὗτοι εἰσιν οἱ λοιμοὶ, οἱ τοῖδ' οὖν κακὸν ἐπὶ πάντας ἄγειν φιλονεικῶντες, κλ. S. Bas. Omnes enim immemorem beneficii oderunt. Cic. And the same may be said of the unfaithful, perjured, &c.

S E C T.

SECT. VII. Truths respecting particular Societies of Men, or Governments.

I. **M**AN is a social creature : that is, a single man, or family, cannot subsist, or not well, alone out of all society. More things are necessary to sustain life, or at least to make it in any degree pleasant and desirable, than it is possible for any one man to make and provide for himself merely by his own labor and ingenuity. Meat, and drink, and clothing, and house, and that frugal furniture which is absolutely requisite, with a little necessary physic, suppose many arts and trades, many heads, and many hands. If he could make a shift in time of health to live as a wild man under the protection of trees and rocks, feeding upon such fruits, herbs, roots, and other things, as the earth should afford, and happen to present to him ; yet what could he do in sickness, or old age, when he would not be able to stir out, or receive her beneficence.

If he should take from the other sex such a help, as nature prompts him to seek, or he might happen to meet with in his walks ; yet still if the hands are doubled, the wants are doubled too : nay more, additional wants, and great ones, attending the bearing and education of children.

If we could suppose all these difficulties surmounted, and a family grown up, and doing what a single family is capable of doing by itself ; supporting themselves by gardening, a little agriculture, or a few cattle, which they have some how got, and tamed (tho even this would be hard for them to do, having no markets, where they might exchange the produce of their husbandry, or of their little flock, or herd for other things ; no shops to repair to for tools ; no servant, or laborer to assist ; nor any public invention, of which they might serve themselves in the preparation of their grain, dressing their meat, manufacturing their wool, and the like) ; yet still it is only the *cortex* of the man, which is provided for : what must become of the interior part, the *minds* of these people ? How would those be fed, and improved ? Arts and sciences, so much of them as is necessary to teach men the use of their faculties, and unfold their reason, are not the growth of single families so imployd. And yet

\* Quid ergo, anima nullane habet alimenta propria ? an ejus esca scientia nobis videtur ? S. Aust.



for men to lay out all their pains and time in procuring only what is proper to keep the blood and humors in *circulation*, without any further views, or any regard to the *nobler* part of themselves, is utterly incongruous to the idea of a being formed for *rational* exercises.

If all the *exceptions* against this separate way of living could be removed; yet as mankind increases, the *little plots*, which the several families possess, and cultivate, must be enlarged, or multiplied: by degrees they would find themselves straitened: and there would soon be a *collision* of interests, from whence disputes and quarrels would ensue. Other things too might minister matter for these. And beside all this, some men are *naturally* troublesome, vitious, thievish, pugnacious, rabid; and these would always be disturbing and flying upon the next to them: as others are ambitious, or covetous, and, if they happen to have any advantage or superiority in power, would not fail to make themselves yet greater or stronger by eating up their neighbours, till by repeated incroachments they might grow to be *formidable*<sup>a</sup>.

Under so many *wants*, and such *apprehensions*, or *present dangers*, necessity would bring some families into terms of *friendship* with others for mutual comfort and defence: and this, as the reason of it increased, would become stronger, introduce stricter engagements, and *at last* bring the people to mix and unite. And then the weak being glad to shelter themselves under the protection and conduct of the more able, and so naturally giving way for these to ascend, the several sorts would at length *settle* into their places, according to their several weights and capacities with respect to the common concern. And thus some form of a *society* must arise: men cannot subsist upon any other foot.

But if it was possible for a man to preserve life by *himself*, or with his *petit* company about him: yet no body can deny, that it would be infinitely *better* for him, and them, to live in a society, where men are serviceable to themselves and their neighbours at the same time, by *exchanging* their money, or goods, for such other things as they want more; where they are capable of doing *good offices* each for other in time of need; where they have the *protection* of laws, and a public security against cheats, robbers, assassines, and all enemies to property; where a common force or *army* is ready to interpose between them and foreign invaders; and where they may enjoy those *discoveries* which have been made in arts and learning, may improve their faculties by *conversation* and innocent conflicts of reason, and (to speak out) may be made *men*.

<sup>a</sup> *Alter in alterius exitium levi compendio ducitur. Sen.*

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If, when we have the *privilege* of society and laws, we can scarce preserve our own, or be safe, what a woful condition should we be in *without them*; exposed to the insults, rapines, and violence of unjust and merciless men, not having any *sanctuary*, any thing to take refuge in? So again, if notwithstanding the help of *friends* and those about us, and such conveniences as may be had in cities and peopled places, we are forced to bear many pains and melancholy hours, how *irksome* would life be, if in sickness or other trouble there was no body to administer either *remedy* or *consolation*?

Lastly, society is what men generally *desire*. And tho *much* company may be attended with much vanity, and occasion many evils<sup>a</sup>; yet it is certain, that absolute and perpetual *solitude* has something in it very irksome and hideous<sup>b</sup>. Thus the social life is *natural* to man; or, what his nature and circumstances require.

II. *The end of society is the common welfare and good of the people associated.* This is but the consequence of what has been just said. For because men cannot subsist *well*, or not *so well*, separately, therefore they unite into greater bodies: that is, the *end* of their uniting is their better subsistence; and by how much their manner of living becomes better, by so much the more effectually is this *end* answerd.

III. *A society, into which men enter for this end, supposes some rules or laws, according to which they agree all to be governed, with a power of altering or adding to them as occasion shall require.* A number of men met together without any *rules*, by which they submit to be governed, can be nothing but an *irregular* multitude. Every one being still *sui juris*, and left intirely to his own private choice, by whatever kind of judgment or passion or caprice that happens to be determind, they must needs *interfere* one with another: nor can such a *concourse* of people be any thing different from an indigested *chaos* of dissenting parts, which by their *confused* motions would damnify, and destroy each other. This must be true, if men *differ* in the size of their understandings, in their manner of thinking, and the several turns their minds take from their education, way of living, and other circumstances; if the greatest part of them are under the direction of *bodily affections*; and if these *differ* as much as their shapes, their complexions, their constitutions do<sup>c</sup>. Here then we find nothing but *confusion* and *unhappiness*.

<sup>a</sup> Aristotle says a good man would be neither *ἄφελος*, nor *πολύφελος*. This is just. Therefore Seneca seems to go a little too far, when he writes, *Omnes amicos habere operosum esse, satis esse inimicos non habere.*

<sup>b</sup> Ζῶον συναγελασκὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. S. Bas.

<sup>c</sup> Man is, in

Greg. Naz.'s words, τὸ πολυτροπάτατον ἢ ζῶον, καὶ ποιικιλιάτατον.



Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their *common good* and *happiness*, must be such a one as, in the first place, may render them *compatible* one with another: which cannot be without *rules*, that may direct and adjust their several motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to some degree of *uniformity*, or at least restrain such *excursions* and *enormities*, as would render their manner of living inconsistent.

Then, there must be some express declarations and *scita* to *ascertain* properties and titles to things by common consent: that so, when any altercations or disputes shall happen concerning them (as be sure many must in a world so unreasonable and prone to iniquity), the appeal may be made to their *own settlements*; and by the application of a *general undisputed rule* to the *particular case* before them it may appear, on *which side* the obliquity lies, the controversy may be *fairly* decided, and all mouths eternally stopped. And then again, that they may be protected and persevere in this agreeable life, and the injoyment of their respective properties be *secured* to them, several things must be forecasted by way of precaution against foreign *invasions*; punishments must be appointed for *offences* committed amongst themselves, which being known may deter men from committing them, &c. These rules, methods, and appointments of punishments, being fairly drawn up, agreed to, and published, are the *mutual compacts* under which the society is confederated, and the *laws* of it.

If then to have the members of a society capable of subsisting together, if to have their respective properties *ascertained*, if to be *safe* and *quiet* in the possession of them be for the *general good* of the society, and these things cannot be had without *laws*; then a society, whose foundation and cement is the public good, must have such *laws*, or be supposed at least to design such.

As to the making of any *further laws*, when the public interest and welfare require them, that is but repeating the *same power* in other instances, which they made use of before in making their first laws: and as to *altering* or *repealing*, it is certain the power of making and unmaking here are *equal*. Beside, when men are incorporated and live together for their mutual good, this *end* is to be considered *at one time* as much as at *another*; not only in their first constitution and settlement.

IV. *These laws and determinations must be such, as are not inconsistent with natural justice.* For 1. To ordain any thing that interferes with truth is the same as to ordain, that what is *true* shall be *false*; or *v. v* <sup>b</sup>. which is absurd. 2. To pretend by a law to make that to be *just*, which before and in itself was *unjust*, is the same as to ordain that which interferes with truth: because justice is founded in

<sup>a</sup> Πᾶς ἐστὶ νόμος ——— πόλεως συνθήκη κοινή. Demosth.  
ἐ Πλατ.

<sup>b</sup> Νόμος ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντος εὐρεσις. Stob.

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truth (as before), and every where the same<sup>a</sup>. Therefore, 3. by a law to enact any thing which is *naturally* unjust is to enact that which is absurd; that which by sect. I. is morally evil; and that which is opposite to *those laws*, by which it is manifestly the will of our Creator we should be governed<sup>b</sup>. And to enact what is thus evil must be *evil indeed*. Lastly, to establish injustice must be utterly *inconsistent* with the general good and happiness of any society; unless to be unjustly treated, pilled, and abused can be happiness<sup>c</sup>. And if so, it is utterly inconsistent with the *end* of society; or, it is to deny that to be the end of it, which is the end of it.

V. *A society limited by laws supposes magistrates, and a subordination of powers: that is, it supposes a government of some form or other.* Because, where men are to act by rules or laws for the public weal, some must of necessity be appointed to *judge*, when those laws are transgressed, and how far; to *decide* doubtful cases, and the like: there must be some armed with authority to *execute* those judgments, and to *punish* offenders: there must be persons chosen not only to punish and *prevent* public evils, but also to do many other things, which will be required in *advancement* of the public good: and then the power of making *new laws*, and abrogating or mending *old ones*, as experience may direct or the case at any time require, as also of providing presently for the safety of the public in time of *sudden danger*, must be lodged somewhere.

If there are no *executors* of the laws, the laws cannot be executed: and if so, they are but a dead letter, and equal to *none*: and if the society has none, it is indeed *no society*, or not such a one as is the subject of this proposition. Guardians and executors of laws are therefore the *vitals* of a society, without which there can be no *circulation* of justice, no care of it taken, nor can it continue. And since men can be but in one place at once, there must be *numbers* of these proportionable to the bigness and extent of it.

<sup>a</sup> Δίκαιον φύσει, ἀκίνητον, καὶ πανταχῇ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Πέρσῃ καί ἐν Ἰνδῇ. *Arist.*

<sup>b</sup> Even the Heathens believed, that above all human κηρύγματα there were ἀγραπτα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ θεῶν νόμιμα, which mortals ought not to transgress: καὶ γὰρ τι νῦν γε καὶ χθρὶς, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ πότε ζῇ τὰυτα. *Soph.* Nec se regnante Tarquinio nulla erat Roma scripta lex de stupris, idcirco non contra ——— legem sempiternam Sex. Tarquinius vim Lucretia ——— attulit. Erat enim ratio profecta à rerum natura, & ad rectè faciendum impellens, & à delicto avocans: qua non tum deniq; incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum cum orta est. Orta autem simul est cum mente divina. *Cic.*

<sup>c</sup> Si tanta potestas est stultorum sententiis atq; jussis, ut eorum suffragiis rerum natura vertatur; cur non sanciant, ut, quæ mala perniciosaq; sunt, habeantur pro bonis, ac salutaribus? aut cur, cum jus ex injuria lex facere possit, bonum eadem facere non possit ex malo? *Cic.*

And



And further, since the concerns of a whole society, and such things as may fall within the compass of a statute book, are *various*, requiring several sorts and sizes of *abilities*, and lying one *above* another in nature; since not only private men want to be *inspected*, but even magistrates and officers themselves, who (tho they oft forget it) are still *but men*; and since the whole society is to be *one*, one compact body: I say, since the case is thus, there must be men to act in several *spheres* as well as *places*, of which the *inferior* sort in their several quarters must act immediately under their respective *superiors*; and so this class of superiors in their several provinces under *others above them*; till at last the ascent is terminated in some *head*, where the legislative power is deposited, and from whence spirits and motion are communicated through the whole body. An *army* may as well be supposed to be well disciplined, well provided, and well conducted without either *general* or *officers*, as a society without *governors* and their *subalterns*, or (which is the same) without *some form* of government, to answer the end of its being.

VI. *A man may part with some of his natural rights, and put himself under the government of laws, and those, who in their several stations are intrusted with the execution of them, in order to gain the protection of them, and the privileges of a regular society.* Because by this he doth but exchange one thing for another, which he reckons *equivalent*, or indeed *preferable* by much: and this he may do without acting against any *truth*. For the liberties and natural rights, which he exchanges, are *his own*, and therefore no other man's property is *denied* by this: nor is the nature of happiness *denied* to be what it is, since it is happiness which he *aims at* in doing this. On the contrary, he would rather offend against *truth*, and deny *happiness* to be what it is, if he did not do it; especially seeing, that here his *own* happiness coincides with the *general* happiness and more convenient being of the kingdom or commonwealth, where his *lot* falls, or his *choice* determines him to live.

If the question should be asked, *what* natural rights a man may part with, or *how far* he may part with them; the *general* answer, I think, may be this. Some things are *essential* to our being, and some it is *not in our power* to part with. As to the *rest*, he may depart from them so far as it is consistent with the *end*, for which he does this: not further, because beyond that lies a contradiction. A man cannot *give away* the natural right and property he has in any thing, in order to *preserve* or *retain* that property: but he may consent to contribute *part* of his estate, in order to preserve the *rest*, when otherwise it might *all* be lost; to take his *share* of danger in defence of his country, rather than *certainly* perish, be enslaved, or ruined by the conquest or oppression of it; and the like.

VII. *Men*

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VII. Men may become members of a society (*i. e.* do what is mentiond in the foregoing proposition) by giving their consent, either explicitly, or implicitly. That a man may subject himself to laws, we have seen. If he does this, he must do it either in *his own person*; or he must do it by some *proxy*, whom he substitutes in his room to agree to public laws; or his consent must be *collected* only from the conformity of his carriage, his adhering to the society, accepting the benefits of its constitution, and acquiescing in the establishd methods and what is done by virtue of them. By the *two first* ways he declares himself *explicitly*, and *directly*: nor can he after that behave himself as if he was no member of the society, without acting as if he had *not done* what he *has done*. And this is the case not only of them, who have been concerned in the *first formation* of any government, but also of them, who have in the said manners<sup>a</sup> given their consent to any *subsequent* acts, by which they ownd, confirmed, and came into what their ancestors had done, or who have by *oaths* put themselves under obligations to the public. By the *last* of the three ways mentiond a man's consent is given indeed *implicitly*, and less directly; but yet it is given, and he becomes a party. For suppose him to be *born* in some certain kingdom or commonwealth, but never to have been *party* to any law, never to have taken any *oath* to the government, nor ever formally to have ingaged himself by any *other act*. In this case he cannot methinks but have some *love* and *sympathy* for that place, which afforded him the first air he drew; some *gratitude* towards that constitution, which protectd his parents, while they educated and provided for him; some *regard* to those obligations, under which perhaps they have laid him, and with which limitations as it were they (or rather the Governor of the world by them) conveyd to him his very life.

If he *inherits* or takes any thing by the laws of the place, to which he has no indefeasible right in nature, or which, if he had a natural right to it, he could not tell how to *get*, or *keep*, without the aid of laws and advantage of society; then, when he takes this inheritance, or whatever it is, *with* it he takes and owns the *laws* which give it him.

Indeed since the *security* he has from the laws of the countrey in respect of his person, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereafter, is the general *equivalent* for his *submission* to them, he cannot accept *that* without being obliged in equity to pay *this*.

<sup>a</sup> In person, or by proxy.



Nay, lastly, his very *continuing* and *settling* in any place shews, that either he *likes* the constitution, or likes it *better* than any other, or at least thinks it better in *his circumstances* to conform to it than to seek any other: that is, he consents to be comprehended in it <sup>a</sup>.

VIII. When a man is become member of a society, if he would behave himself according to truth, he ought to do these things: viz. to consider property as founded not only in nature, but also in law; and men's titles to what they have, <sup>are</sup> strengthened by that, and even by his own concession and covenants; and therefore by so much the more inviolable and sacred: instead of taking such measures to do himself right, when he is molested, or injured, as his own prudence might suggest in a state of nature, to confine himself to such ways as are with his own consent marked out for him: and, in a word, to behave himself according to his subordination or place in the community, and to observe the laws of it. For it is contained in the idea of a law, that it is intended to be observed: and therefore he, who is a party to any laws, or professes himself member of a society formed upon laws, cannot willingly transgress those laws without denying laws to be what they are, or himself to be what he is supposed or professes himself to be; and indeed without contradicting all or most of those truths contained in the foregoing propositions.

IX. In respect of those things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, or if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of those laws cannot be had (for so it may sometimes happen. I say, in respect of such things), he who is a member of a society in other respects retains his natural liberty, is still as it were in a state of nature, and must endeavour to act according to truth and his best prudence. For in the former case there is nothing to limit him, by the supposition, but truth and nature. And in the other it is the same as if there was nothing; since in effect there is no law, where no effect or benefit from it is to be had. As, for example, if a man should be attacked by thieves or assassines, and has no opportunity or power to call the proper magistrate or officer to his assistance.

There is a third case, which perhaps may demand admission here: and that is, when laws are plainly contrary to truth and natural justice. For tho they may pass the usual forms, and be styled laws; yet, since no such law can abrogate that law of nature and reason, to which the Author of our being hath subjected us, or make falsehood

<sup>a</sup> Plato says, when any man has seen our form of government, &c. and remains under it, ἡδὲ παρὲν τῷ τοι ὁμολογηκέναι ἔργῳ ἡμῶν.

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to be truth; and two inconsistent laws cannot *both* oblige, or subsist together; one of them must give way: and it is easy to discern, *which* ought to do it<sup>a</sup>.

There remains one *truth* more to be annexd here, which may be contradicted by the practice and pretences of Enthusiasts<sup>b</sup>.

X. *The societies intended in this section, such as kingdoms and commonwealths, may defend themselves against other nations: or, war may lawfully be waged in defence and for the security of a society, its members and territories, or for reparation of injuries.* For if one man may in a state of nature have a right to defend himself (see sect. VI. prop. VII), two may, or three, and so on. Nay, perhaps two may have a double right, three a threefold right, &c. At least, if the *right* be not *greater*, the *concern* is greater: and there will be more reason, that two, or three, or more should be *saved*, than one only; and therefore that two, or three, or more should *defend* themselves, than that one should. And if this may be done by men in a state of nature, it may be done by them when confederated among themselves: because with respect to other nations they are still in *that state*. I mean, so far as they have not limited themselves by *leagues* and *alliances*.

Beside, if a man may defend himself, he may defend himself by what *methods* he thinks most *proper*, provided he trespasses against no truth; and therefore, by getting the *aid* and assistance of others. Now when *war* is levied in defence of the public, and the people in general, the thing may be considered as if *every particular man* was defending himself with the assistance of *all the rest*, and so be turned into the same case with that of a *single man*.

In truth the condition of a nation seems to be much the same with that of a *single person* when there is no law, or no benefit of law, to be had: and what one man may do to another in *that position*, may be done by one nation or politic body with respect to another: and perhaps by this rule, regard being had to what has been deliverd in sect. VI. the *justice* of foreign wars may be not untruly estimated.

*Mutual defence* is one of the great ends of society, if not the greatest, and in a particular and eminent manner involves in it defence against *foreign enemies*. And whoever signalizes himself, when there is occasion for his service, merits the grateful acknowledgments and celebrations of his countrey-men: so far at least as he acts generously and with a *public spirit*, and not in pursuance *only* of *private views*.

<sup>a</sup> Illud stultissimum, existimare omnia justa esse, quæ scita sunt in populorum institutis, aut legibus. — Si populorum jussis, si principum decretis, si sententiis judicum, jura constituerentur, jus esset latrocinari: jus, adulterare: jus, testamenta falsa supponere, si hæc suffragiis aut scitis multitudinis probarentur. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Manicheans of old, and some moderns.



As to those *wars*, which are undertaken by men out of ambition<sup>a</sup>, merely to enlarge empire, or to shew the world, how terrible they are, how many men they are able to slay, how many slaves to make<sup>b</sup>, how many families to drive from their peaceful habitations, and, in short, how much mischief and misery they are able to bring upon mankind; these are founded upon false notions of glory: *imbellish'd* indeed by servile wits and misplaced eloquence, but *condemned* by all true philosophy and religion.

## Sect. VIII. Truths concerning Families and Relations.

THIS section shall begin as relation itself does, with *marriage*.

I. The end of marriage is the propagation of mankind, and joint happiness of the couple intermarrying, taken together; or the latter by itself<sup>c</sup>. The difference of the sexes, with the strong inclination they have each to the injoyment of the other<sup>d</sup>, is plainly ordain'd by the Author of nature for the continuance of the species, which without that must be soon extinguish'd. And tho people, when they marry, may have many times not so much the increase of their family in their design or wishes, as the gratification of an importunate appetite; yet since nature excites the appetite, and that tends to this end, nature (or rather its great Author) may be said to make this an end of the marriage, tho the bridegroom and bride themselves do not.

<sup>a</sup> Like those particularly of *J. Caesar*: of whom it is reported, that, *animaduersa apud Herculis templum magni Alexandri imagine, ingemuit; quasi pertasus ignaviam suam, quod nihil dum à se memorabile actum esset in ætate quâ jam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset.* Suet.

<sup>b</sup> Some go to war ὥσπερ ἐπὶ θήραν καὶ κυνηγεσίαν ἀνθρώπων. *Plut.* Not out of necessity, and in order to peace; which is the true end of war. Πολεμεῖμεν, ἵνα εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν. *Arist.* Ita bellum suscipiatur, ut nihil aliud quàm pax quesita videatur. *Cic.*

<sup>c</sup> Οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἰ μόνον τὸ τεκνοποιῆσαι χάριν συνοικεῖσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἰς τὸν βίον, κλ. *Arist.*

<sup>d</sup> Ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικὶ φιλία δοκεῖ κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἄνθρωπος γὰρ τῇ φύσει σιωδυστικὸν μᾶλλον ἢ πολιτικόν. *Id.* Ὡς γὰρ ἡ μαγνήτις λίθος πρὸς αὐτὴν τὸ σίδηρον ἔλκει· ἔτω τὸ δὲ θήλειος σῶμα — τὸ δὲ ἀρρένος σῶμα πρὸς τὴν μήλιν ἔλκει. *S. Bas.*

And then as to that other thing, which either accompanies the aforesaid end of marriage, or is (as in many cases it can only be) the *end itself*<sup>a</sup>, the joint happiness of the *conjuges*, no body can be supposed to marry in order and on set purpose to make him or herself *unhappy*; no nor without a presumption of being *more happy*. For without an apprehension of some *degree* of happiness to accrue, or what presents itself to the imagination as such, and is taken for such, what can induce people to alter their condition? Something there must be, by which (however things prove upon trial) they *think* to better it. And indeed if their *circumstances* are such, as may enable them to maintain a family, and provide for children, without difficulties and an over-burden of cares, and if they in *good earnest* resolve to behave themselves as they ought, and *reciprocally* to be helpful and loving each to other, *much* comfort and happiness<sup>b</sup> may justly be expected from this intimate union<sup>c</sup>, the interchange of affections, and a conspiracy of all their counsels and measures<sup>d</sup>, the qualities and abilities of the one sex being fitted and as it were tallying to the wants of the other. For to pass over in silence those joys, which are truest when most conceal'd<sup>e</sup>, many things there are, which may be useful, perhaps necessary to the *man*, and yet require the delicates hand or nicer management and genius of the *woman*<sup>f</sup>: and so, *vicissim*,

<sup>a</sup> That sure is a hard law in *Plato*, which enjoins ἀπέχουσαι ἀλλήλων δηλαδὴ πάσης, ἐν ᾗ μὴ βούλοιντο ἂν σοὶ φίλοι τὸ σπαρέν. That mention'd in *S. Hhared.* says otherwise: יונתו ארם לקיים מצוה וכו' Many opinions are taken up upon slight reasons. When *Ocellus Lucanus* says, Ἄλλας τὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ τὰ ὄργανα, καὶ τὰς ὀρέξεις τὰς πρὸς τὴν μίξιν ὑπὸ θεῶν δεδομένας ἀνδράποισ, καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα δεδωκῆσιν συμβέβηκεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς εἰς τὸν αἰεὶ χρόνον διαμονῆς τῶ γενέας, how doth he know that they were not given for both these ends, in a regular way? And so when *Clemens Alex.* shews his zeal against τὰς ἀκάρεας σποράς, τὴν πρὸς τὰς ἐκύκας ὁμιλίαν, &c. adding, ψιλὴ γὰρ ἡδονή, καὶ ἐν γάμῳ παραληφθῆ, παρόνομος ἐστὶ, κλ. he does this because ὁ Μωσῆς ἀπάγει τῶν ἐκύκων τὰς ἀνδρας; and then cites a text to prove this, which is nothing to the purpose, nor I believe any where to be found: Οὐκ ἔδεσται τὸ λαγόν, ἐδὲ τὴν βύβαν. (*Quem interpretem secutus sit Clemens nescio. Gent. Herv.*) Certainly the Jews understand their lawgiver otherwise. See how that יונת mention'd in the law is explain'd by *Maim in hilch. ish.* Nor are the suffrages of Christians wanting. *Deus, cum ceteras animantes, suscepto foetu, maribus repugnare voluisset, solam omnium mulierem patientem viri fecit; — ne feminis repugnantibus, libido cogeret viros aliud appetere, &c.* that is, that the man and wife might be kept inseparably together. *Lat.* <sup>b</sup> Καὶ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναι δοκεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ φιλίᾳ. *Arist.* כראוי וצשה נוחגים כראוי שכניה בנייה. *Resh. bhokm.* <sup>c</sup> Ἐρως — κατὰπερ ἐνὸς ζώου διτλὰ τμήματα — εἰς ταυτὸν ἀρμόττεται. *Ph. 7.* <sup>d</sup> True love is to be found in marriage, or no where. Πόρνη γὰρ φιλεῖ καὶ ἐπίσταται, ἀλλ' ἐπιβλέπει μόνον. *S. Chryf.* מוסר מכלה והלב מכוסה. *Chryf.* a homely, but true saying of a Jewish commentator. <sup>e</sup> Quod facere turpe non est modo occultè; id dicere obscenum est. *Cic.* <sup>f</sup> Ἐάν γὰρ ἡ κοσμία καὶ ἐπεικὴς, ἡ μόνον τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας παραμυθίαν παρέξει τῷ ἀνδρὶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασὶ πολλὴν τῆς ἑαυτῆς χρείαν ἐπιδεικνύεται, κλ. *S. Chryf.*



the *woman* cannot but want many things, which require the more robust and active powers or greater capacity of the *man*<sup>a</sup>. Thus, in lower life, whilst the wheel, the needle &c. employ *her*, the plough or some trade perhaps demands the muscles and hardiness of *him*: and, more generally, if *she* inspects domestic affairs, and takes care, that every thing be provided regularly, spent frugally, and enjoyd with neatness and advantage, *he* is busied in that profession, or the oversight and improvement of that estate, which must sustain the charge of all this; he presides, and directs in matters of greater moment; preserves order in the family by a gentle and prudent government, &c.<sup>b</sup>

As then I founded the *greater societies* of men upon the mutual convenience, which attends their living regularly together; so may I found this *less*, but *stricter alliance* between the man and the woman in their *joint-happiness*<sup>c</sup>. Nature has ■ *further aim*, the preservation of the kind.

II. That marriages ■ made by some solemn contract, vow, or oath (and these perhaps attended with some pledge, or nuptial rites)<sup>d</sup>, by which the parties mutually ingage to live together

■ Διέχεται τὰ ἔργα, καὶ ἔστιν ἕτερος ἀνδρὺς, καὶ γυναικίος ἐπαρκῶσιν ἕν ἀλλήλοις, εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τιθέντες τὰ ἰδία. *Arist.*

■ See the conversation between *Ischomachus* and his wife in *Xenophon*. ■ The *Plato* (like most of the old *Greeks* and *Romans*) among many very fine things hath now and then some that are weak, and even absurd; yet I cannot think, that by his *community* of women he meant any thing like that, which is said, *ap. Athen.* to have been practised παρὰ Τυρρηνῶν ἐκτόπως τρυφῆσαι; or that his thought could be so gross, ■ *Lactantius* represents it: *Scilicet ut ad eandem mulierem multi viri, tanquam canes, confluerent*. For thus, property being taken out of the world, ■ great part of virtue is extinguishd, and all industry and improvements are at an end. And beside that, many of the most substantial comforts and innocent delights of this life are destroyd at once. *Si omnes omnium fuerint & mariti, & patres, & uxores, & liberi, quæ ista confusio generis humani est? — Quis aut vir mulierem, aut mulier virum diligit, nisi habitaverint semper unâ? nisi devota mens, & servata invicem fides individuum feceris caritatem, &c.* 1d. However it must be confest, that *Plato* has advanced more than was consistent with his own gravity, or with nature. The best excuse to be made for him, that I know of, is that in *Athenaus*, 'Εοικεν ὁ Πλάτων μὴ τοῖς ἔστω ἀνδράποισι γράψαι τὰς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ διαπλαττομένοις; or perhaps to say, that he was so intent upon strengthening and defending his common-wealth, that he forgot, if men must live after his manner, there would be little in it worth defending. After all, his meaning to me is not perfectly clear. ■ Every one knows how marriages were made among the *Romans*, *confarreatione*, *coemptione*, *usu*: of which ways the two former were attended with many ceremonies: and the *legitima tabella* ■ at least consent of friends (which could not be given without some solemnity) preceded all, *auspicia* were usually taken, public notaries and witnesses assisted, &c. Among the *Greeks* men and women were espoused by mutual promises of fidelity: beside which there were witnesses, and dotal writings (προικῶν.)

gether in love, and to be faithful, assisting, and the like, each to other, in all circumstances of health and fortune, till death parts them<sup>a</sup>, I take for granted. For all nations have some form or other upon these occasions: and even private contracts cannot be made without some words in which they are containd, nor perhaps without some kind of significant, tho private, ceremony between the lovers; which lose nothing of force with respect to them by their being both parties and witnesses themselves. Something must pass between them, that is declarative of their intentions, expresses their vows, and binds them each to the other. There is no coming together after the manner of man and wife upon any other foot.

III. That intimate union, by which the conjuges become possessors each of the other's person<sup>b</sup>, the mixture of their fortunes<sup>c</sup>, and the joint relation they have to their children<sup>d</sup>, all strengthen the bonds and obligations of matrimony. By every act done in pursuance of a covenant, such as the matrimonial is, that covenant is own'd, recognized, and as it were made *de integro*, and repeated.

Possession is certainly more than nothing. When this therefore is added to a former title, the title must needs be corroborated.

When two persons throw their all into one stock as joint-traders for life, neither of them can consistently with truth and honesty take his share out and be gone (*i. e.* dissolve the partnership) without the concurrence of the other; and sometimes it may not be easie, perhaps possible, to do it at all. Each therefore is even by this bound, and becomes obnoxious to the other.

And as to the present case, if the marriage be not altogether unfruitful, since both the parents are immediately related to the same child, that child is the medium of a fixt, unalterable relation between them. For, being both of the same blood with the

(*προικῶν*); at the wedding, sacrifices to *Diana* and other deities, and the *γαμήλιος ἐυχαι*; and after that, perhaps the being shut up together, eating the *κυδώνιον*, a formal *λύσις ζώνης*, &c. The *קרושין* of the Jews have been performed *בכסף* or *בשטר*, or *בביאה*: the ceremonies accompanying which may be seen particularly in *Shulhb. ar.* with the additions of *R. Mo. Iserles* (*Eben ez.*) And (to pass by other nations) the form of solemnization of matrimony, and the manner, in which persons married give their troth each to other among us, are extant in our public offices: where they may be seen by such, as seem to have forgot what they are.

<sup>a</sup> *Connubio stabili. Virg.*

<sup>b</sup> *והיו לבשר אחד רכך רכה לאחייחרא רכר ונוקבא בקירוב בשר --- ולא יהא דבר חוצץ וכו'.*

<sup>c</sup> In *Resh khokm.*

<sup>d</sup> *Αὕτη χερμάτων κοινωνία προσήκει μάλιστα τοῖς γαμῶσιν, εἰς μίαν εἰσίαν πάντα καταχεαμένους καὶ ἀναμύζασιν, μὴ τὸ μέρϑ ἰδίον, καὶ τὸ μέρϑ ἀλλότριον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἰδίον ἡγεῖσθαι, καὶ μηδὲν ἀλλότριον. Plur.*

<sup>e</sup> *Σύνδεσμον τὰ τέκνα δοκεῖ εἶναι. Arist.*

child<sup>a</sup>



child<sup>a</sup>, they themselves come to be of the *same blood*: and so that relation, which at first was only moral and legal, becomes *natural*; a relation in nature, which can never cease, or be disannulled. It follows now that,

IV. *Marrying*, when there is little or no prospect of true happiness from the match<sup>b</sup>, and especially if there are plain presages of unhappiness; after marriage adultery; all kinds of infidelity; transferring that affection, which even under the decays of nature ought to preserve its vigor, and never to degenerate (at worst) but into a friendship of a superior kind<sup>c</sup>, and the like, are all wrong<sup>d</sup>. Because the first of these is belying ones own sense of things, and has an air of *distracted*; or however it is to act as if that was the *least* and most trifling of all transactions in life, which is certainly one of the *greatest* and most delicate. And to offend in any of the *other* ways is to behave, as if the *end* of marriage was not what it is; as if no such *league* had been made between the persons married, as has been made, *actually*, and *solemnly*, and is still *subsisting* between them; as if they were not *possess* each of the other; their *fortunes* not interwoven; nor their children so equally related to them, as they are; and therefore the misbehaviour, being repugnant to *truth*, is a sin against it, and the mighty Patron of it.

If the most *express* and *solemn* contracts, upon which persons, when they marry, do so far depend, as in confidence of their being *religiously* observed to *alter quite* their condition, begin a new *thread* of life, and *risque* all their fortune and happiness: I say, if such sacred compacts as *these* are allowed to be broken, there is an end of all *faith*; the obligation of *oaths* (not more binding than *marriage vows*) ceases; no *justice* can be administered; and then what a *direful influence* must this have upon the affairs of mankind upon *that*, and other accounts<sup>e</sup>?

<sup>a</sup> In respect of which that in *Plutarch* is particularly true, Ἡ φύσις μίγνυσι δια τῶν σαρμάτων ἡμῶν, ἢ ἐξ ἑκατέρων μέρος λαβῆσα, καὶ τυχέασα, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδῶν τὸ γενόμενον. <sup>b</sup> *Socrates ab*

*adolescensulo quodam consultus, uxorem duceret, an se omni matrimonio abstineret, respondit, Utrum eorum fecisset, acturum penitentiam. Hic te, inquit, solitudo, hic orbitas, hic generis interitus, hic haeres alienus excipiet: illic perpetua felicitudo, contextus querelarum, — incertus liberorum eventus. Val. M. c* Χρόνη συνηθείας ἐν τεκνέσῃ πάθος ἀνιδέσεται τῷ λογισμῷ τὸ φιλεῖν καὶ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἐπιτετινόμενον. *Plut.* <sup>d</sup> It

is visible that *polygamy*, *pellicate*, &c. must be included here. They are not only inconsistent with our forms and the very *letter* of the marriage-contract, but with the *essence* of marriage, which lie in such a union and love as can *only* be between *two*. *Aristotle* doth not allow there can be even perfect *friendship* between more than two: much less therefore, perfect love. Πολλοῖς εἶναι φίλον, κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ, εἰδ' ἐπὶ πολλῶν ἄμα. *Eth.* Ἔστι γὰρ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός. *Ibid.*

▪ *Fecunda culpa sacula nuptias Primùm inquinavere, & genus, & domos. Hinc fonte derivata clades In patriam, populumque fluxit.* *Hor.*

*Allowance*, by sect. IV. ought to be made for inabilities, and involuntary failings. A person's age, health, estate, or other circumstances may be such, and without any *fault*, that he or she cannot do what they would; or perhaps instead of that one of them may come to want the *pity* and *assistance* of the other. In this case (which requires the philosophy and submission proper in afflictions) it is the duty of the one not only to *bear with*, but also to *comfort*, and do what may be done for the other. This is part of the happiness *proposed*, which consists not only in *positive* pleasures, but also in *lessening* pains and wants; whilst the pair have each in the other a refuge at hand.

N. I have designedly forbore to mention that *authority* of a husband over his wife, which is usually given to him, not only by private writers, but even by laws; because I think it has been carried *much too high*. I would have them live so far upon the *level*, as (according to my constant lesson) to be govern'd *both* by reason<sup>a</sup>. If the *man's* reason be stronger, or his knowledge and experience greater (as it is commonly supposed to be), the *woman* will be obliged upon that score to pay a *deference*, and submit to him<sup>b</sup>.

Having now consider'd the *man* and *woman* between themselves, I proceed in the order of nature to consider them as *parents*; and to see (in a few propositions, following) how things will be carried between *them* and their *children*, as also between other *relations*, coming at first from the same bed, if *truth* and *matters of fact* (to be named, where the argument shall call for them) are not denied.

V. *Parents ought to educate their children, take the best care of them they can, endeavour to provide for them, and be always ready to assist them*. Because otherwise they do not carry themselves towards their children as being what they are, *children*, and *theirs*: they do not do what they would desire to have done to *themselves*, were they again to pass through that feeble and tender state; or perhaps what has been done to them<sup>c</sup>: and beside, they transgress the *law* established by nature for the preservation of the race, which, as things are, could not without a parental care and affection be continued; a *law*, which is in force among all the other tribes of *animals*, so far as there is occasion for it.

<sup>a</sup> Κρατεῖν δὲ τὸ ἄνδρα τὸ γυναικὸς οὐχ ὡς διαπότην κτήματος, ἀλλ' ὡς ψυχὴν σώματος, συμπάθοντα καὶ συμπεφυκότα τῇ ἐνοίᾳ. *Plut.* (A sentence, which deserves to be written in letters of gold.) Ὅπως οὐ Γάιος, ἐγὼ Γαῖα; — ὅπως οὐ κύριος καὶ δικοδισπότης, καὶ ἐγὼ κυρία καὶ δικοδισποινα. *Ap. eund.* <sup>b</sup> Κατὰ φύσιν οἱ ἄρρενες ἔμνον ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις ἄρχουσιν. *Plato ap. Diog. L.*

<sup>c</sup> Πολυπλήθερες δὲ σοι γυῖας Λεῖψω. πατέρες γὰρ ταῦτ' ἐδέξαντο πάρα. *Eur.* *Parentes vos alendo nepotum nutriendorum debito (si quis est pudor) alligaverunt.* V. M.



Not to do what is here required, is not *barely* to act against truth and nature, not *only* such an omission as is mentiond in sect. I. pr. V. but a heinous instance of *cruelty*. If any one can deny this, let him better consider the case of an *infant*, neglected, helpless, and having nothing so much as to solícite for him, but his *cries* and his *innocence*: let him think what it would be to turn a *child*, tho a little grown up, out of doors, destitute of every thing, not knowing whither to fly<sup>a</sup>, or what to do; and whether it is not the same thing, if he be left to be turned out by any body else *hereafter*, or (in general) to conflict with *want* and *misery*: let him reflect a while upon the circumstances of poor *orphans*<sup>b</sup> left unprovided for, to be abused by every body<sup>c</sup>, &c. and then let him say, whether it is *possible* for a *parent* to be so void of bowels, as not to be moved with these considerations; or what *epithet* he deserves, if he is not. If any of them who have been thus abandond, and turned adrift, have *done well*, those instances ought to be placed among *particular providences*: as when a vessel at sea, without pilot or sailer, happens to be blown into the port.

Not only the *care*, but the *early care* of parents is required, lest death should prevent them; death, which skips none, and surprizes many. Not to remember this, and act accordingly, is in practice to contradict one of the most *certain* and *obvious* of all truths.

VI. *In order to the good of children, their education, &c. there must be some authority over them lodged by nature in the parents*: I mean, *the nature of the case is such, as necessarily requires there should be in the parents an authority over their children in order to their good*. At first if some body did not nurse, feed, clothe, and take care of children, the interval between their first and last breath would be very short. They, on whom it is incumbent to do this, are undoubtedly their *parents*: to do this is their duty by the foregoing proposition. But then they must do it as they can, and according to their judgment: and this is plainly an act of *authority*, to order and dispose of another according to one's judgment, tho it be done according to the *best* of one's judgment.

As the child *grows up*, the case is still the same in some degree or other, till he arrives at the age reckond *mature*; and very often longer. He is become able perhaps to walk by himself, but what *path* to choose he knows not; cannot distinguish

<sup>a</sup> *Incertus quo fata ferant, ubi sistere detur*, in the poet's language.  
description of the ἦμαρ ὀρφανῶν in Homer.

<sup>b</sup> See that moving

<sup>c</sup> I could never think of that *Arabic* saying without pity, *The barber [אלהגגא] learns to shave upon the head of an orphan*.

his safety and his danger, his advantages and disadvantages; nor, in general, good and evil: he must be warned, and directed, and watched still by his *parents*, or somebody intrusted by them, or else it might have been possibly much better for him to have *expired* under the midwife's hands, and prevented the effects of his own ignorance.

When he not only runs about, but begins to fancy himself capable of *governing himself*, by how much the *more* he thinks himself capable, by so much the *less* capable may he be, and the *more* may he want to be governed. The avenues of *sense* are open: but the *judgment*, and *intellectual faculties* are not ripened but with time and much practice. The *world* is not easily known by persons of *adult* abilities; and, when they become tolerably acquainted with it, yet they find things in it so intricate, dubious, difficult, that it is many times hard for *them* to resolve, what measures are fittest to be taken: but they, who are not, or but lately, past their *nuts*, cannot be supposed to have any extent of knowledge, or to be, if they are left to themselves, any thing else but a *prey* to the villain who first seizes upon them. Instead of judgment and experience we find *commonly* in youth such things as are remotest from them, childish appetites, irregular passions, peevish and obstinate humors; which require to be *subdued*, and taught to give way to wholesome counsels. Young people are not only obnoxious to their *own* humors and follies, but also to those of their *companions*. They are apt to hearken to them, and to imitate one another's misconduct: and thus folly mingles with folly, and increases prodigiously. The judgment therefore of the *parents* must still interpose, and preside, and *guide* through all these *stages* of infancy, childhood, and youth; *according to their power* improving the minds of their children, breaking the strength of their inordinate passions, cultivating rude nature, forming their manners, and shewing them the way which they *ought* to be found in.

These things are so in *fact*, and a *parent* cannot acquit himself of the duty imposed upon him in the preceding proposition, if he acts so as to *deny* them: but then he cannot act so as *not to deny* them (*that is*, so as to subdue the passions of the child, break his stomach, and cause him to mind his instructions) without some sort of *discipline*, and a proper severity; at least very rarely <sup>a</sup>.

To all this, and much more that might be urged, must be superadded, that the *fortunes* of children, and their manner of setting out in the world depending (com-

<sup>a</sup> For certainly, when it can be, *Hoc patrium est, potius consuefacere filium sua sponte recte facere, quam alieno metu.* Ter.



monly) upon their parents; their parents must upon this account be their *directors*, and govern their affairs.

N. 1. It appears now from the premisses, that even *parents* have not properly a *dominion* over their *children*, such as is intended sect. VI. prop. V. from which this *parental authority* is a very different thing. This only respects the *good* of the children, and reaches not beyond the means, which the *parents*, acting according to the best of their skill, abilities, and opportunities, find most conducive to *that end*: but *dominion* only respects the *will* of the lord, and is of the same extent with his *pleasure*. Parents may not, by virtue of this authority, command their children to do any thing which is in itself *evil*: and if they do, the children ought not to obey<sup>a</sup>. Nor may they do *any thing*, what they please, to them. They may not kill, or maim, or expose them<sup>b</sup>: and when they come to be *men* or *women*, and are possessor of estates, which either their parents have given them, or they have acquired by their own labor, management, or frugality, they have the same *properties* in these with respect to *their parents*, which they have with respect to *other people*: the parents have no more right to take them by force from them, than the rest of the world have<sup>c</sup>. So that what occurs in the place above-mentiond remains *firm*, notwithstanding any thing that may be objected from the case of *parents* and *children*. And moreover,

N. 2. They, who found *monarchy* in paternal authority, gain little advantage with respect to *despotic* or *absolute* power. A power to be exercised for the *good* of subjects (like that of parents for the *good* of their children), and that principally, where they are *incapable* of helping themselves, can only be derived from hence. The *father* of his countrey cannot by this way of reasoning be demonstrated to be the *absolute lord*<sup>d</sup> of the lives, and limbs, and fortunes of the people, to dispose of them as he *pleases*<sup>e</sup>. The authority of parents goes *not this length*. Beside, if a parent hath an authority over his children, it doth not follow, that the *eldest son* should have the same authority, be it what it will, over his *brothers* and *sisters*: and much less, that

<sup>a</sup> Πρὸς ταῦτα μόνον ἀπειθόντες γονεῦσι, πρὸς δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῖς θεοῖς νόμοις ἐπαίθονται. Hierocl.

<sup>b</sup> The barbarity of the thing at length put a stop to the custom of exposing children: but it had been practised by the *Persians*, *Greeks*, &c. *Romulus's* law only restrained it, but did not abolish it. For it enjoined his citizens only ἀπασαν ἄρρενα γενεάν ἐκτρέφειν, καὶ θυγατέρας τὰς πρωτογόνους ἀποκτείνουσαι ἢ μηδὲν τὸ γενομένην νεώτερον τριετὺς, πλὴν εἰ τι γένοιτο παιδίον ἀνάπηρον, κλ. *Dion. Hal.* And beside, ἀπασαν, ὡς εἰπὲν, ἔδωκεν ἐξουσίαν πατρὶ κατ' ἡμέραν, καὶ ὅσα πάντα τὰ εἰς χρόνον, κλ. *Id.*

<sup>c</sup> Ρωμαίοις ἐθὲν ἰδίον ἐστὶ κτῆμα ζώντων ἐστὶ τὸ πατέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ χεῖματα καὶ τὰ σάματα τὸ πάλαιον, τὰ ἐκλόνται διατιθέναι τοῖς πατέρας ἀποδίδονται. *Id.* These are instances of such laws, as should not be, by prop. 4. sect. 7.

<sup>d</sup> Roma patrem patriæ Ciceronem libera dixit. *Juv.*

<sup>e</sup> Ὡς λογικῶν

ἡμῶν ἄξιοι. *Arr.*

the *heir* of the *first parent* should in succeeding generations have it over all the *collaterals*. The very *relation* between them soon vanishes, and comes at last in effect to nothing, and this *notion* with it.

VII. *As parents are obliged to educate their children, &c. so children ought to consider parents as the immediate authors (authors under the first and great Cause<sup>a</sup>) of their being; or to speak more properly, of their being born.* I know children are apt (not very respectfully, or prudently) to say; that their parents did not beget them for *their sakes*, whom they could not know before they were born, but for their *own pleasure*. But they, who make this a pretext for their disobedience, or disregard, have not sufficiently thought, what *pain*, what *trouble*, how many *frights* and *cares*<sup>b</sup>, what *charges*, and what *self-denials* parents undergo upon the score of their children: and that all these, if parents only rushed into pleasure, and consulted *nothing else*, might easily be avoided, by *neglecting* them and their welfare<sup>c</sup>. For as to those parents, who do this, let them speak for themselves: I shall not be *their* advocate.

VIII. *A great submission and many grateful acknowledgments, much respect and piety are due from children to their parents.* For if there is an authority in parents (as before) this must be answered by a proportionable submission on the other side: since an authority, to which *no obedience* is due, is equal to *no authority*.

If the thought of *annihilation* be generally disagreeable, as it seems to be, then merely to be conscious of *existence* must have in it something desirable<sup>d</sup>. And if so, our parents must be considered as the authors, or at least the instruments of *that good* to us, whatever it is: which cannot be done, unless they are treated with *distinction* and great regard, being to us what no other *is*, or *ever can be*.

God, as the first cause of all beings, is often styled metaphorically, or in a large sense of the word, the *Father* of the world, or of us all: and, if we behave our selves towards Him as *being such*, we cannot (according to sect. V. pr. XIX. n. 3.) but *adore* Him. Something *analogous*, tho in a low degree, to the case between God and his offspring there seems to be in the case between *parents* and *their children*. If that requires *divine worship*, this will demand a great *respect* and *reverence*<sup>e</sup>. Nor can I

<sup>a</sup> ששתן שותפין ביצירתם. S. Hbared.  
rere, & patrias intus deprendere curas.

<sup>b</sup> Utinam oculos in pectora possent Inferre, & patrias intus deprendere curas.  
<sup>c</sup> I confess, in Seneca's words, *minimum esse beneficium patris matrisq; concubitus, nisi accesserint alia, quae prosequerentur hoc initium muneris, & aliis officiis hoc ratum facerent.*

<sup>d</sup> Τὸ αἰσιδανέσθαι ὅτι ζῇ ἢ ἰδεῖν κατ' αὐτό φύσει ᾗ ἀγαθὸν ἢ ζῶν. Arist. The sense of life (of being alive) seems to be something more than what Seneca calls *muscarum ac vermium bonum*.

<sup>e</sup> Οἱ πόλαιοι ἢ παλαιὸν νόμοι, κλ. ———— οἱ ὅτι παλαιότεροι τοῦτον τὴν γοῖαν ἐσφῶνθαι, ὡς καὶ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἐρωῖσαι καλεῖν. Simpl.



believe, that a child, who doth not honor his *parent*, can have any disposition to worship his *Creator*<sup>a</sup>. That precept of *honoring parents*, to be found in almost all nations and religions, seems to proceed from some such sentiment : for in books we meet with it commonly following, or rather adhering to that of *worshipping the Deity*<sup>b</sup>. In laying children under this obligation they have all conspired, tho scarce in any thing else<sup>c</sup>.

The *admonitions* of a parent must be of the greatest weight with his children, if they do but remember, that he hath lived longer, and had repeted occasions to *consider things*, and *observe events*; hath *cooler passions*, as he advances in years, and sees things more *truly* as they are; is able in a manner to predict what *they themselves* will desire to have done, when they shall arrive at his age; may upon these accounts, ordinarily, be presumed to be a more competent *judge* than themselves<sup>d</sup>; and lastly, from his relation to them must be more *sincerely* inclined to tell them truth, than *any other person* in the world can be supposed to be<sup>e</sup>. I say, if young people reflect well on these things, they cannot in *prudence*, or even kindness to *themselves*, but pay the utmost *deference* to the advertisements and directions of a parent.

And to conclude, if *parents* want the assistance of their *children*, especially in the declension of their age, and when they verge towards a *helpless* condition again, they cannot deny or withhold it, but they must at the same time *deny* to requite the care and tenderness shewd by their parents towards them in *their* helpless and dangerous years; that is, without being *ungrateful*; and that is, without being *unjust*, if there be injustice in ingratitude<sup>f</sup>. Nor (which is more still) can they do this without

<sup>a</sup> Meo judicio pietas fundamentum est omnium virtutum. Cic. The same author reckons among those things, that are laudable, *parentem vereri ut deum* (neq; enim multo secus parens liberis). 'Ουδ' αὖ πάλιν μείζων ἐπιθυμία ἀδελφὸν γέγονε τ' περὶ γονεῖς ὀλιγαρίας καὶ πλημμελείας. Plut.

<sup>b</sup> Πάντες ——— λέγουσι καὶ ἄδουσιν, ὡς ἰουδαῖοι τιμὴν μετὰ θεὸν πρῶτην καὶ μεγίστην ἢ τε φύσις, ὃ, τε τὴν φύσιν πᾶσιν νόμος ἀπέδωκε. Plut. Γονέων τιμὴν μετὰ τὴν πρὸς Θεὸν δευτέραν ἔταξε [Μάυσῃς]. Jos. We indeed usually divide the two tables of *Moses's* law so, that the fifth (*Honor thy father and thy mother*) falls in the second: but the Jews themselves divide them otherwise; ὡς εἶναι τ' μὲν μίας [γραφῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν Θεὸν καὶ πατέρα] ——— τ' παντὸς, τὸ δὲ τέλος ἰουδαῖοι, καλ. Ph. Jud. Agreeably to this, *Josephus* says that οἱ δέκα λόγοι were written upon two tables, ἀνὰ πέντε μὲν εἰς ἑκατέραν [πλάκα]: *Abarbanel* reckons the fifth commandment the last of the first table; and says their *Hhakamim* do so: and in the offices of that nation these commandments are mentiond as written עַל הַלְוִחוֹת חֻמֹּשׁ חֻמֹּשׁ חֻמֹּשׁ.

<sup>c</sup> Prima igitur est optima rerum natura pietatis est magistra, &c. Val. M.

<sup>d</sup> Ὁ χερόνος, τὰλλα πάντ' ἀφαιρῶν, τὸ [ἡρὰ] προσέθησι τὴν ἐπισήμην. Plut. father, and he will shew thee. Deut.

<sup>e</sup> Δόξειε δ' ἂν τροφῆς ἰουδαῖοι δὲν μάλιστα ἐπαρκέω, ὡς οὐκ ἐλλογίας, καὶ τοῖς αἰτίοις τ' εἶναι. ——— καὶ τιμὴν δὲ κατὰ μέρος θεοῖς. Arist. Among the ancients *τροφῆρια* and *τροφῆια* were reckond due. And he, who doth not requite to his parents הַטוֹבָה הַזֶּה, is called κατ' ἐξοχὴν γῶρ in S. Hhan.

denying.

denying what they may in *their turn* require of *their* children<sup>a</sup>. In effect they do thus by their actions *deny* that to have been, which has been; and those things to be possible, which may be hereafter.

Not only *bodily* infirmities of parents, but such decays of their *minds* as may happen, ought to be pitied, their little hastinesses and mistakes dissembled, and their defects supplied, *decently*<sup>b</sup>.

IX. That *σοφία* or affection on both sides, which naturally and regularly is in parents towards their children, and vicissim<sup>c</sup>, ought to be observed and followed, when there is no reason to the contrary.

We have seen before, and it is evident from the terms, that *sense* ought to govern, when *reason* does not interpose; *i. e.* when there is *no reason*, why it should not. If then this *σοφία* or mutual affection be an inward *sense* of the case between parents and children, which, without much thinking upon it, is *felt* by them, and sits upon their natures<sup>d</sup>, it may be comprised in prop. XIV, and XV. of sect. III. But whether it is or not, the same may be said (which must be repeted in another place) of every affection, passion, inclination in general. For when there is no reason, why we should not comply with them, their own very solicitation, and the agreeableness we apprehend to be in complying, are *preponderating* arguments. This must be true, if *something* is more than *nothing*; or that ought to be granted, which there is no reason to deny. So that if this *σοφία* be only taken as a kind of attraction, or tendence, in the mere matter of parents and children; yet still this physical motion or *sympathy* ought not to be over-ruled, if there be not a *good* reason for it. On the contrary, it ought to be taken as a suggestion of nature, which should always be regarded, when it is not superseded by something *superior*; that is, by *reason*. But further, here reason doth not only not gainsay, by its silence consent, and so barely leave its right of commanding to this bodily inclination; but it comes in strongly to *abet* and *inforce* it, as design'd for a reasonable end: and therefore not to act *according to* it is not to act according to reason, and to deny that to be which is.

X. The same is true of that affection, which other relations naturally have, in some proportion or other, each for other. To this they ought to accommodate themselves.

<sup>a</sup> Τοῦτος γὰρ περὶ τὰς γονεῖς, οὕτως ἀν' ἑαυτοῦ περὶ σεαυτὸν γινώσκῃ τὰς σεαυτῆ παῖδας. *Isocr.*  
epithet *pius* (*pious Aeneas*) shines in *Virgil*.

<sup>c</sup> *Posita est inter parentes ac liberos honesta contentio, dederint majora, an receperint. Sen.*

<sup>d</sup> That is, methinks, a moving description in *S. Basil* (Περὶ πλεονεξ.) of a conflict which a poor man had within himself, when he had no other way left to preserve life but by selling one of his children.

<sup>b</sup> That

where



where reason does not prohibit. The proof of this assertion is much the same with that of the foregoing *mut. mutand.*

The foundation of all *natural relation* is laid in *marriage*<sup>a</sup>. For the *husband* and *wife* having solemnly attachd themselves each to other, having the same children, interests, &c. become so intimately related as to be reckond united, *one flesh*, and in the laws of nations many times *one person*<sup>b</sup>. Certainly they are such with respect to their posterity, who proceed from them jointly<sup>c</sup>. The *children* of this couple are related between themselves by the mediation of the parents. For every one of them being of the *same blood* with their common parents, they are all of the same blood (*truly consanguinei*), the relations, which they respectively bear to their parents, meeting there as in their *center*. This is the *nearest* relation that can be<sup>d</sup>, *next* to those of man and wife, parents and their children, who are *immediately* related by contact or rather continuity of blood, if one may speak so. The relation between the children of these children grows more *remote* and *dilute*, and in time wears out. For at every *remove* the natural tincture or sympathy may be supposed to be weakend; if for no other reason, yet for this. Every *remove* takes off *half* the common blood derived from the grand parents. For let C be the son of A and B, D the son of C, E of D, F of E: and let the *relation* of C to A and B be as 1: then the *relation* of D to A and B will be but  $\frac{1}{2}$ ; because C is but one of the parents of D, and so the *relation* of D to A and B is but the half of that, which C bears to them. By proceeding after the same manner it will be found, that the *relation* of E to A and B is  $\frac{1}{4}$  (or half of the half), of F  $\frac{1}{8}$ : and so on. So that the *relation*, which *descendents* in a direct line have by blood to their grand parents, *decreasing* thus in geometrical proportion<sup>e</sup>, the *relation* between them of *collateral* lines, which passes and is made out through the grand parents, must soon be reduced to an inconsiderable matter<sup>f</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> *Prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis, &c. Cic.*  
viro concessit in unum. *Lucr.* כְּחֶרֶץ גּוֹפֵשׁ יְשִׁיבִי. *Ap. R. Elaz. Azq. & pass.*

<sup>b</sup> *Mulier conjuncta*  
<sup>c</sup> Ἡ συγγενική [φιλία] φαίνεται πολυειδής εἶναι, καὶ ἡγετᾶς πάντα ἐν τῇ πατρικῇ: οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐξέρχονται τὰ τέκνα, ὡς αὐτῶν τι ὄντα: τὰ δὲ τέκνα τὰς γονεῖς, ὡς ἀπ' ἐκείνων τι ὄντα. — Ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἀλλήλους [φιλεῖσι] τὰς ἐν τῇ αὐτῶν πεφυκέναι. — Ἀνέψιοι δὲ καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ συγγενεῖς — τὰς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν εἶναι. γίνονται δ' οἱ μὲν οἰκειότεροι, οἱ δὲ ἀλλοτριώτεροι, κτλ. *Arist.*

<sup>d</sup> *Quam copiosæ suavitatis illa recordatio est!*  
In eodem domicilio, antequam nascerer, habitavi: in iisdem incunabulis infantiae tempora peregi: eosdem appellavi parentes, &c. *Val. M.*

<sup>e</sup> There is no name for any descendent, who is more than *trinepos*.  
<sup>f</sup> It becomes ἀμυδρά. *Andr. Rhod.*

If then we suppose this *affection* or sympathy, when it is permitted to act regularly and according to nature, no reason intervening to exalt or abate it, to operate with ■ strength nearly *proportionable* to the quantity or degree of relation, computed as above, we may perhaps nearly discern the *degrees* of that obligation, which persons related lie under, to assist each other, *from this motive*.

But there are many circumstances and incidents in life capable of affecting this *obligation*, and altering the degrees of it. A man must weigh the *wants of himself* and his own *family* against those of his *relations*: he must consider their *sex*, their *age*, their *abilities* and opportunities, how *capable* they are of good offices, how they will take them, what use they will make of them, and the like. He, who designs to act agreeably to *truth*, may find many such things demanding his regard; some justly moving him to compassion, others holding back his hand. But however this may in general be taken as evident, that *next after* our parents and own offspring<sup>a</sup> nature directs us to be helpful, in the *first place* to brothers and sisters, and *then* to other relations according to their respective distances in the genealogy of the family, *preferably* to all foreigners<sup>b</sup>. And tho our power, or opportunities of helping them in their wants should be but little; yet we ought to preserve our affection towards them, and a disposition to serve them, as far as we *honestly* and *prudently* can, and whenever the proper opportunity shall present itself. This *nature* and *truth* require.

## SECT. IX. Truths belonging to a Private Man, and respecting (directly) only himself.

I. *Every man knows (or may<sup>c</sup> know) best, what his own faculties, and personal circumstances are, and consequently what powers he has of acting, and governing himself.* Because he only of all mankind has the *internal* knowledge of himself, and what he is; and has the only opportunity by *reflexion* and *experiments* of himself to find, what his own abilities, passions, &c. truly are<sup>d</sup>.

■ *Man and Wife* are supposed to be *one*, and therefore have no place here; any more than ■ *man* and his *self*. Otherwise, considered distinctly, the one of them ought always to be the *first* care of the other.

<sup>b</sup> Μηδὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἴσον ποιῆσαι ἑταῖρον. Hes.

<sup>c</sup> For many

I acknowledge there are, who seem to be without reflexion, and almost thought. Τίς ἀγνοῖ τὴν οὐκίαν φύσιν; πολλοί, τάχα δὲ πάντες πλὴν ἐλάχιστων. S. Chrys.

<sup>d</sup> Nec se quaesiverit

extra.



II. He, that well examines himself, I suppose, will find these things to be true<sup>a</sup>.

1. That there are *some* things *common* to him not only with *sensitive animals* and *vegetables*, but also with *inanimate matter*: as, that his body is subject to the general law of gravitation; that its parts are capable of being separated, or dislocated; and that therefore he is in danger from falls, and all impressions of violence.

2. That there are *other* things *common* to him with *vegetables* and *sensitive animals*: as, that he comes from a seed (such the original *animalculum* may be taken to be); grows, and is preserved by proper matter, taken in and distributed through a set of vessels; ripens, flourishes, withers, decays, dies; is subject to diseases, may be hurt, or killed; [and therefore wants, as they do, nourishment, a proper habitation, protection from injuries, and the like.

3. That he has *other* properties *common* only to *him* and the *sensitive tribe*: as, that he receives by his senses the notice of many external objects, and things; perceives many affections of his body; finds pleasure from some, and pain from others; and has certain powers of moving himself, and acting: *that is*, he is not only obnoxious to hurts, diseases, and the causes of death, but also *feels* them<sup>b</sup>; is not only capable of nourishment, and many other provisions made for him, but also *injoys* them; and, beside, may *contribute* much himself to either his enjoyments, or his sufferings.

4. That *beside these* he has *other faculties*, which he doth not apprehend to be either in the inert mass of matter, or in vegetables, or even in the sensitive kind, at least in any considerable degree; by the help of which he investigates truth, or probability, and judges, whether things are agreeable to them, or not, after the manner set down in sect. III. or, in a word, that he is *animal rationale*<sup>c</sup>.

5. That he is conscious of a *liberty* in himself to act or not to act; and that therefore he is *such a being* as is described sect. I. prop. I. a being, whose acts may be *morally good or evil*. Further,

6. That there are in him many *inclinations* and *aversions*; from whence flow such affections, as desire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, sorrow, pity, anger, &c. all which *prompt* him to act this or that way.

7. That he is sensible of *great defects* and *limitations* in the use of his rational faculties, and powers of action, upon many occasions: as also, that his passions are many

<sup>a</sup> Illud γινώσκει σκαυτῶν noli putare ad arrogantiam minuendam solum esse dictum, verum etiam ut bona nostra norimus. Cic. ad. Qu. fr.

<sup>b</sup> Non sentire mala sua non est hominis: & non ferre non est viri. Sen. who condescends here to be something like other men. As also, when he says, *Alia sunt, quæ sapientem ferunt, etiam si non pervertunt; ut dolor capitis, &c.* Hac non nego sentire sapientem, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Qui se ipse norit, aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c. Cic.

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times apt to take wrong turns, to grow warm, irregular, excessive<sup>a</sup>. In other words, that he is in many respects fallible, and infirm<sup>b</sup>.

Lastly, that he desires to be happy: as every thing must, which understands what is meant by that word.

III. If he doth find these things to be so, then if he will act as he ought to do (that is, agreeably to truth and fact) he must do such things as these.

1. He must subject his sensual inclinations, his bodily passions, and the motions of all his members<sup>c</sup> to reason; and try every thing by it. For in the climax set down he cannot but observe, that as the principle of vegetation is something above the inertia of mere matter, and sense something above that again; so reason must be something above all these<sup>d</sup>: or, that his uppermost faculty is reason<sup>e</sup>. And from hence it follows, that he is such a being as is supposed sect. III. prop. XI. and that the great law imposed upon him is to be governed by reason.

Any man may prove this to himself by experiment, if he pleases. Because he cannot (at least without great violence to his nature) do any thing, if he has a greater reason against the doing of it than for it. When men do err against reason, it is either because they do not (perhaps will not) advert, and use their reason, or not enough; or because their faculties are defective.

And further, by sect. III. prop. X. to endeavour to act according to right reason, and to endeavour to act according to truth are in effect the same thing. We cannot do the one, but we must do the other. We cannot act according to truth, or so as not to deny any truth, and that is we cannot act right, unless we endeavour to act according to right reason, and are led by it.

Therefore not to subject one's sensitive inclinations and passions to reason is to deny either that he is rational, or that reason is the supreme and ruling faculty in his nature:

<sup>a</sup> שאור בעיסה (in Jewish language) שבע החומר ויצר הרע.

<sup>b</sup> Ἀπύχονον ἵνα.

ἀπύχονον ἵνα ἀναγκάσθων. Chrys.

<sup>c</sup> The Author of S. Hhared. reckons eight, the right use of which comprehends all practical religion: the heart, the eye, the mouth, nose, ear, hand, foot, and ראש הגויה. The duties respecting these are the subject of that (not bad) book.

<sup>d</sup> Cum tria sint hæc, esse, vivere, intelligere: & lapis est, & pecus vivit, nec tamen lapidem puto vivere, aut pecus intelligere; qui autem intelligit, eum & esse & vivere certissimum est. Quare non dubito id excellentius judicare, cui omnia tria insunt, quàm id cui duo vel unum desit. S. Aug. Thus reason sets man above the other visible orders of beings, &c.

<sup>e</sup> Præsto est domina omnium & regina ratio —. Hæc ut imperet illi parti animi, qua obedire debet, id videndum est viro. Cic.



and that is to desert mankind<sup>a</sup>, and to *deny* himself to be what he knows himself by experience and in his own conscience upon examination to be, and what he would be very angry if any body should say he was not.

If a *beast* could be supposed to give up his *sense* and activity; neglect the calls of hunger, and those appetites by which he (according to *his nature*) is to be guided; and refusing to use the powers, with which he is indued in order to get his food and preserve his life, lie still in some place, and expect to grow, and be fed like a *plant*; this would be much the same case, only not so bad, as when a *man* cancels his *reason*, and as it were strives to metamorphize himself into a *brute*. And yet this he does, who pursues only sensual objects, and leaves himself to the impulses of appetite and passion. For as in that case the *brute* neglects the law of *his nature*, and affects that of the order *below* him: so doth the *man* disobey the law of *his nature*, and put himself under that of the *lower* animals; to whom he thus makes a defection<sup>b</sup>.

If this be so, how wretchedly do they violate the *order* of nature, and transgress against *truth*, who not only *reject* the conduct of reason to follow sense and passion, but even make it *subservient* to them<sup>c</sup>; who use it only in finding out means to effect their wicked ends, but never apply it to the consideration of those ends, or the nature of those means, whether they are just or unjust, *right* or *wrong*? This is not only to *deviate* from the path of nature, but to *invert* it, and to become something *more* than brutish; *brutes with reason*, which must be the most enormous and worst of all brutes. When the *brute* is governed by sense and bodily appetites, he observes *his proper rule*; when a *man* is governed after that manner in defiance of reason, he *violates* his: but when he makes his rational powers to *serve* the brutish part, to assist and promote it, he heightens and increases the *brutality*, enlarges its field, makes it to act with greater force and effect<sup>e</sup>, and becomes a *monster*.

His duty then, who is *conscious* to himself of the truth of those things recounted under the foregoing proposition, is to examine every thing carefully, and to see that he

<sup>a</sup> *Abiecto homine in sylvestre animal transire.* Sen. Ἐν τῷ λογικῷ τίνων χωρίζομεθα; τῶν θηρίων. — Ὅρα δὲ μὴ τι πῶς ὡς θηρίον ποιήσης. Arr. Pertinet ad omnem officii questionem semper in promptu habere, quantum natura hominis pecudibus reliquisque belluis antecedit. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Πρὸς τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἀλογίαν ἐκπεσόν. Chrys.

<sup>c</sup> A thing too often done. Qua enim libido, qua avaritia, quod facinus aut suscipitur nisi consilio capto, aut sine — ratione perficitur? Cotta. ap. Cic.

<sup>e</sup> Some- thing like him, who, in Chrysostom's words, διὰ τῶν ὀρέων καταδύει τὸ σκῆφος.

<sup>e</sup> This makes Cotta say, Satiis fuit nullam omnino nobis à diis immortalibus datam esse rationem, quàm tanta cum pernicie datam: with other bitter things. Tho an answer to this may be given in the words, which follow afterward: A deo tantum rationem habemus, si modò habemus: bonam autem rationem, aut non bonam, à nobis.

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complies with no corporeal inclination at the expense of his reason; but that all his affections, concupiscible and irascible, be directed towards such objects, and in such measure, time, and place, as that allows. Every word<sup>a</sup> and action, every motion and step in life should be conducted by reason<sup>b</sup>. This is the foundation and indeed the sum of all virtue.

2. He must take care not to bring upon himself<sup>c</sup> want, diseases, trouble; but, on the contrary, endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable subsistence, as far as he can without contradicting any truth<sup>d</sup> (that is, without denying matters of fact, and such propositions, as have been already or will in the sequel here be shewn to be true, concerning God, property, the superiority of reason, &c.) To explain this limitation: if a man should consider himself as obnoxious to hunger, weather, injuries, diseases, and the rest; then, to supply his wants, take what is his neighbour's property; and at last, in vindication of himself, say, "I act according to what I am, ■ being obnoxious to hunger, &c. and to act otherwise would be incomp'iance with truth"; this would not be sufficient to justify him. The grand rule requires, that what he does, should interfere with no truth: but what he does interferes with several. For by taking that, which (by the supposition) is his neighbour's, he acts as if it was not his

■ This certainly excludes all that talk, which familiarizes vice, takes off those restraints which men have from nature or ■ modest education, and is so utterly destructive of virtue, that Aristotle banishes it out of the commonwealth. "Ολως μὲν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ὥσπερ ἄλλό τι, δεῖ τι νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν ἐν τῇ δ' εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὅτι οὐ τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεργος. <sup>b</sup> True, manly reason: which is a very different thing from that superstitious preciseness, which carries things too far. As v. g. when the Jews, not contented to condemn דבור נבלה or נבלות הפה, and every where to express גורל האסור go so far as to comprehend under it אפי' שיחה קלה שארם אפי' משיח עם אשתו: and to add, מוציא מלה לבטלה כמוציא זרע לבטלה וכו'. There are other sayings of this kind to be seen, many of them, among those, which R. El. de Vidas has collected: as that particularly, 'וכו' ענין ראות צריך שלא להוציא לבטלה וכו'. What Aelian reports of Anaxagoras and others, belongs to this place; that they never laughed: with many other unnecessary austerities, which might be added. <sup>c</sup> אפי' אני לי מי לי P. Ab. ■ Προσδύτα:

τάτων [τῶν ἐκτός ἀγαθῶν] ὁ ἀνθρώπινος βίος κύρια δ' εἰσὶν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας. Arist. They, who treated the body and things pertaining to it as merely ἀλλότρια, distinguishing between τὰ ἡμέτερα and τὰ τῆ σώματος, making these latter to be ἕδωκ' ἡμῶς, and leaving the body as it were to itself (αὐτὸ [σώματιον] περιμνάτω, — εἰ τι πάχει): they, I say, might enjoy their own philosophy; but they would scarce gain many proselytes now ■ days, or ever persuade people, that the pains they feel are not theirs, or any thing to them. Nor indeed do I much credit many stories that are told of some old philosophers: as that of Anaxarchus, when he was put to a most cruel death by Nicocreon; οὐ φροντίσαντα τῆς τιμωρίας, εἰπεῖν — Πτίσσει τὸν Ἀναξάρχου Φύλακον, Ἀναξάρχον δὲ ἐπλήττει. See Epict. Arr. Simpl. Anton. D. Laert. and others.

Y :

neighbours



neighbour's, but *his own*, and therefore plainly contradicts *fact*, and those *truths* in sect. VI, VII. respecting property: when by not taking what is his neighbour's, he would contradict no truth, he would not deny himself to be obnoxious to hunger, &c. There are other ways of furnishing himself with conveniences, or at least necessities, which are consistent with *property* and *all truth*: and he can only be said to deny himself to be *what he is* by *omitting* to provide against his wants, when he omits to provide against them by some of *those ways*; and then indeed he doth do it. (See p. 28. Anf. to Obj. 3.)

So again, when a man does any thing to *avoid* present suffering or dangers *contrary* to the express dictates of reason, and the tenor of forementioned truths, he acts as a *sensitive* being only, not as being what he *really is*, *sensitivo-rationalis*. But when there is no good argument *against* his doing of any thing, that may gain him protection from evil, or a better condition of life, he may then look upon himself *only* as a being, who needs that which is to be obtained by doing it: and *in that case*, if he should not do it, he would be false to himself, and deny the circumstances of his own nature.

Certainly when a man may *without transgressing* the limits prescribed consult his own safety, support, and reasonable satisfaction, and does not; and especially when he takes a counter-course, and exposes himself<sup>a</sup>, he forgets *many* of the foregoing truths, and treats himself as *not being* what he is. This is true with respect to *futurity*, as well as the *present time*: and indeed by how much future time is more than the present, by so much the more perhaps ought *that* to be regarded. At least enjoyments ought to be taken and adjusted in such a manner, that no one should preclude, or spoil *more*, or *greater* to come.

It may easily be understood here, that *those evils*, which is it not in a man's power to prevent, he must endeavour to bear *patiently* and *decently*, i. e. as such; and moreover, such as are made by this means *lighter*<sup>b</sup>: for when they cannot be totally prevented, as much of the *effect* must be prevented, or taken off, as can be. And in order to this it is good to be prepared for all attacks; especially the *last, great* one<sup>c</sup>.

3. He must consider even *bodily and sensual affections, passions, and inclinations* as *intimations*, which many times he not only may, but ought to hearken to. What is said before of the subjection of passions and appetites to *reason* must always be remembered. They are not to proceed from unjustifiable causes, or terminate in wrong objects; not be

<sup>a</sup> Ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa: quo nihil potest esse stultius. — In tranquillo tempest item adversam optare dementis est. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Levius sit patientia, Quicquid currere est nefas. Hor.

<sup>c</sup> Μὴ λίην θάνατος was a great man's definition of philosophy.

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unreasonable or immoderate. Being *thus regulated*, set to a true bias, and freed from all eruptions and violence, they become *such as are here intended*; gentle ferments working in our breasts, without which we should settle in inactivity; and what I think may be taken for just *motives* and *good arguments* to act upon.

For if a man finds, that he has *not only* a superior faculty of reason, but *also* an inferior appetitive faculty, under which are contained many propensions and aversions, *these* cannot be denied to be any more than *that*; tho they must be taken indeed for what they *really are*, and not *more*. When they are checked by reason and truth, or there lies a reason *against* them (as there always will, when they are not within the foresaid restrictions), they must be taken *as clogd* with this circumstance, as things *overruled* and *disabled*: but when they are under no prohibition from the *superior powers* and *truth*, then they are to be considered as unfettered and free, and become governing principles. For (as it has been observed upon a particular occasion before p. 165.) when there is *no reason against* the complying with our senses, there is always *one* for it by prop. XIV. sect. III. the inclination itself, being prevented by nothing above it, is in this case *uppermost*, and in course takes the commanding post: and then a man must act as being what he is in n. 3. under prop. II. of this section.

The *springs* of all human actions are in fact, either a sense of *duty*, or a prospect of some *pleasure* or *profit* to be obtained, some *evil* or *danger* to be avoided; that is, either the reasonableness of what is done, or the manner, in which something doth or is like to affect the agent: and that is again, human actions are founded either in *reason*, or *passion* and *inclination*. (I need not add they may be in both.) This being so, what should hinder, when *reason* does not work, but that the *inferior springs* should retain their nature, and act.

*Bodily* inclinations and passions, when they observe their due *subordination* to reason, and only take place, where that leaves it open for them, or allows them to be as it were assessors to it upon the throne, are of admirable use in life, and tend *many times* to noble ends. This is applicable to the irascible, as well as the concupiscible affections, and the whole animal system. *Love* of that which is amiable, *compassion*<sup>b</sup> toward the miserable and helpless, a natural *abhorrence* and resentment<sup>c</sup> of that which

<sup>a</sup> Ἡ ὀργὴ — ὑποκλήσκει ἡμῶν διεγείρει. Chrys.

<sup>b</sup> When the Stoics say, that a wise man may relieve one, who wants his help, without *pitying* him; I own indeed he *may*, but I very much doubt whether he *would*. If he had not some compassion, and in some measure felt the ills or wants of the other, I scarce know how he should come to take him for an object of his charity.

<sup>c</sup> Ὁ μὲν ἐφ' οἷς δεῖ, καὶ οἷς δεῖ ὀργιζόμενος, ἐτι καὶ ὡς δεῖ, καὶ ὅτε, καὶ ὅσον χρόνον, ἐπαινεῖται. Arist. To be angry under these conditions is a different thing from *rage*, and those *transports* which perhaps scarce comply with any one of them: such as that of *Alexander*, who, because his ἐρώμενος died, commanded the Ἀσκληπεία to be all burnt. Arr.



is villainous or vitious or base<sup>a</sup>, fear<sup>b</sup> of evils, are things, which *duly* temperd have laudable effects: and without them mankind could not well subsist. By which it appears, that the Author of nature has placed these *conatus's*, these tendencies, and reluctancies in us, to dispose us for action, when there are no arguments of a *higher nature* to move us. So far are they, *rightly managed*, from being mere infirmities. And certainly the *philosopher*, who pretends to absolute *apathy*, maims nature, and sets up for a half-man, or I don't know what<sup>c</sup>.

I must confess however, that our *passions* are so *very apt* to grow upon us, and become exorbitant, if they are not kept under an *exact discipline*, that by way of prevention or caution it is advisable rather to affect a *degree* of apathy, or to recede *more* from the worse extreme<sup>d</sup>. This very proposition itself, which, when *reason* is absent, places *sense* and *inclination* in the chair, obliges not to permit the reins to our passions, or give them their full career; because if we do, they may (and will) carry us into such *excesses*, such *dangers* and *mischiefs*, as may sadly affect the sensitive part of us: that part itself, which now governs. They ought to be watched, and well examin'd; if *reason* is on their side, or stands neuter, they are to be heard (this is all, that I say): in *other cases* we must be deaf to their applications, strongly guard against their emotions, and in *due time* prevent their rebelling against the sovereign faculty.

I cannot forbear to add, tho I fear I shall tire you with repetitions, that, from what is said here and just before, not only the *liberty* men take in preferring what they like best, among present enjoynments, meats, drinks, &c. so far as they are *innocent*; but all those *prudential* and *lawful* methods, by which they endeavour to secure to themselves a comfortable and pleasant being, may be justified, and that obs. under prop. XIII. in sect. II. strengthend.

<sup>a</sup> There is, according to Tully, *Civile odium, quo omnes improbos odimus*. Φοβέμεθα δηλονότι τὰ φοβερά. — φοβέμεθα ὡς πάντα τὰ κακά. ὅσον ἀδοξίαν, πέναν, νόσον, ἀφιλίαν, θάνατον. — ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ καλόν. τὸ δὲ μὴ, ἀσχερόν, καλ. *Arist.* When one called *Xenophanes* coward because he would not play at dice with him, ὡμολόγει πάνυ δειλὸς εἶναι πρὸς τὰ αἰχρὰ καὶ ἀτολμῶ. *Plut.* A wise man is not ἀπαθής, but μετριοπαθής. *Arist. ap. Diog. L.* Δεῖ γὰρ σοφιστὴν μέσας ἀποχωρεῖν ὅ μᾶλλον ἐναντίως. — γὰρ ἄκραν, τὸ μὲν ἐς ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ δὲ ἥττον. *Arist.* — In the same chapter he gives two other excellent rules, which I cannot but set down here. Σκοπεῖν δὲ πρὸς ἃ αὐτοὶ εὐκαταίφοροι ἔσμεν — εἰς τὸ μωραντίον δ' ἑαυτὸς ἀφέλκειν. — ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεσπασμένα γὰρ ζύλαν ὀρθῶντες ποῖσιν. And after, Ἐν παντί ὃ μάλιστα φυλακτίον τὸ ἡδὺ, καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν. καὶ γὰρ ἀδέκατοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν.

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If the gratification of an appetite be incompatible with *reason* and *truth*, to treat that appetite according to what it is, is to *deny* it: but if it is not, to use it as it is, is to consider it as an appetite clear of all objections, and this must be to *comply* with it. The humoring of *such appetites*, as lie not under the interdict of truth and reason, seems to be the *very means*, by which the Author of nature intended to *sweeten* the journey of life: and a man may upon the road as well muffle himself up against sun-shine and blue sky, and expose himself bare to rains and storms and cold, as debar himself of the *innocent delights* of his nature for affected melancholy, want, and pain. Yet,

4. He must *use what means he can to cure his own defects, or at least to prevent the effects of them; learn to deny temptations, or keep them at a proper distance<sup>a</sup>; even mortify, where mortification is necessary<sup>b</sup>; and alway carry about him the sense of his being but a man.* He who doth not do this, doth not conform himself to the *seventh* particular under the preceding prop. (doth not own that to be *true*, which he is supposed to have found *true* in himself); denies a *defect* to be what it is, to be something which requires to be supplied, or amended; and is guilty of an *omission*, that will fall under sect. I. prop. V.

I might here mention some *precautions*, with some kinds and degrees of *mortification* or *self-denial*, which men will commonly find to be necessary. But I shall not *prescribe*; leaving them, who best know their own weak places and diseases, to select for themselves the proper *remedies*.

I shall only take notice, that since the *self-denial* here recommended can only respect things in themselves *lawful* and not unreasonable, and in favor of such our bare *inclinations* have been allowd to be taken for arguments and directions, it looks as if this advice to *deny ones self* or *inclinations* inferred a contradiction. But this knot will be quickly untied. For when we deny our inclinations in order to better our natures, or prevent crimes, tho to follow those inclinations might *otherwise* be right; yet in *these circumstances* and under this view there arises a good reason against it, and they, according to the *establishd rule*, must therefore give way: which is all that is intended<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Ἀγεσιλέω μέχρι τῶ ὀφθαλμῶν προσελθὼν ὁ ἕως, ἐνταῦθα ἔση ἐπὶ θύραις τῆ ψυχῆς. Max. Tyr. — To appoint things, as the Jewish Doctors have done, to be כרי להרחיק את, or סייג לתורה, would be right, if they were judiciously chosen, and not so very particular and trifling. Some of their cautions are certainly just: as that, לא יסתכל אדם באשת איש ובשאר, עריות פן ינקש בהם. Passim.

<sup>b</sup> What should a man do to live? ימית עצמו. Mishn.

<sup>c</sup> No monkery, no superstitious or phantastical mortifications are here recommended.



The last clause of the proposition takes in a *great compass*. It will oblige men, if they do but think well what *they* are, and consequently what *others* of the same kind with themselves also are, not to be proud, conceited, vain; but modest, and humble, and rather diffident of themselves: not to censure the failings of others too hardly, not to be over-severe in punishing or exacting justice<sup>a</sup>, and particularly not to be revengeful; but candid, placable, mansuete: and so forth.

5. *He ought to examine<sup>b</sup> his own actions and conduct, and where he finds he has transgressed<sup>c</sup>, to repent.* That is, if the transgression be against his neighbour, and the nature of it admits, to make *reparation*, or at least as far as he can: in other cases, when that which is done cannot be *recalled*, or *repaid*, or terminates in *himself* only, to live however under a sense of his fault, and to prove by such acts as are proper, that he desires *forgiveness*, and heartily wishes it undone; which is as it were an essay toward the *undoing* of it<sup>d</sup>, and all that now can be<sup>e</sup>: and lastly, to use all possible care not to *relapse*. All this is involved in the *idea* of a fault, or action that is wrong, as it presents itself to a rational mind. For such a mind cannot approve what is unreasonable, and repugnant to truth; that is, what is *wrong*, or a *fault*: nay more, it cannot but disapprove it, detest it. No *rational* animal therefore can act according to *truth*, the *true* nature of himself and the idea of a crime, if he doth not endeavour not to commit it; and, when it is committed, to repair it, if he can, or at least shew himself to be *penitent*<sup>f</sup>.

If when a man is *criminal*, he doth not behave himself *as such*; or, which is the same, behaves himself as being *not such*, he opposes *truth* confidently.

And further, to act agreeably to what he is supposed to find himself *to be*, is to act as one who is in danger of *relapsing*: which is to be upon his guard for the future.

6. *He must labor to improve his rational faculties by such means, as are (fairly) practicable by him, and consistent with his circumstances.* If it be a disadvantage to be obnoxious to *error*, and act in the dark, it is an advantage to know such *truths* as may prevent this: if so, it is a greater advantage to know, or be capable of knowing, *more* such truths<sup>g</sup>: and then again, not to endeavour to improve those faculties, by

<sup>a</sup> חסיד עושה טובה לפניו משורת הדין (which words I understand in the sense, that *Rashi* seems to put upon them, *Gen.* 44. 10.)

<sup>b</sup> Πῇ παρέβην; τί δ' ἔειπα; τί μοι δέον ἐκ ἐτε-

λεσθῆ; *Ant. carm.* <sup>c</sup> Τίς γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἀγῶνα τῆς βίης παρελθὼν ἁπτατός ἐμεινε; τίς δ' ἔχ' ὑπο-

σκελιστέας; εὐδαιμον ὁ μὴ πολλάκις. *Ph. Jud.*

<sup>d</sup> Quem penitet peccasse, penè est innocens.

<sup>e</sup> Even a few days, שקולה כנגד כל הקרבנות [חשובה]. *S. Hhah'd.*

<sup>f</sup> Ελοιδόησαι; εὐλογησον. ἐπλεονεκτήσας; ἀπόδ' ὅτι. ἐμεθύσας; νήσωσον. *S. Baf.*

<sup>g</sup> Ἔστι γὰρ τὰ ὄντι φιλοσοφία μέγιστον κτήμα. *Jusl. dl.*

which

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which these *truths* are apprehended, is to shut them out, as being not what they are <sup>a</sup>.

And moreover, by the enlargement of our rational faculties we become *more rational*; that is, we advance our natures <sup>b</sup>, and become more attentive to *rational enjoyments*.

The *ordinary* means indeed of improving our minds are the instruction of able men, reading, observation, meditation: but every man has not proper *opportunities*, or *capacity* for these, or but in some low degree; and no man is obliged beyond his abilities, and opportunities (by sect. IV. prop. II.) Therefore that mollification is added, *by such means, &c.*

Beside *health*, a comfortable and suitable provision of *externals* is so necessary to the well-being of the *whole man*, that without it the rational part cannot dwell easy, all pursuits of knowledge will be liable to interruption, and improvements (commonly) imperfect <sup>c</sup>. And so *reason* itself (which cannot betray its own interest) must for its own sake concur in seeking and promoting that, which tends to the preservation and happiness of the *whole*. But the doing of this ingrosses time and industry; and before that which is sought can be obtained (if it is ever obtained), probably the *use* of it is lost: except where men live by the profession of some part of learning.

And as to them who are *more free* from worldly cares, or whose business and employment brings them into a stricter acquaintance with letters, after all their endeavours (such is the great variety of human circumstances in *other respects*) they must be contented with several *degrees* and *portions* of knowledge. Some are blest with clean and strong constitutions, early instructions and other helps, succeeding encouragements, useful acquaintance, and freedom from disturbance: whilst others, under an ill state of body, and other disadvantages, are forced to be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can.

But notwithstanding all this, every man may in *some degree* or *other* endeavour to cultivate his nature, and possess himself of useful truths. And not to do this is (again) to cast off *reason* (which never can be *reasonable*), apostatize from humanity, and recoil into the bestial life <sup>d</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> And perhaps ■ if our own minds were not what they are. For πάντες άνθρωποι τ' εἶδ' ἔχειν οὐ γινώσκουσιν φύσει. *Arist.*

<sup>b</sup> *Aristotle* being asked, *what he got by philosophy*, answered, Τὸ ἀνεπιτάκτως ποιεῖν ἃ τινες ἀπὸ τῶν νόμων φόβον ποιοῦσιν. And another time, *how the learned differed from the unlearned*, said, Ὅσα οἱ ζῶντες τῇ τηδνηκώτων τὴν παιδείαν ἔλαβον ἐν μὲν εὐτυχίᾳ εἶναι κόσμον, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀτυχίᾳ καταφυγὴν. *D. Laert.*

<sup>c</sup> Ἀδύνατον γὰρ, ἢ ἔραδιον, τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ πράττεται κατὰ περὶ δι' ὀργάνων, κτλ. *Arist.*

<sup>d</sup> Nam fuit quoddam tempus, cum in agris homines passim bestiarum modo vagabantur, &c. *Cic.*



7. *He must attend to instruction<sup>a</sup>, and even ask advice; especially in matters of consequence.* Not to do this is to *deny*, that his faculties are limited and defective, or that he is fallible (which is *contrary* to that, which he is presumed to be conscious of); and perhaps, that it is possible for another to *know* what he *doth* not.

*Advice* every man is capable of hearing, and the meaner a man's own improvements are, the *more* doth truth press him to submit to the counsel and opinions of others. Nor is every one only *capable*, but every one *wants* upon some occasions to be informed. In how many countrey affairs must the *scholar* take the *rustic* for his master? In how many other men of business, *traders*, and *mechanics*? And on the other side, in respect of how many things does the generality of the world want to be taught by them, who are *learned* and *honest*?

There is or should be ■ *commerce* or interchange of counsel and knowledge, ■ well as of other things: and where men have not these of their *own growth*, they should thankfully receive any *supply* from other quarters.

I do not mean, that ■ man ought *implicitly* and *blindly* to follow the opinion of another<sup>b</sup> (this other being *fallible* too, as well as himself), unless he has *in himself* ■ good reason so to do, which many times happens; but by the assistance of another, and hearing what he has to say, to *find out* more certainly on which side *reason*, *truth*, and *happiness* (which always keep close together) do lie. And thus it is indeed a man's *own reason* at last, which governs.

He, who is governed by what *another* says (or does), without understanding it and making the reason of it his own, is not governed by his *own reason*, and that is, by *no reason that he has*. To say one is led by the nose (as we commonly speak<sup>c</sup>) gives immediately the idea of ■ brute<sup>d</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> The effect, which Xenocrates's lecture had upon Polemo, is remarkable: *unius orationis saluberrima medicina sanatus, ex infami ganeone maximus philosophus evasit.* Val. M.

<sup>b</sup> Like them, who submit to their *Hhakamim*, אפילו יאמרו על ימין שהוא שמאל וכו'. In *S. Iqqar*. Many more instances might easily be given.

<sup>c</sup> Not only we. Τῆς πινός ἐλακᾶς was used in the same sense by the Greeks.

<sup>d</sup> *Nihil magis praestandum est, quam ne, pecorum ritu, sequamur antecedentium gregem, pergentes non qua eundum est, sed qua itur.* Sen. Something may perhaps be expected in this place concerning *vogue* and *fashion*, which seem to be public declarations of some general opinion; shewing how far they ought to sway with us. I think, so far as to keep us from being contemned, derided, or marked, where that may lawfully and conveniently be done; especially in respect of trifling and little matters. But further ■ wise man will scarce mind them. That is a good sentence in *Demophilus*, Ποίει δ' αἰεὶ καλὰ, καὶ ποιῶν μέγας ἀδοξήσει· φᾶνλον δ' ἢ κριτὴς καλῶς πράγματι δ' ὀχλόν.

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Lastly, *He must labor to clear his mind of those preoccupations and incumbrances which hang about it, and hinder him from reasoning freely, and judging impartially.* We set out in life from such poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under such remains of superstition and ignorance, such influences of company and fashion, such insinuations of pleasure, &c. that it is no wonder, if men get habits of thinking only in *one way*; that these habits in time grow rigid and confirmed; and so their minds come to be overcast with thick *prejudices*, scarce penetrable by any ray of truth or light of reason. He therefore, who would use his rational faculties, must in the first place disentangle them, and render them *fit* to be used: and he, who doth not do this, doth hereby declare, that he doth not *intend* to use them; that is, he proclaims himself *irrational*, contrary to truth, if supposition the fourth be *true*.

The sum of all is this: it is the duty of every *man*, if that word expresses such a being as is before described, to behave himself in all respects (which I cannot pretend to enumerate) as far as he is able according to reason. And from hence it will follow, further, that,

IV. *Every man is obliged to live virtuously and piously.* Because to live after that manner is to *practice reason*<sup>a</sup> and *truth*<sup>b</sup>. For from the contents of the foregoing sections it is apparent, that one cannot practise reason (or act according to truth) without behaving himself *reverently* and *dutifully* toward that Almighty being, on whom he depends; nor without *justice* and a tender regard to the properties of other men: that is, unless his enjoyments be free from impiety, virtuous and harmless. And as to those virtues, which respect *a mans self*, the same thing<sup>c</sup> will be as apparent, when I have told what I mean by some of the *principal* ones.

*Prudence*, the queen of virtues, is nothing but choosing (after things<sup>d</sup> have been duly weighd) and using the most reasonable means to obtain some end, that is reasonable. This is therefore *directly* the exercise of reason.

*Temperance* permits us to take meat and drink not only as phyfic for hunger and thirst, but also as an *innocent cordial* and fortifier against the evils of life, or even sometimes, reason not refusing that liberty, merely as matter of *pleasure*. It only confines us to such *kinds, quantities, and seasons*, as may best consist with our health.

<sup>a</sup> *Ipsa virtus brevissimè recta ratio dici potest. Cic. Qua non aliud est quàm recta ratio. Sen.*

<sup>b</sup> *Idem esse dicebat Socrates veritatem & virtutem. Id.*

<sup>c</sup> *Viz. That a man cannot practise*

reason without practising them. <sup>d</sup> *Τὰ τ' ἔόντα, τὰ τ' ἐοικέναι, ἀπὸ τ' ἔόντα.*

<sup>e</sup> *That*

saying of *Timotheus* to *Plato*, with whom he had supped the night before in the Academy, should be remembered. *Ἰμῶς ἐν δειπνίῃ — ἐν τῷ ὑπερβαίῳ — ἡμέραν. Ἀπ. Athen.*



the use of our faculties <sup>a</sup>, our fortune, &c. and shew, that we do not think our selves made *only* to eat and drink here <sup>b</sup>; that is, such as speak us to be *what we are*.

*Chastity* does not pretend to *extinguish* our tender passions, or cancel one part of our nature: it only bids us not to indulge them against *reason* and *truth* <sup>c</sup>; not give up the *man* to humor the *brute* <sup>d</sup>; nor hurt *others* to please *our selves*; to divert our inclinations by business, or some honest amusement, till we can gratify them *lawfully*, *conveniently*, *regularly* <sup>e</sup>; and even then to participate of the mysteries of love with *modesty*, as within a veil or sacred inclosure, not with a canine impudence <sup>f</sup>.

*Frugality* indeed looks forward, and round about; not only considers the man *himself*, but compassionates his *family*; knows, that, when the exactest computation is made that can be beforehand, there will still be found many unforeseen *desiderata* in the calendar of his expences; is *apprehensive* of the world, and accidents, and new occasions, that may arise, tho they are not yet in being <sup>g</sup>; and therefore endeavours wisely to lay in as much, as may give him some kind of security against *future* wants and casualties, without which provision no man, whose sense is not quite lost, or circumscribed within the present minute, can be very easy <sup>h</sup>. To this end it not only cuts off all *profusion* and *extravagance*, but even deducts something from that, which according to the present appearance might be *afforded* <sup>i</sup>; and chooses rather that he should live upon half allowance now, than be exposed (or expose any body else) to the danger of starving hereafter <sup>k</sup>, when full meals and former plenty shall make *poverty* and *fasting* more insupportable. But still it forbids no instance of *generosity*, or even *magnificence*, which is agreeable to the man's station and circumstances, or (which is tantamount) to the *truth* of his case <sup>l</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> Corpus onustum Hesternis vitiis animum quoq; pręgravat unā, &c. Hor. <sup>b</sup> Quibus in solo vivendi causa palato est. Juv. Sic prandete commilitones tanquam apud inferos canaturi (Leonid. ap. Val. M.) may be turned to a general memento, no man knowing, how near his death may be. <sup>c</sup> Τί εἶδες; — καλόν; Ἐπαγε τὸ κανόνα. Arr. <sup>d</sup> Venerem incertam rapientes, — fera- rum. Hor.

<sup>e</sup> In which words are comprehended naturally (Τὸ μὴ τὰς ὡρὰς φύσιν ὑπο- νῶς διακρίν). <sup>f</sup> Not as Crates and Hipparchia (of whom see Diog. L. Sext. Emp. & al.),

and indeed the Cynics in general are said to have done: quibus in propatulo coire cum conjugibus mos fuit. Lactant. Of whom therefore Cicero says with good reason, Cynicorum ratio [al. natio] tota est ejicienda. Est enim inimica verecundia, sine qua nihil rectum esse potest, nihil honestum. נִבְּיָאֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל נִבְּיָאֵי [שִׁינִי]. S. Hhas. That in Herodotus, Ἄρα κιθῶνι ἐνδομῆνα συνεκδύεται καὶ τὴν αἰδῶ γυνή, ought not to be true. Verecundiā naturali habent provisum lupanaria ipsa secretum. Aug. <sup>g</sup> Εἰς τὸ τῆς τύχης ἀτέκμαρτον ἀφορῶσα. Ph. 7.

<sup>h</sup> Simonides was wont to say, Βελόμην ἀνδρά- σαντων τοῖς ἐχθροῖς μάλλον ἀπολιπεῖν, ἢ ζῶν δειδῶς τῷ φίλῳ. Stob. <sup>i</sup> Non intelligunt homines quānam magnum vestigal sit parsimonia. Cic.

<sup>k</sup> Like them, who ἐν τῇ νεότητι τὰ ἔγχεως ἐφῶδια προκαταναλίσκωσι, as in Athen. <sup>l</sup> Ea liberalitate utamur, quæ pro sit amicis, noceat nemini. Cic.

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After the same manner I might proceed upon other *particular* virtues. But my notion of them must by this time be sufficiently understood: and therefore I shall only give this *general* advice. That you may take the truer prospect of any act; place your self in your imagination *beyond it* (beyond it in time), and suppose it *already done*, and then see how it appears; always remembering, that a long *repentance* is a disproportionate price for a *short enjoyment*. Or, fancy it done by some *other man*, and then view it in that *speculum*: we are commonly sharper-sighted in discerning the faults of others, than of our selves<sup>a</sup>. And further, as to those *virtues*, which are said to consist in the mean, it may be sometimes safer to incline a *little more* to one of the *extremes*, than to the other: as, rather to stinginess, than prodigality; rather to inflexibility, and even a *degree* of ill nature, than to dangerous complaisance, or easiness in respect of vice, and such things as may be hurtful; and so on<sup>b</sup>.

Since then to live *virtuously* is to practise *reason* and act conformably to *truth*, he, who lives so, must be *ultimately happy*, by sect. II. prop. XIV. and therefore not only the commands of reason, but even the desire of happiness (a motive, that cannot but work strongly upon all who *think*) will oblige a man to live so.

It may be collected even from *experience*, that the *virtuous life* compared with the *contrary*, if one looks no further than the present state, is the *happier life*<sup>c</sup>; or, that the virtuous pleasures, when the whole account is made up, are the truer<sup>d</sup>. Who sees not, that the *vitious life* is full of dangers and sollicitudes, and usually ends ill; perhaps in rottenness and rags, or at least in a peevish and despicable discontent<sup>e</sup>?

I am not of opinion, that *virtue* can make a man happy upon a rack<sup>f</sup>, under a violent fit of the stone, or the like<sup>g</sup>; or that *virtue* and *prudence* can always exempt him from wants and sufferings, mend a strait fortune, or rectify an ill constitu-

<sup>a</sup> Non est incommodum, quale quodq; — sit, ex aliis judicare: ut si quid dedecet in aliis, vitemus & ipsi. Fit enim nescio quo modo, ut magis in aliis cernamus, quam in nobismet ipsis, si quid delinquitur. Cic.

<sup>b</sup> Οἷον, ἐν δειπνῶ προπίνει τις ἄδην ἔχοντι; μὴ δυσωπηδῆς, μὴδὲ προσβιάσῃ σεαυτὸν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ποτήριον, κλ. Plut.

<sup>c</sup> Even Epicurus himself ἀχαρίστον φησὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν μόνην· and Ἀφ' τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰς ἀρετὰς δεῦ ἀπειρῶν. Diog. L.

<sup>d</sup> Isocrates gives one reason for this, where he compares vitious pleasures with virtue. Ἐκεῖ μὲν πρῶτον ἡθύνοντες, ὕστερον ἐλυπήθημεν· ἐνταῦθα δ' ἡμεῖς τὰς λύπας τὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχομεν.

<sup>e</sup> Whereas virtue is ἐφόδιον πρὸς γῆρας. Bias ap. S. Bas.

<sup>f</sup> For who can bear such rants as that, Epicurus ait, sapientem, si in Phalaridis tauro peruratur, exclamaturum, Dulce est, & ad me nihil pertinet? Sen. Tully reports the same.

<sup>g</sup> It is in the power of very few to act like him, qui dum varices exsecandas praberet, legere librum perseveravit: or him, qui non desit ridere, cum ob hoc ipsum irati tortores omnia instrumenta crudelitatis experirentur. Sen.



tion: amidst so many enemies to virtue, so many infirmities as attend life, he cannot but be *sometimes affected*. But I have said, and say again, that the *natural* and *usual* effect of virtue is happiness; and if a virtuous man should in some respects be unhappy, yet still his virtue will make him *less unhappy*: for at least he enjoys inward tranquillity, and a breast conscious of no evil. And which kind of life I pray ought one to prefer: that, which *naturally* tends to *happiness*, tho it may be disturbed; or that, which *naturally* tends to *unhappiness*? In brief, *virtue* will make a man *here*, in any given circumstances, as happy as a man can be in those circumstances: or however it will make him happy *hereafter* in some other state: for *ultimately*, all taken together, happy he *must* be.

Some may possibly wonder, why among virtues I have not so much as once named one of the *cardinal*, and the only one perhaps which they pretend to: I mean *fortitude*. That *that*, by which so many heroes have triumphed over enemies, even the greatest, *death* itself; *that*, which distinguishes nations, raises empires, has been the grand theme of almost all wits, attracts all eyes, opens all mouths, and assumes the name of *virtue* by way of excellence; that *this* should be forgot!

To atone for this omission I will make this *appendix* to the foregoing brief account of the virtues. If *fortitude* be taken for natural courage (*i. e.* strength, activity, plenty of spirits, and a contempt of dangers resulting from these), this is constitution and the gift of God<sup>a</sup>, not any *virtue* in us: because if it be *our* virtue, it must consist in something, which *we* produce, or do our selves<sup>b</sup>. The case is the same with that of fine features and complexion, a large inheritance, or strong walls, which may indeed be *great advantages*, but were never called *virtues*<sup>c</sup>. To *have these* is not virtue; but to *use them rightly*, or according to reason, if we have them.

That this is justly said, may perhaps appear from what is to be said on the *other side*. It may be a man's *misfortune*, that he has not more courage, a greater stock of spirits, firmer health, and stronger limbs, if he has a just occasion to use them; but it never can be reckoned a *vice* or fault not to *use* what he *has not*: for otherwise it might be a crime not to be able to carry ten thousand pound weight, or outrun a cannon-ball.

<sup>a</sup> Εἰ μᾶλλον καρτερός ἐσσι, θεός τις σοὶ τούτῳ ἔδωκεν. Hom.

<sup>b</sup> Propter virtutem jure laudamur, & in virtute recte gloriamur. Quod non contingeret, si id donum à deo, non à nobis haberemus. Cic.

<sup>c</sup> As that word is used here. For when it is used as in that ap. Luc. Ἀρετὴ μὴ σώματος ἰσχύος, and the like passages, it has another meaning.

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*Fortitude* considered as a *virtue* consists in standing and endeavouring to overcome dangers and oppositions, when they cannot be avoided without the violation of *reason* and *truth*. Here it is, that he, who is endowd with natural bravery, a healthful constitution, good bones and muscles, ought to *use* them, and be *thankful* to the *Donor*: and he who is not so favored, must yet do *what he can*: if he cannot conquer, he must endeavour to be patient and prudent. And thus he, who is naturally timorous, or weak, or otherwise infirm, *may* have as much, or more of the *virtue* of fortitude, than the *hero* himself; who apprehends little, and feels little, compared with the other, or *possibly* may find pleasure in a scene of dangerous action.

If a man can *prevent*, or *escape* any peril or trouble, *salvâ veritate*, he ought to do it: otherwise he neither considers *himself*, nor *them* as being what they are; them not as *unnecessary*, himself not as capable of *being hurt* by them; and so dashes against truth on the worse side<sup>a</sup>. But where that cannot be done, he must exert himself according to his *abilities*, whether *great* or *little*, and refer the success to the Divine providence. This is the true *virtue* of *fortitude*, which is nothing but *endeavouring* firmly and honestly to act as *truth requires*; and therefore is directly deducible from that notion, on which we have founded the morality of human acts.

It has for its *object* not only adversaries, noxious animals, and bold undertakings, but in general all the *evils of life*<sup>b</sup>; which a man must labor by prudence to ward off, and where this cannot be done to bear with resignation, decency, and an humble expectation of an adjustment of all events in a *future state*: the belief of which I am now going to prove, *in my manner*, to be no vain nor groundless conceit.

V. Every one, that finds himself as before in prop. I. finds in himself at the same time a consciousness of his own existence and acts (which is life), with a power of apprehending, thinking, reasoning, willing, beginning and stopping many kinds and degrees of motion in his own members, &c.<sup>c</sup>. He, who has not these powers, has no power to dispute this with me: therefore I can perceive no room for any dispute here, unless it be concerning the power of *beginning motion*. For they, who say there is always the same quantity of motion in the world, must not allow the production of any *new*; and therefore must suppose the animal spirits not to be put into motion by the mind, but only

<sup>a</sup> Καπνὸς καὶ κύματ' ἐκτὸς ἔργου Νῆα. Hom.

<sup>b</sup> Εἰσὶ δ' οἱ καὶ ἐν οὐκία διατρίβοντες, ἢ σωματικῶν αὐτοῖς ἢ μακρῶν νόσοις, ἢ ἐπιπόνῳ γῆρας κατεσκελετευμέναν, — πῶς ἀληθῆ διαπονέσιν ἀνδράν, ἀσκητὰς σοφίας ὄντες. Ph. f. Non in viribus corporis & lacertis tantummodo fortitudinis gloria est, sed magis in virtute animi. — Fure ea fortitudo vocatur, quando unusquisque seipsum vincit, iram continet, nullis illecebris emollitur atque inflectitur, non adversis perturbatur, non extollitur secundis, &c. S. Ambr.

<sup>c</sup> Qui se ipse norit, primum aliquid sentiet se habere divinum, &c. Cic.

being



being already in motion to receive from it their directions into these or those canals, according as it intends to move this or that limb. But to this may be answerd, that, if the mind can give these *new directions* and turns to the spirits, this serves my purpose as well, and what I intend will follow as well from it. And besides, it could not do this, if it could not excite those spirits being at rest.

It is plain I can *move* my hand upward or downward or horizontally, faster or slower or not at all, or stop it when it is in motion, *just as I will*. Now if my hand and those parts and spirits, by which it is put into motion, were left to be governed by the law of gravitation, or by any motions already imprest upon them, the effects would be *determin'd* by rules of mechanism, and be *necessary*: the motion or rest of my hand would not attend upon *my will*, and be alterable upon a thought at *my pleasure*. If then I have (as I am sensible I have) a *power of moving* my hand in a manner, which it would not move in by those laws, that mere bodies already in motion or under the force of gravitation would observe, this motion depends solely upon *my will*, and begins there <sup>a</sup>.

VI. *That, which in man is the subject or suppositum of self-consciousness, thinks, and has the foresaid faculties, must be something different from his body or carcass.*

For, first, he doth not I suppose find himself to think, see, hear, &c. *all over*, in any part of his body: but the seat of cogitation and reflexion he finds in his *head*: and the nerves, by which the knowledge of external objects are conveyd to him, all tend to the same place. It is plainly something, which resides *there*, in the region of the brain, that by the mediation of these nerves governs the body and moves the parts of it (as by so many reins, or wires) <sup>d</sup>, feels what is done to it, sees through the eyes, hears through the ears, &c. <sup>e</sup>.

<sup>a</sup> 'Εἰ μήτε ἔξωθεν κινεῖται [τὸ σῶμα] ὡς τὰ ἀψυχα, μήτε φυσικῶς ὡς τὸ πῦρ, δῆλον ὅτι ὑπὸ ψυχῆς κινεῖται, κλ. Greg. Thaum.

<sup>b</sup> Which, ὡς εἶπεῖν, οἰκός ἐστι τῆ ἀειδήσεως. Artem.

<sup>c</sup> Ὅπως ἡ βασιλεύς, ἐκεῖ καὶ οἱ δορυφόροι· δορυφόροι δὲ αἰσθήσεις τῆ νῆς, περὶ κεφαλὴν ἔσται. Ph. f.

<sup>d</sup> Τὰ μέρη τῆ σώματος ἄλογά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ὁρμὴ γένηται, σείσαντ' ὥσπερ ἡνίας τῆ λογισμῶν, πάντα τίτανται καὶ συνῆκται καὶ ὑπακούει. Plut.

<sup>e</sup> Nos ne nunc quidem oculis cernimus eas, quæ videmus: neque enim est ullus sensus in corpore, sed — via quasi quadam sunt ad oculos, ad aures, ad nares à sede animi perforata. Itaque sæpe aut cogitatione, aut aliqua vi morbi impediti, apertis atque integris & oculis & auribus, nec videmus, nec audimus: ut facile intelligi possit, animum et videre, & audire, non eas partes, quæ quasi fenestra sunt animi: quibus tamen sentire nihil queat mens, nisi id agat, & adsit. Cic.

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Upon amputation of a limb<sup>a</sup> this thing (whatever it is) is not found to be *diminished*<sup>b</sup>, nor any of its faculties *lost*. Its *sphere* of acting, while it is confined to the body, is only contracted, and part of its *instrument* lost. It cannot make use of that which is not, or which it has not.

If the *eyes* be shut, or the *ears* stopt, it cannot then see, or hear: but remove the obstruction, and it instantly appears that the *faculty*, by which it apprehends the impressions made upon the organs of sensation, remained all that while intire; and that so it might have done, if the eyes, or ears had *never* been opened again; or, if the eyes had been out, or the ears quite disabled. This shews in general, that when any *sense* or *faculty* seems to be impaired or lost by any bodily hurt, after a fever, or through age, this doth not come to pass, because it is *the body* that perceives and has these faculties in itself; but because the body loses its *instrumentality*, and gives that which is the *true subject* of these faculties no opportunity of exerting them, or of exerting them *well*: tho it *retains* them as much as in the case before, when the eyes or ears were only shut<sup>c</sup>. Thus distinct are it and its faculties from the body and its affections. I will now call it the *soul*.

Again, as a man peruses and *considers* his own *body*, doth it not undeniably appear to be something different from the *considerer*? And when he uses this expression *my body*, or *the body of me*, may it not properly be demanded, who is meant by *me*, or what *my* relates to? It cannot be the *body* itself: that cannot say of itself, *it is my body*, or *the body of me*. And yet this way of speaking we naturally fall into, from an inward and habitual sense of our selves, and what we are, even tho we do not advert upon it.

What I mean is this. A *man* being supposed a *person* consisting of *two* parts, soul and body, the *whole person* may say of this or that part of him, *the soul of me*, or *the body of me*: but if he was either *all soul*, or *all body*, and nothing else, he could not then speak in this manner: because it would be the same as to say *the soul of the soul*, or *the body of the body*, or *the I of me*. The pronoun therefore must stand for something else, to which the body belongs<sup>d</sup>; or at least for something, of which it is only a part, *viz.* the person of the *whole man*. And then even this implies, that there is another part of him, which is not *body*.

<sup>a</sup> Or even *destrueto corpore multo* as Lucretius speaks.

καταλυναν, ολοκληρω ενεννη [ή ψυχή] μινει. Chryf.

had a young man's eye, βλέπει αν, ωςπερ η ε νεω. "Ωστε το γηρας, ε τας τιν' ψυχην πεπονθεναι τι, αλλ'

εν η καθεαπερ εν μεταις η νοσοις, κτλ.

the true man. Σὺ γὰρ εἰς ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ δὲ σῶμα σὸν.

man; by which the soul, as one part of it, is called *κόμμα*.

<sup>b</sup> Πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶ χειρῶν καὶ τῶ ποδῶν ἐκκε-

<sup>c</sup> Therefore Aristotle says, if an old man

<sup>d</sup> Hierocles (with others) accounts the soul to be

<sup>e</sup> So Plato uses Αὐτός for the whole of the



It is plain there are two *different interests* in men<sup>a</sup>, on the one side reason, on the other passion: which, being many times directly *opposite*, must belong to *different subjects*. There are upon many occasions contests, and as it were wars between the *mind* and the *body*: so far are they from being the *same* thing.

Lastly, there is we may perceive *something within us*, which supports the body (keeps it up), directs its motions for the better preservation of it, when any hurts or evils befall it, finds out the means of its cure, and the like; without which it would fall to the ground, and undergo the fate of common matter. The *body* therefore must be considered as being under the *direction* and *tuition* of some other thing, which is (or should be) the governor of it, and consequently upon this account must be concluded to be *different* from it.

VII. *The soul cannot be mere matter.* For if it is, then either *all matter* must think; or the difference must arise from the different *modification, magnitude, figure, or motion*<sup>b</sup> of some parcels of matter in respect of others; or a faculty of thinking must be *superadded* to some systems of it, which is not superadded to others. But,

In the first place, that position, which makes *all matter* to be cogitative, is contrary to all the apprehensions and knowledge we have of the nature of it; nor can it be true, unless our senses and faculties be contrived only to *deceive* us. We perceive not the least symptom of *cogitation*, or *sense* in our tables, chairs, &c.

Why doth the scene of thinking lie in our *heads*, and all the instruments of sensation make their reports to something *there*, if *all matter* be apprehensive, and cogitative? For in that case there would be as much thought and understanding in our *heels*, and every where else, as in our *heads*.

If *all matter* be cogitative, then it must be so *quatenus matter*, and thinking must be of the essence and definition of it: whereas by *matter* no more is meant but a substance extended and impenetrable to other matter. And since, for this reason, it cannot be *necessary* for matter to think (because it may be matter without this property), it cannot think *as matter only*.

If it did, we should not only *continue* to think always, till the matter of which we consist is annihilated, and so the assertor of this doctrine would stumble upon

<sup>a</sup> Φέρεται ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός, ἢ μάχεται τε καὶ ἀντιτίθεται τῷ λόγῳ. *Arist.*

<sup>b</sup> Whether any form, modification, or motion of matter can be a human soul, seems to be much such another question as that in one of *Seneca's* epistles, *An justitia, an fortitudo, prudentia, ceteraque virtutes, animalia sint.*

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*immortality* unawares; but we must also have thought always *in times past*, ever since that matter was in being; nor could there be any the least intermission of *actual thinking*: which does not appear to be our case.

If thinking, self-consciousness, &c. were *essential* to matter, every part of it must have them: and then no *system* could have them. For a system of material parts would be a system of things conscious *every one by itself* of its own existence and individuality, and consequently thinking *by itself*: but there could be no *one act* of self-consciousness or thought common to the *whole*. Juxta-position in this case could signify nothing: the distinction and individuation of the several particles would be as much retained in their vicinity, as if they were separated by miles.

In the next place, the faculties of thinking, &c. cannot arise from the *size, figure, texture, or motion* of it: because bodies by the alteration of these only become greater, or less; round or square, &c. rare, or dense; translated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity; or the like: all which *ideas* are quite different from that of *thinking*; there can be *no relation* between them<sup>a</sup>. These modifications and affections of matter are so far from being *principles* or *causes* of thinking and acting, that they are themselves but *effects*, proceeding from the action of some other matter or thing upon it, and are proofs of its passivity, deadness, and utter incapacity of becoming *cogitative*. This is evident to sense.

They, who place the essence of the soul in a certain *motion* given to some matter (if any such men there really be) should consider, among many other things, that to *move* the body spontaneously is one of the faculties of the soul<sup>b</sup>; and that this, which is the same with the *power of beginning motion*, cannot come from *motion already begun*, and imprest *ab extra*.

Let the materialist examine well, whether he does not feel something within himself, that acts from an *internal principle*: whether he doth not experience some *liberty*, some power of *governing* himself, and *choosing*: whether he does not enjoy a kind of *invisible empire*, in which he commands his own thoughts, sends them to this or that place, employs them about this or that business<sup>c</sup>, forms such and such designs and

<sup>a</sup> Νῦν ἔδ' ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι πῶς ὅτι ἐν τὰ ἀνόητα οὐκ ἐστὶν γενέσθαι. Sallust.

the soul is the principle of motion, or that which begins it in us, is (tho it wants no testimony) often said by the Ancients. Φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι, καὶ μάλιστα, καὶ πρῶτος ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινῶν. Arist. Ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἰσθῶθεν κινῶν τὰ σώματα, καὶ αὐτοκίνητον. Simp<sup>l</sup>. Ἀρχὴ κινήσεως, P. otin.

περίσσι πάσαν γῆν, ἐν γῆς ἐπ' ἔρανον, κλ. Max. T.

<sup>b</sup> That

<sup>c</sup> Ἡ ψυχὴ



schemes: and whether there is any thing like this in *bare matter*<sup>a</sup>, however fashioned, or proportioned; which, if nothing should protrude or communicate motion to it, would for ever remain fixt to the place where it happens to be, an eternal monument of its own being dead. Can such an *active* being as the *soul* is<sup>b</sup>, the subject of *so many powers*, be itself nothing but an *accident*?

When I begin to *move* my self, I do it for some *reason*, and with respect to some *end*, the *means* to effect which I have, if there be occasion for it, concerted within my self: and this doth not at all look like motion *merely material* (or, in which *matter* is only concerned), which is all mechanical. Who can imagine *matter* to be moved by *arguments*, or ever placed *sylogisms* and *demonstrations* among levers and pulleys?

We not only *move* our selves upon reasons, which we find in our selves, but upon reasons imparted by *words* or *writing* from others, or perhaps merely at their desire or bare suggestion. In which case, again, no body sure can imagine, that the *words* spoken or written (the sound in the air, or the strokes on the paper) can by any natural or mechanical *efficiency* cause the reader or hearer to *move* in any determinate manner (or at all). The reason, request, or friendly admonition, which is the true *motive*, can make no impression upon *matter*. It must be some *other kind* of being, that apprehends the force and sense of them.

Do not we see in conversation, how a pleasant thing said makes people break out into *laughter*, a rude thing into *passion*, and so on? These affections cannot be the *physical effects* of the words spoken: because then they would have the same effect, whether they were understood, or not. And this is further demonstrable from hence, that tho the *words* do really contain *nothing*, which is either pleasant, or rude; or perhaps words are thought to be spoken, which are not spoken; yet if they are *apprehended* to do that, or the sound to be otherwise than it was, the effect will be the *same*. It is therefore the *sense* of the words, which is an immaterial thing, that by passing through the *understanding* and causing that, which is the subject of the intellectual faculties, to influence the body, produces these *motions* in the spirits, blood, muscles.

<sup>a</sup> What a ridiculous argument for the materiality of the soul is that in *Lucretius*? *Ubi propellere membra, Conripere ex somno corpus, &c. videtur (Quorum nil fieri sine tactu posse videmus, Nec tactum porro sine corpore); nonne fatendum est Corporeâ naturâ animum constare, animamq;* If nothing can move the body, but another body, what moves this? The body might as well move itself, as be moved by one that does.

<sup>b</sup> Τάχιστον ὅτις ἅλ' αὐτὸς ᾧ τίχεται. *Thal. ap. Diog. L.*

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They, who can fancy, that *matter* may come to live, think, and act spontaneously, by being reduced to a certain *magnitude*, or having its parts placed after a certain *manner*, or being invested with such a *figure*, or excited by such a particular *motion*: they, I say, would do well to discover to us that *degree* of fineness, that *alteration* in the situation of its parts, &c. at which *matter* may *begin* to find itself alive and cogitative; and which is the *critical minute*, that introduces these important properties. If they cannot do this, nor have their eye upon any *particular crisis*, it is a sign they have no good reason for what they say. For if they have no reason to charge this change upon any *particular degree* or *difference*, one more than another, they have no reason to charge it upon *any* degree or difference *at all*; and then they have no reason, by which they can prove that such a change is made *at all*. ----- Besides all which, since magnitude, figure, motion are but *accidents* of matter, not *matter*, and only the *substance* is truly matter; and since the *substance* of any one part of matter does not differ from that of another, if *any* matter can be by nature cogitative, *all* must be so. But this we have seen cannot be.

So then in conclusion, if there is any such thing as *matter that thinks*, &c. this must be a particular *privilege* granted to it: that is, a *faculty of thinking* must be *superadded* to certain parts or parcels of it. Which, by the way, must infer the existence of some Being able to confer this faculty; who, when the ineptness of matter has been well considered, cannot appear to be less than *omnipotent*, or God. But the truth is, matter seems not to be *capable* of such improvement, of being made to think. For since it is not of the *essence* of matter, it cannot be *made to be so* without making matter *another kind* of substance from what it is. Nor can it be *made* to arise from any of the modifications or accidents of matter; and in respect of what else can any matter be *made to* differ from other matter.

The *accidents* of matter are so far from being made by *any power* to produce cogitation, that some *even of them* shew it incapable of having a faculty of thinking superadded. The very *divisibility* of it does this. For that which is made to think must either be *one* part, or more *parts* joined together. But there is no such thing as a part of matter purely *one* (or indivisible). It may indeed have pleased the Author of nature, that there should be *atoms*, whose parts are *actually* indiscernible, and which may be the *principles* of other bodies: but still they consist of *parts*, tho' firmly adhering together. And if the seat of cogitation be in *more* parts than one (whether they lie close together, or are loose, or in a state of fluidity, it is the same thing), how can it be avoided, but that either there must be so many several minds, or *thinking substances*, as there are *parts* (and then the consequence, which has been mention'd, would return upon us again); or else,  
that



that there must be *something else* superadded for them to center in, to unite their acts, and make their thoughts to be *one*? And then what can this be, but some other *substance*, which is purely *one*?

*Matter* by itself can never intertain *abstracted* and *general ideas*, such ■ many in our minds are <sup>a</sup>. For could it reflect upon what passes within itself, it could possibly find there nothing but *material* and *particular* impressions; *abstractions* and *metaphysical ideas* could not be printed upon it <sup>b</sup>. How could one abstract *from matter*, who is himself nothing but *matter*? And then ■ to *material* images themselves, which are usually supposed to be impressed upon the brain (or some part of it), and stock the *phantasy* and *memory*, that which peruses the impressions and traces there (or any where) must be something distinct from the *brain*, or *that* upon which these impressions are made: otherwise it must contemplate itself, and be both *reader* and *book*. And this other distinct contemplating *being* cannot be merely corporeal, any more than the body can perceive and think without a soul. For such a corporeal being must require *sense*, and suitable *organs*, to perceive and read these characters and *vestigia* of things; and so *another* organized body would be introduced, and the same questions and difficulties redoubled, concerning the soul of that body and its faculties <sup>c</sup>.

If my *soul* was mere matter, external visible objects could only be perceived within me according to the *impressions* they make upon matter, and not otherwise. *Ex. gr.* the image of a *cube* in my mind (or my idea of a cube) must be always under some particular *prospect*, and conform to the rules of *perspective*; nor could I otherwise represent it to my self: whereas now I can form an idea of it ■ it is *in itself*, and almost view all its *hedra* at once, ■ it were encompassing it with my mind.

I can within myself *correct* the external appearances and impressions of objects; and advance, upon the reports and hints received by my senses, to form ideas of things that are *not extant* in matter. By seeing a *material circle* I may learn to form the idea of a *circle*, or figure generated by the revolution of a ray about its center: but then recollecting what I know of matter upon other occasions, I can conclude there is ■ *exact* material circle. So that I have an idea, which perhaps was raised from the hints I received *from without*, but is *not truly* to be found there. If I see a *tower* ■ a great distance, which according to the impressions made upon my material organs seems

<sup>a</sup> *Diogenes*, tho he could see the *table*, and the *pot*, could not by his eyes see *Plato's* τραπέζιτης, & κυβότης. *Diog. L.*

<sup>b</sup> *Plato*, & οι σαφός (more generally) say, that the soul indeed perceives objects of sense by the mediation of the body; but there are νοητά, which it doth καθ' αυτην οὐδυναιδῶς. *Id.*

<sup>c</sup> Such a soul must be indeed as *Greg. Thaum.* has it, σῶμα ἐμψυχον. ἄτοπον ὃ ψυχῆς ψυχὴν λέγειν.

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*little and round*, I do not therefore conclude it to be *either*: there is something within, that reasons upon the circumstances of the appearance, and as it were controlls my sense, and corrects the impressi<sup>o</sup>n: and this must be something superior to matter, since a *material soul* is no otherwise impressible itself, but as *material organs* are. Instances of this kind are endless. (v. p. 53, 54.)

If we know any thing of *matter*, we know, that *by itself* it is a lifeless thing, inert, and passive only; and acts *necessarily* (or rather is acted) according to the laws of motion and gravitation. This passiveness seems to be *essential* to it. And if we know any thing of *our selves*, we know, that we are conscious of our own existence and acts (*i. e.* that we *live*); that we have a degree of *freedom*; that we can move our selves *spontaneously*; and in short, that we can, in many instances, take off the effect of gravitation, and impress new motions upon our spirits (or give them new directions); *only by a thought*. Therefore to make *mere matter* do all this is to change the *nature* of it; to change death into life, incapacity of thinking into cogitativity, necessity into liberty. And to say, that God may *superadd* a faculty of thinking, moving itself, &c. to matter, if by this be meant, that he may make matter to be the *suppositum* of these faculties (that substance, in which they inhere), is the same in effect as to say, that God may superadd a faculty of *thinking* to *incogitativity*, of acting *freely* to *necessity*, and so on. What sense is there in this? And yet so it must be, while matter continues to be matter.

That *faculty of thinking*, so much talked of by some as superadded to certain *systems* of matter, fitly disposed, by virtue of God's omnipotence, tho it be so called, must *in reality* amount to the same thing as another *substance* with the faculty of thinking. For a faculty of thinking *alone* will not make up the idea of a human *soul*, which is indued with *many faculties*; apprehending, reflecting, comparing, judging, making deductions and reasoning, willing, putting the body in motion, continuing the animal functions by its presence, and giving life: and therefore, *whatever it is* that is superadded, it must be *something* which is indued with all those other faculties. And whether that can be a *faculty of thinking*, and so these other faculties be only *faculties of a faculty*<sup>a</sup>; or whether they must not all be rather the faculties of some

<sup>a</sup> This is worse than  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$   $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\varsigma$  in *Max. Tyr.* and the place just before cited. The author of the *Essay conc. Hum. Underst.* has himself exploded it, or what is very like it. To ask, says he, whether the Will has freedom, is to ask, whether one Power has another power, one Ability another ability; a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute, or need an answer. For who is it that sees not, that Powers belong only to Agents, and are attributes only of substances, and not of Powers themselves? There is, if my memory does not deceive me, another passage some where in the same book as much (or more) to my purpose: but at present I cannot find it.



*substance* <sup>a</sup>, which, being (by their own concession) *superadded* to matter, must be *different* from it, I leave to the unprejudiced to determin.

If men would but seriously look into themselves, I am persuaded the *soul* would not appear to them as a *faculty* of the body, or kind of *appurtenance* to it; but rather as some *substance*, properly placed in it, not only to use it as an instrument, and act by it, but also to *govern* it (or the parts of it; as the tongue, hands, feet, &c.) according to its own reason. For I think it is plain enough, that the *mind*, tho it acts under great limitations, doth however in many instances *govern* the body *arbitrarily*: and it is monstrous to suppose this governor to be nothing but some fit *disposition* or *accident* (super-added) of that matter which is governed. A *ship* it is true would not be fit for *navigation*, if it was not built and provided in a proper manner: but then, when it has its proper form, and is become a *system* of materials fitly disposed, it is not this *disposition* that *governs* it. It is the *man*, that other substance, who sits at the helm, and they, who manage the sails and tackle, that do this. So *our vessels* without a proper organization and conformity of parts would not be capable of being acted as they are; but still it is not the shape, or modification, or any other accident, that can govern them. The *capacity* of being governed or used can never be the *governor*, applying and using <sup>b</sup> that capacity. No there must be at the helm *something distinct*, that commands the body, and without which it would run adrift, or rather sink.

For the foregoing reasons it seems to me, that *matter* cannot think, cannot be made to think. But if a *faculty of thinking* can be superadded to a system of matter, without uniting an immaterial substance to it <sup>c</sup>; I say, if this can be, yet a *human body* is not such a system, being plainly void of thought, and organized in such a manner as to transmit the impressions of sensible objects up to the brain, where the *percipient*, and that which *reflects* upon them, certainly resides: and therefore that, which *there* apprehends, thinks, and wills, must be *that system of matter* to which a faculty of thinking is superadded. All the premisses then well considered, judge I beseech you, whether instead of saying, that this *inhabitant* of our heads (the *soul*) is a system of matter, to which a faculty of thinking is superadded, it might not be more reasonable to say, it is a *thinking substance intimately united to some fine material vehicle, which has its residence in*

<sup>a</sup> If the soul is only an accident (or attribute) of the *body*, how comes this accident to have (or be the support of) other accidents, contrary ones too? As when we say, נפש חכמה ונפש סכלה וכו' s. *Haemun*.

<sup>b</sup> Ἐτιγον δὲ τότε χεῖμαρον ἐν ᾧ χεῖται. *Plato*.

<sup>c</sup> Or, if to a *thinking substance* can be superadded the modification of solidity. Which way of speaking, tho I do not remember to have met with it any where, nor doth it seem to differ much from the other, yet would please me better.

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*the brain.* Tho I understand not perfectly the manner, how ■ *cogitative* and *spiritual* substance can be thus closely united to such ■ *material* vehicle; yet I can understand this union as well, as how it can be united to the body in general (perhaps, as how the particles of the body itself cohere together), and much better than how ■ *thinking* faculty can be superadded to matter: and beside, several *phenomena* may more easily be solved by this *hypothesis*; which (tho I shall not pertinaciously maintain it) in short is this. *Viz.* that the human *soul* is a *cogitative* substance, clothed in a *material* vehicle, or rather united to it, and as it were *inseparably* mixt (I had almost said *incorporated*) with it<sup>a</sup>: that these act in *conjunction*, that, which affects the one, affecting the other: that the *soul* is detain'd in the *body* (the head or brain) by some *sympathy* or *attraction* between this material vehicle and it, till the habitation is spoild, and this mutual tendency interrupted (and perhaps turned into an aversion, that makes it fly off), by some hurt, or disease, or by the decays and ruins of old age, or the like, happening to the body: and that in the *interim* by means of this vehicle motions and impressions are communicated to and fro. But of this perhaps something more by and by.

VIII. *The soul of man subsists after the dissolution of his body: or, is immortal.* For,

1. If it is *immaterial*, it is *indiscernible*, and therefore *incapable* of being dissolved or demolish'd, as bodies are<sup>b</sup>. Such ■ being can only perish by *annihilation*: that is, it will continue to subsist and live, if some other being, able to do this, doth not by ■ particular act *annihilate* it. And if there is any reason to believe, that at the death of every man there is always such ■ particular annihilation, let him that knows it produce it. Certainly to reduce any *substance* into *nothing* requires just the same power as to convert *nothing* into *something*: and I fancy they, who deny the immortality of the soul, will be cautious how they admit any such power.

2. If the soul *could* be material; that is, if there could be any *matter*, that might be the subject of those faculties of thinking, willing, &c. yet still, since we cannot but be sensible, that all these are faculties of the *self-same thing*; and that all the several acts of the mind are acts of the *same thing*, each of them *individual* and truly *one*: I say, since it is so, this matter must be so *perfectly united* in itself, so abso-

<sup>a</sup> It is worth our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirit, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured, that created spirits are not totally separate from matter, because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only passive; those Beings, that are both active and passive, we may judge to partake of both. Hum. Underst.

<sup>b</sup> This is *Socrates's* argument in *Plato*. The soul is altogether ἀδιόλυτος, and therefore ἀνώλεστον. Which *Cicero* interprets thus: nec dissolvi, nec dissolvi potest; nec interire igitur.



lutely *one*, as no matter knowable by us can be. And then the *least* that can be allowd is that it should be truly solid, and not *actually divisible*; that is, such as no *natural cause* could destroy.

To introduce matter with a faculty of thinking, or a *thinking matter*, is to introduce matter with a new and opposite property; and that is to introduce a *new species* of matter<sup>a</sup>, which will differ as essentially from the other common *unthinking* kind, as any species whatsoever doth from its opposite in *scala predicamentali*, even as *body* doth from *spirit*. For thinking and unthinking differ as corporeal and incorporeal. And if so, this *thinking matter* must always continue to think, till either it is *annihilated*, or there is a *transmutation* of one species into another: and to take refuge in either of these expectations is at least to expect omnipotence should interpose to help out a bad cause.

If any one should say, that God might by virtue of his omnipotence superadd to certain parcels of matter a *fourth dimension*, I should not perhaps dispute the Divine power: but I might say, that such matter, existing under four dimensions, would *essentially* differ from that, which cannot exist under four, or which can exist but *only under three*; and that this four-dimensiond matter must *always* remain such, because no substance can be changed into or become another, essentially different, nor do we know of any, that by the course of nature ceases totally to be, or is reduced to nothing.

3. The next argument shall proceed by way of *objection* and *answer*. Because a removal of the principal objection *against* any thing is a good argument *for it*. *Obj.* It seems as if *thinking* was not essential to the soul, but rather a *capacity of thinking* under certain circumstances. For it doth *not think*, when it lies conceald in the primitive rudiment of the man, in the womb, perhaps in the beginnings of infancy, in sleep, in a swoon: and the reason of this seems to lie in the circumstances of the *body*, which either is not sufficiently extended, and prepared; or for a while employs the spirits wholly in the digestion of its aliment, and other offices in the animal oeconomy; or by some external attack, or the working of some enemy got into it, hath its parts disorderd, and the passages so possessd, that the blood and other fluids can scarce break through; or after some such manner is preternaturally affected. And therefore the question to be resolv'd is not, whether the soul is *material* or *immaterial*; and much less, whether it will be *annihilated* at death; but, whether that soul (be it what it will), which ceases to think, when the body is *not fully disposed*,

<sup>a</sup> Lucretius seems to be aware of this. *Jam triplex animi est natura reperta: Nec tamen hac satis sunt ad sensum cuncta creandum, &c. Quarta quoque his igitur quædam natura necesse est attribui: ea est omnino nominis expers.*

can think at all, when the body is quite dissolved, and leaves the soul no opportunity of actuating it any more, or operating by it <sup>a</sup>. *Ans.* If this objection cannot be fully answerd, till we know more of the nature of spiritual beings, and of that *vinculum*, by which the soul and body are connected, than we do at present, it must not therefore be lookd upon as certainly *unanswerable* in it self; and much less, if only it cannot be answerd by me. It may perhaps be possible to turn it even into an argument for the immortality of the soul.

The soul it cannot be denied is a limited being, or a being, which acts *under limitations*: these limitations at different times are *different*, its activity and faculties being more obstructed or clogd at one time than another, and most of all in sleep, or *deliquium*: as these obstructions are removed, it acts more *clearly* and *freely*: and therefore if the state of the soul in the body (its confinement there) may be considerd as one *general* and *great limitation*, why, when this limitation shall be taken off (this great obstruction removed), may it <sup>b</sup> not be allowd to act with still *greater* freedom and clearness; the *greatest* it is capable of? Whilst it remains in the brain, it can as it were look out at a *few apertures*; that is, receive the notices of many things by those nerves and organs, which are the instruments of *sensation*: but if any of those avenues to it be stopd, that branch of its knowledge is for a time cut off. If those tracks in the brain, or those *marks*, whatever they are, and where ever they are imprinted, upon which our *memory* and *images* of things seem to depend, are filled up or overcast by any vapor, or otherwise darkend, it can read them no more, till the cloud is disperfed. (For it cannot *read* what is not *legible*, and indeed for the present not there.) And since even in *abstracted reflexions* the mind is obliged to make use of *words* <sup>c</sup>, or some kind of signs, to fix its ideas, and to render them tractable and stable enough to be perused, compared, &c. and this kind of *language* depends upon *memory*; whilst this is intermitted, the use of the other is taken away, with all that depends upon it. This is the *present state* of the soul: and from hence the reason appears in some measure, why we do not think in sound *sleep*, &c. but it does not follow from hence, that the soul cannot subsist and act under *more enlarged circumstances*. That, which, being confined to the body, and able to act only according

<sup>a</sup> If *Lucan* by *sensus* means all manner of apprehension and knowledge, there is no room for that disjunction: *Aut nihil est sensus animis à morte relictum, Aut mors ipsa nihil*. For if the former part be true, the other will follow.

<sup>b</sup> *Velut è ditino carcere emissus [animus]*. Sen.

<sup>c</sup> Those kinds of animals, which do not *speak*, do not *reason*: but those, which do the one, do the other. Therefore חַי מְדַבֵּר (or Arab. ناطق) is a *rational animal*: and λόγος signifies both *speech* and *reason*, as going together.



to the opportunities this affords, can now perceive visible objects only with *two eyes* (at two windows<sup>a</sup>), because there *are no more*, might doubtless see with *four*, if there were so many properly placed and disposed; or if its habitation were *all eye* (window all round), might see all round. And so, in general, that, which now can know many things by the impressions made at the ends of the nerves, or by the intervention of our present organs, and in this *situation* and *inclosure* can know them no other way, may for all that, when it comes to be *loosed* out of that prison<sup>b</sup>, know them *immediately*, or by some *other medium*. That, which is now forced to make shift with *words* and *signs* of things in its reasonings, may, when it shall be set at liberty and can come at them, reason upon the intuition of *things themselves*, or use a language more *spiritual* or *ideal*. I say, it is not *impossible*, that this should be the case; and therefore no one can say, *with reason*, that it is not: especially, since we find by experience, that the soul is limited; that the limitations are variable; that we know not enough of the nature of spirit to determin, how these limitations are effected: and therefore cannot tell, how far they may be carried on, or taken off. This suffices to *remove the force* of the objection. But further,

A man, when he *wakes*, or *comes to himself* (which phrase implies what I am going to say), immediately knows this, and knows himself to be the *same soul* that he was before his sleep, or fainting away. I will suppose, that he is also conscious to himself, that in those intervals he thought *not at all* (which is the same the objector must suppose): *that is*, if his body had been cut to pieces, or mouldered to dust, he could not have thought *less*: for there is no thinking less than thinking *not at all*. From hence then I gather, that the soul *preserves* a capacity of thinking, &c. under those circumstances and indispositions of the body, in which it thinks *no more*, than if the body was *destroyd*; and that therefore it may, and will *preserve* it, when the body is *destroyd*. And if so, what can this *capacity* be preserved for? Certainly *not*, that it may *never* be exerted. The Author of nature doth not use to act after *that manner*. So that here is this *dilemma* to be opposed to the objection. In sleep and swoonings the soul doth either *think*, or *not*. If it *does*, the objection has no foundation: and if it *doth not*, then all that will follow, which I have just now said.

If we should suppose the *soul* to be a being by nature made to inform some *body*, and that it cannot exist and act in a state of *total separation* from all body; it would not follow from hence, that what we call death, must therefore reduce it

<sup>a</sup> Οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ὅπως τὴ ψυχῆς αἰ ἀιδήσεις. Bas. διὰ τὴν διημερίαν. Ph. 7.

<sup>b</sup> Ἀσάρετον ἢ ἀσώματος ἐν τῇ ὅ παντός

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to a state of absolute *insensibility* and *inactivity*, which to it would be equal to *non-existence*. For that *body*, which is so necessary to it, may be some *fine vehicle*, that dwells with it in the brain (according to that *hypothesis* p. 193.) and goes off with it at death. Neither the answers to the objection, nor the case after death will be much altered by such a *supposition*. And since I confess I see no absurdity in it, I will try to explain it a little further. We are sensible of many *material impressions* (impressions made upon us by material causes, or bodies): that there are such we are sure. Therefore there must be *some matter* within us, which being moved or pressed upon, the soul apprehends it *immediately*. And therefore, again, there must be *some matter* to which it is *immediately* and *intimately united*, and *related* in such a manner, as it is *not related* to any other. Let us now suppose this said *matter* to be some refined and spirituous *vehicle*<sup>a</sup>, which the soul doth immediately inform; with which it sympathizes; by which it acts, and is acted upon; and to which it is *vitally* and *inseparably* united: and that this animated vehicle has its abode in the *brain*, among the heads and beginnings of the nerves. Suppose we also, that when any *impressions* are made upon the organs or parts of the body, the effects of them are carried by the *nerves* up to their fountain, and the place, where the soul in its vehicle is; and there they communicate their several motions or tremors to this material *vehicle* (or by their motions, or tendency to motion, press upon it); so that the *soul*, which inhabits it in a peculiar manner, and is thoroughly possess'd of it, shall be apprehensive of these motions or pressures: and moreover, that this *vehicle* so guarded and *incompassed* by the body as it is, can be *come at* or *moved* by external objects no other way, but by the mediation of the nerves; nor the *soul*, by consequence, have any direct intelligence concerning them, or correspondence with them, any *other* way. And as we suppose the *soul* to receive notices of things from without in this manner, so let us suppose, on the other side, that by moving its own *vehicle* it may produce motion in the contiguous *spi-*

<sup>a</sup> So Hierocles distinguishes τὸ ἀνυποειδὲς ἡμῶν σῶμα, ὃ καὶ ψυχῆς λεπτὸν ὄχημα, from that, which he calls τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν σῶμα, and to which the former communicates life. Τῷ ἀνυποειδῇ ἡμῶν σώματι προσέφω σῶμα θνητὸν ὄν. Id. This fine body he calls also ψυχικὸν σῶμα, and πνευματικὸν ὄχημα. In Nishm. hhaiy. there is much concerning that *fine body*, in which the soul is clothed, and from which it is never to be separated, according to the old tradition. Men. h Isr. gives us the sum of it in such words as these. יש גוף דק ער מאד בו מתלבש הנשמה שרם ביאה לעולם. and afterward, הנשמות המה בבריתם הראשונה נקשרות עם גשמים רקים רוחניים כהחבצ, השמימי בלתי מושגים לחוש הראות. והנשמות לא יתפררו מאותם הגשמים הרקים הרוחניים כל ימי עולם אם קודם בואם לגוף ואם בהיותם עמו וגם אחרי הפרד ממנו. And as long before him joins to the soul רק עצם; which he says is רק [יותר וד] מן, Sec.



rits and nerves, and so move the body: I mean, when nothing renders them unfit to be moved. Let us suppose further, that the *soul* by means of this *vehicle* feels or finds those prints and portraits, or those *effects* and *remains* left by objects on the mind in some manner or other, which cause the *remembrance* of words and things: I mean again, when they are not filled up, or obscured by any thing; or, when there are any such to be felt. And lastly, let us suppose, that if the *soul* in its more *abstracted* and *purser* reasonings, or more spiritual acts, has any occasion for *matter*, to serve it, the matter of this *vehicle* is that which is always with it, and serves it. All which it is easy to understand, and perhaps not very difficult to suppose. On the contrary, by many symptoms it appears most probable, that *that* matter, to which the mind is *immediately* present, and in which is its true *shekinah*, is not the whole gross body, but some *subtile body*, placed (as I have said) in the region of the brain. For *there* all the conveyances of sensible *species* conspire to meet, and *there* in reflexion we find our selves: when a limb is lost, the soul, 'tis true, loses an *opportunity* of receiving intelligence from or by it, and of using it, but perceives no loss *in itself*: and tho the *body*, many parts of it at least, are in a perpetual flux and continually altering, yet I know that the substance, which *thinks* within me *now* (or rather, which is I), is, notwithstanding all the changes my body has undergone, the *very same* which *thought* above fifty years ago, and ever since; when I playd in such a field, went to such a school, was of such a university, performed such and such exercises, &c.<sup>a</sup> If you would permit me to use a school term, I would say the *egoity*<sup>b</sup> remains. Now to *answer* the objection, and apply all this to our purpose. Why do we not perceive external objects in our *sleep*, or a *swoon*? Because the *passages* are become impracticable, the *windows* shut, and the *nerves*, being obstructed, or some how rendered for the time useless, can transmit no information to it. Why however does it not reason and think about *something or other*? Because, all the *marks* by which things are rememberd being for the present choked up or disorderd, the remembrance of those *objects*, about which it is wont to imploy itself, and even of the *words* (or other signs), in which it uses to reason, and to preserve the deductions and conclusions it makes, is all suspended and lost for the time; and so its tables being coverd, its books closd, and its tools lockd up, the requisites for reasoning are wanting, and no subject offers itself, to exercise its thoughts, it having yet had little or no opportu-

<sup>a</sup> Cum corpora quotidie nostra fluant, & aut crescant aut decrescant, ergo tot erimus homines, quot quotidie commutamur? aut alius fui, cum decem annorum essem; alius, cum triginta; alius cum quinquaginta, alius, cum jam toto cano capite sum? S. Hier. So it must be, if our souls are nothing different from our bodies.

<sup>b</sup> Tully has *Levitas*, and *Appietas*; in the same form, tho not just the like sense.

nity to take in *higher objects* and more *refined matter* for contemplation. And to conclude, if it be demanded, why any one should imagin, that the *soul* may think, perceive, act *after death*, when it doth not do this *in sleep*, &c. the answer is; because those *inclosures* and *impediments*, which occasioned the forementiond intermissions, and those great limitations under which it labors at all times, will be *removed* with its enlargement out of the body. When it shall in its *proper* vehicle be let go, and take its flight into the open fields of heaven, it will then be bare to the *immediate* impressions of objects: and why should not those impressions, which affected the *nerves* that moved and affected the vehicle and soul in it, *affect the vehicle immediately*, when they are *immediately* made upon it, without the interposition of the nerves? The *hands* which feels an object at the end of a *staff*, may certainly be allowd to feel the same much better by *immediate contact*, without the staff. Nay, why should we not think, that it may admit of *more* objects and the knowledge of more things, than it can now; since being exposd *all round* to the influences of them, it may be moved not only by visible objects just at the extremities of the *optic* nerves, by sounds at the ends of the *auditory*, &c. but become as it were *all eye* to visible objects, *all ear* to audible, and so on? And why should we not think this the rather, because then the *soul* may be also perceptive of *finer* impressions and *ethereal* contacts, and consequently of *more kinds* of objects, such as we are now incapable of knowing? And then, this being so, why should we not preface, that *other endowments*, as faculties of reasoning, communicating thoughts, and the like, will be *proportionable* to such noble opportunities of knowledge? There seems to be nothing in this account *impossible*; and therefore nothing, but what *may be*.

If we do but attend, we must see every where, that *many* things are by ways, which we *do not*, nor *can* understand; and therefore we must be convinced, even from hence, that *more* may be; and therefore that the objection before us, tho we could not salve the *difficulties* in it, and what is supposed here should be all rejected as *chimerical*, yet ought to be no prejudice against the belief of the immortality of the soul, if there is *any* (but *one*) good reason for it.

But if we can in any *tolerable* manner (which in our present circumstances is as much, as can be expected) account for the difficulties objected, and those the *greatest* belonging to this matter, and shew how it is *possible* that they may consist with immortality, this will greatly *corroborate* the arguments for it, if not be one *itself*. This I hope is done: or if I have not spoke directly to *every part* of the objection, from what has been done that defect may easily be supplied.

4. We may conclude the souls of men to be immortal from the *nature of God*. For if he is (which sure no body doubts) a perfect being, He, as such, can do nothing inconsistent



consistent with *perfect* or *right reason*. And then no *being*, nor *circumstance* of any being, can come from Him as its cause, which it is not agreeable to *such reason* should be: or (which is the same), He cannot but deal *reasonably* with all His dependents. And then again, if we are in the number of these, and the *mortality* of the human soul does not consist with reason, we may be sure it is *immortal*: as sure as we can be of any thing by the use of our faculties; and that is, as sure as we can be of any thing. Whether therefore that doth *consist* with reason, or *not*, is to be inquired.

To produce a being into a state of *clear happiness*, in any degree, can be no injury to it: or into a state of *mixt happiness*, provided the happiness certainly *overbalances* the contrary, and the unhappy or suffering part be not greater than what that being would *choose* in order to obtain the happiness, or rather than lose it. Nor, again, can any wrong be done by producing a being *subject* to more misery than happiness, if that being hath it in *his own power* to avoid the misery, or so much of it, as may leave the remainder of misery not greater, than what he would rather sustain than miss the proportion of happiness. The only case then, by which wrong can be done in the production of any being, is, when it is *necessarily* and *irremediably* to be *miserable*, without any recompense, or balance of that misery<sup>a</sup>: and this indeed is a case so grievous, so utterly irreconcilable to all *reason*, that the heart of a reasoning and considering man can scarce bear the thought of it. So much every one must understand of the nature of reason and justice as to allow these things for truths incontestable.

Now then he, who says the *soul* of man is *mortal*, must say one of these *two* things: either that God is an unreasonable, unjust, cruel Being; or that no man, in respect of this life (which according to him is *all*), has a greater share of misery, *unavoidable*, than of happiness. To say the *former* is to contradict that, which I presume has been proved beyond contradiction. To which I may add here, that this is to avow such an unworthy, impious notion of the *Supreme being*, as one would not entertain without caution even of the *worst of men*; such a one, as even the person himself, who says this, must know to be *false*. For he cannot but see, and must own many instances of the *reasonableness* and *beneficence* of the Deity: not *one* of which could be, if cruelty and unreasonableness were His inclination; since He has power to execute His own inclinations *thoroughly*, and is a Being *uniform* in his nature. Then to say the *latter* is to contradict the *whole story* of mankind, and even *ones own senses*.

<sup>a</sup> That passage in *S. Iaquar.* imports much the same thing, that has been said here: הוא מבואר שהרבה שמציאותו טוב ראוי שימצא והרבה שמציאותו רע אין ראוי שימצא ומזה שמציאותו מעורב מן הטוב והרע אם הטוב הוא הגובר ראוי שימצא ואם הרע הוא הגובר אין ראוי שימצא.

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Consider well the dreadful effects of many wars, and all those barbarous desolations, which we read of: what cruel tyrants there are, and have been in the world, who (at least in their fits) *divert themselves* with the pangs and convulsions of their fellow-creatures<sup>a</sup>: what slavery is<sup>b</sup>, and how men have been brought into that lamentable state: how many have been ruin'd by accidents unforeseen: how many have suffer'd or been undone by unjust laws, judges, witnesses, &c.<sup>c</sup> how many have brought incurable diseases, or the causes of them, and of great torments, into the world with them: how many more, such bodily infirmities and disadvantages, as have render'd their whole lives uneasy: how many are born in such circumstances, as make their only inheritance to be invincible poverty and trouble? Instances are endless: but, for a little taste of the condition of mankind here, reflect upon that story related by Strabo (from Polybius) and Plutarch, where, even by order of the Roman senate, P. Amylius, one of the best of them too, at one prefixt hour sack'd and destroy'd seventy cities, unawares, and drove fifteen myriads of innocent persons into captivity; to be sold, only to raise pay for the merciless soldiers and their own executioners. Peruse that account of the gold-works in the confines of Egypt given by Diodorus: and think over the circumstances of the unfortunate laborers there, who were not only criminals, or men taken in war, but even such as calumny, or unjust power had doom'd (perhaps for being too good) to that place of torment; many times with

<sup>a</sup> C. Caesar — Senatores & Equites — cecidit, torfit, non quaestionis, sed animi causâ. Deinde quosdam ex illis — ad lucernam decollabat. — Torserat per omnia, quæ in rerum natura tristissima sunt, fidiculis, &c. Sen. Homo, sacra res, jam per lulum & jocum occiditur. Id.

<sup>b</sup> Slaves were reckon'd among beasts of old. Οὐτε γὰρ γυνὴ πέφυκας, οὐτ' ἐν ἀνδράσι σὺν γ' εἶ. Eurip. And sometimes as mere instruments and tools. Ὁ γὰρ δὲ λαὸς ἐμψυχον ὄργανον τὸ δ' ὄργανον ἀψυχον δὲ λαὸς. Arist. Their sad condition I will set down in Plato's words. Οὐκ ἀνδρὸς τὸ τό γ' ἐστὶ τὸ πάθημα, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀνδραπόδ' εἶναι, ὃ κρεῖττον τεθνάαι ἐστὶν ἢ ζῆναι ὅστις ἀδικεῖται ἢ προπηλακίζμενος, μὴ οἷός τε εἶναι αὐτὸς αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν, μηδὲ ἄλλω ἢ ἀνὴρ κήδηται.

<sup>c</sup> Those ἀρρήτοι καὶ ἀπίστοι δυστυχίαι, which the τεθῶναι had brought upon the cities of Asia, are too many to be transcribed: but some account of them is to be seen in Plut. v. Luc. which may serve for one instance out of thousands. It may be reckon'd madness indeed maximas virtutes, quasi gravissima delicta, punire; as Val. M. says, speaking of Phocion's case: but such madness has been very common, and men have suffer'd even for their virtue. Ochus cruelly put to death, Ochus sororem —, & patrum cum centum amplius filiis ac nepotibus —, nulla injuria laceffitus, sed quod in his maximam apud Persas probitatis & fortitudinis laudem consistere videbat. Id. And Seneca having recommended the example of Grecinus Fulius (Fulius Gracinus, ap. Tacit. the father of Fulius Agricola), adds, quem C. Cesar occidit ob hoc unum, quod melior vir erat, quam esse quemquam tyranno expediret.



all their relations and poor children<sup>a</sup>. Or, once for all, take a view of *servitude*, as it is described by *Pignorius*. To pass over the *Sicilian* tyrants, him of *Pheræ*, *Apollodorus*, and the like, of which history supplies plenty; consider those terrible proscriptions among the *Romans*<sup>c</sup>, with the reigns of most of their *emperors*, more bloody than *Lybic* lion, or *Hyrcanian* tiger, even some of the *Christian* *emperors* not excepted. Read the direful and unjust executions reported by *Amm. Marcellinus*: among hundreds of others that of *Eusebius*<sup>d</sup>. Every *whisper* in those times or *light suspicion* brought upon men the question and tortures inconceivable. Men's very *dreams* were once interpreted to be treason; and they durst scarce own, that they had ever slept. What inhuman punishments were used among the *Persians*<sup>e</sup>, in an arbitrary manner too; and many times extended to whole families, and all the kindred, tho not concern'd. But instead of enumerating here burnings, crucifixions, breakings upon the wheel, impalings, σκαρπισιὺς, &c. I choose to refer you to those authors, who have designedly treated of the *torments* and *questions* of the ancients. Look into the history of the *Christian Church*, and her *martyrologies*: examin the prisons of the *Inquisition*, the groans of which those walls are conscious, and upon what *slight* occasions men are rack'd and tortured by the tormentors there: and, to finish this detail (hideous indeed, but too true) as fast as I can, consider the many massacres, persecutions, and miseries consequent upon them, which *false religion* has caused, authorized, sanctified. Indeed the *history* of mankind is little else but the history of uncomfortable, dreadful passages: and a great part of it, however things are palliated and gilded over, is scarcely to be red by a good natured man without amazement, horror, tears. One can scarce look into a *news-paper*, or out at his *window*, but hardships and sufferings present themselves, in one shape or other. Now among all those millions, who have suffer'd *eminently*, can it be imagin'd, that there have not been *multitudes*, whose griefs and pangs have far outweigh'd all their enjoyments; and yet who have not been able, either by their innocence, their

<sup>a</sup> Οἱ ἀδικοὶ διαβολαῖς περιπετόντες, καὶ διὰ θυμὸν εἰς φυλακὰς παραδιδόμενοι, ποτὲ μὲν αὐτοί, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ μετὰ πάσης συγγενείας.

<sup>b</sup> Mention'd by Cicero with Phalaris. He was tyrant of *Cassandria*, and is represent'd (out of Polyannus) as φοινκώτατος καὶ ἀμώτατος πάντων, ὅσοι παρ' Ἑλλάδι καὶ ὠκεῖ βαρβάρους ἐτυράνευσαν. Yet *Ælian* says, Ἐκ τῆς οὐκ ἵκανα φλεγόμενος καὶ ὑπεξαπτόμενος, ἐγένετο φοινκώτατος, κλ.

<sup>c</sup> It is said of Sylla's peace, after Marius's party were broken, Pax cum bello de crudelitate certavit, & vicit. S. Aust.

<sup>d</sup> Qui ita evisceratus, ut cruciatibus membra deessent, implorans calo justitiam, torvum renidens fundato pectore mansit immobilis, &c. In the reign of Constantius.

<sup>e</sup> Marebantque docti quidam, quod apud Atlanteos nati non essent, ubi memorantur somnia non videri.

<sup>f</sup> V. Plut. in v. Artax.

<sup>g</sup> Ob noxam

unius cum ispropinquitas perit. Amm. Marc.

prudence, or any power in them, to escape that *bitter draught*, which they have drunk? And then, how can we acquit the *justice* and *reasonableness* of that Being, upon whom these poor creatures depend, and who leaves them such great losers by their existence, if there be no *future state*, where the proper amends may be made? So that the argument is brought to this undeniable issue: if the *soul* of man is not *immortal*, either there is *no God*, upon whom we depend; or He is an *unreasonable Being*; or there never has been *any man*, whose sufferings in this world have exceeded his enjoyments, without his being the cause of it himself. But surely *no one* of these three things can be said. *Ergo-----*.

That, which aggravates the *hard case* of the poor sufferers mentiond above, if there be no *future state*, in which their past sufferings may be brought into the account, and recompensed, is, that many times their *persecutors* and *tormentors* pass their lives in plenty and grandeur: that is, the *innocent* have not only the portion, that properly belongs to the criminal and unreasonable part of mankind, but the *guilty* have that, which belongs rather to the innocent<sup>a</sup>. Such a *transposition* of rewards and punishments, ending in itself, without any respect to something which is to follow hereafter, can never consist with the nature of a Governor, who is not very much *below* rational: a thought, which *God forbid* any one should entertain of Him. To suppose the *virtuous* and *wise* left ultimately but in the same state with the unjust and profligate is to suppose such a *constitution* of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reason, a God of *truth* and *equity*: and therefore such a constitution, as leaves the former in a *worse* condition than the other, can *much less* be supposed.

*Obj.* It hath been said, that *virtue* tends to make men's lives happy even here, &c. and how then can the virtuous be supposed ever to be so *very miserable*? *Ans.* In ordinary cases *virtue* doth produce happiness: at least it has indeed a *natural tendency* to it; is the mean, by which it is most likely to be attaind; and is therefore the way, which a wise man would choose for his own sake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there are no *perturbations* in human affairs; no cases, in which the usual effect of virtue may be *overpowered* by diseases, violence, disasters. It doth not render men *invulnerable*; cannot command the *seasons*; nor prevent many great calamities, under which virtue and vice must fall *undistinguished*. (There may be a *direct road* to a place, and such a one, as he, who sets out for that place, ought to be found in, and yet it is possible he may meet with *robbers* or *accidents* in it, that may incommode, or hurt him in his journey) On the other side, *vice* and *wickedness* may be so circumstan-

<sup>a</sup> Dies deficiet, si velim numerare, quibus bonis male evenit: nec minus, si commemorem, quibus improbis optime, Cic. This is justly said; tho I account his instances not the most apposite.



tiated as to be attended with much greater *pleasure* than *pain*, contrary to the tendency of its nature; that is, a *wicked man* may be of a healthful make, born to riches or power, or fortunately placed for attaining them; and from the advantage of a strong constitution, an ample fortune, happy situation, many friends, or lucky hits, he may derive *pleasures*, which shall exceed the present *inconveniences* and *sufferings* naturally following from his vices<sup>a</sup>.

Men's *circumstances* have a natural influence with respect to the present pleasures or sufferings, as well as their *virtue* or *vice*. No body sure ever said, that *all* depends *only* upon these: nor, when the natural tendency of *them* is asserted, is the natural tendency or effect of the *other* denied. Therefore indeed, when it is said that virtue *naturally* tends to make men happy even here, the meaning only is, that it tends to make men happy in *proportion* to their circumstances; and vice does the *contrary*. It is naturally productive of that part of happiness, which is in our *own power*, and depends upon *our selves*; makes men more truly happy, whatever their circumstances are, than they could be *without it*; and *commonly* tends to mend their worldly circumstances too; but it is not asserted, that virtue can *always intirely* correct them, or make *men* so *completely* happy in this life, as that their enjoyments shall exceed their mortifications; no more than the vices of some particular men, tho they bereave them of many solid pleasures, and bring troubles upon them too, do hinder their worldly enjoyments from being greater than their present sufferings. Not only our *being*, but our *place*, with the *time*, and *manner* of our being in this world depend upon the Author of the scheme: the manner of *behaving our selves* in our station (according to our indowments, and the talents we have) only depends upon us. And perhaps (which has been hinted already) He has so orderd things on purpose, that from the *various compositions* of men's circumstances with the natural effects of their virtues and vices, and the many *inequalities* arising thence, they might see the *necessity* and *certainty* of another state: and that for this reason there should always be some remarkable instances of *opprest innocence* and *flourishing wickedness*.

The upshot is, that upon comparing *those pleasures*, which are the natural effects of virtue with *those sufferings*, which are the natural effects of ill constitution or other calamity, *these* are many, very many times found to exceed: and *è contrario*, upon balancing *those evils*, which are the genuin effects of vice, against the *advantages* re-

<sup>a</sup> Yet according to Aristotle he cannot be happy for all that. His opinion Diog. L. represents thus: τίς ἀρετὴν μὴ εἶναι αὐτάρεκον πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν προδίδωσιν ὅς τ' ἢ πρὸς σῶμα καὶ τ' ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν. — τὴν μὲν τοι κακίαν αὐτάρεκον πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν, καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα παρ' αὐτῇ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς σῶμα.

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sulting from a fortunate estate, *these* may often be found to outdo the other. Both contrary to reason, if all ends with this life, and after death be nothing. For my part, if there were only some few, nay but *one* instance of each kind in the world (unfortunate virtue, and prosperous wickedness), it would be to me a sufficient argument for a future state: because God cannot be unjust or unreasonable in any *one* instance. It must not be forgot here, that many times men of great vices have also great virtues, and the natural effect of these may qualify that of the other, and being added to their favourable circumstances may help to turn the scale.

If there is no other beside the present being, the general and usual state of mankind is scarce consistent with the idea of a reasonable Cause. Let us consider it a little <sup>a</sup>. Not to mention what we must suffer from the very settlement and condition of this world, by hunger, thirst, heat, cold, and indispositions; like leaves one generation drops, and another springs up, to fall again, and be forgotten <sup>b</sup>. As we come into the world with the labor of our mothers, we soon go out of it with our own. Childhood and youth are much of them lost in insensibility or trifling, vanity and rudeness; obnoxious to many pains and accidents; and, when they are spent in the best manner, are attended with labor and discipline. When we reach that stage of life, which usually takes us from our nearest relations, and brings us out into the world, with what difficulty are proper employments and stations found for us? When we are got out, and left to scramble for our selves, how many hardships and tricks are put upon us, before we get the sagacity and dexterity to save our selves? How many chances do we stand? How troublesome is business made by unreasonableness, ill nature, or trifling and want of punctuality in the persons with whom we deal? How do we find our selves instantly surrounded with snares from designing men, knaves, enemies (of which the best men have some), opposite interests, factions, and many times from a mischievous breed, whose childish or diabolical humor seeks pleasure in the uneasiness of other people? Even in many of those enjoyments, which men principally propose to themselves, they are greatly disappointed, and experience shews, how unlike they are to the antecedent images of them. They are commonly mixt <sup>c</sup>: the apparatus to most of them is too operose: the completion of them seldom depends upon

<sup>a</sup> Et valet annales nostrorum audire laborum. For, as Seneca says, Nulli contigit impunè nasci. <sup>b</sup> Οἴητες φύλλων γενεή, τοιούδε καὶ ἀνθρώπων. — ἢ μὲν φύει, ἢ δ' ἀπολήγει. Hom. This is true not only of single men, but even of cities (famous ones), kingdoms, empires. One may say the same concerning many of them, that Florus says of Veii: Laborat animalium fides, ut Veios fuisse credamus. <sup>c</sup> Labor voluptasq; dissimillima naturâ, societate quadam inter se naturali sunt juncta. Liv.



our selves alone, but upon a concurrence of things, which rarely hit all right<sup>a</sup>: they are generally not only less in practice, than in theory, but die almost as soon as they are: and perhaps they intail upon us a tax to be paid after they are gone. To go on with the history of human life: tho affairs go prosperously, yet still perhaps a family is increasing, and with it new occasions of solicitude are introduced, accompanied with many fears and tender apprehensions. At length, if a man, through many cares and toils and various adventures, arrives at old age, then he feels most commonly his pressures rather increased, than diminished, and himself less able to support them<sup>b</sup>. The business he has to do grows urgent upon him, and calls for dispatch: most of his faculties and active powers begin now to fail him apace: relations and friends, who might be helpful to him (and among them perhaps the dear Consort of all his joys, and all his cares<sup>c</sup>) leave him, never to return more: wants and pains all the while are multiplying upon him: and under this additional load he comes melancholy behind, tottering, and bending toward the earth; till he either stumbles upon something which throws him into the grave<sup>d</sup>, or fainting falls of himself. And must he end here? Is this the period of his being? Is this all? Did he come into the world only to make his way through the press, amidst many justlings and hard struggles, with at best only a few deceitful, little, fugacious pleasures interspersed, and so go out of it again? Can this be an end worthy a first Cause perfectly reasonable? Would even any man, of common sense and good nature, send another upon a difficult journey, in which, tho he might perhaps now and then meet with a little smooth way, get an interval for rest and contemplation, or be entertaind with some verdures and the smiles of a few daisies on the banks of the road; yet upon the whole he must travel through much dirt, take many wearisome steps, be continually inquiring after some clew or directions to carry him through the turnings and intricacies of it, be puzzled how to get a competent viaticum and pay his reckonings, ever and anon be in danger of being lost in deep waters, and beside forced all the while to fence against weather, accidents, and cruel robbers, who are every where lying in wait for him: I say, would any one send a man upon such a journey as this, only that the man might faint and expire at the end of it, and all his thoughts perish; that is, either for no end at all, or for the punishment of one, whom I suppose never to have hurt him, nor ever to have

<sup>a</sup> Sensible of this, Socrates used to say, δὲν τὰς ἡδονὰς, μὴ παρ' ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ παρ' ἑμῶν θησάμενος. Stob.

<sup>b</sup> Seneca, & levissimis quoque curis impar: as Seneca, of himself, in Tac.

mate Conjugis, &c. Juv.

<sup>c</sup> Rogus aspiendus

<sup>d</sup> Σύνετα παλαιὰ σώματα ἐνάξει ῥαπία. Soph.

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been capable of hurting him? And now can we impute to God that, which is below the common size of *men*<sup>a</sup>?

I am apt to think, that even among those, whose state is beheld with envy, there are *many*, who, if at the end of their course they were put to their *option*, whether, without any respect to a *future state*, they would repeat all the pleasures they have had in life, *upon condition* to go over again also all the same disappointments, the same vexations and unkind treatments from the world, the same secret pangs and tedious hours, the same labors of body and mind, the same pains and sicknesses, would be *far from accepting* them at that price<sup>b</sup>.

But here the case, as I have put it, only respects them, who may be reckoned among the *more fortunate* passengers: and for *one*, that makes his voyage so well, *thousands* are tost in tempests, and lost<sup>c</sup>. How many never attain any comfortable settlement in the world? How many sail, after they have attained it, by various misfortunes? What melancholy, what distractions are caused in families by inhumane or virious husbands, false or peevish wives, refractory or unhappy children; and, if they are otherwise, if they are good, what sorrow by the loss of them? How many are forced by necessity upon drudging and very shocking employments for a poor livelihood? How many subsist upon begging, borrowing, and other shifts, nor can do otherwise? How many meet with sad accidents, or fall into deplorable diseases? Are not all companies, and the very streets filled with complaints, and grievances, and doleful stories? I verily believe, that a great part of mankind may ascribe their deaths to want and dejection. In a word, the *present state* of mankind is unaccountable, if it has not some connexion with *another*, and be not as it were the porch or entry to it<sup>d</sup>.

There is one thing more, of which notice ought to be taken. To one, who carefully peruses the story and face of the world, what appears to *prevail* in it? Is it not corruption, vice, iniquity, folly at least? Are not debauching<sup>e</sup>, getting *per fas aut nefas*, defaming one another, erecting tyrannies of one kind or other, propagating

<sup>a</sup> Πάντες ἴσμεν ἐν ὁδοῖς. — ἴδες ἐπὶ τῇ ὁδῷ φυτόν ἢ πῶλον ἢ ὑδωρ ἢ ὅ, τι ἂν τύχη τῷ ἀξίαν διαύματος· μικρὸν ἐτέρφθης; ἔπειτα παρέδραμες. πάλιν ἐντυχες λίθοις καὶ φάραγγι καὶ κρήναις καὶ σκοπέλοις, ἢ που καὶ θηρίοις, κλ. Τοῖστος ὁ βίος. Bas. <sup>b</sup> Non mehercule quisquam accepisset [vitam], nisi daretur insciis. Sen.

<sup>c</sup> Paulisper te crede subduci in montis ardui verticem celsiorem; speculari inde rerum infra te jacentium facies; & oculis in diversa porrectis, fluctuantis mundi turbines intruere. Jam seculi & ipse miseraberis, &c. Cypr. <sup>d</sup> העולם הזה רומה לפרודור בפני הנה העולם. P. Aboth.

<sup>e</sup> O si possis in illa sublimi specula constitutus oculos tuos inferre secretis, recludere cubiculorum obductas fores, & ad conscientiam luminum penetralia occulta referre, &c. Cypr.



empty and senseless opinions with bawling and fury the great business of *this world*? And are not all these contrary to *reason*? Can any one then with reason imagine, that *reason* should be given, tho it were but to a few, only to be run down and trampled upon, and then *extinguish'd*? May we not rather conclude, that there must be *some world*, where *reason* will have its turn, and prevail and triumph? Some kingdom of *reason* to come<sup>a</sup>?

5. In the last place, that *great expectation*, which men have, of continuing to live in another state, *beyond the grave*, has I suppose been commonly admitted as one proof, that they *shall live*; and does seem indeed to me to add some weight to what has been said. That they generally have had such an *expectation*, can scarce be denied. The histories of mankind, their deifications, rites, stories of apparitions, the frequent mention of a *hades*, with rewards and punishments hereafter, &c. all testify, that even the Heathen world believed, that the *souls* of men *survived* their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the seats and circumstances of the departed has begot many *errors* and *superstitions*; and these have been multiplied by licentious *poets* and idle *visionairs*: but this, being no more than what is usual in the like cases, ought to be no prejudice against the *fundamental opinion* itself.

Cicero<sup>b</sup>, tho he owns there were different opinions among the *Greek* philosophers about this matter; that, *quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit, animos hominum esse sempiternos*; that *Pythagoras* and his school confirmed this opinion; that *Plato* was the man, who brought a reason for it, &c. yet tells us plainly, *naturam ipsam de immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare*; that *nescio quomodo inheret in mentibus quasi seculorum quoddam augurium*; that *permanere animos arbitramur consensu nationum omnium*; and more to this purpose. Now if this consent was only the effect of some *tradition*, handed from parents to their children; yet since we meet with it in *all the quarters* of the world (where there is any civility or sense), and in *all ages*, it seems to be *coeval* to mankind itself, and born with it. And this is sufficient to give a great *authority* to this opinion of the soul's immortality. But this is not all. For it is supported by all the foregoing arguments, and many other reasonings and symptoms which we may find within ourselves. All which, put together, may at least *justify* an expectation of a future state: that is, render it a just or reasonable expectation: and then this *reasonable expectation* grows, by being such, into a further argument, that there *will be* such a state.

<sup>a</sup> Beside, there being no satiety of knowledge in this life, we may hope for future opportunities, when our faculties shall be exalted, &c. Τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ θείας ἡ ὁρὴ ἐπὶ πάντας τὰς ἐραντὰς ἐπέλησεν ἑαυτὸν ἰκανῶς. κτλ. P.Mt.

<sup>b</sup> In Tusculan. disp.

Fancy a man walking in some retired field, far from noise, and free from prejudice, to debate this matter with himself: and then judge, whether such meditations as these would not be just. “ I think I may be sure, that neither lifeless matter, nor the “ vegetative tribe, that stone, that flower, that tree have any reflex thoughts: nor do “ the sensitive animals, that sheep, that ox, seem to have any such thing, or but in “ the lowest degree, and in respect of present objects only. They do not reason, nor “ discourse. I may therefore certainly pretend to be something much above all these “ things<sup>a</sup>. I not only apprehend and consider these external objects acting at present “ upon my nerves, but have ideas raised within my self of a higher order, and many: “ I can, not only represent to my self things, that are, or have been, but deduce many “ other from them, make excursions into futurity, and foresee much of what will be, “ or at least may be; by strict thinking, I had almost said, get into another world “ beforehand: and, whether I shall live in some other state after death, or not, I am “ certainly being capable of such an expectation, and cannot but be solicitous about “ it: none of which things can be said of these clods, or those brutes<sup>b</sup>. Can I then be “ designed for nothing further, than just to eat, drink, sleep, walk about, and act “ upon this earth<sup>c</sup>; that is, to have no further being, than what these brutes have, “ so far beneath me? Can I be made capable of such great expectations, which those “ animals know nothing of (happier by far in this regard than I am, if we must die “ alike), only to be disappointed at last? Thus placed, just upon the confines of ano- “ ther better world, and fed with hopes of penetrating into it, and injoying it, “ only to make a short appearance here<sup>d</sup>, and then to be shut out, and totally sunk? “ Must I then, when I bid my last farewell to these walks, when I close these lids, “ and yonder blue regions and all this scene darken upon me and go out, must I then “ only serve to furnish dust to be mingled with the ashes of these herds and plants, “ or with this dirt under my feet? Have I been set so far above them in life, only to “ be levelled with them at death?

This argument grows stronger in the apprehension of one, who is conscious of abilities and intellectual improvements, which he has had no opportunity here of shewing and using, through want of health, want of confidence<sup>e</sup>, want of proper place, want

<sup>a</sup> Methinks those philosophers make but an odd appearance in story, who, looking big and fastu-  
ous, at the same time professed, that their own souls were not superior to those of gnats, ὅτι οἱ  
τὰς ὀφρὺς ἀνεσπαρόντες μηδὲν κατὰ πλὴν ἐσὶαν διαφέρειν ἀπεφάνησαν ἐμπρόσθε τε καὶ ἐν ὕλῃ, καὶ μύμῳ, —  
καὶ σοὺς ψυχῆς — πλὴν σφῶν αὐτῶν φιλοσοφωτάτων ψυχῆν, as Euseb.

<sup>b</sup> Alexander after death might be in the same state with his muletier (M. Anton.), but sure not with his mule.

<sup>c</sup> Brevis est hic fructus homullis, may be justly said for all Lucretius.

<sup>d</sup> Ὁ κόσμος σκητὴ, ὁ βίος πάροδος ἥλδης, ἰδὲς, ἀπῆλδης, Democrat.

<sup>e</sup> חכמה צנועית חכמה. Prov.



of liberty. Such improvements, and the knowledge consequent upon them, cannot ultimately respect *this state*: they can be only an enlargement, and *preparation* for another. That is all they *can be*: and if they are not that, they are *nothing*. And therefore he may be supposed thus, further, to argue within himself. “Can the Author of my *reasoning* faculties be Himself so *unreasonable* as to give me them, either not to employ them, or only to weary my self with *useless* pursuits, and then drop me? Can He, who is privy to all my *circumstances*, and to these very *thoughts* of mine, be so insensible of my case, as to have *no regard* to it, and not provide for it?”

It grows *stronger still* upon the mind of one, who reflecting upon the hard treatment he has met with from this world, the little cause he has given for it, the pains and secret uneasinesses he has felt upon that score, together with many other sufferings which it was not in his power to prevent, cannot but make a *silent, humble appeal* to that Being, who is his *last and true refuge*, and who he must believe will not desert him thus.

Lastly, it is *strongest of all* to one, who, besides all this, *endeavours* in the conduct of his life to observe the laws of *reason* (that is, of *his nature*; and that is, of the *Author of nature*, upon whom he depends); laments, and labors against his own *infirmities*; implores the Divine *mercy*; prays for some *better state* hereafter; acts and lives in the *hopes* of one; and *denies* himself many things upon that view: one, who by the exaltation of his *reason* and upper faculties, and that, which is certainly the effect of real and useful philosophy, the practice of *virtue*, is still approaching toward a higher manner of being, and doth already taste something spiritual and above this world. To such a one there must be a strong expectation *indeed*, and the argument built upon it must be proportionable. For can he be indowd with such capacities, and have as it were *overtures* of immortality made him, if after all there is no such thing? Must his *private* acts and *conceald* exercises of religion be all lost? Can a Perfect Being have so little regard to one, who however inferior and *nothing* to Him, yet regards Him according to *his best abilities* in the government of himself?

Are such *meditations* and reflexions as these well founded, or not? If they are, it must be reasonable to think, that God will satisfy a *reasonable expectation*.

There are *other arguments* for the immortality of the soul, *two* of which I will leave with you, to be at your leisure ponderd well. The *one* is, that, if the *souls* of men are *mortal* (extinguishd at death), the case of *brutes* is by much preferable to that of *men*. The *pleasures* of *brutes*, tho but *sensual*, are more sincere, being palld or di-

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minishd by no diverting consideration: they go *wholly* into them; and when they have them not, they seem less to want them, not thinking of them. Their *sufferings* are attended with no reflexion<sup>a</sup>, but are such as they are said to be p. 34. obs. 8. They are void of *cares*; are under no apprehension for families and posterity; never fatigue themselves with vain inquiries, hunting after *knowledge* which must perish with them; are not anxious about their *future state*<sup>b</sup>, nor can be disappointed of any hopes or expectations; and at last some sudden blow (or a few minutes of *unforeseen pain*) finishes them, having never *so much as known* that they were mortal.

The *other* is, that the soul is a *principle of life*: that, which brings vitality to the body. For how should that, which has been proved to be a substance, and at the same time is also a principle of life, and *as such* (as being what it is) is *alive*; I say, how can that *die*<sup>c</sup>, unless it is annihilated?

Here I begin to be very sensible how much I want a *guide*. But as the religion of *nature* is my theme, I must at present content my self with that light which *nature* affords; my business being, as it seems, only to shew, what a Heathen *philosopher*, without any other help, and almost *αὐτοδιδάκτος*, may be supposed to think. I hope that neither the doing of this, nor any thing else containd in this *Delineation*, can be the least prejudice to any other *true religion*. Whatever is immediately *reveald from God*, must, as well as any thing else, be treated as being *what it is*: which cannot be, if it is not treated with the highest regard, *believed* and *obeyd*. That therefore, which has been so much insisted on by me, and is as it were the burden of my song, is so far from undermining true *reveald religion*, that it rather paves the way for its reception. This I take this opportunity to remark to you once for all. And so returning to my *philosopher*, I cannot imagin but that *even he* would have at least some such general thoughts as these, which make up almost the remainder of this last section.

<sup>a</sup> Fera pericula, quæ vident, fugiunt: cum effugere, secunda sunt, &c. Sen.

וכו יצטערו בהיותם משערים שסופם למות כאדם וכו' S. Iquar.

<sup>b</sup> Sic mihi persuasi, sic sentio, cum —

semper agitetur animus, nec principium motus habeat, quia se ipse moveat; ne finem quidem habiturum esse motus, quia nunquam se ipse sit relicturus. Cic. That in Greg. Thaum. is like this thought of Tully: Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀδολοκνήσκει ἑσθ' ἐδέποτε ἔστιν ἀλλοτρίᾳ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ αὐτοκινήτῳ τὸ αἰεὶ κινητὸν εἶναι τὸ ἢ αἰεὶ κινητὸν ἀπαυστὸν εἶναι, κλ. But that in S. Austin comes something nearer to my meaning: Est animus vita quædam, unde omne quod animatum est vivit. —

Non ergo potest animus mori. Nam si carere poterit vita, non animus sed animatum aliquid est.



IX. *The soul, when it parts from this gross body, will pass by some law into some new seat, or state, agreeable to the nature of it<sup>a</sup>.* Every species of beings must belong to some region, or state. Because nothing can be, but it must be *some where*, and *some how*: and there being different kinds of abodes and manners of subsisting in the universe, and the natures of the things, that are to exist in them, being also different, there will be a greater *congruity* between some of these *natures* and some *places*, or *states*, than there is between them and others; and indeed such a one, that out of those perhaps they cannot subsist, or not *naturally*. To those therefore must be their respective *tendencies*: to those they are *adjudged* by the course of nature, and constitution of things, or rather by the Author of them<sup>b</sup>.

While the soul is in the body, it has some powers and opportunities of moving it spontaneously, or otherwise than it would be moved by the mere laws of gravitation and mechanism. This is evident. But yet, notwithstanding this, the weight of that *body*, to which at present it is limited (among other causes) constrains it to act for a while upon *this stage*. That general law, to which bodies are subjected, makes it sink in this fluid of air, so much lighter than itself; keeps it down; and so determines the seat of it, and of the soul in it, to be upon the surface of this *earth*, where, or in whose neighbourhood it was first produced. But then, when the soul shall be disengaged from the gross matter, which now incloses and incumbers it, and either become *naked spirit*, or be only veild in its own fine and obsequious *vehicle*, it must at the same time be either freed from the *laws* of bodies, and fall under *some other*, which will carry it to some *proper* mansion, or state<sup>c</sup>; or at least by the *old ones* be capable of mounting upwards<sup>d</sup>, in proportion to the volatility of its vehicle, and of emerging out of these regions into some *medium* more suitable, and (if the philosopher may say so) *equilibrious*. Thus much as to the *general state* of souls after death. But then,

<sup>a</sup> The *transmigration* of souls has been much talked of: but *ea sententia, — quoniam ridicula, & mīmo dignior quā scholā, ne refelli quidem serio debet*; quod qui facit, videtur vereri, ne quis id credat. So Lactantius. Indeed who can but laugh, when he reads in Lucian of Homer's having been a camel in Bactria, &c.

<sup>b</sup> Χωρεῖν ὃ ἀνάγκη τὸ ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον. Hiercl. <sup>c</sup> Ex humili atque depresso in eum emicabit locum, quisquis ille est, qui solutus vinculis animas beato recipit sinu. Sen. Ἡ τ' ἀνητῆς προσπαθείας ἀποβολή, καὶ ἡ τ' ἀρετῶν ὅσον πλεῶν τιμῶν, ἐκφυγίς πρὸς τὴν καλὴν καὶ δαυρὸν τόπον, εἰς τὴν δέξιν ἐνζωίαν ἡμῶς ἀνάξει. Hierocl. <sup>d</sup> Depositā sarcinā, levior volabit ad caelum. S. Hier.

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X. In this new state, or place of abode, there may be different stations besuited the differences of particular souls among themselves, as they are more or less perfect in their kind. We see even inanimate bodies, which have different gravities, figures, impulses, &c. settle into some order among themselves, agreeable to these differences. And so by the same universal rule in nature (*viz.* that differences in things are attended with answerable relations and effects) souls must also take their situations in some kind of order according to their differences.

XI. The great difference of human souls, with respect to perfection and imperfection, lies in their different degrees and habits of reasonableness or unreasonableness<sup>b</sup>. That is to say, not only in men's different improvements, or neglects and abuse of their rational faculties; but also in the greater or less influence of these upon their actions, and by consequence in their different degrees of virtue, or vice. For a man is accounted a reasonable man, when he reasons rightly, and follows his reason: in which expression virtue must be included, being (as p. 179, & al.) nothing but the practice of reason and truth.

That men are reasonable, or the contrary, in different degrees is plain. Some reason well upon some subjects, but in respect of others, to which they have not been accustomed, are dim and confused: or they are partial to their vices and passions, their old impressions and parties; and so their reason is not general, nor has its due extent, or influence. Others, whose reason is uncultivated and weak, tho they have virtuous inclinations, many times fall into superstition and absurdities; misled by authorities, and over-awed by old or formal modes of speaking, and grave non-sense. Many, if not the most, seem to have scarce any notion of reason or virtue at all, but act fortuitously, or as they see other folks act; moved either by bodily propensions, or by example. Some few there are, who endeavour to improve their understandings, to discover what is agreeable to reason, and to fix their opinions; and conduct their lives accordingly. And in all these several kinds there are various degrees of elevation in knowledge and virtue, and of immersion in vice and ignorance, and new differences arising endlessly. All this is visible.

<sup>a</sup> The Jews, who generally say, that by the practice of religion the soul acquires perfection and life eternal, lay such a stress upon habits of piety, that R. Albo makes the effect of giving 1000 zuzin in charity at once by no means equal to that of giving one zuz and repeating it 1000 times. החמדת כל עשיית פעל אחד בעצמו יקנה מדרגה יותר גרולה מעשיית הפעל ההוא פעם אחת. <sup>b</sup> עושה מצות הבורא יתברך ימצא שכל טוב--והגמול הנמשך אחר השכל האמיתי הוא השארת הנפש אחר כלות הגוף והדבקו בשכל הפועל והיותו קים לעד. If. Lev.



Now the soul, reflecting, finds in itself *two* general faculties, *one*, by which it understands, and judges, and reasons (all which I comprehend under the term *rational faculties*, or *reason*); and *another*, by which it wills, or determines to act, according to the judgments and conclusions made in the upper part of it. And the more *perfectly* it performs these operations (*i. e.* the more *truly* it reasons, and the more *readily* it wills and executes the decisions of reason), the more *perfect* certainly it must be in its kind; and the more imperfectly, the more imperfect. The accomplishments therefore and *perfections* of human souls, and the *contrary*, must be in proportion to the fore-mentioned *differences*.

XII. *According to these differences then it is reasonable to think the souls of men will find their stations in the future world*<sup>a</sup>. This is but a corollary from what goes before.

*Obj.* Why should we think, that God causes things to be in such a manner, as that in the *future state* men shall be placed and treated according to their merit, and the progress they have made in reason and virtue, when we see the case to be widely different in this? *Ans.* It must be remembered, that this is one of those very *reasons* on which the belief of the soul's immortality is founded. Now, if it be reasonable to believe there is a future state, because things are dealt *unequally* now, upon that very score it will be reasonable to think, that they are dealt *equally*<sup>b</sup> in that other state.

Here *bodily* wants and affections, and such things as proceed from them, do intermix with human affairs, and do confound *merit* with *demerit*, *knowledge* with *ignorance*: and hence it comes to pass many times, that bad men enjoy much, and good men suffer, and both are, if there is no other state, in their wrong places. But, when the *corporeal causes* of misplacing shall be removed, *spirits* (or spirits and their σώματα πνευματικά) may be supposed more regularly to take their *due* posts and privileges: the impudent and vicious will have no such *opportunities* of getting into circumstances, of which they are unworthy, nor improved and virtuous minds find such *obstructions* to keep them down in circumstances unworthy of them. Be sure the more advanced and pure any state is, the more *properly* will the inhabitants be ranked, and the *juster* and more *natural* will the subordination of its members be.

Even *here* we commonly find men in that kind of business, for which they are educated and *prepared*; men of the same professions generally keeping together; the virtuous and reasonable *desiring* to be (tho they not always can be) with *their like*<sup>c</sup>;

<sup>a</sup> Τόπως προσήκοντας τῇ ἀρετῇ. Plato.  
deserts: equitably.

<sup>b</sup> With an equal or impartial regard to every man's  
<sup>c</sup> Ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ δαίτας ἴσιν Ἀυτομάτοι ἀγαθοί. E. Plat.

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and the vicious (as they scarcely cannot be) with *theirs*. And why should we not think, than an *association* and *communion* of souls with those of their own size, disposition, and habits may be more *universal* and *complete*, when those things, which in great measure hinderd it here, shall be no more? If we may think this, certainly those fields or states, in which the *virtuous* and *wise* shall meet, must be different from those, in which the *foolish* and *wicked* shall herd together<sup>b</sup>. The very difference of the *company* will itself create a vast difference in the manner of their living.

XIII. *The mansions and conditions of the virtuous and reasoning part must be proportionably better than those of the foolish and vitious.* The proposition cannot be inverted, or the case be otherwise, if the constitution of things depends upon a reasonable Cause: as I have endeavourd to shew it does.

*Cor.* Hence it follows, that *the practice of reason* (in its just extent) *is the great preparative for death, and the means of advancing our happiness through all our subsequent duration.* But moreover,

XIV. *In the future state respect will be had not only to men's reasoning, and virtues, or the contrary, but also to their enjoyments and sufferings here<sup>c</sup>.* Because the forementiond inequalities of this world can by no means be redrest, unless men's enjoyments and sufferings, taken together with their virtues and vices, are compared and balanced. I say, *taken together*: because no reason can be assignd, why a vitious man should be recompensd for the pains and mischiefs and troubles, which he *brings upon himself* by his vices, as the natural consequences of them; nor, on the other side, why any deductions should be made from the future happiness of a good man upon the score of those *innocent* enjoyments, which are the genuin fruit of his moderation, regularity, other virtues, and sound reasoning.

*Cor.* *Wicked men* will not only be less happy than the wise and virtuous, *but be really unhappy in that state to come,* For when all the happiness, that answers to those degrees of virtue, which they had, and those sufferings, which they underwent, above what was the natural effect of their wickedness; I say, when that is subtracted, what remains upon the account will be something below no-happiness: which must be some quantity of *positive unhappiness*, or misery.

<sup>a</sup> Οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς, or οἱ ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφοι, in Plato's style.

τὰς ἐκείνους μὲν ὁ ἑ κακῶν καθαρός τόπος οὐ δέχεται, ἐνθαυδὲ ἢ τιμὴ αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῇ διαγωγῇ αἰεὶ ἔχουσι, κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες. Plato.

κακισσύνης αὐτῷ λογίζεται. Chrys.

<sup>b</sup> Τελυτήσαντας αὐ.

<sup>c</sup> Εἰ πλέον τῷ ἀμαρτημάτων κολάζεται [ὁ δίκαιος], προδήλην δι-

Thus.



Thus there will be *rewards*, and *punishments* hereafter: and men will be *happy*, or *unhappy*, according to their behaviour, enjoyments, and sufferings in this present life. But,

XV. *If the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated, yet it is certain the contrary cannot<sup>a</sup>. To say, when a house is ruinous and fallen, that it once had an inhabitant, and that he is escaped out of it, and lives in some other place, can involve no contradiction, or absurdity<sup>b</sup>. And,*

XVI. *If the immortality of the soul should be considered only as a probability, or even a chance possible, yet still a virtuous life is to be preferred before its contrary. For if the soul be mortal, and all perception perishes for ever at our death, what in this case does a good man lose by his virtue? Very rarely more than some acts of devotion, and instances of mortification, which too by custom grow habitual and easy<sup>c</sup>, and it may be pleasant by being (or seeming at least to be) reasonable. On the other hand, what does a vicious man gain? Only such enjoyments, as a virtuous man leaves: and those are such, as most commonly owe their being to a vitiated taste; grow insipid in time; require more trouble and contrivance to obtain them, than they are worth; go off disagreeably; are followed many times by sharp reflexions and bitter penances in the rear; and at best after a short time end in nothing, as if they had never been. This*

<sup>a</sup> Sure those arguments in *Lucretius* can convince no body. *Nunc quoniam, quassatis undique vasis, Dissuere humorem, & laticem discedere cernis; Crede animam quoque diffundi, &c. And Præterea gigni pariter cum corpore & unâ Crescere sentimus, pariterque senescere mentem, &c. Quare animam quoque dissolvi fateare necesse est; Quandoquidem penetrant in eum contagia morbi.* Nor those in *Pliny* (*N. H.* 7. 55.): if there really are any at all. For to plead the *antegenitale experimentum* is to beg the question; which may be put thus, Whether we shall after death be more conscious of our existence, than we were before we were born. And if *Dicaarchus's* *Lefbiaci* were extant, I believe we should find nothing stronger in them. The truth seems to be, Οὐ βέλεται ὁ καιρὸς ἀθανάτων εἶναι τινὲς αὐτῶν ψυχὴν: but he comforts himself with this thought, that ἡ μετὰ θάνατον ἐδένεια αὐτῶν will prevent future sufferings. This is εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι καταφυγή. *Hierocl.* <sup>b</sup> Nor, that the soul still exists ἔρημον καὶ ἀλιπῆσα ζωῆς τῷ ἡμέτερον οἶκον. *Ph. J. Domus ab habitatore deserta dilabitur: — & corpus, relictum ab anima, defluit.* *Laët.* <sup>c</sup> Μακρὸς ὅτι ὁδεῖται ὁμοῦ ἐπ' αὐτὴν [ἀρετὴν], καὶ τρυχὸς τὸ πρῶτον ἐπὶν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, Ρήϊδ' δ' ἡπειτα πέλει. *Hesl*

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is all <sup>a</sup>. But then if the soul prove to be *immortal* (as we have all the reason in the world to think it will), what does the virtuous *man* gain? His present pleasures (if not so many) are more *sincere* <sup>b</sup> and *natural* <sup>c</sup>; and the effect of his self-denials and submission to reason, in order to prepare himself for a future state, is the happiness of that state: which, without pretending to describe it, may be presumed to be *immortal*, because the soul is so; and to be purer and of a more exalted nature (*i. e.* *truer*, and *greater*) than any of these low enjoyments here, because that state is every way in nature above this. And again, what does the wicked man *lose*? That happiness, which the virtuous gain *as such*; and he sinks, beside, into some degree of the *unhappiness* of that future state: of which one may say in general, that it may be as much greater than the unhappiness or sufferings of this world, as the happiness and joys of that are above those of this.

In a state that is *spiritual* and clear every thing will be purer, and operate more directly and strongly, and (if the expression may be tolerated) *with more spirit*: there will be fewer obstructions to either happiness or unhappiness: the soul will lie *more open*, and have more *immediate* and acute perceptions of either: so that each of them in their kind will be more *intense*, the one nearer to pure or mere happiness, the other to the contrary <sup>d</sup>. But to enter further into the nature and oeconomy of the yet unknown world is too arduous an undertaking for my *Philosopher*.

I shall only add, that the *reasoning* and *virtuous* man has at least this advantage over the *foolish* and *profligate*, that, tho his wisdom and virtue cannot *always* rectify that which is amiss in himself or his circumstances, they will find means to *alleviate* his pressures and disadvantages, and support him under all the anomalies of life, with *comforts* of which the other knows nothing: particularly this, the enjoyment of an humble, but well grounded expectation of *felicity hereafter*, sincere and durable <sup>e</sup>.

XVII. He therefore, who would act according to truth, must, in the last place, not only consider what he is, and how circumstantiated in this present state, and provide accordingly; but, further, must consider himself also as one whose existence proceeds on into another, and provide for that too. How I think this is to be done, by this time I hope you fully apprehend.

For a *conclusion* of the whole matter; let our conversation in this world, so far as we are concern'd, and able, be such as acknowledges every thing to be *what it is*

<sup>a</sup> Cato præferitur Adonis.

<sup>b</sup> Ὁ ἀρετῇ διατρέπων καὶ ἡδονὰς ἀμεταμελήτως καρπῆται. Hierocl.

<sup>c</sup> If the soul was mortal, yet the virtuous man τὴν αὐτῆς τελειότητα ἀπολαμβάνων, τὸ δικαίον καρπῆ-  
μενος ἀρετῶν ἐνθάδε ὅπως ἐστὶ καὶ μακάριος. καὶ ὅτι καὶ τὸ σῶμα, κτλ. Simplic.

<sup>d</sup> Ὡς μὴ  
μονον τὰ καλῶ περιέναι τὸ σπασθῆναι τὸ φάναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ἡδονῇ κερῆν, δι' ἣν μόνον δοκεῖ εἰς καλὴν καὶ  
φύλλος ὑπάρχει. Hier.

<sup>e</sup> Οἱ δὲ δίκαιοι τὸ ἡδονῶν, καὶ μὴ ἕν ἄλλο πλ. σκεπτόσιν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἐλπίσι  
καὶ σπασθῆναι ὡς ἔχουσιν. Isocr.



(what it is in *itself*, and what with regard to *us*, to other *beings*, to *causes*, *circumstances*, *consequences*): that is, let us by no act *deny* any thing to be *true*, which is *true*: that is, let us act according to *reason*: and that is, let us act according to *the law of our nature*. By *honestly endeavouring* to do this we shall express our duty <sup>a</sup> to *Him*, who is the Author of it, and of that law; and at the same time prosecute our own *proper* happiness (the happiness of *rational* beings): we shall do what tends to make us easy here, and be qualifying our selves and preparing for our removal hence to our long home; that great *revolution*, which, at the farthest, cannot be very far off.

And now, *Sir*, the trouble is almost over for the present, not properly which I give you, but which you have brought upon yourself, these being the *Thoughts*, which you *desired*: unless I have any where misrepresented myself through *inadvertence*; which I own may be. At the foot of the page I have in some places subjoined a *few little* strictures principally of *antiquity*, after the manner of annotations: such as, when I came to revise these sheets, I could recollect upon the sudden <sup>b</sup>; having no commonplace book to help me, nor thought of any such thing before that time. They may serve perhaps sometimes a little to explain the text; and sometimes to add weight; but chiefly to *divert* you, who know very well how to improve any the *least hint* out of the Ancients, and I fear will *want* to be diverted. I have also printed a few copies of this *Sketch*, not with any design to make it public, but merely to save the trouble of *transcribing* <sup>c</sup>; being minded, since I have made it, to leave it not only with *you*, but perhaps also with two or three other *friends*: or however, with my *Family*, as a *private monument* of one that meant well. Tho, as to the disposal and fate of it, much will depend upon your judgment and manner of acceptance.

<sup>a</sup> Τρόπος ἢ Θεῶν θεραπείας ἔτος ὁσιώτατος [ἄσπετον ἀρετήν]. *Jos.*  
added in this second impression.

<sup>b</sup> Some more have been  
<sup>c</sup> Nothing more was intended at first. See the *advertisement*.


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
E R R A T A. occurring in the following places are to be thus amended:

*Read* p. 8. l. ult. φανής. p. 12. l. 26. φύσιν. p. 20. l. penult. 'Ου γὰρ. p. 27. l. 34. which it will, p. 29. l. 35. *πρῶτον, δεύτερον.* p. 32. l. 19, 20. the principal are. l. 20. thinking. *As I.* p. 35. l. 30. אין. לרין. p. 56. l. 33. *לרין.* p. 73. l. 29. word G O D. p. 83. l. 9. that not only they, but other. p. 89. l. 35. יגדל. p. 98. l. 33. *rationem, modum.* p. 142. l. 26. μοιχευόμενος. p. 157. l. 26. קדושים. p. 158. l. 24. Plutarch particularly is. p. 162. l. 13. parents (or any body else). p. 172. l. 25. which it is.


\* These are such as were collected in haste, but there are more; particularly in respect of *Greek* and *Hebrew* letters, accents, points, &c. and perhaps things of *greater importance*: tho it is hoped only such as a reader may easily correct, or will readily forgive.













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